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ABSTRACT 
New evidence from the records of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (now British 
Petroleum) and Shell for the period, 1939-45 supplements accounts of British oil relations 
based on state archives. This historical account demonstrates the continuity between the 
interwar industry cartel and the Allied wartime collaboration orchestrated through industry 
committees. The companies made use of their quasi-official position to manage crisis of 
prewar arrangements aggravated by the war which presaged the rapid expansion of 
postwar Middle East production. The companies then shaped the Anglo-American Oil 
Agreements of 1944 and 1945, establishing a basis for remaking their position in the 
Middle East, expanding the web of interfirm relations. The nationalisation of Anglo- 
Iranian in 1951 threatened the web and the companies were able to embargo nationalised 
Iranian oil and thus bankrupt the state. This society of oil majors was constituted by shared 
understandings and interests cultivated by the companies. 
Structures of private governance may be quite significant factors for states allied to them. 
The United Kingdom was more closely tied into the system of private governance that 
prevailed in international oil in the middle decades of the century than was the United 
States and consequently was able to call on more resources to resist United States 
initiatives during this period. British influence persisted in the oil issue-area, in spite of 
greater United States resources overall, because of this close working relationship 
between state and companies. Close examination of the relationship reveals the extent of 
penetration by the companies into both the decision-malting and implementation of foreign 
relations. The `national' interest was thus articulated through an interplay of Governmental 
and corporate agendas, and this supports a general argument that `national' power is not 
exercised solely by the state, but by the state in cooperation with other powerful social 
institutions. Non-state actors and their archives may enrich the study of foreign relations. 
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PART ONE 
Part one sets out the purpose of the research reported in the main body of the 
thesis and the means by which this was accomplished. In order to assess the influence of 
companies on foreign policies it was necessary to use corporate archives. These revealed 
that the companies were involved in a complex web of social relations of a kind that could 
not be fully accounted for within a formal economic analysis. It was useful to posit an 
analogy between their relations and Hedley Bull's concept of international society which 
had its origins in a similar dissatisfaction with a purely power-maximising realist account 
of inter-state relations. There was a counterpart in inter-corporate relations for each of 
Bull's five institutions of international society. The web provided the firms with leverage 
to play an important role in foreign relations through a variety of mechanisms including 
providing expert advise and enabling implementing coalitions. `British' foreign relations 
involved an interplay of Governmental and corporate actors, agendas, and resources. 
Helpful for purposes of exposition, the analogy between an English School view of 
international society and relations between major international corporations also suggests a 
sympathetic revision of Bull's analysis by offering a uniform terminology for the 




CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 SCOPE AND FOCUS OF THE THESIS 
The general objective of this dissertation is to help determine the political impact 
of transnational corporations. A voluminous literature examines the economic impact of 
transnational corporations on parent and host economies alike, but less has been written on 
the impact of transnational corporations in political processes, in particular foreign policy. ' 
There are two main reasons for this. The first of these is the problem of access to material 
that by its nature is sensitive both to companies and those involved in foreign policy. It is a 
problem that influenced the design of this study in so far as it became preferable to use 
archival material to shed light on the recent past rather than attempt a more contemporary 
treatment. The second problem is that discussion of this topic in the 1970s and 1980s 
degenerated into a highly polarised debate through a combination of high stakes and 
limited information. 2 However, even well researched studies limited themselves to a focus 
on political contributions and payments, "many... patently illegal. "3 Within the academic 
discipline of International Relations, studies examining the broader and more structural 
impact of transnational firms and industries would improve our understanding of 
It 
processes and outcomes in international affairs. Previously, further distortions took place 
'For surveys of the different approaches see Rhys Jenkins, Transnational Corporations and 
Uneven Development: The Internationalization of Capital and the Third World, Development and 
Underdevelopment Series, ed. Ray Bromley and Gavin Kitching (London: Routledge, 1991; 
Methuen, 1987). 
2Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Power and Interdependence: World Politics in 
Transiti on (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977), 23-37; Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi, 2d ed., International Relations Theory: Realism. Pluralism. Globalism (New York: Macmillan Publishing 
Company, 1993), 5-8; Ken Booth and Steve Smith, ed., International Relations Theory Today 
(Oxford: Polity Press, 1995), 21-2. 
3John J. McCloy, Nathan W. Pearson and Beverley Matthews, The Great Oil Snill" The Inside 
Report, Gulf Oil's Bribery and Political Chicanery (New York: Chelsea House Publishers, 1976), 2. 
as transnational firm and nation state became the respective champions of the 
interdependence and realist schools or, on the Left, of internationalist and economic 
nationalist factions. 4 In the 1990s there have been some attempts to transcend the standoff 
and specify the range and types of political influence of transnational corporations, usually 
as part of studies on globalisation. 5 
Oil has long been an important strategic commodity. Recently, British Petroleum, 
formerly known as the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, has made its archives available for 
public inspection. The Royal Dutch/Shell Group maintains a generous policy of public 
access on a case-by-case basis. Taken together these well-presented and carefully 
preserved corporate archives provided an opportunity to test the hypothesis that our 
understanding of British foreign oil relations might be deepened by the use of company 
records in addition to official records. The period 1939-1954 was chosen because it was 
the most recent period for which archive access was available. 
At first sight it would appear fairly straightforward to assess the influence of 
companies on British oil relations. But this already assumes that `British' in this case is a 
synonym for the state. This assumption would dictate the method of the study - isolate the 
state's oil relations and then assess how the companies affected it. This was not possible. 
While it is important for analytical purposes to disentangle corporate strategy from foreign 
policy, this is often difficult. For one thing there was no coordinated or clearly articulated 
4Robert 0. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Power and Interdependence; Kenneth Waltz, 
of International Politics (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979); Bill Warren, "How international 
is capital? " in International Firms and Modern Imperialism ed. H. Radice (Harmondsworth: 
Penguin, 1975), 135-140; Robin Murray, "The internationalization of capital and the nation state, " in International Firms, ed. H. Radice, 107-33. 
5Thomas Risse-Kappen, Bringing Transnational Relations Back In: Non-State Actors Domestic 
Structures and International Institutions, Cambridge Studies in International Relations, no. 42 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 15-16. 
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British official policy on oil before the negotiations for the first Anglo-American Oil 
Agreement in 1944. A pattern of extensive informal collaboration had developed between 
the state and British firms. Indeed, the foreign oil relations of the British Government 
between 1939 and 1954 may be said to have been subcontracted to the companies, whose 
representatives responded by formulating policies that respected the interests of the state 
and the British economy as well as their own, and could accordingly look with confidence 
to the state for diplomatic support when requested. 
This diffusion of policy-making is hard to believe given the public importance of 
foreign oil relations during this period. The main issues of direct concern to the British 
state relating to oil were the Allied oil supply programme during the Second World War, 
the negotiations for the Anglo-American Oil Agreement in 1944 which may be seen as a 
forerunner for other world commodity agreements, Cold War issues in Azerbaijan in 
1946, and the increasing assertiveness of Persian Gulf countries more generally. 6 The 
growing resistance to British influence culminated in the expropriation of the Anglo- 
Iranian Oil Company in 1951 which was only overturned after a joint Anglo-American 
covert action against Iran's democratically elected Prime Minister, Muhammad Musaddiq, 
in 1953. Logistics in time of war, great power territorial rivalries, and the assertiveness of 
rising powers are core concerns of the state. 
While there have been treatments of these issues highlighting the importance of 
oil, they have suffered from lack of access to corporate records and, related to this, 
6The most important oil-producing countries of this time were located in the Persian Gulf. Since 
this was located in the `Middle East' that lay between the `Near' East close to Europe and the 'Far' East I use `Persian Gulf' and `Middle East' interchangeably. This area roughly corresponds 
with the preferred contemporary term, `South-west Asia'. However, the term `Middle East' is 
sometimes used to correspond to states with Arab populations or historic Islamic civilisations. In 
3 
inadequate understanding of the corporate perspective. From that viewpoint it is clear that 
these episodes were shaped as much by the developing relationships among the major 
international oil companies as by relations among public authorities. And while the 
corporate archives have been used before, the business historians have been primarily 
concerned to develop narrative corporate histories. In these, international events intrude 
only occasionally.? While successful in their own terms, these studies differ essentially 
from the present work which focuses on the nexus between corporate strategy and national 
policy, incorporating business history into the study of international relations. 
In an earlier work on oil companies in the international system Louis Turner 
lamented: "the historical record on which this book is based is still extremely patchy, 
reflecting the fact that oil historians have not been overly concerned with the interests of 
political scientists, while the fact that the latter have not often considered the role of the oil 
companies is the specific reason for this book. Given this historical vacuum, it is hardly 
surprising that a number of judgements made in this book are best described as educated 
guesses. "8 Use of this newly available corporate archive material reveals more fully the 
role of the seven dominant international oil companies, the `majors', during the period 
between 1939 and 1954 and challenges Turner's conclusion that "the majors have 
possessed marginal influence, providing a source of pressure which has added to the 
these instances, it also includes North Africa. However, North African production was not 
significant during the period examined in this thesis. 
7J. H. Bamberg, The History of The British Petroleum Company, vol. 2, the Anglo-Iranian Years. 
1928-1954 (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1994); Stephen Howarth, A Century in Oil: 
The "Shell" Transport and Trading Company. 11897-1997 (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1997). 
8Louis Turner, Oil Companies in the International System (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1978), 21. 
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richness of diplomatic history without being a dominant force. " There is a great deal of 
space to be explored between marginality and dominance. 
1.2 ARGUMENT AND STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
The basic proposition of this thesis is that corporate records provide material on 
relations among global firms on the one hand, and relations between global firms and 
states on the other which force a reinterpretation of the dynamics and actors behind events 
usually examined from a state-centric perspective. Susan Strange offered the heuristic 
device of a triangle, each side of which affects the other two sides. The first side 
represents firm-firm relations, the second represents firm-state relations, and the third 
represents state-state relations. 1° To understand the dynamics of international political 
economy the analyst has to cultivate a three-dimensional rather than one-dimensional view. 
Part two provides a critical survey of previous research, almost all of which, however 
valuable, lacks this three-dimensional perspective. 
Relations between firms were highly institutionalised due to the oil cartel that 
operated during this period. There was an effective system of private global governance or 
"governance without governments" in this period. Il It is possible to draw an analogy with 
Hedley Bull's concept of international society. t Bull argued that states retain their 
independence but are also tied together by a sense of society based on common norms. 
The society is supported by five pillars - diplomacy, war, international law, the balance of 
91bid., 20. 
' °Susan Strange, Rival States. Rival Firms: Competition for world market share. Cambridge Studies in International Relations, no. 18 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). 
"James Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel, Governance without government: order and change in 
world Dolitics, Cambridge Studies in International Relations, no. 20 (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1992). 
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power, and great power management. 12 In the same way as it is possible to interpret 
Hedley Bull and the English school as constructivists, so it is possible to see how the oil 
majors at one and the same time constructed, and were constructed by, the cartelised 
world oil market. The `rules' of the cartel did not merely regulate the market but made the 
market possible. In the same way as an analysis of a game of football would be hampered 
if it were restricted to noting the behavioural regularities without understanding what they 
were running for, and what the small signs and signals meant, so analysis of the oil cartel 
comes alive by treating it as a society whose discourse and subjective self-awareness 
significantly shapes the identity and interests of its member firms. 13 The six chapters of 
part three may be seen to illustrate the different aspects of an international corporate 
society. 
Chapter three examines the beginnings of this private international society while 
chapter four demonstrates how the corporate diplomacy of the inter-war period provided 
the model and personnel for Allied oil diplomacy during the Second World War. Chapter 
five looks at the trade war precipitated by disruption of pre-war trade agreements and 
chapter six investigates the Anglo-American Oil Agreements from the perspective of 
transnational law rather than public international law. Chapter seven examines the ways in 
which war and uncertainty during the oil negotiations had encouraged corporate balance of 
power behaviour that fed into Cold War rivalry in the Middle East. Chapter eight clarifies 
how the establishment of a stable balance of power enabled the seven great powers of the 
12Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1977). 
13Marlene Wind, "Nicholas G. Onuf,: the rules of anarchy, " in The Future of International Relations: Masters in the Makin ed. Iver B. Neumann and Ole Waever, The New International Relations Series, ed Barry Buzan and Gerald Segal (London: Routledge, 1997), 251. 
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international oil industry to form a great power condominium to frustrate the 
nationalisation movement in Iran between 1951 and 1953. 
In addition to examining an aspect of the corporate international society of oil 
majors, each chapter explores a different facet of this modification of Government policy 
output. Firms changed the behaviour of the British Government by various means. 
Chapter three examines the system of governance without governments during the inter- 
war period. The Government permitted and encouraged companies to develop private 
global governance agreements. Chapter four traces the ways in which this was translated 
into transgovernmental relations between Britain and the United States conducted by 
corporate executives co-opted into Allied service. Chapter five focuses on the 
implementation of oil policy that was left to the discretion of the companies. In many 
respects the implementers became the decision-makers. Organisational politics among 
administrative agencies is an important theme of chapter six. Such politics may be looked 
at narrowly, by focusing on public bodies, but also more widely, by examining the role of 
non-state actors in the decision-making process. Chapter seven demonstrates how 
standard operating procedures may effectively preclude decision-making as an active 
process while chapter eight focuses on the importance of the psychological dimension, 
especially in crisis situations. Taken together they show some of the dangers 'of regarding 
the state as a unitary and rational actor, and clarify the important role that non-state actors 
may have in foreign relations. 14 
14David Allen, "The Context of Foreign Policy Systems: The Contemporary International 
Environment, " in Understan 'F reign Policy The Foreign Policy Systems Approach, ed. Michael Clarke and Brian White (Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1989), 70-77. 
7 
Both the companies and the state constituted `British' oil relations for British 
`identity' and `interests' were not determined prior to interaction with other firms and 
states, but actually constituted through it. By studying the co-construction of firm and 
cartel, and the construction of `British' oil relations by both firms and state, the 
construction of international relations becomes apparent. `British' and `American' identity 
and interests are co-constructed by the interplay of firms and states. National identities and 
interests are endogenously shaped through domestic political praxis - they are not fixed 
preferences. Anarchy is what states and firms make of themselves through the interrelated 
engagements of inter-firm, firm and state, and inter-state relations. 15 
The persistent heuristic analogy between the oil cartel and Hedley Bull's concept 
of international society aims to clarify the nature of relations among firms, while 
complementary foreign policy analysis throughout elucidates relations between firms and 
the state. The study of intersubjective social relations among firms and firms in foreign 
policy analysis provides the basis for inquiring into state interest and identity on both 
empirical and theoretical levels. 
It will be noted that both bodies of theory are examined in the six chapters of part 
three with a different aspect dominant in each chapter. It is possible to point to the 
correspondence between these different aspects on a chapter-by-chapter basis. Thus, 
chapter three looks at the evolution of the international society of oil majors that provided a 
system of governance without governments. Chapter four examines the continuation 
between personalities involved in the inter-war corporate diplomacy and the Allied oil 
"Alexander Wendt, «Arwchy is What States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power 
Politics, " International Organization 46.2 (Spring 1992): 391-425. Wendt retains the focus on 
states in his title while problematising both state interests and identity. My inquiry into `British' oil 
S 
committees organised as informal transgovernmental bodies. Chapter five explores the 
trade war that was carried out as companies had considerable independence of action as 
the implementers of oil policy. Chapter six demonstrates the complex organisational 
bureaucratic politics between public bodies, and public and private bodies behind the 
scenes of the Anglo-American Oil Agreements. Chapter seven looks at the link between 
standard operating procedures and corporate balance of power manoeuvres which 
provoked an Anglo-American race for oil concessions in Iranian Azerbaijan provoking 
Soviet fears on its southern flank. Chapter eight examines how the decision to remove 
nationalist Prime Minister Musaddiq through a coup was the result of the psychological 
closure affecting Musaddiq whose persistent negativism frustrated Anglo-American 
efforts at a peaceful settlement. Such correspondences show the empirical link between 
relations between firms and between the firms and the British state in constructing 
`British' oil relations. 
In combination, the thought-experiment of corporate international society and the 
more conventional essays in foreign policy analysis complete the two sides of Susan Strange's 
triangle which have been overlooked because of neglect of corporate evidence. This permits 
reassessment of the third side, relations between states. Where historical studies of the oil 
industry have been based on Government records they have focused exclusively on relations 
between states in the manner of traditional diplomatic history. By bringing in the other two 
sides of the triangle the historical account is developed in several ways which are highlighted 
below and discussed more fully in part four. Part five comprises the conclusion, which 
develops this central theme and examines its wider implications for the study of 
transnationalism and foreign relations. 
policy demonstrated the considerable role of the firms in the endogenous process of constructing `British' oil identity and interests. 
9 
1.3 HISTORIOGRAPHICAL IMPLICATIONS OF EXAMINING TRIANGULAR 
DIPLOMACY IN BRITISH OIL POLICY, 1939-54 
While defering discussion of secondary historical works it may be helpful to 
anticipate some of the findings to introduce some of the more detailed findings to press 
home the utility of the triangular diplomacy approach. Foremost among these, perhaps, is 
the challenge offered to hegemonic stability theory. Here, as demonstrated in chapter 
three, the expectation of a breakdown in cooperation between states in the leaderless inter- 
war period is contradicted by unprecedented Anglo-American agreement on oil, and the 
key to this is a prior development of inter-corporate cooperation, a factor neglected in the 
excessively statist vision of hegemonic stability theory. 
A second historiographic revision, largely developed in chapter four helps resolve 
an awkward contradiction between the Anglo-American `special relationship' and the 
apparent clash of economic interests between these two Allied powers. Allied oil supply 
during the Second World War were based on established pre-war patterns of `diplomacy' 
between the companies. This confirms a link between the pre-war cartel committees and 
the co-opted wartime public administration of oil supply and in turn suggests that Allied 
cooperation in oil owed more"to inter-firm cooperation, wonting against the grain of 
rivalries between the Governments of the United States and Britain, than to the `Special 
Relationship' between the two states of later British Cold War imaginings. The British 
Government took advantage of its closer and more comfortable relations with major 
companies working in transgovernmental Allied committees to resist United States plans 
to place international oil collaboration on a more public footing. 
10 
Chapter five traces the continuation and development of private agreements during 
the war, challenging the view that all cartel and cartel-inspired arrangements had ended by 
1939. During the Second World War some companies took the opportunity to try to 
change the status quo by abrogating past agreements, but the principle of inter-corporate 
agreement remained and this private `war' over market share took place in the context of 
the web of inter-corporate social relations, not against it. Hostilities between firms may 
thus be seen as one phase or aspect of orderly relations between them, rather than a total 
breakdown of these relations. Underlying the trade war was shared recognition within the 
industry that world oil production would shift from the Americas to the Persian Gulf in the 
post-war world. The war between the companies was provoked by doubts about how 
different companies would accommodate themselves to these changing circumstances. 
The salient feature is that an `international society' approach to these developments 
exposes greater continuities than might have been expected between the mercantilist 
1930s and the liberal post-war era. 
Chapter six examines the negotiations surrounding the Anglo-American Oil 
Agreements of 1944-8. More threatening than the trade war to this web of corporate 
international society than the disruption caused by the Second World War was the attempt 
by the United States to either enter into, or to regulate, the international oil industry, and 
the companies duly united with the British Government to oppose it. The failure to impose 
public regulation does not equate with a failure of international law as has been implicitly 
accepted by most commentators. Since what amounted to a (virtual) war between the oil 
majors during the Second World War has remained hidden, writers have felt justified in 
treating the Agreements in intergovernmental terms which, because neither of them was 
ratified, makes them unimportant. The trade war explains the position of the companies in 
11 
the negotiations around the Anglo-American Oil Agreements and the importance of these 
negotiations. Taken in a longer historical perspective it becomes clearer that the 
Agreements were signalling devices, or what is today referred to as transnational law. 
They indicated norms of significance to private agencies rather than providing publicly 
enforceable articles. The main importance of the Anglo-American Oil Agreements of 1944 
was that the companies accepted changes to the previous order which had been embodied 
in international contractual agreements. The importance of this was that the `legal order' 
of the companies (lex mercatoria or transnational law) was upheld as the basis for the 
international oil market while its content was adapted to accommodate greater United 
States corporate participation in increased Middle East production. 
Uncertainty over the outcome of the oil talks and concern about competition from 
the American companies led British companies to seek concessions in northern Iran. 
However, in 1944 Iran was still occupied by the Allies, by the British and Americans in 
the south, and the Soviets in the north. When Shell tried to win a concession, some 
American companies also made a bid The Soviets became anxious about a western 
presence on their southern flank and provided a third bid, supporting this with threats to 
support secessionists in the north. The impasse in Iranian Azerbaijan was one of the first 
Cold War crises. Here the effect of taking relations between international firms seriously is 
to contribute to a growing post-revisionist literature on the origins of the Cold War. This 
has shifted attention away from traditional concern with Soviet aggression and the 
revisionist preoccupation with the expansion of United States capital by considering the 
role of third actors. In this case Iran's resistance to British international capital and residual 
political influence was the primary motive behind the invitation to United States interests 
which in turn provoked Soviet fears. Once established, the link between oil companies, 
12 
Middle East oil, and the Cold War became embedded in United States foreign policy. This 
stance affected American attitudes to the nationalisation of oil in Iran in 1951, examined in 
chapter eight. 
The balance of power manoeuvres between the companies had resulted in the 
weaving together of corporate interests in Middle East oil. Continuing the international 
society analogy, chapter eight demonstrates how this made possible "great power 
management" by the leading international firms against the nationalisation of Anglo- 
Iranian in 1951. Joint management made it possible to enforce an embargo and prevent 
distress to Anglo-Iranian which stiffened their back in resisting political solutions from the 
United States, even at the cost of straining Anglo-American relations. The Americans had 
continually put pressure on the British to make 'concessions to secure an agreement. The 
boycott limited the opportunities of the Iranian Government to undertake reforms 
calculated to maintain stability while also stiffening Anglo-Iranian's resistance to 
conciliatory schemes originating in the State Department or the Foreign Office. They made 
negotiations more difficult while their boycott increased discontent in Iran raising the 
spectre of Communism. The boycott caused economic discontent in Iran while British 
agents and supporters tried to replace the Government though political intrigues. When the 
limits of intrigue became apparent they enlisted American assistance for covert action. The 
culmination of oil embargo and intrigues contributed to Musaddiq's psychological closure 
concerning his objective of excluding all British influence, especially the Anglo-Iranian 
Oil Company. Even when this was conceded he `saw' Anglo-Iranian behind the demand 
that compensation for nationalisation be fixed by an international tribunal and, therefore, 
rejected it. British actions contributed to his psychological closure, and the fact that it took 
two years to accept that compensation was the main issue to be settled. Far from accepting 
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United States hegemony in the post-war world this chapter reveals the power of British 
resistance in the post-war world, but of a British resistance that was expressed as much 
through corporate as through state power. 
Bringing together inter-state, inter-corporate, and state-firm relations in this single 
issue area chips away at the clarity of the 1944 boundary between mercantilism and 
liberalism, helps resolve seeming contradiction in the post-war relationship between the 
British and American states, qualifies what has often been judged the failure of Anglo- 
American oil negotiations, de-emphasises bipolar accounts of the Iranian crisis by 
allocating Britain a more central role in the drama, and, more generally, supports a more 
gradualist and nuanced account of the decline of British power and the transition to 
bipolarity. 
1.4. METHODOLOGY 
The most important methodological innovation of the dissertation has been use of 
corporate archives in conjunction with Government archives. To examine the private 
global governance among the oil majors it has been useful to draw an analogy with Hedley 
11 Bull's concept of international society. The social relations of oligopolistic firms are 
important in co-constituting the market space and the nature of the firm. The assumption 
of an anarchic market is further dented by the explicit study of the politics of international 
oil throughout. Neo-liberal economic assumptions about actors operating in an anarchic 
market fail to confront the relationships between the oligopolistic organisation of the 
industry and the nature of the firms, and also the political involvement in the industry. 
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Revelation of the extent of company involvement in foreign policy makes it 
necessary to widen the scope of foreign policy analysis. It is important to embrace studies 
on transgovernmental relations, implementation, bureaucratic politics, standard operating 
procedures, and psychological approaches to crisis management to include non- 
governmental actors together with public bodies. At a theoretical level, the constructivist 
account of firms and states through the processes of the corporate international society and 
foreign policy has implications for method. It shows how methodology is shaped by 
ontology - how studying the state depends on what we think the state is. Through archives 
the interpenetration of corporate and national policy became clearer thereby questioning 
the assumption of `British' identity and interests. The stabilisation of `British' identity as 
state identity to which rational interests are ascribed is only made possible by forgetting, 
silencing or subjugating the history of non-state actors in constructing and constituting 
`British' identity and interests. Examination of corporate archives compels us to rethink 
the concept of the `state' as a unitary and rational actor and thus undermines the neo- 
realist and neo-liberal synthesis which has dominated the discipline of international 
relations in recent years. 16 
1.4.1 PRIMARY MATERIAL 
s 
The British Petroleum archives housed at the University of Warwick are available 
to the general public. The Royal Dutch/Shell Group of Companies very kindly permitted 
inspection of the Godber Papers dealing with his service during the Second World War. 
These have been splendidly maintained at their London headquarters at Waterloo. The 
1601e Waever, "Figures of international thought: introducing persons instead of paradigms, " in The Future of International Relations: Masters in the Making ed. Iver B. Neumann and Ole Waever, The New International Relations Series, ed. Barry Buzan and Gerald Segal (London: Routledge, 1997), 19. 
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records of the other significant international British company, the Burmah Oil Company 
Ltd., were destroyed in the denial operation put into place against the Japanese invasion in 
1942.17 For detail of the role of the British Government I relied on material available from 
the Public Records Office at Kew, London. 
1.4.2 SECONDARY SOURCES 
The study draws on existing research from several disciplines. These included 
international relations theory, in particular the concept of international society developed 
by Hedley Bull and the English school more generally. Also, use was made of material 
from the sub-discipline of foreign policy analysis. Much of the secondary material used 
was historical and included company histories, studies of the international oil industry, 
Middle East country and regional studies, and material pertaining to Anglo-American 
relations. 
17privaft Correspondence, Burman Castros Group Archivist, Katey Logan to KS. Kanwar, 27 August 1993. 
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PART TWO 
This Literature Survey in chapter two describes the main books and articles 
which the thesis aims to build upon. Detailed historical works are dealt with in the 
relevant chapters in part three, while the literature on foreign policy analysis is examined 
in part four. The chapter thus provides background to the central argument, which is that 
by combining material from corporate together with Government archives, the rich 
institutional cooperation among the firms -a private international society - is analysed, 
and the interplay of state and firm is clarified. Realist assumptions about a `billiard ball' 
state give way to a constructivist account of the co-constitution of global firm and 
private international society, and state and firm. 
Chapter three introduces the major oil companies and the As Is system, which 
was the major organisational form of the society of majors that they constructed at that 
time. It briefly explains the history of the main protagonists so that we can better 
appreciate the dynamics of their behaviour between 1939 and 1954. In particular, there 
are two aspects which I shall focus on, the first being their relations with their respective 
home Governments, Britain and the United States. The second aspect is the company 
specific strengths and weaknesses in different phases of the industry such as production, 
refining, transportation and marketing. By tracing the development of the As Is system in 
the inter-war period it is possible to contrast the Anglo-American Governmental rivalry 
which prevailed in the period before As Is, with the cooperation which the As Is system 
made possible. 
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE SURVEY 
This thesis aims to enrich understanding of the role of British oil transnational 
corporations in British foreign policy regarding oil between 1939 and 1954. Hitherto, the 
narrative accounts of British oil policy have been substantially based on Government 
records. This inevitably leads to understatement of the role of non-Governmental actors 
in shaping the foreign policy environment, the foreign policy process, and foreign policy 
implementation. The combination of corporate and official materials makes possible a 
more balanced account. This literature survey is divided into three sections, first setting 
out the main types of writing about the oil industry - monographs, company histories, 
and industry histories. I examine these from the perspective of trying to clarify how my 
work relates to them within the discipline of International Relations. Section two 
discusses the concept of international society developed by Hedley Bull and the English 
School of International Relations which is used by analogy to analyse the forms of 
institutional cooperation found among the oil majors. I examine how this review of the 
role of firms in foreign relations forces us to re-examine ontological categories such as 
the `state', `British national interest', and `British national `power' which may be located 
in broader concerns with constructivist theories. 
" 
2.1 ANGL IRANIAN. SHELL AND BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY IN 01 L. 
1939-1954 
There has been no explicit study of British foreign relations in oil for the period 
1939-1954. Nevertheless, I isolated three classes of historical literature, which were of 
use for this study - the historical monograph, the corporate history, and the broader 
industry study based on secondary sources. Historical monographs often displayed first- 
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rate scholarly standards but were of limited use because, although they mentioned the 
importance of the oil companies, they rarely discussed them in depth. Their main 
importance was in suggesting fu ther research avenues for this study. Payton-Smith has 
written about the British Government machinery during the war; Stoff has written about 
the abortive Anglo-American Oil Agreements for the post-war world; Fawcett has 
discussed oil in the context of the Azerbaijan crisis of 1946; and Louis has written about 
oil in the context of waning British influence in the Middle East. ' By focusing on 
discrete historical episodes these writers have failed to identify the threads of historical 
continuity. One reason for this is that their researches did not draw on corporate records. 
For it is in the society of oil majors that the continuities are most clearly evident. 
Studies based on corporate records are scarce. There has been no published 
academic study of Shell for this period but the second volume of the history of British 
Petroleum dealing with the years between 1933 and 1954 was valuable. 2 Bamberg's 
treatment of the crisis in Iran demonstrates how important a single firm can be in shaping 
political relations between states, but also how Government records are still important 
sources for writing business histories. The third class of literature is the general book 
based on secondary literature. It includes books by Yergin, Sampson, Shwadran, and 
Turner. 3 The main contribution of such books is interpretative and they have often 
1D. J. Payton-Smith, Oil: A Study_ of War-time Policy and Administration, United Kingdom Civil 
Series of the History of the Second World War (London: HMSO, 1971). Michael B. Stoff, Oil 
War and American Security: The Search for a National Policy on Foreign Oil 1941-1947, Yale 
Historical Publications, no. 125 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980); Louise Fawcett, Iran 
and the Cold War The Azerbaijan crisis of 1946, Cambridge Middle East Library, no. 26 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); William Roger Louis, The British Empire in 
the Middle East: Arab Nationalism. the United States. and Postwar Imperialism 1945-1951 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984). 
2J. H. Bamberg, The History of The British Petroleum Company, vol. 2, the Anglo-Iranian Years. 1928-1954, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994). 
3Daniel Yergin, The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil Money and Power (London: Simon and Schuster, 1991); Lou's Turner, Oil Companies in the International System (London: George 
Allen and Unwin, 1978); Benjamin Shwadran, 3d rev. ed., The Middle East. Oil and the Great 
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dictated the terms of debate by identifying key themes. 
2.1.1 Historical Monographs 
Here I will summarise the main contributions and deficiencies in the specialist 
monographs which were most useful. Payton-Smith's official history was published in 
1971, a year before the Public Record Office documents on which it was based were 
made available for public inspection. The strength of the book lies in its definitive 
account of the administrative effort in London. However, after Lend-Lease and, more 
especially, the entry of the United States into the war, oil formally became an Anglo- 
American issue. Policy was also made and implemented in Washington and Payton- 
Smith freely acknowledges that this lies beyond the scope of his research although 
impacting upon the task in London. The collaboration in Washington was orchestrated 
through corporate personnel, and in an interview Payton-Smith recalled his earlier 
curiosity about the relationship between corporate agendas and relations and the policy 
output. 4 Clarifying the relationship between corporate diplomacy and inter-state 
diplomacy is the task of chapters four and five. 
Stoffs work is grounded in concern about the lack of a public world oil policy in 
11 
the United States. In the negotiations around the post-war future of oil, which began in 
1944, an opportunity for an intergovernmental accord was missed and control of any 
world oil policy was left in the hands of the majors. 3 However, lack of access to 
company records means that Stoff does not follow the motives of the companies in 
Powers (New York: John Wiley, 1973); Anthony Sampson, 3d rev. ed., The Seven Sisters: The Great Oil Companies and the World Th , Made (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1993). 4D. J. Payton-Smith, interview by author, 31 January 1994; D. J. Payton-Smith, Oil: A Study of War-time Policy and Administratio 250. 
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promoting the talks. My own research suggests that the negotiations were prompted by 
the desire to contain the conflicts within the industry produced by the growing 
importance of Middle East oil. The context for the Anglo-American Oil Agreements was 
the sense of international society among the majors. Chapter five examines the state of 
war between the companies while chapter six situates the Anglo-American Oil 
Agreements in the further development of lex mercatoria or transnational law by the 
companies as a means of shaping the outcome of this war. 
Fawcett focuses on the Azerbaijan crisis of 1946 in the development of the Cold 
War. In it she elucidates the role of concession seeking by British interests in prompting 
a more aggressive Soviet attitude in north Iran. Louis bases his extensive writings about 
British decline in the Middle East on official sources in both the United Kingdom and 
United States. This is interesting since both writers point out the importance of corporate 
oil interests in their narratives. 6 Examining the sources of the corporate agendas sheds 
light on part of the environment which public policy was reacting to. 
2.1.2 Company Histories 
Shell's recently produced company history succeeds in its intention as an 
attractive general introduction to the company rather than as a formal, academic study. ' 
British Petroleum, on the other hand, is completing a comprehensive, scholarly history 
from the foundation of the company in 1901 to 1975. Jim Bamberg has written the 
5Michael Stof Oil. War and American Security: The Search for a National Policy on Foreign Oil. 1941-1947, Preface. 
6Louise Fawcett, Iran and the Cold War: The Azerbaijan crisis of 1946. William Louis, The British Empire in the Middle East. 
7Stephen Howarth, interview by author, 13 March 1997. Stephen Howarth, A Century in Oil: The `Shell' Transport and Trading Company. 1897-1997 (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1997). 
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second volume of this series. In it he provides a broad account of the company's 
operations discussing labour relations, corporate strategy, concessionary relations with 
the Iranian Government, and relations with the British Government. The work deals 
extensively with the concessionary crisis of the early 1950s and this part of the book was 
found to be especially useful. It combined an integrated analysis of the company's 
relations with the British Government, and its relations with other companies, with a 
treatment of Anglo-American Governmental relations with regard to the nationalisation. 8 
2.1.3 Industry Histori es 
This final selection of texts includes books on the industry based chiefly on 
secondary sources or, at least, non-archival material, which nevertheless identified 
interesting and instructive themes. Yergin's study provides a comprehensive treatment of 
world oil from 1859 to the present. While there were bound to be errors of fact in this 
wide-ranging book, it was found useful in clarifying the importance of oil to state power. 
More particularly, it provided striking analysis of the course of the Second World War, 
and also the anti-competitive tendency of the industry based on instability in oil reserves, 
production, and the unpredictability of the political environment. 9 
b 
In contrast, Shwadran limits his study to great power interest in Middle East oil 
up to 1955.10 He examines states shaping the international oil market but fails to 
consider the feedback of the majors acting back on the state system to change state 
policies and capabilities. However, this one-sided study of the interplay of states and 
majors provides a useful corrective to Anthony Sampson's The Seven Sisters which 
8Jim Bamberg, History of the British Petroleum ComQanv, especially part three. 9Daniel Yergin, The Prize: The EDic Quest for Oil. Money and Power. IOBeniamin Shwadran, The Middle East. Oil and the Great Powers. 
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understates the impact of state behaviour, but which makes the point that state policies 
and capabilities are embedded in a matrix of relations formed by inter-firm behaviour. 
Sampson's study depended to a considerable degree on the 1974 report of a United 
States Senate Subcommittee chaired by Senator Frank Church. 11 This had examined the 
influence of the oil companies in United States foreign policy in the Persian Gulf. 
Turner's Oil Companies in the International System tries to assess the historical 
evidence in terms of a debate between state-centric and multi-actor models of 
international relations. He acknowledges the paucity of historical evidence but speculates 
that, although the majors played an important economic role and affected the economic 
power of a state, they did not really affect the political relations between states very 
much. He provides an intelligent chronology for the international oil industry and 
identifies 1939-1954 as a time-period characterised by high levels of political 
involvement. 12 The constraint on access to archival material, which dictated a terminal 
date of 1954 for this research, nevertheless, provided the opportunity to test his 
hypothesis that access to the archives of the majors would shed little additional light on 
international history. My own findings challenge his speculation about the role of the 
majors in international history. 
s 
Part of Turner's difficulty lay in the inadequate historical literature; but part of it 
lay in his failure to engage seriously with the literature from the subdiscipline of foreign 
policy analysis to the extent that he does with the literature from the subdiscipline of 
international relations theory and international political economy. My discussion of 
foreign policy analysis is developed toward the end of the thesis, in chapter nine, in the 
light of the empirical material covered in the central chapters. Also, it is more helpful for 
l Anthony Sampson, The Seven Sisters, 14. 
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the reader first to understand the analogy between Hedley Bull's five institutions of 
international society and the society of majors. In this way it becomes possible to 
appreciate how, for Anglo-Iranian and Shell, managing relations with other firms was 
just as important as managing their relations with states, and an essentially similar task. 
The variety of mechanisms which regulated relations between the firms are analogous to 
those of the state system. 
2.2. Hedlev Bull's Concept of International Society 
The basic premise of the English school of international relations is that 
sovereign states are embedded in a society of states. The basis for this sense of society is 
shared civilisation which gives rise to common institutions and rules. The core concern 
was to identify sources of order in relations between states. It was found that order arose 
from shared norms and expectations giving rise to institutions and bodies of rules and 
practices. Orders thus existed within civilisation areas but not between them. Hence, the 
city-states of ancient Greece formed an international society with regard to relations with 
one another, but only an international system in their relations, collectively or severally, 
with Persia. 13 The oil majors shared a common industry perspective, which was 
concerned with the limitation of Government regulation and reduction of competition 
among themselves. It was given expression in a series of agreements in the twenties and 
thirties. Each of the five institutions which Hedley Bull identified as providing order to 
international society - diplomacy, war, international law, balance of power, and great 
12Louis Turner, Oil Companies in the International System, 38-49. 
BAdam Watson, The Evolution of International Society: A Comparative Historical Analysis (London: Routledge, 1992), 2-22. 
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power management - finds its counterpart in the "international society" of oil majors. '4 
The analogy between Hedley Bull's concept of international society and the oligopolistic 
competition in the international oil industry was found to be useful to illuminate the 
various mechanisms of this cooperation. Bull explains that, 
A society of states (or international society) exists when a group of states, 
conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society in 
the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of 
rules in their relations with one another, and share in the workings of 
common institutions. 15 
Hedley Bull describes five institutions of international society. These are balance 
of power, international law, diplomacy, war, and great power management. In his 
discussion of the balance of power, Bull makes a distinction between a contrived balance 
and a fortuitous balance. A fortuitous balance occurs when powers seeking to restrain 
another power achieve a moment of deadlock while a contrived balance implies self- 
restraint. A fortuitous balance is typical of an international system while a contrived 
balance is typical of an international Society. 16 Chapter seven explores how such a 
contrived balance was arranged between the companies in the increasing production of 
Middle East oil in the post-war period. At this point it is interesting to recall the analogy 
between the balance of power and microeconomic theory developed by the founder of 
neo-realism, Kenneth Waltz. '7 On a simple reading of Waltz the balance of power 
among states would always be fortuitous. International society is no more than rhetoric 
serving the interests of the great powers. However, more sophisticated readings 
14Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (London: 
Macmillan, 1977). 
15lbid., 13. 
16P id., 104-106. 
17Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1979), 89 for his 
justification of the analogy which is developed through the book. According to Adam Watson the 
concept has been generalised in the past, being related to checks and balances within the 
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demonstrate how the anarchic structure itself might generate some elements of society. 18 
Competitive pressures within an anarchic system may reward cooperation, and thus the 
transition from system to society might be indicated by the development of contrived 
rather than purely fortuitous balances of power. The market share agreements thus 
provide an indication of the development of society. 
The idea of international law is that sovereign, free entities create a body of rules 
which binds them, even though enforcement may be difficult. While municipal law is 
enforceable by the state, there is no authoritative enforcer in the international system. 
However, the rules qualify to be called law because they are intended to be binding and 
to be enforced. The difference between international law and municipal law is thus one 
of degree, rather than one of kind. 19 It distinguishes a relatively decentralised legal order 
from a relatively centralised legal order. Since self-help plays an important role in 
enforcement the functioning of international law depends, among other things, on factors 
such as whether the state is a status quo or revisionist power, on whether it is a great 
power or small power, and on the balance of power. Where power is widely distributed 
states can uphold the legal order for themselves. 20 The companies were at the forefront 
of the development of transnational law but paradoxically, private global governance, 
while transcending Government jurisdictions, depended on national jurisdictions for its 
implementation. However, the main relevance of these laws lay in making possible the 
convergence around expectations needed for long-term contracts and arrangements such 
constitution on the one hand, to the laws of physics on the other. Adam Watson, The Evolution of 
International Society: a comparative historical analysis, 200. "Barry Buzan, Charles Jones and Richard Little, The Logic of Anarchy: Neorealism to Structural Realism, New Directions in World Politics, ed. Helen Milner and John Gerard Ruggie (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 242-243 for a summary of the reconstruction of Waltz's theory of balance of power. 
19Louis Henkin, Richard Crawford Pugh, Oscar Schachter, and Hans Smit, 2d ed., International Law: Cases and Materials, American Casebook Series (St Paul, MN: West Publishing Co., 1987), 1-23. Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics, 127-140. 
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as joint ventures. The legality of these arrangements as recognised by the states system 
provided a framework for the frequent negotiations, which made the agreements `work'. 
Litigation depending for enforcement in national courts was only a final threat in these 
situations. 
Bull defines diplomacy as: "The conduct of relations between states and other 
entities with standing in world politics by official agents and by peaceful means. "21 He 
sees the five most important features of diplomacy to be communication, negotiation of 
agreements, gathering of intelligence or information, minimising friction in relations 
between actors, and as visible expressions of the idea of a society. 22 There is nothing in 
this definition to exclude relations between firms, or between firms and states. Chapter 
four explores the intersection of corporate and official diplomacy. 
War has a paradoxical relationship with international society. On the one hand, 
war is a manifestation of a breakdown in international society; on the other hand, war 
may be a instrument of international society used for three main purposes: enforcing 
international law, preserving the balance of power, and promoting changes in the system 
which might be considered just. 23 These purposes were significant in the corporate war 
during the Second World War, a theme developed in chapter five. 
It is perhaps here that the analogy between inter-state and inter-corporate 
relations might seem most strained. Modern corporations seldom maintain armed forces 
or resort to direct coercion; the days of the East Indian Company are long gone; and is 
not use of public force the defining feature of war? It is certainly the defining feature of 
20Hedicy Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics, 108-109. 211bid., 162. 
221bid., 170-172. 
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battle; but war may as easily be defined as a suspension of diplomacy, an abrogation of 
certain elements of international law, and a partial breakdown of great power 
management and the balance of power. A negative definition of this sort allows the 
analogy to stand while also legitimizing popular understandings of the Cold War as a 
real war, though one without direct battles between the main protagonists. The 
suspension of major institutions of international society to which the negative definition 
draws attention narrows the range of the resources available to states, leading to the 
adoption of extreme measures which in turn may provoke an escalation of hostilities, but 
the measures employed in warfare differ as between states and firms. 
Great power management is vital to international society. Great powers fulfil two 
major roles: managing their relations with one another and imparting a degree of central 
direction to the international society. These roles may be fulfilled in six ways. These are 
by preserving the general balance of power, avoiding or controlling friction in their 
relations with each other through diplomacy, avoiding or controlling war with each 
other, exploiting their local preponderance, mutual recognition of spheres of influence, 
or joint action, as is implied by the idea of a great power concert or condominium. 24 The 
seven oil majors performed all of these functions in the society of oil majors. 
The `thickly' developed concept of international society can enrich our 
understanding of oligopolistic behaviour in many ways. To anticipate some of the lines 
of the analogy between the concept of international society and the international 
companies, one can compare great power management to the domination of the majors. 
The joint ventures in exploration, production, and marketing, and consolidation behind 
an embargo meant that they were operating a type of `great power condominium'. There 
23Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics, 186-189. 
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was the international `law' of the As Is Agreement and the Red Line Agreement, the 
limited trade 'wars'; the company `diplomats' of the cartel committees, and the various 
dimensions of the changing corporate `balances of power' with shifting joint venture 
alliances. 
Since the term "international society" has a definite meaning in the literature of 
the English school, I will reserve its usage to refer to states. I will refer to the parallel 
society of the oil majors as the "society of oil majors". I locate this society in the wider 
transnational society which is composed of ideologies, social movements and other 
groups with a sense of "we" which crosses borders. This opens the possibility of 
considering the society of oil majors as a major influence on international society, while 
closing that of regarding both as important elements in a more broadly conceived 
international society. 
From the perspective of the firm, the six chapters in part two of this dissertation 
could be called: `The development of the society', `Diplomacy', `War', `Law', `Balance 
of power', and `Great Power management'. From the perspective of British foreign 
policy they could be called: `Inter-war Anglo-American settlement', 'Anglo-American 
relations during the Second World War', `Private struggles during public service', 't'he 
Anglo-American Oil Agreements', `The onset of the Cold War in the Persian Gulf , and 
`The revolutionary, nationalist Government of Muhammed Musaddiq'. These alternate 
headings express the impact of the society of majors on British foreign relations. The 
society of majors was a feature of transnational society, which underpinned the 
international society headed by the British and Americans. 
241bid., 207. 
29 
2.3 CONSTRUCTIV! SM 
The basic issue is that the answer to the question, "How do we study the state? " 
depends on the prior answer to the question, "What is the state? " It is this question which 
is fundamental to this study - what constituted British foreign oil relations? It does not 
suffice to assume that British policy is the `national interest'. According to Geerz, "The 
main defects of the interest theory are that its psychology is too anemic and its sociology 
too muscular. Lacking a developed analysis of motivation, it has been constantly forced 
to oscillate between a narrow and superficial utilitarianism that sees men as impelled by 
rational calculation of their consciously recognised personal advantage and a broader, 
but no less superficial, heroicism that speaks with a studied vagueness of men's ideas as 
somehow `reflecting', `expressing', `corresponding to', `emerging from', or `conditioned 
by' their social commitments. "25 I have tried to overcome this problem by using foreign 
policy analysis (FPA) as a tool to interpret the historical empirical material. 
The use of FPA makes it easier to analyse the impact of the firms on the policy 
system at both the decision making and implement phases. Since foreign policy analysis 
comprises a large body of literature, chapter nine is devoted to explicating the relevant 
body of FPA scholarship before examining the effect of applying it to the material in part 
three. However, to anticipate the argument, the central finding is that the assumption that 
the state makes and implements policy as a rational actor is unsustainable. 
Transgovernmental coalitions, standard operating procedures, psychological factors 
during crises, and the role of the companies in implementing policy, and in international 
negotiations demonstrate the role of the companies. State interests and identities are 
shaped, though not necessarily determined, by the firms. 
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It then becomes important to analyse what is shaping the interests and identities 
of the firms. One important factor was the other firms, since institutions and actors 
mutually constitute each other, a fording which fits with applying Bull's concept of 
international society to relations between the firms. The way the firms shaped each other 
provided them with specific expertise and access. The channels of expertise derived 
from, constituted, and supported the society of majors, but also affected their relations 
with the British Government. 
Recognising that the national interest is constructed rather than exogenous makes 
it easier to understand international cooperation. For the firms in their international 
society of oil majors already had a basis for worldwide cooperation. By feeding into 
British foreign relations the firms shaped cooperation between states. The mutual 
construction of firms and society of majors on the one hand, and of British oil policy on 
the other, makes it possible to see how relations between states are also constructed 
through historical processes among a variety of actors. 
Yet as we shall see, the society of majors itself was constantly developing, and 
the impact of individual states and the states system was also a factor in that 
development. A reification of firms or the society of majors should not replace the 
reification of the state-as-actor and the national interest. Certainly, the companies did 
affect policies and increase the ability of the British Government to affect changes, 
which could constrain United States initiatives. 26 Nevertheless, both firms and states 
mattered. The contrasting relations between state and firm in Britain and the United 
25Clifford Geerz, (1964), "Ideology as a Cultural System, " in Ideology and Discontent ed. David E. Apter (New York: Free Press, 1964), 47-76,64. 
26These findings are readily comparable to those of Robert 0. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "Transnational Relations and World Politics: An Introduction, " International Organization 25.5 
(Summer 1971): 737. 
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States explains why British policies accorded more closely with the society of majors 
and why, therefore, it was able to draw on these resources. 27 
Regime theory originally developed in response to the over-emphasis on 
intergovernmental institutions such as the United Nations. Ruggie argued that there were 
also informal and more broad patterns of cooperative interstate behaviour. 28 For 
Keohane and Nye there were Governmental arrangements regulating transnational as 
well as intergovernmental relations; rules, networks, norms and procedures regularised 
state behaviour. 29 However, empirical research on regimes often undermined the theory. 
Keohane's research on the political economy of oil emphasised the role of firms in 
creating and maintaining the regime. It conceded that a regime need not be based on 
formal intergovernmental arrangements at all. Moreover, bargaining between the United 
States Government and the firms was the main reason why an international regime - by 
definition, an intergovernmental arrangement - was not created after the Second World 
Waz 30 
Other regime theorists have challenged Keohane's treatment of oil as a regime. 31 
Due to the state-centricity of regime theory, it is possible to consider "private bodies like 
27An argument for the importance of domestic factors in addition to international factors can 
also be found in Thomas Risse-Kappen, Bringing Transnational Relations Back In: Non-State 
Actors Domestic Structures and International Institutions, Cambridge Studies in International 
Relations, no. 42 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). 
2801e Waever, "John G. Ruggie: transformation and institutionalization, " in The Future of 
International Relations: Masters in the Making ed. Iver B. Neumann and Ole Waever, The New 
International Relations Series, ed. Barry Buzan and Gerald Segal (London: Routledge, 1997), 
176. 
29Robert 0. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Independence: World Politics in Transition (New York: Little, Brown, 1977), 5,19. 
30Robert 0. Keohane, After Hegemony. Co-operation and Discord in the World Political 
Economy (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 141,150-159,177,185. 
31Beth Simmons and Stephen Haggard, "Theories of International Regimes, " International Organization 41 (Summer 1987): 494. 
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industrial cartels and professional associations" as an alternative to regimes. 32 For 
Nowell, the activities of the firms are important since, 
the process of international struggle for market control, or transnational 
structuring, can powerfully affect the local (national) institutional 
outcome ... 'Transnational structuring' describes a process, not an outcome. 
In contrast to `sovereignty at bay' portraits of corporations as a challenge to 
national power, the attempt to secure regulation actually increases the 
state's power to intervene. Transnational structuring is the means by which 
the normal political and economic lobbying activities of capitalism can lead 
to the creation of new state institutions... In transnational structuring, the 
state broadcasts the version of the public interest most suited to the 
dominant parties: not only is the form of the state mutable ... so are its 
professed objectives. Everywhere transnational structuring occurs, it looks 
like a local (national) political event... historians writing about oil regulation 
in Romania will seldom bother to look at what happened in the United 
States 33 
The impact of the firms in shaping the policies and structure of the states is an 
issue prior to how states may or may not make any regime for regulation of the firms. 
This issue is addressed by assessing the impact of Anglo-Iranian and Shell on `British' 
policy using the tools of foreign policy analysis. However, it is also important to analyse 
how the firms are embedded within the society of majors, in other words, to look at how 
relations between firms affect relations between the firm and state. Nowell highlights the 
importance of such inter-firm relations. He looks at the literature dealing with 
"transnational corporations and their negotiations with states, whether from the 
perspective of regimes, `sovereignty at bay', dependency or world systems", and 
concludes that "no theory discusses how the efforts of multinational enterprises, through 
their political activities and goals, shape the character, power, staffing, and authority of 
many states simultaneously. "34 Yet while Nowell rightly points to the originality of 
32Susan Strange, "Cave! Hic Dragones: A Critique of Regime Analysis, " in International 
ftim, ed. Stephen Krasner (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), 351. 
33Gregory Nowell, Mercantile States and the World Oil Cartel. 1900-1939. (New York: Cornell University Press, 1994): 4-5. 
34lbid., 12. 
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looking at relations between firms to examine how firms influence and constitute states, 
his transnational structuring approach, though not his empirical work, neglects the 
impact of the states system. Strange's triangular diplomacy approach is, therefore, a 
more comprehensive framework. 
In constructivist approaches, agents and structures are co-constituted, with the 
reproduction of both occurring through practise. "Constructivism holds that individuals 
and societies make, construct or constitute each other. "35 Individuals make societies 
through their actions; societies make individuals as they understand themselves through 
these same actions. Each is in some sense an effect of the other. They are mutually 
constitutive while remaining separate entities. This implies norms and rules, for "people 
need rules for all but their most transient exchanges. When they confront the necessity of 
dealing with each other without knowing if they follow the same rules, they learn what 
they commonly know and make what other rules they need. "36 The rules make the very 
possibility of social interaction. Without the rules of football or chess there could be no 
game. It is these rules, which are the intersubjective aspects of intergovernmental 
relations. 
The interesting thing is that these rules were found in relations among the firms. 
International relations in the oil issue were shaped by rules, but not by intergovernmental 
rules. Applying the categories of international society to these rules helped clarify the 
complexity and durability of international cooperation among the firms. However, a 
fuller rapprochement between the English school and constructivist approaches will 
require a re-examination of the basis of the rules in world politics which means 
350nuf, "Intervention for a Common Good, " in Beyond Westphalia? National Sovereignty and 
International Intervention ed. Michael Mastanduno and Gene Lyons (Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press), 4. 
34 
jettisoning the state as the a priori locus for research in world order. Such reconstruction 
lies beyond the scope of this thesis. 37 Once it is clear that state identities are not given by 
material factors per se, but also by the interpretation given to them, it becomes clearer 
that the identity of the `British' policy is not given but is socially constructed. This is 
where foreign policy analysis clarifies the construction of this identity and the interests, 
which this identity acts out. The firms affected the state identity and interests, but the 
analogy between the cartel and `international society' shows how the firms themselves 
were shaped by the `structure' of the society of majors. `British' oil policy was 
constructed by firms and indirectly by the society of majors more discernibly than 
through the economical calculation of the `national interest' deduced from the 
international political system. State identities and interests are created through 
interaction with other actors, such as firms and a: global society of firms, as well as 
through interaction with other states. 
6 
36Thid., 8. 
37For a start in this direction, see Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer, and Volker Rittberger, Theories of International Regimes, Cambridge Studies in International Relations, no. 55 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 169-176. 
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CHAPTER THREE: THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY OF 
MAJORS TO 1939 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
The realist school that dominates International Relations views the discipline as 
the study of inter-state relations. Limited by this definition a scholar influenced by the 
realist school would be predisposed to argue that the oil companies did not directly affect 
outcomes in the inter-war period. However, I found that firms not only influenced the 
foreign relations of individual states, but also partly created the international 
environment to which state policies were directed through their inter-firm relations. 
Thus, it is important to extend or revise the study of International Relations to include 
non-state actors, agendas and dynamics in addition to relations among states. Susan 
Strange's concept of triangular diplomacy is used to organise this chapter, with firm- 
state relations in section two, inter-firm relations in section three, and how these factors 
influence inter-state relations in section four. 
In section two I introduce the main protagonists. These are the Anglo-Persian Oil 
Company which was renamed the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in 1935, British 
Petroleum in 1954 and BP-Amoco in 1997, the Royal Dutch-Shell Group, and the 
British state. Their close working relationship is contrasted with the schizophrenic 
relations between their competitors, Standard Oil of New Jersey (Jeresy), Standard Oil 
Company of New York (Socony-Vacuum), Gulf and Texas and the United States 
Government. There, different Government departments pursued radically different 
policies, with, for instance, the State Department supporting the companies overseas 
while the Justice Department and Federal Trade Commission investigated and 
sometimes attempted to take antitrust action. The contrast between these two forms of 
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Government-Industry relations is a central theme as it shaped the different approaches of 
the two states to the international oil environment partly constituted by the society of 
majors. 
This society's evolution is chronicled at length in part three of the dissertation 
(chapters 4-8) through an elaboration of the analogy between the society of majors and 
Hedley Bull's five institutions of international society: war, international law, great 
power management, balance of power and diplomacy. These may be translated as price 
cutting (war), private international agreements (international law), cartel committees and 
interlocking directorships (great power management), market share agreements (balance 
of power), and how this whole society was sustained by the efforts of international 
managers (diplomacy). The rising level of social relations between the majors was based 
on developing shared norms to define economic and political interests. These norms 
began to take concrete form in the As Is agreement of 1928 which became a kind of 
constitution for this whole body of private international law and is therefore examined in 
the third section of this chapter. The As Is system endured into the 1950s, underpinning 
the wide range of business and political practices examined in part three of, the 
dissertation. However, it would be a mistake to conflate As Is and international 
cooperation among the majors. This is analogous to discussing the strength of 
international society solely by reference to the League of Nations or the United Nations, 
of `the West' by reference to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, or of `Europe' by 
reference to the European Union. 
Increasing collaboration among firms was the basis for increased cooperation 
among states, in particular the home states of the oil majors, Britain and the United 
States. Existing analyses have treated Anglo-American politics separately from British 
foreign policy concerning oil, and these `political' phenomena separately from the 
development of the companies and the cartel. While sufficient in their own terms, these 
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accounts disguise the links between politics and economics, state and firm, international 
and domestic, which lie at the heart of the attempt to illuminate the influence of 
transnational corporations in foreign and international relations. 
This Anglo-American cooperation, which is analysed in the final section of the 
chapter, points to some limitations of realist versions of hegemonic stability theory. This 
theory argues that in the absence of hegemonic leadership in the international system the 
level of international economic cooperation will tend to decline since the world economy 
needs a stabilising power. ' The hegemonic or dominant power uses its influence to 
create international regimes defined as "principles, norms, rules and decision-making 
procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue-area "2 The 
decline of the hegemonic power leads to the weakening of the regime. The inter-war 
years are cited as an example of the breakdown of international economic cooperation 
due to the decline of British power. 3 Moreover, "as hegemonic periods come to an end 
with the waning of the leading country's economic vitality, new regimes needed to meet 
new problems are difficult to create. "4 One conclusion of this thesis is that hegemonic 
stability theory is an oversimplification, and this theme is first adumbrated in the closing 
section of the present chapter. 
'Charles Kindleberger, "Dominance and Leadership in the International Economy: Exploitation, 
Public Goods and Free Rides, " International Studies Ouarterly 25 (1981): 242-54,247; Robert 
Keohane, After Hegemony Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1984); Robert Gilpin, The Political Economy of International 
ie ations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987). 
2Stephen Krasner, "Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables, " International Organization 36 (1982): 185. 
3Stephen Krasner, "State Power and the Structure of International Trade, " World Politics 28 (1976): 317-347. 
4Charles Kindleberger, "International Public Goods without International Government, " American Economic Review 76 (1986): S. 
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3.2 THE MAJOR OIL COMPANIES AND THE HOME STATES 
The history of oil is ancient and law pertaining to mining concessions formed an 
important subject in Arab law. 5 However, for many centuries there was little use for oil 
products. The modern oil industry is usually dated to 1859 when a self-styled `Colonel' 
Drake used a derrick to extract underground petroleum reserves in the United States. At 
that time the main use of oil products was kerosene for oil lamps. This was obtained 
through refining and distillation in which the residue - the `heavier' oil was disposed of. 
Later, much of this residue was used in the quickly emerging transportation industries as 
fuel oil for marine use and motor petrol for road transport. The market for aviation spirit 
developed later still. 6 Since the industry developed in the United States, it is not 
surprising that it became the parent Government for five of the seven majors. Three of 
these developed from the dissolution of the Standard Oil Company and the other two 
from the discovery of oil reserves in Texas. Though the Texas Oil Company and Gulf 
Oil Company were independent of Standard Oil, it is necessary to distinguish these 
majors from the `Texas Independents', which was the name given to the many smaller 
firms based in Texas. The international oil trade was trade in refined oil products rather 
than crude oil. This is because refineries were located at the source of production rather 
than near the consuming market to build economies of scale in refining and prevent 
cross-haulage of products which might not be required in the newly developing 
consuming markets of the time. Thus, the United States was initially the leading exporter 
of oil products. 
The law in the United States recognised the rule of capture which had originally 
been applied to game birds found on neighbouring estates. Now it was applied to the 
5RJ. Forbes, Studies in Early Petroleum History (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1958), Introduction, vii. 61äe distinction between heavy and light fuels was also formulated as black versus white fuels, 
and dirty versus clean fuels. The main black oil we will be discussing is fuel oil for ships, and the 
main white oils are `petrol' and aviation fuel. 
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small parcels of private land under which oil was discovered. This inadvertently 
encouraged the practice of extracting as much oil as possible as quickly as possible in 
order to drain off any oil under neighbouring land. Thus, there were periods when there 
was a glut of oil and prices crashed, followed by periods of shortage when new fields 
awaited discovery. John D. Rockefeller of the Standard Oil Company controlled the 
means of transportation from the fields. In this way he could charge competing 
producers and refiners more than his own downstream operations and thus have 
privileged access to markets. This was the central feature of the strong position which 
Standard Oil developed.? Standard did not own many oilfields, but through its control of 
refining it was practically the sole buyer and thus could determine the production prices 
posted at the wellhead. 8 By the mid-1880s, it controlled eighty per cent of the refining 
and marketing of oil products and in addition, by 1891, twenty-five per cent of the 
production in the United States. 9 
Standard Oil's kerosene initially dominated world markets, but was challenged 
by production in Russia organised by the Rothschilds and Nobels, by production from 
the Netherland East Indies, wherethe most significant producer was Royal Dutch, and 
also production in Mexico in which Lord Cowdray's British company, the Mexican 
Eagle, held an important stake. By 1888, Russian production alone amounted to four- 
fifths that of the United States. The growth of these producers led to price wars which it 
was attempted to resolve in a worldwide agreement between the Rothschilds and Nobels 
"on behalf of the petroleum industry of Russia" and "Standard Oil on behalf of the 
71da Tarbell, The History of the Standard Oil Company. Two volumes in one. Gloucester, MA: 
Peter Smith, 1963, Vol. 2., 283. 
8Craig Thompson, C. Thompson, Since Spindletop" A Human Story of Gulf's First Half- 
(Pittsburgh: Gulf Oil, 1951), 18. 
9Daniel Yergin, The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil. Money and Power, (London: Simon and Schuster, 1991), 51-53; B. Bringhurst, Antitrust and the Oil Monopoly. The Standard Oil Cases 1890-1911, (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1979); R. W. Hidy and M. E. Hidy, The History of the Standard Oil ComDanv (New Jersey), vol. 1, Pioneering in Big Business. 1892-1911, New York: Harper and Brothers, 1955). 
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petroleum industry of the United States". Russian Governmental opposition destroyed 
this first private attempt to regulate world market share. 10 
On the other hand, some local agreements flourished. In 1895 Standard and the 
Burmah Oil Company, another British firm, agreed to divide the Indian market 
maintaining one-third for Standard and allowing two-thirds to Burmah which they would 
share with rivals from the Scottish shale industry. " The Standard Oil Company was 
soon to be dissolved because of the successful antitrust suit brought against it in the 
United States. 12 Three major companies came out of its integrated operations. These 
were the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey, (sometimes called Jersey Standard or, 
more simply, Jersey, later Exxon, known in Britain under the brand name Esso), 
Standard Oil of New York (Socony, which later merged with the Vacuum Oil Company, 
an affiliate of the original trust, to create Socony-Vacuum, now Mobil) and Standard Oil 
of California (Socal, later Chevron). The pre-1911 Standard Oil Company cast a long 
shadow over its successors. "They all sold their oil at the same price, under the name 
Standard name, their directors were old Standard Oil men, and their principal 
shareholder was still John D. Rockefeller. "13 The companies had carried out different 
functions in the Standard Oil trust and this shaped their future development. 
The old Standard Oil Company had been incorporated in New Jersey. Jersey 
retained financial muscle and access to the marketing outlets but lacked the crude to 
supply them. Therefore, it was the most active in seeking sources of production outside 
the United States. In the inter-war period, it achieved a share in Mesopotamian oil 
production, obtained concessions in Mexico and Venezuela, and tried to obtain a 
10Daniel Yergin, The Prize, 58-62,72. 
"Timothy Anthony Buchanan Corley, A History of the Burmah Oil Company. 1886-1924 (London: Heinemann, 1983), 41-42. 
12B. Bringhnrst, Antitrust and the Oil Monopoly. The Standard Oil Cases 1890-1911. 
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concession in the northern territories of Iran. 14 Similarly, Socony was short of crude oil 
but lacked as much capital. Therefore, it also achieved a share in Mesopotamian oil and 
also in the Netherlands East Indies, but was more opportunistic and bought Soviet oil 
which had been boycotted by the other major oil companies in the late 1920s. Its 
shortage was eased after the merger with the Vacuum Oil Company in 1931 to create 
Socony-Vacuum. In 1933, Socony-Vacuum and Jersey formed a jointly owned 
subsidiary, Standard-Vacuum, in which they merged their producing, refining, pipeline 
and marketing interests in the Far East. '5 In their international operations, the two 
companies were also united by their shares in the Turkish Petroleum Company (TPC) 
which managed the Mesopotamian oil concession. 
The American companies had a 23.75% share of the TPC, which was the same 
per centage owned by the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, the Royal Dutch/Shell Group, 
and the French state-owned enterprise, Compagnie Francaise des Petroles. The 
remaining five per cent was owned by Calouste Gulbenkian. The creation of the TPC 
was related to the adoption of the Red Line agreement which prevented members of the 
company from seeking other concessions within the area bounded by the Red Line 
except through the TPC In effect, any member of the company could therefore veto the 
expansion of any other member within the Red Line. The Red Line marked the 
boundaries of the now defunct Ottoman Empire. 16 Within this area competition between 
the companies for concessions had been eliminated by their common agreement, though 
Jersey and Socony were later to challenge the restrictions. 
13Anthony Sampson, 3d rev. ed. The Seven Sisters: The Great Oil Companies and the World 
Th. cy Made e, (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1993), 58-62. 
14G. S. Gibb and E. H. Knowlton, The History of the Standard Oil Company (New Jersey), vol. 2, The Resurgent Years: 1911-1927 (New York: Harpers and Brothers, 1956). 15 th T. Penrose, The Large International Firm in Developing Countries. The International 
Petrolenun Industry (London: Allen and Unwin, 1968), 90,130. 
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Figure 1. Map of the Red Line Area. It has been partly redrawn to show more complete 
political boundaries in North Africa and the upper reaches of the Nile. Reprinted from 
Christopher Tugendhat and Adrian Hamilton, Oil: The Biggest Business. London: Eyre 
and Spottiswoode, 1968,85. 
Socal essentially had been a producing company for the original Standard Oil 
Company, in California For this reason, it lacked marketing outlets and it was not 
immediately interested in obtaining production outside the United States. For this reason 
it did not obtain a share of the Mesopotamian concession. 17 This later provided them 
with certain opportunities since they were not bound by the Red Line agreement. Thus, 
after 1928 Jersey and Socony were unable to acquire concessions in Bahrain and Saudi 
Arabia which fell within the Red Line. Socal acquired concessions in these two 
Kingdoms, but their problem with limited outlets for this production remained. To assist 
with this problem they joined with the Texas Oil Company to make a marketing joint 
venture, Caltex, in 1936. 
16 fie, Jones, The State and the Emergence of the British Oil Industry (London: Macmillan, 
1981), 237-238. 
17Gerald T. White, Formative Years in the Far West: A History of Standard Oil of California and 
Its Predecessors Throu 1919 (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1962). 
43 
The Texas Oil Company, Texaco, emerged from the large oilfields of Texas. As 
a large producer they began to export oil products and developed a large market share in 
the Far East. Their joint venture with Socal's production in the Persian Gulf secured their 
marketing positions, but also led them aggressively to seek new marketing possibilities 
for their productive capacity. 18 Thus, whereas Jersey and Socony-Vacuum had 
established market positions and sought new sources of production, Socal and Texas, the 
Caltex interests, had large sources of production and sought new marketing 
opportunities. The fifth American major was the Gulf Oil Company which was 
controlled by the financially powerful and politically important Mellon family. Gulf was 
the other large firm to start from Texas. After its first foreign venture in Mexico, it 
sought entry into Kuwait, something it could only achieve with diplomatic support, since 
although Kuwait fell outside the Red Line, the British Government had more influence 
in Kuwait than it had in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia. The outcome was a joint venture 
between Gulf and the British-owned Anglo-Persian Oil Company. 19 
Geoffrey Jones observes that, "From 1918 the policy of the United States 
Government towards the oil companies became decidedly schizophrenic. While the State 
Department cooperated with American oil companies all over the world, and frequently 
urged them to cooperate with each other, other United States Government agencies, 
notably the Justice Department and the Federal Trade Commission, took the companies 
to court for cooperating with each other at home. "20 As Robert Wilson of Amoco was to 
quip years later, "In England they knight their leading businessmen, over here they indict 
them. "21 Writing in 1945, John A. Loftus, Special Assistant to the Director of the Office 
of International Trade Policy in the Department of State observed that, 
"Marquis James, The Texaco Story - The First Fifty Years 1902-1952 (New York: Texas Company, 1953). 
19Craig Thompson, Since SnindletQp, 9-14. 
20y Jones, The State and the Emergence, 251. 
21Quoted in Robert Engler, The Politics of Oil, 367. 
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a review of diplomatic history of the past 35 years will show that petroleum 
has historically played a larger part in the external relations of the United 
States than any other commodity... international commerce, predicated 
upon free trade and private enterprise (which is the conceptual core of 
United States foreign economic policy) is, in the long run, incompatible with 
an extensive spread of state ownership and operation of commercial 
properties. Another major category of problems concerns the support given 
by the Department on behalf of the United States Government to American 
nationals seeking to obtain or to retain rights to engage in petroleum 
development, transportation, and processing abroad. This is the traditional 
function of the Department with respect to petroleum... In Iran the 
negotiations which were apparently near to culmination last fall have been 
temporarily suspended for political reasons... there are other areas where 
after the war there is a genuine possibility of securing an amelioration of the 
unfavorable discriminatory conditions under which American nationals 
were able to obtain rights before the war. 22 
The "traditional function" he refers to resulted in assistance being given in 
Mexico and later in the Middle East from the 1910s. In 1945, the "discriminatory 
conditions" he was referring to were primarily the clauses of the Red Line agreement 
which effectively prevented Jersey and Socony-Vacuum from joining the Caltex 
interests in Saudi Arabia. Removal of these restrictions was then under negotiation in the 
Anglo-American oil talks which are examined in chapter six. Uncertainty over the 
outcome of these talks led to a scramble for concessions in the northern territories of Iran 
between British and American companies. This concerned the Soviets who now began to 
press their rights in their traditional sphere of influence and the great powers stumbled 
into an early Cold War crisis which is discussed in chapter seven. These were the 
6 "political reasons" for the suspension of the Iranian negotiations mentioned above. The 
structural attributes of the individual companies and the contrasting policies towards 
them by different departments of the United States Government continued to influence 
events after 1939. 
22John Loftus, "Petroleum in International Relations". U. S. Department of State Bulletin, 
vol. XIII, August 5,1945: 173-5, quoted in Michael Tanzer, The Political Economy of International Oil and the Under-Developed Countries (London: Temple Smith, 1970), 51-3. At 
one time Loftus was also chief of the Petroleum Division at the Department of State. 
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The main departments of the British Government dealing with the oil industry 
prior to the First World War were the India Office, Mines Department, Admiralty and 
Foreign Office. The India Office was involved in supervising concessions in Burma, 
where the Burmah Oil Company in particular was active. The Mines Department was 
responsible for the coal industry, but also the shale industry indigenous to the United 
Kingdom, which involved relatively small Scottish companies. The Foreign Office 
supported British oil interests outside the Empire, such as Lord Cowdray's investments 
in Mexico. The Admiralty developed an interest in oil as a source of power for ships. 
There was no unified policy; departments responded to circumstances as they arose. 23 
Ferrier also notes how the British Government was "ultimately without a positive and 
consistent... commitment to the overriding priority of an oil policy and its effective 
implementation. "24 This proliferation of ad hoc and independent departmental relations 
continued through the inter-war period. However, as the British industry continued to 
develop internationally, the Foreign Office began to play an increasingly prominent role 
in British oil politics. 
The Admiralty became interested in oil as a strategic commodity. The projection 
of Naval power was central to the British Empire and it was impossible to ignore the 
military advantages which an oil-powered fleet would have over a coal-powered fleet. 
The champion of this technical transformation was the military head of the Royal Navy, 
First Sea Lord Admiral Fisher, nicknamed the `Oil Maniac'. A later civilian head of the 
Navy, First Lord Winston Churchill, appointed Fisher to head a commission which 
examined the relative merits of coal-powered versus oil-powered ships and it duly 
recommended the change. 21 The problem was that whereas Britain had an indigenous 
23Geoffrey Jones, The State and the Emergence. 
24Ronald Ferrier. The History of the British Petroleum Company, vol. 1, The Developing Years. 1901-1932 (Cambridge: Cambridge University press, 1982), 260. 
25Frank C. Hanighen, The Secret War: The War for Oil (London: George Routledge and Sons, 1935), 16-17. 
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coal industry it did not have sufficient indigenous oil reserves. William Knox D'Arcy 
had prospected for oil in Persia (later Iran) and acquired a concession covering all the 
country except the five northern territories. Whereas the British dominated southern 
Persia, the northern provinces fell within the Russian, and later Soviet, sphere of 
influence. Shortage of funds led to D'Arcy's company being acquired by the Burmah Oil 
Company. The Admiralty interest in acquiring a reliable source of fuel oil for the Royal 
Navy complemented the continuing shortage of funds, and the Government acquired a 
controlling interest in the company. The corporate search for Government capital was 
"hardly the image of glorious imperial prescience mirrored in many commentaries" and 
the presence of Government appointed directors on the board originated in "company 
policy, not Government policy. "25 However, some commentators have argued that there 
was more active Government policy. Gregory Nowell argues that, "The British 
Government had no oil policy other than protection of [the] Burmah [Oil Company]. To 
this end it put resources into the fledgling Anglo-Persian, whose stockholders were 
unwilling to accept the necessary risks. "27 This difference may be explained as due to his 
reliance on secondary sources and Government archives, and failure to engage the 
relevant corporate sources. Inevitably, this will underplay the active role and dynamics 
of the company. 
This intertwining of Government and corporate needs was the beginning of an 
"exceptional relationship" between the Anglo-Persian Oil Company and the British 
Government. 28 The underlying reason for the dramatic Government entry into private 
business was the need for an unambiguously British oil company. Cadman had been the 
Government consultant on Persian oil when the Government bought a stake in it, and 
later became chairman of the Anglo-Persian. During the First World War, he was called 
26Ronald Ferrier, The History of the British Petroleum Company, 168,72. 
27Gregory Nowell, Mercantile States and the World Oil Cartel. 1900-1939 (New York: Cornell 
University Press, 1994), 56. 
47 
to direct the newly formed Petroleum Executive and later chair the Allied Petroleum 
Council. 29 It has been noted that, 
In the long run, the consequences of this decision were momentous and 
complex. It certainly assured oil supplies for the Navy; it also assured 
governmental backing for the development of Anglo-Persian... notably in 
securing a half share in the concession in Kuwait... Nor was BP [Anglo- 
Persian] its only lien upon international oil: the 40 per cent British in royal 
Dutch/Shell, in spite of hard words over that `combine' when Anglo-Persian 
was being bought, has linked this group's interests with Britain's almost as 
firmly as those of BP [Anglo-Persian] 30 
In justifying the policy of the Government in buying a share in the company, 
Churchill had made reference to two dominant global oil companies, Standard Oil and 
Shell, and their allegedly abusing their control of supplies and price. Through the 
purchase of shares in Anglo-Persian, the Admiralty achieved access to its needed fuel oil 
:; with a financial interest in the price of oil. The Persian production was prolific and cheap 
to extract. The background to its formation shaped its fundamental features -a close 
relationship with the British Government and problems with finding markets for its oil 
production. These features became significant when the Shah, Reza Khan, cancelled the 
concession in 1932. The Government offered support to the company and the company 
negotiated urgently to prevent loss of markets. 
The Royal Dutch-Shell Group originated in two separate enterprises, one with 
markets, the other with production. The Royal Dutch operated concessions in the Dutch 
colonies in the Netherlands East Indies, which later became Indonesia. Shell, on the 
other hand, grew out of a trading company which had imported exotic shells into Britain. 
Later, it started moving oil products through the Suez Canal with the help of the 
Rothschilds in specially designed ships - oil tankers. While Royal Dutch had production, 
28Geoffrey Jones, The State and the Emergence , chap. 6. 29BP 94104, The first Cadman memorial lecture delivered by Sir William Fraser, 27 March 
1946,3. 
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Shell had transport facilities. In 1897 there was an alliance between Royal Dutch and 
Shell which crystalised into a marketing joint venture, the Asiatic Petroleum Company in 
1902. Shell made long-term agreements for supplies with the Gulf Oil Company in the 
United States and the Russian oilfields of the Caucasus. As Spindletop, the first of the 
large Texas oilfields, ceased yielding oil, the arrangement with Gulf was cancelled. 31 
Rothschilds interests were threatened in Baku after 1905 and these agreements proved 
insufficient to provide products for Shell's markets. In 1907, Shell formally merged with 
Royal Dutch on a 40: 60 basis. All parts of the business were managed by the same 
people through a system of interlocking directorships, rather than one overall central 
body. 32 The main mechanism for the centralisation and coordination of `Shell' was the 
interlocking directorship. As interlocking directorships proliferated in the international 
industry there was considerable centralisation and coordination of global oil capital in 
spite of the existence of different global firms. 
Shell became regarded as unreliable because of its Dutch majority shareholding 
when Holland was thought to be susceptible to German influence. Nevertheless, Shell 
was integral to the British war effort in the First World War. "In effect Shell acted-as the 
quartermaster general for oil, acquiring and organising supplies around the world for the 
British forces and the entire war effort. "33 Shell's global interests made them eminently 
qualified for their position in the Allied war effort, but also a controversial choice. Their 
01 
technical expertise was invaluable, yet as Nowell points out, "While ships were lost and 
men slaughtered, the companies fought their own war for the control of oil 
resources... [: a] commercial war, waged through rather than by nation-states. "34 A 
30J. E. Hartshorn, Politics and World Oil Economics (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), 
233. 
31Craig Thompson, Since Spindletoo, Introduction. 
32BP 55200, Chart of Royal Dutch/Shell Transport Group of Companies. See also, BP 72491, Royal Dutch/Shell Organisation and interests, 1918 1921. 
33Damel Yergin. The Prize, 175. 
34Gregory Nowell, Mercantile States, 79. 
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strikingly similar analysis is offered in chapter five in the context of the Second World 
War. 
Before the war, Shell had acquired interests in the United States and after the 
war, purchased the Mexican Eagle. (The name survived in `Shell-Mex'. ). Shell also 
sought shares in Mesopotamian oil, not only as a British company, but also as a French 
company. According to Nowell, Shell after the First World War perceived its interests to 
lie in seeking dominant rights to the French domestic market and obtaining exclusive 
rights to the French portion of the Mesopotamian oil concession. It could not achieve this 
if it were perceived as British. "The Shell combine instead became `French', and this 
was why France had an international oil policy in 1918-1920. "35 The British 
Government now attempted to acquire control of Shell through various mergers. These 
focused on Burmah. "In" the years 1915-24, the company found itself the kernel of 
ultimately abortive amalgamation talks aimed at creating an all-British combine that 
would have dominated Britain's oil scene between the wars, much as ICI [Imperial 
Chemicals Industries Ltd] was to do in chemicals. "36 McBeth has remarked that, "the 
attempt to secure Britain's oil independence failed miserably. "37 
However, neither ownership nor fully British control of private oil companies 
lk 
were necessary since the close working relations between the British state and firms 
made it unnecessary to regulate the companies publicly. The British firms pre-empted 
public regulation throughout this period by their willingness to advance national policy 
as private organisations. In war, this was motivated by a sense of patriotism; in peace, 
commercial interests naturally loomed larger and the desire to seek diplomatic support 
35Ibid., 130. 
36Timothy. A. B. Corley, A His of the Burmah Oil Company, 3. William J. Reader, "Imperial 
Chemicals Industries and the State, " in Essays in British Business History, ed. Barry Supple (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977), 242. 
37B. S. McBeth, British Oil Policy, 1919-1939 (London: Frank Cass, 1985), 148. 
50 
became important. Thus, while there was no formal policy statement Government 
relations with the companies had at least acquired some consistency by the end of 1920s. 
The Government viewed the growth of cartels in the oil industry as an inevitable feature 
of economic life. To some extent its attitude towards them was permissive, to some 
extent, as we shall see, it was even warmer. 
3.3 THE EVOLUTION OF THE SOCIETY OF MAJORS 
After the Russian revolution of 1917 there was expropriation of the oilfields. 
Many companies including Shell bought title to the expropriated properties since they 
were sure that the revolution would fail. Sir Henri Deterding, chairman of Shell was 
hardened in his views after his marriage to a `White' Russian. Shell wanted to organise a 
corporate boycott, a front uni. But whereas Shell had supplies from Romania, Socony 
began to use Soviet oil to supply the Indian market. 38 Shell tried to discourage these 
purchases by initiating a price war in India. This spread as the companies tried to attack 
and counter-attack each other across the world. Other companies were forced to cut 
prices to maintain their market share. Soon there were pressures for a truce, particularly 
from the three largest international companies, Jersey, Shell and Anglo-Persian. 
These early years of the international industry witnessed the 'birth of global 
competition in the oil industry, the equivalent to what Hedley Bull referred to as an 
international system. 39 It was gradually recognised that competition of the sort sparked 
by the Soviet expropriations, and indeed by contemporaneous events in Mexico would 
suit no one. Thus far, it was a case "where a sense of common interests is tentative and 
38While there was an ideological war of words, this should not be permitted to obscure the 
considerable economic activity between the Soviet Union and the West. Christine A. White, British and American Commercial Relations with Soviet Russia. 1918-1924 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992). 
39Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), 9. 
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inchoate; where the common rules perceived are vague and ill-formed, and there is doubt 
as to whether they are worthy of the name of rules; or where common institutions - 
relating to diplomatic machinery or to limitations in war - are implicit or embryonic. "40 
But a meeting in Achnacarry Castle in 1928 was to lead to the As Is agreement which 
was to explicitly develop some of these embryonic institutions. 
According to the authors of the Federal Trade Commission Report, American 
companies led the initiative, but Christopher Tugendhai and Adrian Hamilton argue that 
Deterding of Shell originated the idea and dominated the meetings. 41 Some recent 
researches tends to favour the British companies. 42 Granted permission by its majority 
shareholder, the Chairman of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, John Cadman began 
arrangements to pool markets and facilities in India with Shell. Various outstanding 
issues were finally settled in January 1928 at the same- time as the `Heads of Agreement' 
covered Egypt, East and South Africa. 43 Cadman, "now representing government policy 
as well as Anglo-Persian, pursued a concordat with the American companies. "440n 22 
February 1928, he wrote to Teagle, the president of Jersey to propose "a small `clearing- 
house' for matters of the very highest policy, in which the interests of the great Standard 
40Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Societv, 15. 
41 Congress, Senate, Staff Report of the Federal Trade Commission on the International 
Petroleum Cartel, Subcommittee on Small Business of the United States Senate, 22 August 1952, 
198. [Hereinafter FTC, Reps]; Christopher Tugendhat and Adrian Hamilton, Oil: The Biggest 
Business (London: Eyre Methuen, 1968), 100. Deterding had expressed the idea to Walter 
Teagle, then a young Jersey executive based in London. Impressed he arranged a meeting with 
the president of Jersey, Archbold, who was not very interested On page 99 they claim that "Deterding was the dominant figure at the meeting. " 
42Daniel Yergin, The Rd r& 260-265. Furthermore, it is possible to see the post-World War I Shell as a British company in spite of its share ownership and the misgivings of the British 
government at the time of its share purchase in Anglo-Persian. For instance, Deterding became a British citizen in 1915. See E. M. Earle, "The Turkish Petroleum Company, " Political Science 
cart y 39 (June 1925), 273. 
43BP 68317, World Co-operation in Oil. Short Journal of Events. 44Daniel Yergin, The Prize, 263. This contradicts Louis Turner's account of As Is which he 
regards as resulting from the absence of governmental intervention from Britain and the United States. Louis Turner, Oil Companies in the International System, 30. 
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Oil, Royal Dutch-Shell and the Anglo-Persian organisations are engaged. "45 On 7 March 
1928 Cadman wrote to Meyer of Socony proposing coordination of policy. 46 These 
overtures culminated in an invitation from Deterding to Cadman, Teagle, Mellon of Gulf 
and others to Achnacarry Castle in August 1928.47 American fear concerning the rising 
British share of international markets due to her relatively cheaper sources of supply 
shaped the discussions. 48 The importance of the American fears is reflected in the title of 
the `Pool Association' or As Is Agreement which was agreed to, though never signed. 49 
The main feature of the As Is system was that each company was given a quota 
for each market based on its share in 1928. Companies could only keep to the same per 
centage share but, of course, volumes would increase as markets matured. Companies 
might also agree to share costs through joint ventures in exploration, refining and 
marketing. Transportation costs would be kept down through the device of product 
exchanges, where markets were supplied from the nearest source. The resultant 
`phantom freights' are discussed extensively in chapter five in the context of continuing 
wartime As Is inspired activities. 50 The accord was the Pool Association of September 
17,1928 which had seven governing principles. The first was accepting and maintaining 
the status quo as regards market share; the second was that existing facilities were to be 
made available to competitors; the third was that new facilities would only be 
constructed when made necessary by increased demand. The fourth principle was that 
production should retain the advantage of geographical situation; the fifth was drawing 
supplies from the nearest geographical area; the sixth was preventing surplus production 
in any area from upsetting the price structure in any other area. Companies would 
45BP 68317, World Co-operation in Oil. Short Journal of Events. 46BP 68317, World Co-operation in Oil. Short Journal of Events. 47Daniel Yergin, The Prize, 263. 
48BP 43855, Kuwait Oil Company. Note. Folder 10/3, "Kuwait". 
49BP 77958 contains a slightly earlier marketing agreement of 25 October 1927 which appears to 
contain the same terms as the As Is Agreement. 
50Anthony Sampson, The Seven Sisters, 106-107. 
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establish a tanker pool making product exchanges of standardised products to reduce 
cross-hauling and duplication of facilities. The seventh principle was that there was no 
public interest in price increases which would reduce consumption. 51 
The cartel administrative agency was referred to as `an association' or `the 
association'. The procedural section of the Achnacarry Agreement had envisioned an 
association managed by a working representative of each group. This association was to 
perform the central statistical and sales management functions necessary to carry out the 
cartel's objectives and comprised one representative of each group. It made all the 
necessary subsidiary arrangements and agreements in the fields of quota-making, price- 
fixing, production-allocating and transport-assigning. It was provided information by 
each marketing organisation through reports on expected demand for each product. It 
kept groups informed of the total demand from the marketing organisations. It allocated 
to each group its quota of each product and directed shipments to the geographically 
most favourably located areas. Another function was to prepare schedules of relative 
freight rates from each port of shipment to each port of import for six months in advance. 
It would administer the pool of member-controlled surplus transportation facilities 
provided for in the agreement, and furnish transportation facilities from this pool or from 
outside agencies for product shipments members did not want transported in their own 
ships. 52 
Through this period, the majors also controlled about two-thirds of the world's 
privately owned tanker fleet, and fifty per cent of the world's total tanker fleet, including 
all Government as well as privately owned tonnage. Anglo-Persian alone employed 
fourteen per cent of the world fleet; together with Shell the figure rose to approximately 
51Christopher Tudendhat and Adrian Hamilton, Oil, 100-101 provides a complete text of the 
seven principles of As Is. 
52FTC, Reyort, 205-210. 
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thirty per cent. 53 The cartel not only allocated markets but also set prices. The basis for 
this was the `Gulf Plus System'. Thus, oil shipped from Iran to Italy was to be charged at 
the prices asked at the Gulf of Mexico with the addition of the freight cost of the journey 
from the Gulf. Price competition between American and foreign sources of oil was, 
therefore, ruled out. 54 Given that the real cost of supplying markets in Italy with Iranian 
oil was far less than the theoretical cost at Gulf of Mexico prices plus freight costs, 
Anglo-Persian would enjoy excellent profits from supplying to the Italian markets 
whether as the main retailer or not. In one of the most durable As Is inspired agreements, 
Anglo-Persian ruled themselves out from any direct marketing in Italy in exchange for 
the right to supply twenty per cent of the needs of Jersey and Shell local distributing 
organisations. ss 
A different example is a draft agreement between Anglo-Persian and Texas from 
1929. Belgium, Holland and Sweden were designated as group A; England, Scotland, 
Switzerland, Germany, Denmark, and Norway as group B. They agreed to create a 
holding company on an equal sharing equity basis called Petrex Consolidated Ltd. This 
would supply group A countries with benzine, kerosene, gas oil, fuel oil, and diesel oil 
from Anglo-Persian, and lubricating oils, greases, and asphalt from Texas; and group B 
countries with lubricating oils, greases, and asphalt from Texas. S6 However, there were 
problems with the arrangements. Chief among these was that the antitrust rules of the 
United States forbade applying the agreement to the United States domestic market, and 
that the American Independents could price themselves a little lower and so nibble at 
53FTC, Reitort, 23. 
54Anthony Sampson, The Seven Sisters, 107. 
55BP 37143, Memorandum on Italy, Morris to Fraser, 16 May 1945; Moms, 3 September 1943. 
J. H. Bamberg, The History of The British Petroleum Company, vol. 2, the Anglo-Iranian Years, 1928-1954 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 115-6. 
56BP 68978, Draft Agreement Anglo-Persian Oil Company and Texas, 18 July 1929. This is one 
of the many agreements which the researcher came across which have not been referred to 
elsewhere. The fact that so many unexamined agreements came to light demonstrates the richness 
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markets. Even if price cutting kicked them from one market, they would then move to 
another. For instance, American exports amounted to one-third of oil consumed outside 
America, but the seventeen companies in the Export Petroleum Association never 
controlled more than forty-five per cent of American oil exports. 57 
The American Petroleum Institute called a series of conferences between 30 July 
1928 and 15 March 1929. There was a recommendation that domestic United States 
production stay at the 1928 level. This was achieved under the rubric of `conservation' 
by which United States oil production was limited to maintain price levels. As P. H. 
Frankel puts it, "conservation was the missing link which had to be forged. "58 The other 
part of this strategy was limiting exports. Under the Webb-Pomerene Export Trade Act, 
two United States Petroleum Export Associations were made. The first was the Standard 
Oil Export Corporation which centralised the production and export activities of all New 
Jersey subsidiaries. The second organisation was the Export Petroleum Association, Inc. 
There were fifteen members by 1928, but in 1930 two more joined. These were the 
Standard Oil Export Corporation, representing New Jersey and Shell-Union Oil 
Corporation, representing Shell. The breakdown of the Export Petroleum Association 
was due to one of its procedural rules. This was the requirement for unanimity for 
decisions. On its central committee which comprised one member of each participating 
company it appears that one member prevented agreement on export prices in 1930. 
While it is not possible to establish beyond all doubt which company this was, there is 
evidence that it may have been Shell. The curtailment of production was breaking down 
in the United States as higher export prices were encouraging production. Excess oil was 
leaking through the loophole into world markets. Sabotaging the association may well 
have been decided in a secret oil conference in August 1929, which was hosted in 
and complexity of the web of agreements, a point of view shared with Jim Bamberg. Informal interview by author, March 1997. 
5 7Damel Yergin, The Prize, 265. 
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London, convened to discuss the problem of United States export prices. 59 On 12 
November, Basil Jackson from the New York Office wrote to William Fraser, also of 
Anglo-Persian, that Shell was making waves in the United States since As Is and 
agreement with the American group required Shell surrendering some share in other 
markets. 60 
The collapse of the Export Petroleum Association led to the adoption of a more 
piecemeal approach to global regulation. The Memorandum for European Markets of 
January 20 1930 provided procedural amendments to cover the application to local areas. 
Moreover, the three central players realised their domination of world markets was an 
insufficient basis for effective controls. Anglo-Persian, Shell and Jersey decided that 
other companies could join their local agreements, if there were consensus among the 
three. The base year for quotas remained 1928, and members could expand quotas only 
at the expense of outsiders. Over- and under-trading would be adjusted by a transfer of 
customers during the year. Should this not be possible, there would be a transfer of `net 
proceeds' at the end of the year. 61 
However, Soviet and Rumanian exports grew in the 1930s and a new device was 
needed to accommodate these exports. The text of the Heads of Agreement for 
Distribution (Heads) of 1932 generally followed the 1930 agreement. The biggest 
difference was in the policy towards outsiders. An initiative to encourage their 
participation included new members being able to join with quotas exceeding their share 
in 1928. Many outsiders had expanded their trade through using cheap Soviet and 
58P. H. Frankel, Essentials of Petroleum: A Key to Oil Economics New ed. (London: Frank Cass, 
1969), 116-117. 
59pleum Times, August 10,1929,239. 
60BP 71383, B. R. Jackson New York Office. Jackson to Fraser 12 November 1929; Jackson to 
Fraser, 18 November 1929. 
61Bp 51727, D. Anderson to M. T. Lloyd, 11 October 1934,2. The effect was to require the over- trader to pay for the oil and also the marketing profit received from the sale. 
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Rumanian production. However, compensation was agreed: as trade was taken from 
outsiders, the original members would first regain their market share. Heads was "a 
guide to representatives on the field for drawing up rules for local cartels or for local 
Agreements. " It also established global machinery to supervise the local agreements. 
There were two As Is Committees, one in New York, the other in London. 62 
The New York Committee was responsible for restricting production, 
particularly in the United States. The London Committee supervised and coordinated the 
structure of world oil cartel controls and local market agreements. Heads was formulated 
in London based on meetings held on October 24 and 15, and November 17 and 18, 
1932. There was one consolidated minute. At the meetings on 15 and 16 December 1932 
when the agreement was adopted, there were representatives from Jersey, Anglo-Persian, 
Gulf, Atlantic, Texas, Socony-Vacuum, and Shell. The representative from Sinclair 
wired regret. These appear to have been the representatives of the London Committee. 
Supporting all As Is activities, it was decided to establish a central As Is secretariat in 
London with administrative rather than executive functions. All decisions affecting 
major issues and matters of principle were referred to both London and New York 
Committees. The Central Committee would collect and maintain statistical data for 
administration; it would record and circulate decisions made by the two main executive 
committees, and also settle all disputes under the Heads agreement. 63 
3.3 1 DRAFT MEMORANDUM OF PRINCIPLES 
The Heads agreement lasted till 1934, when continuing problems with 
Rumanian, Soviet and United States production led to over-supply. This led to 
difficulties in the local agreements in Europe and elsewhere. A conference held in 
62BP 77958, As Is quotas, 12 March 1934. This pattern continued through all the revisions of As Is procedure and was introduced in Allied relations/resumed again during the war. 
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London between April and May 1934 involved the `big three', Anglo-Persian, Shell, and 
Jersey. 64 Figures for 1928 to 1933 were exchanged by the groups. This exchange paved 
the way for a revision of As Is quotas. 65 A new agreement, the Draft Memorandum of 
Principles (Draft) was formed in May 1934.66 The Draft "is to cover all countries to the 
extent that it is not contrary to law. "67 The United States was expressly excluded, but the 
significant thing is that the geographic scope was global, rather than European. 
Previously negotiated local agreements would not be disturbed till termination, though 
when renewed they were expected to follow Draft principles. The parties would agree 
product by product and country by country on the per centage of the market which was 
unobtainable. They would then allocate the remainder in the ratio of the existing quota68 
The London Committee would deal with the arbitration of all disputes in local markets, 
though local directors and managers would only know of the Draft to the extent that the 
London Committee thought necessary. The As Is procedures followed worldwide were 
that if the representatives could not agree on matters affecting each other's business, they 
would agree a memorandum setting forth the facts and their differences and submit this 
to the As Is Central Committee. If this failed the matter was referred to the Directors of 
the Groups for final discussion and settlement. 69 Article 22 of the Draft states-that, 
For the purposes of carrying out the purposes of this Memorandum, a 
committee shall be maintained in London comprising one representative of 
each participant, and to the committee shall be referred all matters of 
dispute concerning the interpretation of this Memorandum or any other 
questions which may arise as regards the operation of this 
Memorandum... the decision taken shall be binding on all participants... It 
63Daniel Yergin, The Pri , 265-7. Also, FTC, Report, 230-231,240-241,247,264. 64BP 91058, London Conference. 
65BP 110644, Crude Oil Production - Standard Oil Company New Jersey 66BP 77958, Copy of Draft Memorandum of Principles. 67BP 77958, Draft Memorandum of Principles, Addendum V, Economy in Competitive Expenditure. 
68BP 110644, Sharing of Joint Gains from Outsiders, 27 April 1936. Quotas remained at the heart of the system, so although a gain might be made by an individual firm it would be shared by the cartel in the ratio of the existing quota. 69BP 110644, Notes on discussion regarding the United Kingdom, 14 August 1935. 
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shall be the duty of the Committee to cement and co-ordinate the relations 
between the participants with a view to obtaining the maximum cooperation 
and the committee is authorised to set up such machinery as it deems 
advisable for the inter-change of such information and statistics as may be 
required, and in general do all things necessary toward the proper 
functioning of this arrangement.. 70 
This article was titled `Committee' in the standard version, but in the version 
approved by Socony-Vacuum all references to As Is were deleted, the article was 
renamed `Disputes' and was shortened by the omission of parts dealing with the 
operation and machinery of the London Committee, though this did not imply that they 
were not applicable. 7' The London Committee As Is territories comprised Albania, 
Algeria, Angola, Austria, Azores Islands, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canary Islands, Congo, 
Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Egypt, Estonia, Finland, France (including Corsica), 
Germany, Gibralter, Greece (including Crete and Rhodes), Hedjaz, Holland, Hungary, 
Iceland, Italy, Sicily, Sardinia and Tripolitania, Jugoslavia, Latvia, Lithuania and Memel, 
Madeira, Malta, Morocco (French Western, French Eastern and Spanish and Tangiers), 
Norway, Palestine, Poland and Danzig, Portugal, Red Sea Area, Rio de Oro, Saar, Spain 
and Belearic Islands, Sudan (Anglo-Egyptian), Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Tunisia, 
Turkey and Asiatic Turkey, United Kingdom and Irish Free State, and West Africa, from 
Senegal to Nigeria. 72 
The Draft was even more flexible for adaptation to local markets than Heads. For 
instance, the version agreed with Standard-Vacuum stated that it was not applicable in 
India, ß It made it possible for local parties to unanimously override the Draft. It was 
also more flexible on the issue of the 1928 based quotas. Quotas could be altered in 
several situations including penalties for under-trading, new membership, or product 
70BP 91058, Draft Memorandum of Principles. 
71BP 91058, Draft Memorandum of Principles as agreed with Socony-Vacuum, enclosed with Guepin's letter of 8 January 1935. 
72BP 96603, London Committee "As Is" Territories, 1. 
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replacement, e. g. diesel fuel oil for gasoline. At the same time it was more 
comprehensive, restricting marketing and advertising to budgets set by the London 
Committee. It provided for looser cooperation and severe reductions in competitive 
advertising campaigns, so that, inter alia, there was agreement on the number and type of 
signs in petrol stations. But the suggestion that outside auditors would check on quotas 
and supplies was resisted. 74 The quotas were revised from 1 January 1936 as over- and 
under-trading had rendered the 1928 benchmark inappropriate. TS One market in which 
problems were persistent was the Far East market in which Caltex habitually over- 
traded. In 1937, Rieber, chairman of Texas, told Cadman that Caltex did not aim to 
destroy As Is but wanted to collaborate fully with Anglo-Iranian, and following the 
retirement of Deterding, also expected better relations with Shell. 76 Rivalry between the 
Caltex Group and its parents, Socal and Texas on the one hand, and the British 
companies on the other, will be a recurrent theme. 
By the end of 1936, "the DMOP [Draft] has been cancelled. " Henceforth, 
disputes should be settled locally, but if it proved necessary to refer to "London Head 
Office officials" this should only be by a joint memorandum agreed by both parties. 77 
The reason why there was little provision for referring matters to principals was that the 
parties to these agreements were the local companies rather than the parent companies. 
The quotas related to the total market and involved relative share between the parties. 
Where there was a loss of market share the over-trader must make adjustments to the 
73BP 91058, Draft Memorandum of Principles as agreed with Standard-Vacuum, enclosed 
Frederick Godber's letter to William Fraser, 29 June 1934. 
74Daniel Yergin, The Prize, 266-8. 
75BP 110644, As Is Implementation, Memorandum, Revision of `As Is' Quotas, 23 September 
1935,1. The memorandum goes on to state that, "there should be no relaxing of the efforts of all 
parties against outside competition, so that we may be ready and able to take full and immediate 
advantage... to expand the joint share of the trade. " 2. 
76BP 16608, Diary Sir John Cadman's Visit to Trinidad and New York, February 18 - April 13, 1937. 
77BP 96602, "Statement", 17 December 1936,2-4. This was agreed by directors of Shell and Standard-Vacuum following meetings held in London from November to December 1936. 
61 
under-trader, which was the same provision as under the Draft. However, this could be 
either through a physical transfer of goods or money, if there were mutual consent. In 
this case, the amount payable would be the gross proceeds less cost of goods and less 
agreed expenses, which were defined in the Proceeds Less Expense addendum, which 
was more explicit than Draft and could last for an indefinite period, but it was possible to 
give notice for any product, without leaving the agreement for the market as a whole. 78 
The system thus retained the principle of cooperation, but provided more flexibility in 
application. 
In fact, the system was called a "New `As Is' Memorandum" by Standard- 
Vacuum. It was superseded by a revised draft of 4 March 1937 which had changes in 
phraseology for legal reasons. 79 The 1937 draft provided for a meeting held each month 
for exchange of figures regarding the trade änd outsiders. There should be an 
independent auditor's certificate at the end of each accounting period for each period. 
The auditor must be acceptable to the other firms, and where possible they could retain 
the same firm. Information on how the trade of outsiders was being calculated should be 
made available and at each monthly meeting definite proposals for adjusting trade should 
be discussed. 80 
It is difficult to know how successful As Is was. Bamberg's research on Anglo- 
Persian /Anglo-Iranian suggests "not that the Company was making high returns as a 
member of an effective cartel, but that it was unable to find shelter from the precipitate 
fall in prices during the great depression"8' The main importance of As Is for this study 
is the link between As Is committees and the evolution of the international society of oil 
78BP 96602, Snow to Norris, "Statement on The New SheH/Standard-Vacuum Agreement", 17 December 1936,1-2. 
79BP 96602, "New `As Is' Memorandum", Standard-Vacuum, 18 December 1936; "Covering 
Note Re. `As Is' Memorandum of 4 March 193T', 4 March 1937. 80BP 96602, "Memorandum", 4 March 1934. 
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majors. In this case it does not matter if the different agreements such as Heads and Draft 
represented different stages in the evolution of As Is as suggested by Yergin or different 
mechanisms for operating As Is as Blair maintains. 82 It may be possible to synthesise the 
two viewpoints to argue that operating As Is evolved through different stages. As Is 
principles, as distinct from specific agreements, were very durable, for instance, Gulf 
Plus Pricing lasted through the Second World War, albeit with modifications examined 
in chapter five. Moreover, many of the personalities involved in the As Is negotiations 
became the corporate diplomatic contacts in Anglo-American relations during the 
Second World War which are examined in chapters four and five. "Official histories do 
not show how much these war committees were related to pre-war attempts by the 
companies to create an international cartel. 1183 One objective of the dissertation is to 
clarify this point. 
In the United Kingdom, for instance, brokers purchased spot cargoes of 
American, Soviet and Rumanian oil. These brokers sold to independent retailers 
nicknamed `pirates' by the majors. The `pirates' sold unbranded products at cut prices. 
In 1929, Anglo-Persian, Jersey and Shell concluded a series of agreements with the 
independent importers, refiners and distributors. Anglo-Persian, Jersey and Shell were 
described as a "joint venture" by a Jersey official. They delivered a common price and 
industry policy and applied the As Is principles. The independents gravitated to the 
market power of this "joint venture", even though the cartel did not achieve complete 
control. 94 For instance, both Trinidad Leaseholds and Texas had established positions in 
the benzine market. The per centage of their trade was allocated to them, and the cartel 
partners reduced their quotas sharing the reduction pro rata to the existing basic quota85 
81Jim Bamberg, History of the British Petroleum Company, 117. 
82Daniel Yergi 
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This is borne out in the records of As Is membership, country by country and product by 
product. In the United Kingdom and the Irish Free State, kerosene, white spirit, gas oil, 
fuel and diesel oil, lubricants and asphalt were regulated by As Is, but benzine came 
under a local agreement between the As Is companies, Anglo-Persian, Shell, Jersey and 
Texas and other firms. The cooperating firms were marked in black, while the `outsiders' 
were marked in red. 86 
3.4 ANGLO-AMERICAN COOPERATION 
These possibilities served the objectives of the Foreign Office and it is important 
to assess this relationship since the Foreign Office was the main British Government 
department dealing with the global interests of Anglo-Persian and Shell. While the 
Foreign Office's influence in policy-making varied in this period, the Department's 
weltanschauung remained unchanged till the early 1950s, which is the terminal period 
for this thesis. This implied looking at the world through the lens of balance of power 
theory with the `Crowe doctrine' the litmus by which policy was measured. The Crowe 
doctrine was based on a report by Sir Eyre Crowe which provided a brilliant analysis of 
the balance of power. The result of the consolidation of Foreign Office control over 
foreign policy after 1925 was a return to the policy of securing a global balance of 
power. In this 1920s this meant supporting the status quo. In the 1930s it meant ensuring 
that any changes to the status quo occurred in ways short of war. 87 So far as oil interests 
were concerned the Foreign Office seemed to develop a dual strategy; it offered 
diplomatic support for the companies but also encouraged them to cooperate with 
American interests. 
86BP 99603, United Kingdom and Irish Free State Agreements, 26 February 1934, Section U, 1- 
2. 
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Equally eager to promote `rationalisation' of the industry and to avoid 
unnecessary disputes with the United States in the inter-war years, the British state could 
use its influence with Anglo-Persian and Shell, specifically with Cadman and Deterding, 
to promote the international inter-firm agreements that would culminate with the As Is 
Agreement of 1928. The separation of politics from economics and of domestic from 
international dimensions results in historians having ignored the importance of "goals 
that were shared by Anglo-American policymakers and industry officials 
alike... particularly the idea that to tolerate cooperation among private petroleum 
interests was a more acceptable means of regulating the development of oil resources 
than either wide-open competition or Government intervention or management. "88 
Hogan rightly draws attention to the normative dimension of international collaboration, 
though since he is studying within the discipline and using the tools of economic history 
rather than international relations he identifies and locates these norms in both Britain 
and the United States, but not does not identify their international location. I submit that 
these norms were located in, shaped and constituted the society of majors. 
In part, the close relationship between the British firms and Government was 
employed by the authorities to resist American proposals which would have reduced 
British independence; in part the inter-firm agreements made possible an Anglo- 
American entente over oil concessions in the inter-war period. This contrasted with the 
situation in Mexico earlier in the century where inter-firm rivalry was translated into 
inter-state competition, carried out by proxy in support given to rival factions in the civil 
war. By 1920 Mexico was meeting twenty per cent of American oil demand. 89 While 
87Brian McKercher, "Old diplomacy and new: the Foreign Office and foreign policy, 1919- 
1939, " in DiDlomacv and World Power: Studies in British Foreign Policy, 1890-1950, ed. 
Michael Dockrill and Brian McKercher (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 79-114. 
88M. J. Hogan, Informal Entente: The Private Structure of Cooperation in Anglo-American 
Economic Diulomacv. 1918-1928 (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 1977), 159. 
89J. C. Brown, "Domestic Politics and Foreign Investment: British Development of Mexico Petroleum, 1889-1911, " Business History Review 61(3) (1987): 387-416. Favouritism was 
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both American Government and firms wanted to enter and maintain this market and each 
tried to influence the other, "it seems reasonable to conclude that the State Department 
effectively influenced the oil companies. "90 Later in 1938 the Mexican Government 
finally nationalised the industry and the foreign companies were excluded. Roosevelt's 
`Good Neighbour' policy ruled out direct action and in 1939 a joint intergovernmental 
commission agreed on a figure of $30 million to be repaid over several years. This 
outraged the American companies who had sought $408 million in compensation, and 
contributed to the mutual distrust that characterised Government-industry relations in the 
United States during the Second World War. 91 
Three examples of cooperation stand out. In Venezuela, the dictator General 
Juan Vicente Gomez provided oil concessions to Shell, Jersey and Gulf. However, 
uncertainty about what would happen following his death, heightened by the experience 
of civil wars in Mexico led the companies to establish the refineries on the nearby Dutch 
West Islands island of Curacao. Jersey then built a refinery on Aruba. This contrasts with 
the experience of American companies earlier in the century when the Dutch 
Government had initially excluded them from the Netherlands East Indies only allowing 
them concessions after diplomatic representations by the State Department. In 1944 
Shell directors noted, "We also share your view that in the event of our erecting any 
sizeable adjunct to the Curacao refinery it will be difficult to convince the Venezuelan 
authorities why such adjunct could not be established in Venezuela. "92 
The second example was in the northern provinces of Iran which had been 
excluded from the concession given to D'Arcy. The British were prepared to join with 
90N Stephen Kane, "Corporate Power and Foreign Policy: Efforts of American Oil Companies to Influence United States Relations with Mexico, 1921-1928, " Diplomatic History 1 (Spring 1977): 170-1. 
91 BT HarriSon, "The Business of America is Business - except in Mexico: Chandler Anderson's Lobby Efforts in the 1920s" Mid-Americ 68(2), 1986,79-97. 
92Shell SC7/P2/2, Godber to Loudon, 21 December 1944. 
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American interests. Hogan concludes, "What the British really envisioned, then, was any 
arrangement that would insure [sic American collaboration in stabilizing Persian against 
bolshevism sic]. " In spite of misgivings of the Foreign Office, the State Department did, 
in fact, defend the Anglo-American combine proposal against Persian objections to 
including the British at all. Yet in spite of warnings that collapse of the deal would make 
it impossible for Persia to find a new source of foreign financial assistance, the Persians 
treated the concession as invalid. This episode anticipates the nationalisation crisis of the 
1950s covered in chapter eight when the Persians again ignored economic considerations 
to deny the legality of a concession which both the British and Americans considered 
valid. It also provides background to the Azerbaijan crisis of 1946 which is discussed in 
chapter seven. 93 
Third, after much struggle with the French over the territorial demarcation of the 
Ottoman Empire, so that they could manage the oil resources of Mosul, the British permitted 
some American participation in the Turkish Petroleum Company, later the Iraq Petroleum 
Company (IPC). 94 The State Department accepted the arrangement of 1928. "So far as the 
IPC was concerned it had been cited _by the 
State Department as an example of international 
cooperation. "9S In spite of these restrictions, the State Department supported the new 
combine when the American group presented the final agreement for approval in April 
1928.96 When a dispute broke out between British and French interests over the destination 
of a pipeline, Jersey was able to develop a compromise. This worked because it influenced 
the man "at the center of the pipeline negotiations... Cadman. ""7 
93Benjamin Shwadran, 3d rev. ed., The Middle East. Oil and the Great Powers (New York: John Wiley, 1973), chap. 4. 
941bid., 223-35. 
95BP 43855, Kuwait Oil Company, Note, "Kuwait", Folder 10/3. 
96G. S. Gibb and E. H. Knowlton, History of Standard Oil (New Jersex)), 298-308. 97Edward Fitzgerald, "Business Diplomacy: Walter Teagle, Jersey Standard, and the Anglo- French Pipeline Conflict in the Middle East, 1930-193 1, " Business History Review 67 (Summer 1993): 242. 
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3.5 CONCLUSION 
The inter-war years are often cited in support of hegemonic stability theory. It is 
argued that the decline in British power and the refusal of the United States to take 
international responsibilities left a lack of leadership in the international system. 98 In 
these circumstances international regimes in finance and other issue areas collapsed. 
However, this narrative demonstrates that international cooperation in petroleum and 
petroleum products actually increased during this period. The distinctiveness of oil 
marks it out from the general pattern of cooperation during the inter-war period and 
qualifies the conventional historical interpretation. The main theoretical point is that 
global governance can take place on the basis of private international cooperation. 
While there was no formal intergovernmental regime, intergovernmental 
cooperation proved possible on the basis of private governance arrangements. The main 
historical and theoretical points are related insofar as the establishment of the 
`international society' of majors led to governance without governments and an increase 
in international cooperation during a period which state-centred theorists have 
generalised as experiencing a decrease of international cooperation. The chapter 
demonstrates the importance of non-state actors in shaping international politics. It also 
shows how the international agenda is extensive and so `low politics' issues like oil can 
affect `high politics' issues like territorial boundaries, for instance, over Mesopotamia. 
Examination of United States policy shows two divergent tendencies - antitrust tradition 
of public accountability represented by the Justice Department on the one hand, and 
support for international private cooperation by the State Department on the other. This 
queries notions of the `state' as a unitary and rational actor. The contrast between 
"Charles P. Kindleberger, The World in Depression 1929-1939 (London: Penguin, 1973); 
Robert 0. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984); Robert Gilpin, The Political Econony of International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987). 
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Government and industry relations in Britain and the United States is a recurring theme 
in this thesis. While the British Government tolerated and even promoted private 
international cooperation, the United States Government was torn between ideals of 
public accountability and scrutiny of civil society on the one hand, and the benefits to be 




Part three shows how the five institutions of the society of majors were used 
between 1939 and 1954. During the Second World War the diplomatic contacts among the 
company personnel developed in the inter-war period translated into Allied cooperation over 
oil. The war itself made redundant some of the pre-war agreements. However, in the 
corporate war which followed, the norm of agreement between the companies was not lost. 
The companies were thus active in planning for the post-war world. Yet such planning was 
threatened by the attitude of the United States Government. The negotiations around the 
Anglo-American Oil Agreements generated some new rules and agreements, which formed 
the basis for a new international legal order for the companies. This order was soon 
brought into being through the balance of power manoeuvres of the international companies 
in the Persian Gulf. Finally, during the nationalisation crisis caused by Iran's prime minister 
Mohammed Musaddiq, the international companies could act as a great power 
condominium to ensure that Anglo-Iranian was not compelled to concede expropriation of 
their assets and associated private control of the rate of production, prices and destination of 
products. 
Drawing on the development of the As Is system by the companies and its 
implications for Anglo-American relations in the inter-war period this thread of continuity 
has linked otherwise disparate oil issues such as the wartime Special Relationship, the 
negotiations for the post-war world, the origins of the Cold War in the Persian Gulf, and the 
role of the oil companies in maintaining the pro-Western stance of Persian Gulf leaders once 
the Cold War had actively begun. Any study of British foreign oil relations in this period 
which did not look at corporate records would neglect evidence helping to explain the 
sources of foreign policy, its implementation, and its outcomes. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: CORPORATE DIPLOMACY DURING THE 
SECOND WORLD WAR 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
During the Second World War Anglo-American cooperation in oil was based on 
the personal contacts between corporate personnel seconded to the Governments. There 
is substantial continuity between the leading members of the inter-war cartel and the 
industry committees in the wartime collaboration. Corporate managers who effectively 
decided what could be achieved carried out British wartime oil relations. They were, in 
terms of the analogy with international society pursued in this dissertation, the diplomats 
of the oil world. Their close working relationship with the British Government contrasts 
with the rivalry between Service and civilian departments in the United States. As the 
American Services tried to reduce the influence of the companies, their efforts were 
thwarted by resistance from the British state and companies, supported by the American 
majors. 
In contrast with the traditional state-centric model which focuses on the 
behaviour of senior politicians from different states, transgovernmental relations refers to 
the relatively autonomous activities of lower-level bureaucracies, rather than those of top 
leadership. I As corporate personnel were integrated into the wartime machinery on both 
sides of the Atlantic they filled the types of operational positions where their expertise 
was irreplaceable. It was their autonomy in operations that made possible the 
transgovernmental coalition against the Service departments. 
'Robert 0. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, "Transgovernmental relations and international 
organizations, " World Politics 27.1 (1974): 43. 
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The persistence of comfortable and effective relations between Britain and the 
oil majors during the war through the process of transgovernmental policy coordination 
is all the more surprising in view of the extreme dependence of the Allies on United 
States oil supplies coupled with American sensitivity about the relatively strong supply 
position the British would enjoy after hostilities ceased because of their strong position 
in Middle East concessions. Their use of the transgovernmental coordination and their 
exploitation of the less happy relations prevailing between Washington and the oil 
majors enabled the British to slow down the transfer of hegemony to the United States. 
The use of company experts to organise oil supplies during the war contributed to greater 
British influence in the oil supply issue than would have been possible had matters been 
arranged directly between Governments. In spite of continual American attempts to 
formalise the management of Allied oil supplies, the companies and the British 
Government combined to prevent this. 
The substance of this chapter is divided into two sections. The first of these 
examines the co-option of leading British oilmen in the United Kingdom. The 
committees which they established were formally under Government control, but in 
practise there was little effective supervision. Their most important work was in assuring 
supplies from the United States in the period before the United States formally joined the 
Second World War. After the United States formally entered the war the oilmen were 
effectively asked to manage global oil supply for the Allies. Many of these individuals 
had shaped the international oil trade in the inter-war period and I trace the continuity of 
personnel from the As Is system. In particular, Harold Wilkinson of Shell was the most 
senior British oil representative and the pivot of Allied co-operation. The second 
substantive section (4.3) deals with the development of a combined oil programme and 
regional machinery. It goes on to examine the continuing attempts by the United States 
Service Departments to minimise the role of the oilmen and thereby seize control of 
Allied oil operations. 
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4.2 1939-42: THE BEGINNING OF INFORMAL COLLABORATION 
Before American entry into the war both aspects of the wartime oil organisation, 
demand and supply, were organised from London with assistance from oil company 
personnel using pre-war contacts with oil companies and company personnel in the 
United States. Many of the most senior managers of the Allied oil supply were the 
architects of the inter-war society of majors. Their corporate diplomacy was now 
translated into Allied diplomacy. 
4.2.1 BRITISH PREFERENCE FOR THE INFORMAL 
During the First World War, Sir John Cadman, who in 1927 became chairman of 
the Anglo-Iranian, was the director of the Petroleum Executive. Through such means as 
convening an Inter-Allied Petroleum Conference in London in April 1918, he had 
managed to secure oil for Britain. Eighty-five per cent of her supplies came from the 
United States. 2 The British Government hoped that the companies could achieve this 
again and contacted the firms in 1938.3 In fact, the Petroleum Executive was 
reconstituted and renamed the Petroleum Department after the First World War. 4 In June 
1942, the Petroleum Department, Mines Department, and sections dealing with gas and 
electricity, were merged into the Ministry of Fuel and Power. The Petroleum Division of 
the Ministry of Fuel and Power was subsequently an important official link between the 
Government and the companies. However, the Treasury had perhaps greater impact as 
the dollar shortage shaped a wide range of economic activity, and the Foreign Office 
remained the most important Government department for Anglo-Iranian and Shell, as 
2BP 72492, Dr Ferdinand Friedensburg, "Notes on Petroleum Industry During World War P', 1939, abbreviated and translated by A. C. Hearn, 37. 
3J. H. Bamberg, The History of The British Petroleum Company, vol. 2, the Anglo-Iranian Years. 1928-1934 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 207. 4D. J. Payton, Oil: A Study of War-time Policy and Administration, United Kingdom Civil Series 
of the History of the Second World War (London: HMSO, 1971), 40. 
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relations with foreign Governments, in particular the United States and Middle Eastern 
states, impacted upon the international oil industry. 
During the Second World War the companies once again became responsible for 
importing oil into Britain and effectively distributing it. Shell, Anglo-Iranian and Jersey 
were most significant as they, together with their industry partners, controlled ninety per 
cent of the petroleum business in Britain with the result that wartime distribution of oil 
was in the hands of the main peacetime suppliers. 5 The three most significant bodies we 
shall be looking at are the Tanker Tonnage Committee, the Overseas Supply Committee 
and the Petroleum Board, which were either company committees or comprised of 
firms. 6 The Tanker Tonnage Committee arranged for tanker allocation, fixing rates, and 
chartering neutral flag tonnage. This was managed by Heath Eves of Anglo-Iranian.? 
Godber of Shell managed the Overseas Supply Committee, which would make 
arrangements for supplies, which necessarily had to be imported from abroad. The 
Petroleum Board managed the internal distribution of products. " It is not the case that 
public officials had no influence in the oil machinery; simply that they were secondary to 
the oilmen. 
The Goverment had been eager to subcontract these functions to the companies 
arguing that, "The oil industry is well organised and efficiently run. A large part of the 
world trade is in the hands of a relatively small number of big groups, who also own a 
very large proportion of the tanker fleets, and normally use a considerable part of the 
5Shell SC7/P14, Notes of a meeting held at the Mines Department, 16 September 1938,7. 
6D. J. Payton-Smith, Q, 77. 
7PRO POWE 33,1998, Meetings with the Mines Department, September 1938; Memorandum, "History of the Scheme", September 1938,7-9. Shell Magazine, "The Story of the Petroleum Board", July 1948, vol. 28,101. 
8Shell SC7/P1/2, Article 2, Petroleum (No. 1) Order 1940 made the Petroleum Board the sole 
supplier of petroleum products in Britain. 
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tankers owned by neutrals. "9 For this reason, "the Trade Committee I propose would be 
staffed by employees of the big Oil Supply Companies and that, therefore, such a 
scheme can only be put into operation with their agreement. The only alternative, if they 
refuse to fall in with the proposal, is for the Government very materially to strengthen its 
own organisation to deal with Overseas Supply and Tanker Tonnage allocation, an 
unsatisfactory alternative which I sincerely hope it will not be necessary to adopt. " 10 
The informal machinery that developed between the British and American 
Governments first arose from the British need to acquire oil. The ad hoc attempts to 
coordinate oil policies in the period when the United States was still neutral operated 
through informal corporate channels to by-pass the isolationists. In January 1940, Jersey 
transferred thirteen tankers to the Panamanian flag to provide assistance after the passage 
of the Neutrality Bill. " Fifty-five British flag vessels belonging to Jersey, Socony- 
Vacuum, and Standard-Vacuum, also came under the control of the Tanker Tonnage 
Committee. 12 
Such assistance tendered during a time of neutrality might appear to foster the 
idea of a cooperative `Special Relationship' between Britain and the United States. 
However, there are contrasting perspectives on the `Special Relationship' during the 
Second World War. These often focus on the effects of Lend-Lease. On 7 December 
1940 Churchill informed Roosevelt of British inability to pay cash for shipping and 
supplies. On 17 December Roosevelt used the example of loaning a garden hose to a 
neighbour to put out a fire in his house. You need not want to sell the hose, only demand 
the return of the hose after the fire. This was his justification for the policy of Lend- 
Lease. There are different assessments of its effect on Britain. For Corelli Barnet, Lend- 
9PRO POWE 33,1104, "Memorandum by the Secretary for Mines", 27 March 1940,3. 
10pRO POWE 33,1104, "Memorandum by the Secretary for Mines", 27 March 1940,7. 
1 "Bp 27775, New York Office War Diary, September 1939-May 1945. 
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Lease reduced Britain into an American satellite warrior-state. 13 On the other hand, 
without the supplies made under Lend-Lease, "the viability of the British war effort 
would have been even more seriously in doubt. "14 By end of 1945 United States aid to 
Britain totalled $26 billion while reverse Lend-Lease from Britain to the United States 
accounted for $6 billion. However, there were also costs. Article VII attacked the tariff 
system promoting imperial preference. Lend-Lease could not be used by British 
manufacturers and exporters to compete with United States goods, particularly in Latin 
America, and British financial reserves had to be kept down. '5 Such a view regards the 
relationship as competitive, with the Americans imposing conditions on the British. 16 
The debate about Lend-Lease is related to the debate about the utility of the war. 
For writers like Charmley, Chamberlain was broadly justified in his attempt to maintain 
British power through peace with Hitler or a limited war in 1940-1.17 The value of 
British private foreign investment amounted to approximately twenty-three thousand 
million dollars in 1938. Over one-third of this was realised during the war to purchase 
required materials. '8 David Reynolds, on the other hand, persuasively argues that 
Germany had proven itself to be untrustworthy with regard to international agreements 
and was in active pursuit of global power. In these circumstances Britain needed the 
12BP 37134, Legh-Jones to Wilkinson, 19 January 1940. 
13C j Barnet, The Audit of War: The Illusion and Reality of Britain as a Great Nation 
(London: Macmillan, 1986). 
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Macmillan, 1990), 33. 
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W. W. Norton and Company, 1991,213-215. 
16u Woods, A Changing of the Guard: Anglo-American Relations. 1941-1946 (Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1990). William Roger Louis, Imperialism at Bay. 1941- 
1945: The United States and the Decolonization of the British Empire (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1978); William Roger Louis, "American anti-colonialism and the dissolution of 
the British Empire, " International Affairs 61.3 (1985): 395-420. 
17John Charmley, Churchill's Grand Alliance: The Anglo-American Special Relationship, 1940- 
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United States. 19 This chapter argues that the British recognised the need for American 
support and shaped this diplomacy from a position of weakness, largely through 
effective use of their close relations with the British companies. 
Between the attack on Pearl Harbour and the end of the Second World War, the 
Allies consumed almost seven billion barrels of oil, of which six billion barrels came 
from the United States. This was not surprising since, in 1940, the Middle East only 
produced about five per cent of world oil compared to sixty-three per cent for the United 
States. 20 Britain depended on American supplies with the result that there were two main 
issues - tanker allocation and production and allocation of aviation spirit. The supply of 
petroleum products from the United States was to constitute ninety per cent of the total 
supplied to the Allies during the war. 21 The use of transgovernmental relations 
minimised the impact of this disparity and limited American preponderance. 
When the United States declared war following the attack on Pearl Harbour, the 
British feared that official American participation in supply matters would lead to 
increased interest in overseas oil supply and would bring to light the discrepancy in the 
relative contribution of the partners. This could well jeopardise British control over her 
oil supply. They had learned this lesson from the comprehensive Anglo-French 
arrangements, which had prepared a permanent organisation dealing with different 
aspects of supply. 22 The main problem which the French faced was that whenever they 
approached the British they were dealing as junior partners because the oil supply was 
19David Reynolds, The Creation of the Anglo-American Alliance. 1937-41: A Study In 
Competitive Cooperation (London: Europa Publications, 1981), 63-92, passim. 20Daniel Yergin, The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil. Money and Power (London: Simon and Schuster, 1993), 379,393. 
21Danie1 Yergin, The Prize, 393. 
22PR0 POWE 33,1446, K. L. Stock, "Information about French oil supplies and requirements", 27 November 1939. Daily Tele aph, 18 November 1939, There were six executive committees. 
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owned and controlled by the British. 23 It was, perhaps, this experience that persuaded the 
British that the informal approach would prove more effective in their relations with the 
United States than inter-governmental bargaining from a position of weakness. It has 
been argued that, "In the procedures of a combined committee British and Americans 
would have confronted one another from prepared national positions in circumstances 
which would dramatise differences and give mutual conflicts of interest the character of 
a national conflict of wills. In such collisions it was the British who would have to give 
way, just as the French had done to the British two years earlier, and for the very same 
24 reason - their dependence on supplies controlled by their partner. 
There was a Combined Food Board, Combined Munitions Assignments Board, 
Combined Raw Materials Board, Combined Production and Resources Board and 
Combined Shipping Board, "in fact, a combined board on everything except oil. "T5 
Formal arrangements had been considered but rejected because of the risk of "putting too 
much control in Washington. Likewise we felt we might do better in a somewhat more 
unorthodox and more free manner. " This involved something of a "`personal racket' 
among the few of us dominating the oil situation here. " The arrangements were resented 
by some Governmental actors in the United States but, "It has been a matter of no small 
pride that within a few months we have seen junior officers who `belonged to the club' 
as it were, conniving with us to thwart the evil intentions of `three ring' Admirals and the 
like, -a situation not often found in Washington. "26 This task was made easier, because 
in contrast with the close working relationship between British Government, Shell, and 
Anglo-Iranian, relations between the United States Government and her majors had 
become strained over the attitude toward the Mexican nationalisation and the 
23PRO POWE 33,608, Starling to Agnew, 20 December 1939. 
24D. J. Payton-Smith, Oil, 252. 
25PRO POWE 34,12, Wilkinson to Butler, 10 March 1945. 
26PRO POWE 34,12, Wilkinson to Butler, 10 March 1945. 
78 
investigations into patent agreements with I. G. Farben, with the insinuation, if not 
allegation, that Jersey in particular, had placed profits before patriotism. 
In striking contrast to Anglo-French relations in September 1939 the Anglo- 
American cooperation in oil matters predated the formal partnership at the end of 1941. 
In August 1940 the Chairman of the Petroleum Board, Sir Andrew Agnew, a retired 
director of Shell, went to the United States. He provided the Americans with a picture of 
British oil projects and problems; and also, at the British Government's request discussed 
the dollar payments problem with them. Continuing after this meeting, the Americans 
began to take British oil needs, particularly of aviation spirit, into account in planning 
their own production. 27 The British suffered from two shortages - tankers and aviation 
fuel. Both were due to military reasons. 
The French had prepared for an attack through the Low Countries. However, the 
schwerpunkt of the blitzkrieg attack on France was the Ardennes sector north of the 
Maginot Line and German tanks blasted to the Atlantic coast. Yet although the Germans 
could now attack Atlantic and Channel shipping more easily they did not get control of 
French ships. The Royal Navy in denial operations destroyed those that resisted British 
control, for instance, at Mers-el-Kebir. 28 However, from bases on the Atlantic attacks on 
tankers could easily be made, in particular, by the U-boats. Tankers had to be re-directed 
from the east coast to the west coast of Britain. The limiting factor for oil imports was 
the shortage of suitable vessels for the east coast ferry service. 29 The eventual closure of 
27PRO POWE 33,32, Report by the Representatives of the Office of Petroleum Co-ordinator 
and British Petroleum Department, "Supplies of Aviation Fuel and Lubricating Oils", 10 February 1942. 
28Robin Edmonds, The Big Three: Churchill Roosevelt and Stalin in Peace and War, 172-175. 29PRO POWE 33,621, Faul cner to Rear Admiral H. R. Moore, 29 August 1940. 
79 
the south and east coasts was more significant than this tanker shortage for the drop in 
oil imports by one half in September and October compared to May and June 1940.30 
However, from June to November 1940, an average of 400,000 tons per month 
was lost. In spring 1941 the Royal Navy suffered further reversals in the eastern 
Mediterranean and North Africa, particularly the loss of Crete at the end of May. 
Following the `destroyers for bases' deal in which British bases were exchanged for 
American destroyers, between mid-May and mid-June, Roosevelt sent ships through the 
Panama Canal, agreed to relieve the British garrison of Iceland and thus begin the escort 
of convoys. His envoy, Hopkins, was sent to Britain in July to prepare the way for the 
first meeting between Roosevelt and Churchill. He also went to Moscow to confer with 
Stalin. Their mutual trust of Hopkins and his recent talks with Stalin helped the 
productivity of the meeting of 9 August. This culminated with the Atlantic Charter but 
more immediately important was that the United States accepted responsibility for the 
western Atlantic from September 1941.31 
The other problem was shortage of aviation fuel since the superiority of German 
troops on the ground in Europe meant that a British counter-attack had to be through the 
air. The Battle of Britain from mid-July to the end of October ensured that the Luftwaffe 
did not develop air superiority, which would have enabled an attack on southern Britain. 
The 704 planes of RAF Fighter Command faced 980 German fighters and 1,480 
bombers. 32 Large quantities of this specialist product came from Iran, but Anglo- 
Iranian's supply of black oils continued to decline because the tanker shortage had led to 
the adoption of the short haul policy, which directed tankers on the shortest route. With 
30pR0 POWE 33,597, Churchill to Lord Leathers, Minister of Transport, 13 December 1940. 31A. P. Dobson, "Economic Diplomacy at the Atlantic Conference, " Review of International Studies 10 (1984): 143-163; Robin Edmonds, The Big Three: Churchill. Roosevelt and Stalin in Peace and War, 225. See Shell file: SC7/ P25 for a discussion of how new port facilities and 
storage depots, and an internal transport system had to be developed. Canals were used and pipelines were built between January and July 1941. 
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the Mediterranean closed to Allied shipping, Iran could not supply markets west of Suez. 
However, this decline was reversed when the Japanese captured Burma since the 
Burmah Oil Company destroyed the oilfields so effectively that the Japanese were 
unable to restore production and Persian Gulf production was needed to replace the loss 
of production from the Netherlands East Indies. 33 
The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour was partly driven by the imperative to 
reduce her dependence on potentially hostile raw material suppliers, particularly for oil. 
The Australian Government had been interested in a concession in East Timor in 1940 
mainly because of the Japanese. Standard-Vacuum was invited to secure the political 
objective, as the names of British companies should not appear. 34 Roosevelt believed 
that the Japanese threat he faced was aimed at British and Dutch oil-producing 
territories, not the United States. Hull and the Japanese ambassador, Nomura, held forty- 
five meetings in 1941. On 16 June Ickes held up a shipment of petroleum from 
Philadelphia to Japan. Roosevelt came down hard on him, but contrary to the clear 
recommendation of the Navy, a total oil embargo was implemented from July, whatever 
the foreign policy `decision' might have been among all these competing agencies. 35 
"This embargo became the policy of the U. S. Government, as it were by default. "36 This 
episode shows how the blend of implementation and bureaucratic politics undermines 
the proposition that the state 0a rational and unitary decision-maker and actor. 37 
The overseas operations of American companies were organised under the 
Foreign Operations Committee set up in December 1941 and also working under the 
32Robin Edmonds, The Big Three: Churchill. Roosevelt and Stalin in Peace and War, 176-177. 33pRO POWE 33,653-8, Burma - rehabilitation of oil industry, March 1942 to May 1945. 34BP 42974, Taylor to Kisch, 5 August 1940; BP 42974, Taylor to Lees, 30 August 1940; BP 
42974, Memorandum of Consultation with Dr Idelson, 10 July 1940. 
35Robin Edmonds, The Big Three" Churchill Roosevelt and Stalin in Peace and War, 248-9. 36P bin fonds, The Big x-m: Churchill Roosevelt and Stalin in Peace and War, 249. 
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control of the Petroleum Administration for War (PAW). For foreign oil policies and 
programs the Foreign Operations Committee advised PAW. Production and refining in 
the United States was organised by industry committees under the control of the PAW. 
There were seven hundred oilmen working at the district level, and seventy-eight 
industry leaders worked for the Petroleum Industry War Council. 38 "For staff, the PAW 
and its predecessors turned to the oil companies, asking for qualified executives of long 
experience familiar with every aspect of the business. "39 
The American oilmen were soon called to develop more formal links with their 
British counterparts. On 10 December 1941, three days after the attack on Pearl Harbour 
Germany and Italy joined their Axis partner by declaring war on the United States and 
the Anglo-American working partnership of 1939-1941 became the full war alliance of 
1942-45. But another step in this direction had already been made with the advent of 
Lend-Lease in March 1941. The Neutrality Act had prevented the granting of credit to 
belligerents with the result that sums due for shipments had to be paid prior to loading. 40 
4.2.2 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE AS-IS COMMITTEES AND 
WARTIME S UPPLY ARRANG EMENTS: PER SONAL CO S 
In April 1941 Harry Hopkins was put in charge of Lend-Lease. This was very 
important as he had been Roosevelt's personal emissary to Churchill from 9 January for 
six weeks. Both leaders appreciated his work. The development of Lend-Lease made it 
necessary for the British Government to establish an office in Washington to carry out 
37Irvine Anderson, The Standard-Vacuum Oil Company and United States East Asian Policy, 
1933-1941 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975). 
38BP 52984, New York Management File, September 1939 to December 1944. 
39Kendall Beaton, Entervrise in Oil: A History of Shell in the United States (New York: 
Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1957), 558-9. 
40BP 27775, New York Office. War Diary, July 1940. 
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the work of requisitioning and receiving Lend-Lease oi1.41 The dollar shortage had been 
a significant factor in finding supplies. Between June and August 1939, the companies 
needed forty-four million dollars. 42 In London the Empire's requirements were 
centralised to take into account short haul and the conservation of dollars by using 
sterling sources, for instance, supplies from the Netherlands East Indies to New 
Zealand. 43 There was clarification that oil for Ireland was not covered under Lend- 
Lease. 44 
On 16 May 1941 a Government representative arrived in Washington with the 
title of British Petroleum Representative to establish and operate a British Petroleum 
Mission there. This would work with the British Purchasing Commission and achieved 
five millions tons annually. 45 The British took the opportunity to negotiate with the 
United States for aviation fuel. 46 Apart from aviation fuel, the main priorities were the 
extension of Lend-Lease and the allocation of tankers. These objectives would ensure 
that dollar oil was available in the first place, and that it was possible to transport it to the 
United Kingdom. 47 Once the provision of Lend-Lease was established, and after the 
United States entered the war, at the beginning of 1942 the Petroleum Mission was 
merged with the British Merchant Shipping Mission. 
The British Petroleum Representative became deputy head of mission under Sir 
Arthur Salter, and head of its `Oil and Tanker Division'. This combination of roles called 
41pR0 POWE 33,776, Bridgeman to Godber, 5 August 1941. PRO POWE 33,772 for 
information about reverse Lease-Lend. 
42PR0 POWE 33,1034, Unsigned, Oil Companies' Requirements of Hard Currency, n. d. 
43pR0 POWE 33,776, Dominions Office to United Kingdom High Commissioner, 2 August 
1941. 
44PRO POWE 33,776, Kisch to Godber, 12 August 1941. 
45pR0 POWE 33,771, Note by Petroleum Department, 21 June 1941. 
46pR0 POWE 33,781,1941, USA Lease-Lend. Starling's Visit to U. S. A. in Connection With 
Aviation Fuel Supplies. 
47PR0 POWE 34,8,1942-1943, Priorities in the USA: Papers of the Office of the British Petroleum Representative in the U. S. A. 
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for a new appointment for the Government representative had no connection with the oil 
industry. During this time Harold Wilkinson, a director of Shell's American subsidiary, 
the Shell Union Oil Company from June 27,1939 to January 2,1942 and again from 
July 1,1945 to February 20,1953 had advised him. His Shell colleague, Frederick 
Godber, knighted in 1942 and made Baron Godber in 1956, was a member of the 
original board of the Shell Union Oil Company from February 8,1922 to July 30, 
1946.48 From 1942 Wilkinson was publicly appointed to the new dual post and held this 
appointment until the end of July 1945.49 But his appointment was not unchallenged 
within British Government circles. "I have not by any means reached the stage of 
making a recommendation, but we could not possibly use Wilkinson. He is a very 
charming fellow and will be of the greatest assistance but he is Shell plus American 
business = Shell2. " 50 Ironically, it was these very factors which made him so effective. 
For instance Godber who remained a director of Shell Union, was chairman of the 
Overseas Supply Committee. 
Wilkinson's personal role in the working of the wartime alliance was 
considerable. Payton-Smith notes that, "Mr Wilkinson's appointment in 1942 to the post 
of British Petroleum Representative had been warmly welcomed by the Americans, and 
his relations with the United States Petroleum Administration for War were close and 
comradely from the start. " Developing a contrast with Anglo-French cooperation in oil 
Payton-Smith observes that, "Leading officials on both sides of the Atlantic were 
recruited from the oil companies for war service. Sometimes these British and American 
officials had worked for the same company and known one another for years. " He 
concludes, 
6 
48Kendall Beaton, Enterprise in oil. 779-80. 
49BP 71483, Company War Record, New York War Diary, Chapter Fifteen Section 2. 
50PRO POWE 33,771, Ellis to Bridgeman, 23 May 1941,4. 
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There can be no doubt that this sense of solidarity within the international 
oil community was a very strong card in the hands of the outweighed 
British. They relied on that card and played it skilfully. From it, in the final 
analysis, they drew the strength to hold their own. 51 
Correspondence from February 1945 reveals how in spite of his preference to 
return to London his services were still required by the Government to front the 
discussions on Lend-Lease and Reciprocal Aid, 52 and also to try to reverse the decline in 
United Kingdom stocks due to the shortfall in Atlantic tankers which had been sent to 
the Pacific theatre. He developed the role so that "his office was in the closest touch with 
all these agencies and was in fact in daily contact with them owing to the constantly 
changing picture but not through the medium of a formal committee. "53 
Wilkinson's influential position as the keystone of Anglo-American oil 
collaboration came from his civilian position as head of Shell's American operations and, 
consequently, his personal contact with the top oilmen on both sides of the Atlantic in 
the preceding decades. This supports the importance of looking at interactions on every 
side of the states and firms triangle. It also widens the concept of `international 
diplomacy'. The As-Is negotiations and re-negotiations were, as I argued in chapter 
three, a major factor in international oil diplomacy in the 1920s and 1930s. The company 
officials who met at these meetings developed the personal contacts, which later came to 
be so significant in the alliance politics of the war. The role of Wilkinson, evident from 
the records of the Ministry of Power, substantiates what was no more than a hypothesis 
in Louis Turer's work: that the same personnel were involved in the As-Is negotiations 
and the wartime committees. 54 
51D. J. Payton-Smith, Qil, 479. 
51PRO POWE 33,810,1943-1944, USA Reciprocal Aid: Records and Statistics, PE/45ß5/1 Part 1. 
53pR0 POWE 34,12, Meeting of Munitions Assignments Board, 17 January 1945. 
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The meetings of the London Conference in 1934 involved some of the most 
important oilmen in the world in the reform of the As-Is agreements. Three companies 
were represented, Shell, Anglo-Iranian, and Jersey. Many of these people later served in 
the Allied committees. Sampson writes, "The big companies held successive meetings in 
the early `thirties to try to enforce the cartel... the last and most important meeting was in 
April 1934, when Exxon, Shell and BP met secretly in London to reformulate the 
Achnacarry Agreement. "55 I have identified five meetings out of that series and 
designate these A-E. There was a meeting of the General Committee on 25 April which 
examined the minutes relating to decisions taken on the general agenda (A). Those 
minutes were then approved in a meeting on 27 April (B). There was a third meeting on 
30 April (C), and minutes of that were approved in another meeting (D). A final meeting 
was held on 4 May (E). 56 Clearly, some of the participants in the 1930s would have 
retired a decade later, so I have only dealt with those members who continued to work in 
the industry in the 1940s. The meetings dealt with different aspects of global cooperation 
and members would only attend those meetings with which they were directly involved. 
A member attending all meetings would have wider responsibilities than those attending 
only one or two. During the war, we would expect members attending all meetings to 
have been appointed to more general executive roles and those attending specific 
meetings to be responsible for those functions. This expectation was confirmed. 
6 
Among the representatives of Shell were Godber and Wilkinson. They attended 
all the meetings. Their role in Allied supplies cannot be overstated since Frederick 
Godber became chairman of the Overseas Supply Committee in the United Kingdom 
54Louis Turner, Oil Companies in the International System (London: George Allen and Unwin, 
1978), 40. 
55Anthony Sampson, Rev. ed., The Sisters: The Great Oil Companies and the World They 
Made (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1993), 110. 
56BP 91058, London Conference. Minutes relating to decisions taken on general agenda, 25 April 1934; Minutes of meeting held on 30 April 1934; Minutes of meeting held on 3-4 May, Minutes relating to discussions taken on agenda, 30 April 1934; Minutes of discussion held on 4 May 1934. 
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while Harold Wilkinson served as the British Petroleum Representative to the United 
States. The first meeting was also attended by R. G. A. Van der Woude and F. A. C. 
Guepin, with the latter also attending the second and fifth meetings. Van der Woude 
became a member of the Petroleum Industry War Council. Guepin worked in the 
Mediterranean and Near East during the war while retaining his office and title with 
Shell Oil in New York. 57 Interestingly, Van der Woude was a director of Shell Union 
from May 21,1931 to June 30,1947 and Guepin became a director from April 5,1951 to 
February 20,1953.58 These four people had been the representatives of the Shell Group 
in the London Conference of 1934 and played different yet complementary roles in the 
wartime administration. Another linking feature was that they all served on the board of 
the Shell subsidiary in the United States, the Shell Union Oil Company, renamed the 
Shell Oil Company on September 22,1949. 
Sir William Fraser, Basil Jackson, and David Heath Eves were representatives of 
Anglo-Iranian at the General Committee. Fraser attended all five meetings and was later 
the Honorary Petroleum Adviser to the Government and a member of the Petroleum 
Board. 59 Jackson only attended meetings A and B. In 1929-30 he helped to establish 
Anglo-Iranian's New York office and later became the company's chief representative in 
the United States. He returned to Head Office in 193 5 but returned to New York during 
the war. 60 He worked in a supporting role to Wilkinson. Heath Eves attended meetings 
A, D, and E and managed the Tanker Tonnage Committee during the war. Jackson 
represented Anglo-Iranian on the Foreign Operations Committee, the committee which 
advised the Petroleum Administrator for War on foreign oil matters, but also served on 
the Producing Committee. There were other committees where less senior managers 
served in specialist capacities, but their presence in the United States predated the 
57Kendall Beaton, Enterprise in Oil, 1957,634-5. 
58Ibid., 779-80. 
59Jim Bamberg, History of British Petroleum, 216. 
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formation of the Petroleum Administration for War. From the Anglo-Iranian, H. 
Cartwright-Reid arrived in the United States in September 1939 to assist in the purchase 
of supplies. He later served on the Materials and Supplies Committee and Package 
Goods and General Cargo Transportation Committee. D. G. Smith arrived in November 
1939 as the technical adviser to the Representative and assisted in the Refining and 
Specifications Committee. A. M. Wylie arrived in January 1940 to become the assistant 
to Jackson, and apart from a place on the general committee, he also served in the Near 
East and Far East Supply and Distribution Committee, Bunkers Committee, Aviation 
Committee, and Economics Committee. 61 The historian of British Petroleum notes that, 
"As the machinery of wartime control expanded, more and more Company employees 
were selected for membership of one committee or another until the mobilisation for war 
was so complete that the seam between the Company, other oil firms and the 
Government seemed scarcely to exist at all. "62 
The only Jersey representative who attended all five meetings was Henry E. 
Bedford, Jnr. Orville Harden attended the first, third, fourth and fifth meetings. Donald 
Harper attended the first, third, and fourth meetings. John A. Mowinckel attended the 
second and fifth meetings. Frederick J. Wolfe attended the third meeting. In looking at 
the importance of the Jersey personnel it is important to look at two other meetings 
involving the three companies from the 1930s. One took place between 3-4 May, 1934 
and involved Peter Hurll and W. D. Crampton and the other on 1 September 1936 which 
involved Orville Harden, Heinrich Riedemann, Harry G. Seidel and Walter Teagle. 63 
60BP Office Profiles, "B. R Jackson", October 1950. 
61BP 43853, Foreign Operations Committee, 1 February 1944; BP 71483, Company War 
Record, New York War Diary, Chapter Fifteen, 6. a. 62Jim Bamberg, History of British Petroleum, 210. 
63BP 91058, Meeting, 3-4 May 1934; Minutes of Meeting, 1 September 1936. 
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Teagle, chairman of the board of directors and Harper, contact director for the 
foreign marketing companies both retired at the end of November 1942.64 This does not 
imply that they did not play a major part in the wartime collaboration. In particular, 
Donald Harper had been the contact director for the London Council which was the 
administrative body for the International Association (Petroleum Industry) Ltd. 
established in 1936. Its members consisted of the heads of foreign affiliates involved in 
marketing and the London Council advised the executives of these foreign affiliates in 
their relations with Governments as well as companies. The Council arranged for the 
supply of products from Aruba to supply the United Kingdom market. 65 In 1936, 
Riedemann became chairman of the Council and Seidel was vice-chairman. Emile E. 
Soubry and Henry E. Bedford were both members. Soubry was in charge of advising the 
European marketing affiliates. Bedford was in charge of a department called Company 
Relations, which dealt with marketing problems and policies. Wolfe was managing 
director and later chairman of Anglo-American which was an European marketing 
affiliate while Crampton managed the French subsidiary. Mowinckel was managing 
director of the Italian affiliate, Hurll was active in the British affiliate, and Riedemann 
was a director of several German and Swiss affiliates. These three were also directors of 
the parent company. 66 All these individuals had played important roles in the inter-war 
period which involved close and ongoing contacts with the British companies. 
During the war Bedford and Seidel coordinated with the British companies in 
London before Pearl Harbour by assisting with planning and directing tanker transport 
and controlling stockpiles and preparing to deny oil in countries threatened by the Axis. 
They "served as unofficial observers with the British committees and boards. " While 
64Henrietta M. Larson, Evelyn H. Knowlton and Charles S. Popple, History of Standard Oil 




Seidel was lost in a plane crash in 1943, Bedford continued throughout the war and 
"served in important capacities. "67 Orville Harden was operating head of the staff 
department and later supervised foreign affiliates in Latin America. He became vice 
president in 1935. During the war he became the chairman of the Foreign Operations 
Committee. 69 Soubry was a British representative in Washington until 1943 when he was 
appointed to the position of Co-ordinator of Foreign Marketing for Jersey. 69 Harper 
worked closely with Wilkinson in the provision of Lend-Lease oil, which is discussed 
below. 
In September 1939 Anglo-Iranian made a long-term contract for sale of products 
from Abadan with Standard-Vacuum, the joint venture between Jersey and Socony- 
Vacuum. The American personalities involved included William S. Farish and Orville 
Harden of Jersey, Walden of Standard-Vacuum and John A. Brown of Socony- 
Vacuum. 70 In January 1940 there was another meeting, this time attended by Farish and 
Brown again, but also Riedemann and Sheets. It was decided that in the circumstances 
they should not proceed, but the question should be regarded as suspended rather than 
abandoned. 7' These personalities were also significant. Harold F. Sheets was to work in 
the New York office of Socony-Vacuum in 1941 and later company chairman. 72 Farish 
served on the council of the Petroleum Industry War Council. He was president and 
chairman of the executive committee of Jersey from 1937 till his death in November 
1942. "Other executives were on committees in areas where affiliates operated. " It was 
thus fitting that George S. Walden of Standard-Vacuum was head of the oil attache in the 
671bid. 387 
681bid. 19,320,462. 
69P id. 462. 
70BP 27775, September 1939,1. 
71 BP 27775, January 1940,4. 
72Bennett H. Wall, Growth in a Chant Environment: A History of Standard Oil Company (New ersev . 1950-1972 and Exxon Corporation. 1972 1975 (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1988), Prologue, xxxvi; Daniel Yergin, The Prize, 414. 
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United States Embassy in London. 73 Brown was the President of Socony-Vacuum and 
sat on the executive committee of the Foreign Petroleum Operating Board on which 
Farish, Jackson and Wilkinson also sat, together with the Presidents of Socal, Gulf, 
Texas, and Atlantic. 74 
Thus, the employment of senior industry personnel on both sides of the Atlantic 
resulted in the official engagement of many of the same individuals who had been the 
central players in the cartel negotiations of the 1930s. They used these contacts to 
achieve great efficiency and to maintain the private character of the Allied cooperation 
so far as practicable. This was important so that it was possible to minimise the 
disruptive effects of the war on their pre-war cartel arrangements, which is examined in 
the next chapter. 
Wilkinson had been invaluable to the Government representative as his adviser 
on tanker matters because of his intimate knowledge of the personalities involved. He 
was instrumental in organising the New York shuttle service, which involved American 
tankers transporting oil from South America along the coastline to New York, then to be 
carried across the Atlantic in British tankers. This initiative was agreed between the 
companies and involved them in making use of existing facilities. 75 In 1941, two 
hundred and thirty actual tankers or threq hundred and ten notional tankers of ten 
thousand dead-weight tons at ten knots were transferred. This excluded forty-three actual 
73Henrietta M. Larson, Evelyn H. Knowlton and Charles S. Popple, History of Standard Oil 
Company (New Jersey), 18,466-7,462 
74Michael B. Stoff, Oil. War and American Security: The Search for a National Policy on 
Foreign Oil. 1941-1947. Yale Historical Publications, no. 125 (London: Yale University Press, 
1980), 26, fn. 38. 
75Shell SC7/P29, January-November 1941. This file deals in considerable length with the Shuttle, how use was made of forty-two tankers and facilities owned by the Shell subsidiary, Asiatic Petroleum Company, and how this policy was used in conjunction with the product 
exchanges which are discussed in the next chapter. 
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tankers or fifty notional tankers, which were employed in the Shuttle service. 76 This 
traffic, compared with shipments direct from the South Atlantic, would already have 
saved by the end of April 4,480,000 ton days or, the equivalent of nine voyages each of 
10,000 tons New York/London. 77 
As the organisation of the shuttle was left to the companies, primarily Standard 
Oil of New Jersey and Shell, in many ways the most important personality became the 
linking agent, Wilkinson, in New York. Letters to the Petroleum Department 
demonstrate the importance of Wilkinson. One stated that, "we have just completed with 
Wilkinson survey of the re-arrangement of the Shuttle tonnage to cover as far as possible 
the quantities purchased. "78 Shell had extensive interests in the Americas as a whole 
through, for instance, its production and refining operations in South America and a 
major subsidiary in the United States. No one else shared the extensive contacts, and, 
therefore, trust with the Americans. This increased his stature in London. For instance, 
with regard to Overseas Supply Committee minutes relevant extracts from the minutes 
were sent to Soubry, Jackson and Sheets when applicable. However, "No copies are 
circulated beyond one complete sot [sic, with all enclosures, including the monthly 
market report, to Mr. Wilkinson. Aviation. One copy is sent to Mr Wilkinson only. 
Relevant extracts are sent to Messrs. Soubry and Jackson when applicable. "79 
s 
Wilkinson also played a hugely important role with regard to Lend-Lease oil. The 
Petroleum Division would inform Wilkinson of demands which he passed on to the Foreign 
Economic Administration. Their approval would lead to the Army-Navy Petroleum Board, 
the procurement agency of the United States Government, obtaining the supplies. The Board 
was a joint supply agency set up in July 1942 by these two American services to handle their 
76PRO POWE 33,644, Wilkinson to RI. Metcalfe, Ministry of War Transport, 27 April 1942. 77Shell SC7/P19, Godber to Geoffrey Lloyd, 3rd April 1941. 
78Shell SC7IP4l1, Unsigned letter to Bridgeman, 10 July 1941. 
79Shell SC7/P2/2, F. J. Hopwood to Godber, 28 November 1944. 
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oil requirements overseas. Obtaining Lend-Lease oil "involves an intimate day-to-day 
control of supplies and tanker tonnage which has been satisfactorily worked on an informal 
basis between the British Petroleum Representative in Washington [Wilkinson], and the 
U. S. agencies concerned, such as PAW [Ickes of Petroleum Administration for War], 
A. N. P. B. [Carter of Army-Navy Petroleum Board] and W. S. A. [Brewster Jennings of War 
Shipping Administration]. "80 Even in these agencies oilmen dominated. Brewster Jennings 
worked for and later became its President while Carter was "another oilman pressed into 
wartime service. "8' Thus, there was little difference from the time when "On assumption that 
your telegram refers only to bulk shipments to United Kingdom we are in full agreement 
with the procedure that you indicate and confirm our approval that Wilkinson-Harper 
Committee in communication with Petroleum Board should be the organisation for effecting 
shipment of Lend-Lease oil. "82 Personal contacts developed in the private oil diplomacy of 
the inter-war period were the effective link in Allied oil diplomacy. 
4.2.3 THE TANKER PROBLEM 
During the war the British feared oil shortages, partly due to the lack of the 
dollars, but mainly due to tanker shortages. Of the one thousand four hundred and 
ninety-one ocean going tankers, five hundred and thirty-two were engaged in the Allied 
trade. 93 The Battle of the Atlantic 1941-2 was a very important part of the war. 
Wilkinson revealed that the east'coast tanker fleet on 15 March stood at two hundred and 
eight tankers, or two hundred and ninety-five notional tankers compared to the previous 
year's figure of two hundred and thirty actual tankers or three hundred and ten notional 
80PR0 POWE 34,12, R. N. Duke memorandum, "Assignment Procedure for Petroleum Products 
Obtained in the United States of America", 24 January 1945. 
81D. J. Payton-Smith, il 163; Michael Stoff, Oil. War and American Security, 197,136. 82She11 SC7/P4/1, Outward Telegram. No. 739 Fuel. Your No. 32 Fuel, 16 July 1941. See 
Appendix 3 for the procedure for Lease-Lend oil and the Wilkinson-Harper Committee. 83PR0 POWE, 33,617, Godber to Kisch, 21 March 1940. Enclosures A-E; Memorandum, 
'World's Tankers - Shell Fleet. Note on their disposition, 27 March 1940. 
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tankers. M According to John Keegan, if each U-boat had sunk one more merchant ship in 
summer of 1942, when losses exceeded launchings by ten per cent, then "the course, 
perhaps even the outcome, of the Second World War would have been entirely 
different. "85 Yet the use of convoys and the American building programme meant that by 
the summer of 1943, the Allies had achieved victory over the U-boat. 86 By this time, 
petroleum supplies were needed for any Allied offensive, with "its tonnage 
approximating the total tonnage of all other war supplies combined. "87 
Tanker allocation was carried out in the United States and it was here that 
Wilkinson affected the outcome. London basically assessed the progress and Americans 
there monitored the use to which the British put their allocation. Nevertheless, the 
internal struggles between the civilian and military authorities also affected the 
representation in London. In May 1942, Ickes sent Walden, Chairman of the Standard- 
Vacuum Oil Company, to join the American Embassy as Petroleum Attache. In June, 
Walden also took over the duties of the 'special naval observer' who, since September 
1941, had been watching British tanker handling on behalf of the United States Navy 
Department and Maritime Commission. The Navy was concerned to allocate more 
tankers to the Pacific and, to this end, tried to limit the influence of oilmen in the 
allocation. Walden also attended meetings of the British Oil Control Board and its sub- 
committees. Given his background as a major representative of Standard-Vacuum in 
private international negotiations prior to the war, his appointment was positive for the 
British. 98 
84PR0 POWE 33,644, Wilkinson to RI. Metcalfe, Ministry of War Transport, 27 April 1942. 
85John Keegan, The Second World War, (London, 1989), 123. 
86S. W. Roskill, The War at SM 1939-1945 (London: 111956), 94,218,485-6. 
87PRO POWE 34,9, E. H. Boas (Ministry of Fuel and Power) to J. H. Gunlake (Statistics 
Division), 11 September 1943. 
88BP 43667., At the meeting of the Oil Control Board of 22 June 1942 a welcome was extended 
to G. S. Walden, US Petroleum Attache. Walden represented the State Department, Office of the 
Petroleum Co-ordinator, Maritime Commission, Board of Economic Warfare "and would be 
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4.3 1943-45: TOWARDS A COMBINED OIL PROGRAMME 
Louis Turner comments that "whatever the hesitations of officials, governments 
had to work through the oil companies as these alone possessed the kind of specialist 
knowledge needed for running day-to-day operations as well as for making many long- 
term strategic decisions. The pattern of functional industry committees under a higher 
strategic body to consider wider political interests has seemed both natural and inevitable 
to the oil industry. "89 Nevertheless, political interests did intrude, most notably over 
regional cooperation, aviation fuel, and tanker allocation. Wilkinson noted that, "slowly 
but surely the machine has started to take hold and all the different Governmental 
agencies and their subdivisions have become increasingly restive and anxious to have 
their fling... there is no doubt but that a more orthodox combined machinery would be 
far less vulnerable to such attacks. "90 These `agencies and their subdivisions' included 
the naval subcommittee of the Munitions Assignments Committee whose efforts are 
examined below. It also included the Petroleum Reserves Corporation whose plans are 
analysed in the next two chapters as they formed part of the background to the Anglo- 
American oil talks of 1944-5. The British followed a policy of resisting these bodies by 
putting forward their own plans for a far more limited combined machinery. 
4,3.1 BUILDING ON THE INFORMAL ADNI MSTRATION 
As the last tankers from the civilian trade entered Allied service in 1942, 
Petroleum Co-ordinator Ickes lost the ability to influence tanker allocation. Wilkinson 
observed that "I have always had the most immense support from him in my dealings, 
and he has always been ready to accept political disfavor or difficulties in the course of 
helping our position when I could persuade him that circumstances properly 
89Louis Turner, Oil Companies in the International System, 40. 
90PRO POWE 34,12, Wilkinson to Butler, 10 March 1945. 
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warranted. "91 The feeling was mutual as Ickes spoke of the "great assistance that your 
appointment of Mr Wilkinson has been to us in our petroleum work on this side... your 
selection of Mr Wilkinson is shown to have been a most fortunate one in practical terms, 
i. e. getting a highly important work done without friction and without delay. "92 As 
tanker allocation now involved the military authorities, the British were concerned that 
their influence would be decreased. However, Captain (later Rear Admiral) Carter, 
himself an oilman, now serving as Secretary of the United States Army-Navy Petroleum 
Board, supported the informal machinery "to look after matters, and generally hits the 
malcontents... a `smack in the eye. "'93 However, as this was not a body comprised 
mainly of co-opted oilmen the `malcontents' in the American Service Departments kept 
trying to retaliate. 
In the first half of 1942 three million tons were sunk for the loss of fourteen U- 
boats, out of an operational total, at any one time, of one hundred. The situation became 
worse as the U-boats began to be deployed along the eastern seaboard of the United 
States. 1942 saw the destruction of eight million tons of Allied shipping and the tanker 
shortage worsened after the summer, for in June 1942 the United States won the Battle 
of Midway. As a result 150,000 more troops were used in the Pacific war than had been 
accounted for in earlier plans in which the Allies had planned to focus on the European 
theatre. By the end of 1943 the United States had two million troops committed against 
Germany and the same number against Japan. The diversion of shipping added to the 
shortages in Britain and plans to open a second front in Europe in 1942 were 
postponed. 94 If the British opposed the second front in Europe in 1943 too strongly this 
would support a diversion of resources to the Pacific theatre. The Combined Chiefs 
91Shell SC7/P24, Letter from Wilkinson to William Fraser, 2 September 1943,3. 
92PRO POWE 33,808, Ickes to Lloyd, 21 May 1942. 
93PRO POWE 34,12, Wilkinson to Butler, 10 March 1945. 
94RObin fonds, The Big Three: Churchill. Roosevelt and Stalin in Peace and War, 255,278- 9,308-13. 
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agreed on a formula in January 1943, which would retain sufficient resources in Europe 
to take advantage of any favourable opportunity for the defeat of Germany. 95 
The shortage of oil could prove disastrous. Hitler had been advised that "unless 
the Caucasian oilfields were won, the Reich would collapse. " Hence, the "primary idea" 
of the plan adopted for the invasion of the Soviet Union in 1942 was "the seizure of 
Russian oil" for by the end of 1941 Germany had barely one month's supply. 96 At the 
Battle of Stalingrad, "the primary cause of the loss of momentum was lack of petrol. "97 
Rommel also blamed petrol for many of his difficulties. 98 Given that the British were 
dependent on supplies from the Americas they did not want any diversion of resources. 
But the American Navy continued to support a `Pacific first' strategy. In October 1942 
as the Naval establishment became more significant in supply issues due to the growing 
demands of the Pacific war the British wanted more information about naval needs and 
priorities in the Pacific. However, due to the unwillingness of the Services to divulge 
their needs to the civilians such integration between Service and civilian departments 
and even effective sharing of information failed in the United States. 99 The British 
oilmen, therefore, preferred an informal meeting with their American colleagues at the 
end of 1942 to discuss oil stocks. "I fully realise that it suggests a Mission comprised 
entirely of unofficials, but I put it forward without hesitation and with all facts before 
me. We are looking for results and the men whom I have proposed... are thoroughly 
versed in every phase of the oil situation. " It was proposed that the mission be headed by 
951bid., 320. 
96Major-General J. F. C. Fuller, Decisive Battles of the Western World and their influence upon 
Hi ry. Volume 3- from the American Civil War to the end of the Second World War (RSPCA, 
1956; reprint, Stevenage: Spa Books, 1994), 517-8 (page references are to reprint edition). 971bid., 529. 
98Daniel Yergin, The Pri , 340-3. 99D. J. Payton Smith, Oil, 365. 
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Godber and Heath Eves and "should not be required to work under the British Petroleum 
Mission in Washington. "10° 
Pre-empting any more formal American proposal and in an effort to break the 
deadlock and start combined programming, the Secretary for Petroleum, Geoffrey Lloyd, 
decided, in January 1943, to take a team to Washington. The agenda included 
discussions about supply responsibility for the North African theatre, the Caribbean Area 
Petroleum Committees and the allocation of tankers. Lloyd wanted a mechanism for the 
pooling of information. 101 Simultaneously, the companies tried to influence the 
programmes managed by the Army Navy Petroleum Board using their "experience" as 
their major asset. 102 This was a significant resource since all other parties conceded its 
importance. For instance, when a technical person was needed for General Eisenhower's 
staff, the British identified a suitable candidate but had two caveats. First, there would 
not be any transfer without the permission of Godber, the Shell director and chairman of 
the Overseas Supply Committee. Second, if the role was not developing and the person 
felt underused, he would be permitted to return to work on the North African Supply. 103 
The supply of oil for the North African campaign, Operation Torch, led to the 
proposed creation of formal allocation machinery by the Americans. The British 
objected but claimed to have "no intention whatever on our side to question the prime 
responsibility of Washington, to decide in agreement with London, as to the sub-division 
of oil supplies between the West and the East. " But rather than establishing a 
quadrilateral arrangement between Algiers, Washington, London and Cairo, the British 
proposed that once London and Washington had agreed in detail on programmes, the 
100Bp 43672, Question of Supplies. UK Stock Position. Mission to USA. Sir Andres Agnew to 
Geoffrey Lloyd, 19 December 1942. 
101 Shell SC7/P20, Lloyd to Churchill, 15 February 1943. 
102pRO POWE 34,10, Letter to Sir William Brown, 6 September 1943. 
103pRO POWE 34,10, Charvet to Godber, 2 July 1943. 
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information should be given to local headquarters who should pass it on to the 
companies. There was hope that the visit of Carter would provide an opportunity to 
"arrive at a mutually satisfactory arrangement. " °4 During the Lloyd Mission it was 
agreed that supplies to areas no longer involving operational questions, should be 
managed by the Overseas Supply Committee and Foreign Operations Committee 
machinery. '05 But this victory was not decisive. 
The Americans then began to consider the setting up of a new body to allocate 
tankers. Brewster Jennings held discussions with the Ministry of War Transport in April 
1943. (In May 1941 the Ministry of War Transport was created through the merger of 
the Ministry of Transport and the Ministry of Shipping. The purpose had been to 
combine "the management of our shipping with all the movement of our supplies by rail 
and road. "106) They proposed replacing the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board, so 
far as tanker management was concerned, by a new Allied Tanker Co-ordinating 
Committee (ATCC). The committee was to be composed of the usual triumvirate - 
Carter, Jennings and Wilkinson, together with a British Admiralty representative. The 
committee was= to have two main functions: to ensure that tankers were allotted to the 
trades they were best suited for; and to coordinate the work of the four tanker operating 
agencies (United States Navy Department, War Shipping Administration, Ministry of 
War Transport and Admiralty). The British remained opposed because of their suspicion 
about the Navy Department, with whom the new committee would be housed. They 
offered, instead, the compromise of an `informal committee' which would not carry such 
official authority. This `informal committee' was, in fact, the triumvirate, fed with fuller 
exchange of information. By January 1944, the Ministry of War Transport wanted a 
104PRO POWE 34,10 Sir William Brown to Colonel Irish, 26 July 1943. 
105PRO POWE 34,12, Brief for proposed conversation between Sir William Brown and Colonel Irish. 
106Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War, vol. 3, The Grand Alliance (London: Cassell, 1963), 132. 
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complete analysis of tanker distribution and this necessarily required more than informal 
arrangements. Thus, they agreed with the idea of an Allied Tanker Co-ordinating 
Committee providing that it dealt only with tanker management, not priority so that it 
was for discussion of information, not executive decision making. Moreover, there was 
to be a twin committee structure with one in London, the other in Washington. Finally, 
there was to be no encroachment on the control of the Ministry of War Transport over 
British-controlled tankers. 107 
This was not the only defeat for the Americans. On 15 June 1943, the Americans 
proposed the creation of a new permanent combined body, on which British, though not 
American, civilians might sit. The proposed Combined Petroleum Board was to be 
composed of four representatives of the Army-Navy Petroleum Board, and the same 
number of 'appropriate' British representatives. 
Attempts to set up one over-arching co-ordinating body, the Combined 
Petroleum Board, foundered on Britain's uneasiness about putting what 
was, in effect, their combined civil and military supply operation under a 
committee whose US members would be entirely military. '08 
The British maintained the informal working relationship of Wilkinson, Carter 
and the head of the War Shipping Administration's Tanker Division, Admiral Brewster 
Jennings as responsible for projecting the forward planning of tankers. This group liased 
with the British Admiralty when convoys were organised. 109 On 10 October 1943, a 
British working party arrived in Washington to collaborate with officials of the 
Petroleum Administration for War, the War Shipping Administration and the Army- 
107D. J Payton-Smith, Oil, 371-374. 
108Louis Turner, Oil Companies in the International System, 39. 
109PRO POWE 33,778, extract from letter from Sir Cyril Hururb, 8 June 1943. 
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Navy Petroleum Board in drawing up the first United Nations Oil and Tanker 
Programme. l lo 
4.3.2 REGIONAL MACHINERY 
Beneath this machinery for policy coordination the Allies made a series of ad 
hoc arrangements in the course of 1942 to cooperate at operating level in each area or 
`theatre' since where sterling and dollar resources existed side by side there was an 
obvious need for local coordination. Two examples were the Caribbean and the Persian 
Gulf. In the Persian Gulf the main issue was that its cheap production had been limited 
by the As Is and associated arrangements so as not to disturb world market prices and 
existing market positions. Thus, the Socal concessions and refinery at Bahrain 
established in the 1930s became a problem since it introduced a new supply source into 
the eastern area. For this reason, Socal was a disruptive element in As Is though the 
merger with the Texas Oil Company which created Caltex eased the disruption as Texas 
had well developed markets in the eastern hemisphere. 111 
In spite of this, the development of the concessions and refinery led to increasing 
supplies which persistently led to Caltex pressing for increased sales in markets like 
Egypt, 
. 
India and Australia There were continuing attempts to bring them within the 
cartel. The Company War Record of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company describes how "an 
arrangement had been made by members of the Bunker Pool to allow the Caltex an 
outlet of 200,000 tons per annum in the bunker market. This arrangement was made by 
permitting Caltex to pick up business at agreed prices at ports such as Port Said and 
Colombo, and if they failed to sell their full allowable tonnage, the major companies 
110Shell SC7/P23, Petroleum Mission April-May 1944. 
111 Diel Yergin, The Prize, 299. 
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agreed to lift the balance direct from Bahrain. "112 A large portion of this was with the 
Anglo-Iranian subsidiary in Italy but this arrangement came to an abrupt end when Italy 
entered the war against Britain. Caltex insisted that other groups lift the difference, but 
they did not; and this led Caltex to seek to obtain different bunker business. In 1938, 
Bahrain's output had been equal to only one-tenth of that of Abadan, but due to its sales 
in the eastern hemisphere which were unaffected by war, by 1941 there had been an 
increase of forty per cent in contrast to Abadan's decrease by forty per cent. On the 
thirtieth of January 1940, at a meeting of the Oil Control Board, there was a suggestion 
"that as regards Bahrain, as soon as matters had been further developed regarding 
Abadan, Caltex should be asked to reduce their proportion in the same ratio as will be 
applied to the Anglo-Iranian. " 113 
Caltex were uninterested and by March 1941 Abadan's prospective loss of outlet 
due to strict enforcement of the short-haul policy led to the Trade Control Committee 
putting to the Petroleum Division a scheme for compensating members of the Petroleum 
Board adversely affected by this development. The British Government on grounds of 
principle turned down this proposal. t is The proposal was the result of prior talks with 
Singleton, the London representative of the Texas Oil Company, and consequently 
involved the idea that the American as well as the British companies would be 
compensated for the loss in business. The failure of this state-firm initiative led to the 
breakdown of a possible inter-firm agreement. Singleton had wanted compensation for 
112BP 71480, Company Record, Chapter Four, Section Six, part a. 
113Shell SC7/P13, Oil Control Board, Minutes of meeting of 30 January 1940. 
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unemployment would disappear having been liquidated by financial consideration. They 
suggested a royalty for the Shah, money for unemployed or road works or other public service, 
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restricting Bahrain output. The unwillingness to offer any compensation led to the 
temporary breakdown of the talks. ' 15 
The failure of these state-firm discussions led to reliance on firm-firm 
negotiations. Basil Jackson in New York entered into discussions with Standard-Vacuum 
for sales from Abadan and spoke with Herron of Caltex (sometimes referred to in Anglo- 
Iranian correspondence as `Wading Bird') to come to an agreement. Proposals were 
passed to Caltex through Singleton suggesting an exchange of figures. Caltex refused to 
limit production or exchange figures, instead arguing that since it was geographically 
closer, all Bahrain production should be distributed before any oil from Iran, in strict 
compliance with the official short haul policy. These disagreements became less urgent 
as, in the event, the Japanese invasion led to the collapse of the Far Eastern markets and 
by the middle of 1942 the level of deliveries from Bahrain had fallen substantially. 116 
Between May and July information exchange began but the resulting agreements were 
not purely private arrangements. The situation of these two refineries and their rate of 
production involved issues including their concessionary obligations and so both the 
British and the United States Governments gave their approval to the agreement, which 
was reached. The agreement which was reached in August 1942 permitted Bahrain to 
continue with its average production level for 1939-41, which was only ten per cent 
below maximum. Anglo-Iranian agreed to lift any quantities which Caltex were unable 
01 
to dispose of through normal channels. The price was fixed as the "price level had, by 
that date, been agreed to by all the other major oil companies buying at Abadan. "117 So 
that Caltex could increase black oil production for naval use in the Pacific there was a 
short termination period and a note about force majeure. Due to high bunker 
115Shell SC7/P19, Letter to Starling, Petroleum Department, from Sir Andrew Agnew, Sir 
William Fraser and Heath Eves, 24 April 1941. In cable from New York, no. 1838,28 April 1941, Singleton refused to consider a reduction in offtake without compensation. BP 63649, Cables exchanged with Basil Jackson regarding sales/product exchanges with American 
companies from Abadan between 1941 and 1942. 116BP 71480, Company Record, Chapter Four, Section Six, part b. 
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requirements from the Navy, Anglo-Iranian's liftings from Bahrain were in white fuels. 
In the eighteen months up to December 1943, Anglo-Iranian purchased 204,000 tons of 
benzene and 87,000 tons of kerosene from Caltex who made net purchases from Abadan 
of 127,000 tons black oils. "Actually it seems probable that during this period, their 
production of black oils slightly exceeded their allowable figure but, having regard to the 
way in which the situation was developing at the end of 1943, this was not a matter of 
great concern to us. "118 
The collapse of supply from the Netherlands East Indies due to the success of the 
Japanese invasion led to increased demand from Abadan. The new situation brought 
about the formation of the Middle East Petroleum Supply Committee as a sub-committee 
of the Overseas Supply Committee. Anglo-Iranian's Spooner became its Chairman. The 
role of this new administrative body was to coordinate production of various refineries 
so as to meet Allied demand. It arranged with Caltex production above the allowable 
margin so that "although the Agreement nominally continued to operate after this date 
this variation meant that it ceased to be of any importance. "' 19 Indeed, Caltex remained 
reluctant to make any sort of restrictive arrangements as the Aramco refinery in Saudi 
Arabia started to operate. 120 Caltex was increasingly supported in Government circles, 
especially after the return of the DeGolyer fact finding mission from the Middle East 
which had concluded that the centre of world oil was now shifting to the Middle East. 121 
The increasing American interest in the Middle East is examined in the next two 
chapters. 
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118BP 71480, Company Record, Chapter Four, Section Six, part d. 
119BP 71480, Company Record, Chapter Four, Section Six, part d. 
120BP 71480, Company Record, Chapter Four, Section Six, part d. 
121Shell SC71P24, Petroleum Reserve Corporation; DeGolyer Mission, September 1943-March 
1944. Claims that the British were restricting production to store up for a post-war advantage tied 
in with the fear of depletion of American reserves and British pre-eminence in the Middle East. This affected the production and supply strategy as Abadan which had been sidelined due to 
104 
In the Caribbean region companies including Jersey and Shell operated oilfields 
in the South American mainland in Venezuela and Colombia, and refined most of the 
output from these fields on the Dutch West Indian islands of Aruba and Curacao. The 
crude oil was ferried from Venezuela to these refineries in a fleet of shallow-draught 
tankers, and the refinery products were exported to Britain and other markets. Apart 
from these sources on Dutch territory, two British oil companies, Trinidad Leaseholds 
Ltd and Shell, operated oilfields and refineries on Trinidad side by side with smaller 
British crude oil-producing companies. Refining policy in 1942 was to produce 
maximum quantity of white products, and to keep the combined output of fuel oil from 
exceeding market requirements. On two occasions towards the end of 1942, and again in 
the spring of 1944, the Shell refinery on Curacao was brought almost to a halt because 
all the storage space available had been filled with unwanted fuel oil. 122 In circumstances 
like this there was clearly an urgent need for coordinating machinery; for one thing the 
production policy required that refineries should only treat the lightest of the local crude 
oils regardless of ownership connections. At a meeting held in Aruba it was decided that 
all the companies with offices in New York should set up a committee there, as a sub- 
committee of the Foreign Operations Committee, to coordinate refinery operations. Later 
the scope of the sub-committee was widened to include oilfields as well. This Caribbean 
Area Petroleum Committee met for the first time on 9 December 1942, and set up 
separate sub-committees to deal with production and refining. The intervention of the 
Foreign Operations Committee had important implications: 
This new organisation created a number of sub-committees, which set about 
the collection of an enormous amount of information regarding the oil fields, 
refineries, distributing facilities and the pre-war trade of its members and 
other companies in nearly all the countries of the world apart from the 
U. S. A. The collection of this information which was handled here by 
short-haul was provided with the means to increase its black oil production to supply Asian 
markets, and not only 100 octane aviation spirit. 122Shell SC7/P33, Trinidad: Supply Position, November 1940-February 1942. 
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Distribution Department has continued at intervals up to the present date 
and at times has involved a very great amount of work on this side. These 
data when completed were made available to the Governments of the USA 
and the UK and in principle to all companies who assisted in preparing the 
information, so that it may be said that the major companies operating 
world wide no longer have any important secrets from one another in 
regard to their past and present activities. 123 
6 
Much of this information was to become important as the basis for the post-war 
antitrust cases brought against the companies. The companies had been aware of this 
eventuality, and it had affected their decision to assist the United States Government for, 
"It should be added that the power of these US Committees were circumscribed to a 
greater extent than in this country by the fact that they acted directly under the 
instructions of the PAW [Petroleum Administrator for War]. The majority of the PAW 
executive officials were formerly prominent members of oil companies and therefore 
possessed a detailed knowledge of the industry which enabled them to establish a 
considerable control of the companies' operations, although this does not imply that the 
PAW's activities were necessarily more welcome to the Oil Companies than they would 
have been in this country. Further, the US Oil Companies always had at the back of their 
minds the fear of proceedings under the Anti-Trust Laws against which the Committee 
set-up was intended to protect them and for this reason they were anxious to work in the 
closest collaboration with the Government organisations. "124 
This American initiative in the Caribbean had been watched with mixed feelings 
in London. 125 Regional cooperation would be useful but they did not want the production 
policy of British companies in the area to be determined in New York. Both the 
Government and companies realised that it would reduce Britain's independence and so 
as a counter move it was decided to set up an equal and parallel committee in London, 
composed of representatives from all oil companies operating in the Caribbean with 
123BP 71480, Company Record, Chapter Four, Section Eight, part b. 124BP 71480, Company Record, Chapter Four, Section Eight, part b. 
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offices in London. This Caribbean Area Petroleum Committee (London) also held its 
first meeting towards the end of 1942. The next step was to get the Americans to 
acknowledge its authority. In January 1943, the whole question of cooperation in the 
Caribbean was raised during Lloyd's visit to Washington. The twin committee system 
was formally adopted. It was laid down that if cooperative action between 'sterling' and 
'dollar' companies was called for, the approval of both the London and New York 
committees would have to be obtained. In 1944, when the Americans suggested further 
amendments to the organisation, the British remained suspicious: 
I pointed out that the tone of PAW's observations made me wonder whether 
this was the beginning of another attempt to get control of Curacao and 
Trinidad into American hands, and that our views on this had not changed. 
I have now received a cable from Wilkinson in which he says that he thinks 
the policy has been at fault and not the mechanics, none the less, just so long 
as we run into this recurrent trouble, a number of people are going to feel 
that the cure lies in improving centralisation or co-ordination of 
information. Wilkinson suggests that it is not exactly the control that is at 
stake in the normal sense of the word but an incessant demand for 
machinery which will speed relevant information from one source and 
eliminate the delays which are alleged to result from the present triangular 
route. It appears to Wilkinson that the only stable counter argument is that 
the policy of allocation is at fault. Until that is rectified no improvement in 
mechanics can provide more than a palliative or conversely that if the 
allocation policy is straightened out then the present mechanics will 
satisfy. 126 
Hence, the British continued to argue that effective allocation was more important than 
the machinery, and that information was necessary for effective allocation. Thus, while º 
the Americans sought more publicly accountable machinery, the British focused on 
achieving more information. In this, they were supported by the companies. 
125D. J. Payton-Smith, Oil, p. 259. 
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4.3.3 TRANSGOVERNMENTAL COALITIONS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES 
NAVY 
The Service Departments also tried to increase their control over the allocation of 
tankers. In 1942 the then Chairman of the Munitions Assignments Committee (MAC 
(Navy)), had asked that petroleum could be exempted from prior assignment procedures 
whereby the MAC (Navy) would assess claims for oil prior to assessment by the Foreign 
Economic Administration which examined all Lend-Lease claims. The Combined 
Munitions Assignments Board (CMAB), of which MAC (Navy) was a subcommittee, 
endorsed schedules of approved lease lend oil in arrears. However, in November 1944, at 
a specially convened meeting, Admiral Reeves recommended a reversion to prior 
assignment by the Navy Department, which was unanimously approved. 127 
The special meeting of the MAC (Navy) was called at less than a day's notice. 
The Admiral announced that in future assignments would be made monthly in advance 
by MAC (Navy). He provided a schedule which he claimed to have agreed with all 
parties. The British representative, Admiral Walker, had dissented arguing that the MAC 
(Navy) was not competent to scrutinise the figures and that "the way the 
recommendations had been compiled was a travesty of any combined committee 
procedure, and only in fact represented a unilateral effort to press through allocations 
designed to meet certain objectives laid down by the U. S Chiefs of Staff. "128 The British 
Chiefs of Staff pointed out that MAC (Navy) itself had originated the policy because 
actual deliveries depended on transportation which could not be predicted. 129 Moreover, 
there was a veiled threat that the London Munitions Assignments Board might begin 
127PRO POWE 34,12, Memorandum by United States Chiefs of Staff, "Assignment of Petroleum Products", 9 January 1945. 
128PRO POWE 34,12, Wilkinson to Duke, 25 January 1945,3. 
129pRO POWE 34,12, Memorandum by the Representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff, "Assignment of Oil Products for January 1945", 29 December 1944. 
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prior assignment procedures for the large per centage of the Pacific fleet's oil which was 
drawn from British controlled sources. 130 
The British recognised that Combined Munitions Assignments Board "insist that 
the present machinery" be turned into a subcommittee, but writing to the Joint Staff 
Mission they observed that "Wilkinson's views have been asked" and we "welcome your 
views after consultations with Wilkinson. "131 A letter to Wilkinson the next day noted 
that "the Principal Administrative Officers' Committee decided that you should be 
consulted about it" and wanted him to consult the Joint Staff Mission. The proposal was 
that this new body should be linked with C. M. A. B. directly rather than through MAC 
(Navy) or any other subcommittee. Moreover, it should be "handled by the same officers 
and in substantially the same way as at present. " By existing machinery they meant, 
"yourself and the representatives of PAW [Petroleum Administration for War], A. N. P. B. 
[Army-Navy Petroleum Board] and any other bodies with whom you have contacts. "132 
Wilkinson had written a memorandum for British military personnel on 
C. M. A. B. and the Joint Staff Mission and wondered if some of "your own British 
military friends" in London might not find it useful. 133 For given the British dissent in 
the C. M. A. B., the status given to the American members in London had been queried. 13" 
In fact, they were invited to all meetings and were "more than sympathetic to our point 
of view, but the military members had their hands tied by the directions issued by the 
United States Chiefs of Staff. "135 Later, Admiral Reeves was revealed as "the villain of 
130pRO POWE 34,12, Memorandum by the Representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff, 
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the piece"136 and when Carter discovered that no one in the A. N. P. B. had been consulted 
before the allegedly agreed schedule, "This fact... gave him an ideal opening to really 
attack his enemies. "137 It was generally agreed that the episode was a military move 
designed to enable the American Chiefs of Staff "to enforce their own views regarding 
reduction of the stock level in this theatre. "138 Admiral Reeves had accused the British of 
to trying to maintain the high stock levels agreed for Operation Overlord, the invasion of 
Europe, while operations in the Pacific were working with a buffer of between two and 
three days only. 139 
While this initiative failed, Wilkinson feared that some "more orthodox 
combined machinery" was now needed as the problem was no longer tanker shortage but 
meeting the demands of products. Nevertheless, "this will undoubtedly take the form of 
establishing parallel boards or committees in London and Washington. "140 In other 
words, as with aviation fuel the British would agree to formal machinery, but only when 
it would provide gains. Moreover, the twin committee system would be maintained. The 
British rather than the Americans set the pace for Allied cooperation in oil, even though 
the oil was American. 
Over aviation fuel the British realised that they would achieve better results by 
opting for formal combined machinery since it was produVed for military purposes. 
British contacts with United States civilian agencies could be little help in this particular 
battle. Accordingly, the British pressed strongly at all levels for the setting up of 
combined allocation machinery that, as Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal put it, 
would enable that "the limited amounts available should be distributed where they can 
136pR0 POWE 34,12, Wilkinson to Duke, 9 February 1945. 
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do most good. "'a' In fact, production of aviation fuel both in the United States and in 
other parts of the world developed more quickly than expected with the aid of a new and 
simpler process, developed by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, for the manufacture of 
iso-butane. 142 This gave Anglo-Iranian an important role to play in aviation fuel as 
examined in the next chapter. Moreover, even in the issue area of aviation fuel 
Wilkinson or his deputy attended the meetings of the Aviation Petroleum Products 
Allocation Committee and the Munitions Assignments Committee (Air). Finally, 
aviation fuels produced by British refineries were controlled from London. From the 
spring of 1942, there were attempts to impose upon A. P. P. A. C. to allocate the output of 
Curacao and Trinidad 100-octane plants, which, for `short-haul' reasons, was distributed 
within the American area of supply responsibility. In September 1942 the Chairman of 
APPAC led a mission to London to discuss these issues. 143 The British responded by 
setting up an Aviation Petroleum Products London Assignments Committee (APPLAC) 
to allocate sterling production. 144 Even where formal combined machinery developed, 
the use of corporate contacts, control over British property and twin-headed committee 
systems were adopted. 
4.4 CONCLUSION 
British wartime diplomacy in oil depended to a large extent on the corporate 
" 
`diplomats' of the inter-war period. With regard to relations among firms, Bull's 
140pRO POWE 34,12 Wilkinson to Duke, 12 January 1945. 
141D. J. Payton-Smith, Oil, 261. 
142Jim Bamberg, History of British Petroleum, 198-204. 
143She11 SC71P34, United States, Aeronautical Board: Mission To The United Kingdom, 
September 1942. 
144PRO POWE 33,998, United Kingdom Aviation Products Co-ordinating Committee, Minutes 
of Meeting, 21 October 1942; PRO POWE 33,983, Aviation Petroleum Products London: 
Assignment Committee, Minutes of Meetings. Its other members were from the Petroleum 
Department, the Ministry of Aircraft Production (which was responsible for U. K. production of 100-octane fuel, mainly at Billingham), the two American services and United States Petroleum Attach6, from D. J. Payton-Smith, Qil, 263. 
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discussion of the role of diplomacy may be fruitfully applied to these men. Bull argued 
that diplomats served several purposes. These included employment as envoys, 
intelligence gathering, and reduction of international friction in oil supply. Cooperation 
in oil was based on company diplomacy working against the grain of Anglo-American 
rivalry. 
Wartime Anglo-American oil cooperation was orchestrated through corporate 
managers who had worked together in private committees in the inter-war period. The 
most outstanding individual was Harold Wilkinson, chairman of Shell's subsidiary in the 
United States. Amicable and effective relations between the British companies and 
authorities meant that British demands had a more privileged status before the industry- 
manned committees than they would have had in formal intergovernmental relations. 
The British Government supported the companies in resisting more formal machinery. 
Wilkinson of Shell was the lynchpin of the system and claimed to be, 
perfectly satisfied that we never could have got the results over the last few 
years if we had worked through the rather shackling methods of complete 
orthodoxy with its combined secretariat, its formal meetings, minutes, etc. 
We would always have been less vulnerable and certainly would have 
minimised personal responsibility and generally have had less headaches, 
but I can unhesitatingly and with complete conviction say that we would 
also have paid the price of having a damn sight less oil... we have up to very 
recent times had a strength which the orthodox machinery would never 
have given us. 145 
Allied cooperation in oil was largely managed through a committee structure 
designed and manned by the industry operating transgovernmental policy coordination. 
Transgovernmental policy coordination refers to activity designed to facilitate smooth 
implementation or adjustment of policy, in the absence of detailed policy directives from 
higher offices. It was possible for the British to use their corporate contacts to prevail 
upon their American friends to assist in Britain's chronic tanker shortage. But there was 
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also evidence of transgovemmental coalition building as the British oil authorities, the 
American civilian authorities, and Commodore Carter united to defeat the plans of the 
American Service Departments to control tanker allocation. 
The chapter queries the assumption of the unitary and rational state as the central 
actor in world politics in two ways. First, Allied collaboration involved 
transgovernmental rather than intergovernmental negotiations and second, these 
transgovernmental relations involved company rather than civil servant managers in 
making and implementing policy. There is a double movement against the centrality of 
the unitary and rational state actor: from intergovernmental to transgovernmental, and 
from transgovernmental relations among public bodies to transgovernmental relations 
involving non-state actors seconded to the Government. 
The main historical point is the role of warm company relations as a result of 
intercompany `diplomacy' in securing Allied supply in the teeth of Anglo-American 
tensions which detract from the vision of a `Special Relationship'. The key theoretical 
point is to emphasise transgovernmental relations. The two are = related because 
intercompany diplomacy would be more effective in transgovernmental relations, and 
more marginalised in intergovernmental relations. The companies could potentially use 
this privileged position to secure their own agendas. Whether they did so is examined in 
the next chapter. The findings also tend to widen the scope of the concept of `national 
power'. In so far as the company managers played a decisive role in Allied oil 
cooperation and the British authorities were able to manipulate their closer relations with 
these foreign policy actors to achieve the foreign policy objective of increased oil 
supplies, the companies may be regarded as an aspect of `British' resources in the oil 
issue area. 
145pRO POWE 34,12, Wilkinson to Butler, 10 March 1945. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: INTERFIRM RELATIONS AND 
REGULATED TRADE WARS DURING THE SECOND WORLD 
WAR 
5.11NTRODUCTTON 
Contacts between the international managers of the different companies in the inter- 
war period provided the basis for the wartime Anglo-American collaboration. Large 
numbers of senior personnel in the wartime committees had been previously working 
together in the inter-war cartel committees. These personnel now became the effective 
organisers of the oil effort; rather than simply implementing policy, they were shaping 
policy. Both the companies and the British Government effectively opposed attempts by the 
United States Government to subject the `system' to more formal and transparent 
intergovernmental control. ' Nevertheless, wartime pressures tore through many of these 
arrangements leading to a trade war during the Second World War. However, it is crucial to 
appreciate that this trade war was not a fight-to-the-death of the sort that might have been 
expected in an undifferentiated international anarchy. Instead it was shaped by and in its turn 
reinforced the society of majors. Hedley Bull wrote that war might perform three roles in 
international society - restoring the balance of power, enforcing international law, and 
promoting just changes. 2 Wars fought for any of these purposes may be said to demonstrate 
the vibrancy of an international society rather than its breakdown. 
ID. J. Payton-Smith, interview by author, 31 January 1994. He remarked that, "I have no doubt that 
they had their own agendas. It would be interesting to know how these were treated during the war. " Through the courtesy of British Petroleum and Shell in providing access to hitherto untapped archive 
sources, it is now possible to establish that the companies maintained their prewar arrangements as far as was practicable. 
2Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Stud- of Order in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), 188. 
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The As Is arrangements were designed to provide order in the international society 
of majors through mechanisms such as pricing structures and quotas which would support its 
less formal institutions. In the inter-war period these mechanisms continued to develop. 
However, during the Second World War, the embargo of markets such as Germany and 
Japan, the changing supply needs of the Allies in response to evolving wartime needs, the 
development of new products such as aviation fuels, changing transport routes due to threats 
from U-boats, and the emergence of new customers such as the United States navy all 
resulted in disruption of pre-war arrangements. As Governments became leading customers 
they became more interested in pricing mechanisms and concerned to dictate them. In these 
circumstances the oilmen managing the Allied oil diplomacy and industries tried to limit the 
disruption by reforming the mechanisms. Thus, As Is mechanisms were reformed, but not 
abandoned. 
This task was complicated by the attempt of interests centring on Caltex, whose 
parents were Socal and Texas, to improve their own prewar position and expand their own 
Persian Gulf production. Apart from the short-term difficulties in reforming the agreements, 
the longer-term issue was that any company establishing a strong position in the Persian 
Gulf would become far more important and perhaps offer a challenge to the domination of 
Jersey, Anglo-Iranian and Shell. The inter-war regime had restricted Persian Gulf production 
by establishing Gulf of Mexico pricing as the global standard and establishing quotas. Since 
increased market share could not be achieved because of the quotas there was no need to 
exploit cheap Persian Gulf production in a price war. Moreover, lower production costs 
ensured that Persian Gulf producers earned super-profits when they sold at the global Gulf 
of Mexico prices. The system worked well so long as it appeared that United States 
production could continue indefinitely. However, coupled with depleting American reserves 
was a growing recognition that the huge reserves of the Persian Gulf would soon place it at 
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the centre of world oil production. All companies realised that Persian Gulf production must 
increase; they also realised that different companies must share in this to maintain a balance 
between the parties. Thus, on the one hand, the companies tried to patch up the disruption 
caused by the war to existing arrangements, while, on the other, they sought a deeper 
solution that would increase American participation in anticipated post-war Middle East 
production. The first of these strategies forms the subject of this chapter, the second is 
examined in chapter 6. 
Many of the attempts to adapt the old legal regime foundered on uncertainties about 
the likely extent of Government regulation in the post-war world. The companies pushed for 
Anglo-American oil talks among public officials to clarify the limited role of Government 
and support the removal of restrictions on Persian Gulf development, caused in particular by 
the Red Line agreement which effectively prevented Jersey and Socony-Vacuum from 
joining the Caltex concession in Saudi Arabia. Persian Gulf production was likely to become 
more important than production in the Americas and the Dutch East Indies, both because of 
its natural reserves but also because the fields in the Americas had been more exploited and 
those in the Dutch East Indies were war damaged. American companies therefore feared that 
unless they could enter and expand in the Middle East they might lose their existing 
marketing positions. Moreover, Anglo-Iranian might upset the market structure of the 
6 
industry by seeking new markets for its surplus productive capacity in the Persian Gulf, 
where it enjoyed a strong position due to its investments in Iran, Iraq, and Kuwait. War may 
be seen as "a means of preserving the balance of power, that is the situation in which no one 
state is preponderant and can lay down the law to others. The preservation of a general 
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balance of power has been perceived as esssential to the survival of the states system, and 
war directed to this as carrying out a positive function. "3 For `state' read `firm'. 
In this chapter we focus on how "The international order is notoriously lacking in 
mechanisms of peaceful change, notoriously dependent on war as the agent of just change. "4 
The trade war took place to promote changes which were considered `just' not only by 
Caltex, but by the other American majors, who now realised that Middle Eastern production 
would become more significant than the production of the Americas, and even by Anglo- 
Iranian, who had the most extensive interests in the Middle East, with a monopoly in Iran, a 
half-share in the Kuwait Oil Company and a share in the Iraq Petroleum Company. Thus, as 
Socal and Texaco tried to effect changes to the inter-war agreements by increasing 
production and establishing new market positions, it might appear that cooperation in the 
international industry had come to an end. However, the dispute concerned existing `law', 
but not the idea of a private international `legal' order. 
Throughout this trade war there were attempts to adapt the private legal order, for 
instance, the mechanisms for under- and over-trading of quotas and price agreements. The 
other companies reacted to Caltex hostilities with a mixture of retaliation and conciliation. 
"Given the absence of a central authority or world government, international law can be 
enforced only by particular states able and willing to take up arms on its behalf. "s Again, for 
`states' read `firms'. The attempt to create a new legal order in response to wartime 
disruption and to anticipate the post-war importance of Middle East oil demonstrate the 





deal first with the pricing structure and the relationship between the wartime short-haul 
policy and pre-war product supply agreements, and then with issues of price and market 
share, first in the web of global inter-firm relations and then through a more concentrated 
study of the Asian markets. 
5.2 AS IS PRICING AGREEMENTS DURING THE WAR 
There has been an implicit assumption that As Is activities had ended by 1939, 
which is why the continuation of As Is inspired activities has not been examined in earlier 
published work. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) argues that so far as the `big three', 
Jersey, Shell and Anglo-Iranian were concerned, "in or before the early part of 1938, verbal 
notice was given... of termination of agreement. Any activities that may Save survived came 
to an end in September 1939, as a result of the outbreak of the war. They were never 
renewed" However, it is interesting that the FTC itself also presents a contrary view. "Even 
though there may have been no formal comprehensive international agreement after 193 8 or 
1939, the `as is' principles were apparently of such durable nature as to be regarded as trade 
customs, to be observed as the basis for subsequent arrangements in particular markets. "6 
Nevertheless, it is the former view which has been supported by most commentators. After 
1938, Jersey gave verbal notice of withdrawing from As Is inspired arrangements. As 
companies worked for Governments during the war, As Is activities were largely, but not 
completely, suspended.? 
6Congress, Senate, Staff Report of the Federal Trade Commission on the International Petroleum Cartel, Subcommittee on Small Business of the United States Senate, 22 August 1952,198. 
[Hereinafter FTC, Report], 266. 
7B. I. Kaufman, The Oil Cartel Case: A Documentary Study of Antitrust Activity in the Cold War Era (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1978), Introduction. 
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However, customs are an important source of law; indeed in public international 
law, customary international law is regarded as one of the main sources of law, alongside 
treaties, imposing obligations even on states that are not parties to relevant conventions. This 
is a useful analogy since customary international law is taken to apply to states whether they 
agree with it or not. Its main sources are expressed statements and state practice, rather than 
formal agreements. As Is formed trade customs in much the same way. It was very much 
inscribed into the way firms operated and was discussed as pervading the entire process of 
firm cooperation. The pricing system was an integral trade custom. 
One issue is whether the pricing system could be maintained if the cartel was unable 
to conduct regular meetings. The FTC cites a Swedish Government report which shows that 
before the war the cartel had been active, with weekly meetings of the principal officers of 
the cartel members as the main administrative device. Between 1933 and 1936 the cartel 
controlled between ninety-six and one hundred per cent of the market. There were 55 
meetings in 1937 discussing 897 subjects, 49 meetings in 1938 discussing 656 subjects, and 
51 meetings in 1939 discussing 776 subjects. 8 In February 1939 there was a new agreement 
though it was never formally ratified. In 1943 there were discussions of adjustments for 
under- and over-trading, and in 1946-7 prices and terms of sale were jointly agreed. Thus, 
even in the absence of formal mechanisms and agreements (analogous to intergovernmental 
treaties), As Is trade customs (akin to customary international law) continued to be applied. 
To some extent, As Is activities even got Government sanction. Thus, in the United 
Kingdom the Petroleum Board was composed of nine members representing the whole of 
the industry. It maintained the relative market share of each company, and engaged in price 
&FTC, Report, 291. This is part of chapter nine, "Case Studies in the Application of Marketing Agreements in Selected Areas". BP 113356 contains notes on the FTC report which were prepared by the company. Concerning chapter nine, they argue that it is factually accurate, but at the time of 
writing, no longer relevant. 
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fixing and licensing. It was also responsible for international supply. "Thus during the war 
and for more than two years after the cessation of hostilities, the Board's activities in the 
fields both of international supply and local distribution were carried on with the added 
force of Government sanction. "9 
Pricing was an integral part of the As Is agreements. Since one of the aims of the 
agreements had been to prevent Middle Eastern production being used to undercut 
production from the Americas, the world price was fixed at the prices offered for sale at the 
Gulf of Mexico. Prices were fixed at prevailing Gulf of Mexico levels as reported in the 
trade press such as `Platt's Oilgram'. Since the largest exporter at this point was the Texas 
Oil Company, their prices were effectively the world market prices. A federal sanctioned 
body, the Texas Railroad Commission had been set up to prevent over-production and the 
collapse of Texas prices, under the policy of `conservation'. To this extent the United States 
Government was indirectly involved in fixing the world price for oil. Another element in the 
As Is price structure was the fixing of freight charges so that the oil was sold as if the oil 
was transported from the Gulf of Mexico. Thus, shipments from the Middle East attracted a 
greater netback or net realisation of profits the nearer the Persian Gulf and further from the 
Gulf of Mexico. For instance, buyers in the eastern Mediterranean paid more for oil products 
than customers in western Europe. This was because although they may have been 
geographically nearer the source of production in Iran, with transport through the Suez 
Canal, they were charged as if the oil had been produced and transported from the Gulf of 
Mexico. 10 In this system there were identical delivered prices for oil products at the 
destination, for example, in India, whether the oil had been produced and transported from 
9FTC, Report. 267; J. E. Hartshorn, Oil Companies and Governments: An Account of the 
International Oil Industry in its Political Environment 2d rev. ed. (London: Faber and Faber, 1967), 
140. 
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Iran or Pennslyvania. Since the production costs were lower in Iran and the transport costs to 
India lower than for a comparable cargo refined and transported from Pennslyvania, but the 
costs to the consumer were the same, the profit margins would be substantially higher for 
the Persian Gulf producer. 
Thus, when the Pacific theatre opened up, the companies who were supplying from 
the Persian Gulf charged as if the oil were transported from the Gulf of Mexico. The British 
Government became concerned about these `phantom freights' and insisted on another 
basing point in the Persian Gulf for bunker fuel oil. Although they were able to achieve a 
second basing point they were unable to discover the actual cost of Abadan production and 
had to accept the Gulf of Mexico prices at the Persian Gulf basing point. Il The United States 
Navy Department who were buying largely from Bahiain and Saudi Arabia also agreed to 
this price. By providing specific prices to customers the principle of identical delivered 
prices was lost. 12 The high cost of supplies to the United States Navy Department for its 
supplies necessary for its major role in the Pacific campaign caused a great deal of anger 
which led to Congressional investigations in 1947-8. They discovered that the cost of 
producing Saudi Arabian crude was 40c. per barrel, including the royalty of 21 c. The cost of 
producing Bahrein crude was 25c. per barrel, including a royalty of 15c. The Navy was 
charged at least $1.05 and frequently more. In other words, the As Is pricing structure of 
international oil was affected but not ended by the war. However the war also affected other 
prewar arrangements. To examine these effects it is useful to look closely at a particular 
case. 
10Anthony Sampson, The Seven Sisters: The Great Oil Companies and the World They Made, New 
Edition (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1993), 107 for a discussion on phantom freights. 
11}TC, Reoort, 364. Chapter Ten deals with pricing in general. For the importance of the trade 
journal, "Platt's Oilgram", refer to 352. 
12J. E. Hartshorn, Oil Companies and Governments, 146-148. 
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5.3 THE ANGLO-IRANIAN OIL COMPANY AND PRODUCT EXCHANGES 
Anglo-Iranian's fundamental problem was in developing and expanding market 
outlets to take advantage of its cheap production costs. Companies had already established 
market shares in different markets. Anglo-Iranian could only enter these markets as retailers 
by selling at a cheaper price, but this would risk a global price war. Due to the promise of 
super-profits because of its cheaper Middle East production, but identical delivered prices, 
there was little incentive for them to reduce prices to try to win market share. In the inter- 
war period Anglo-Iranian focused on making deliveries of oil under long term supply 
contracts to organisations including the Admiralty, and companies with established markets, 
such as Asiatic and Burmah-Shell. It also made product exchanges. This involved allowing 
the other company to pick up supplies from Abadan in return for the right to draw equal 
quantities of the same product at another supply point, such as Curacao or Aruba While no 
payment was made either way, these exchanges normally included an arrangement which 
provided for an equal sharing between the two companies of the freight savings. 
For instance, Standard-Vacuum would inform Anglo-Iranian that they intended to 
ship one hundred thousand tons of benzene from Aruba to South Africa. They would ask 
Anglo-Iranian to place this quantity at Abadan for the actual shipment. In turn, they would 
place a similar quantity at Aruba which Anglo-Iranian could use to supply the United 
Kingdom. Standard-Vacuum might save two pounds per ton by supplying South Africa from 
Abadan rather than Aruba, and Anglo-Iranian might save twelve pounds per ton in lower 
shipping costs from Aruba to Britain, as compared to Abadan to Britain. Each party would 
receive half of the joint freight savings; that is, seven pounds per ton each. Anglo-Iranian 
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would give effect to this at the end of the year by paying Standard-Vacuum five pounds per 
ton on the quantities shipped. 13 The main arrangements at the outbreak of war were with: 
1. Standard-Vacuum, under which Anglo-Iranian lifted supplies at Aruba for the United 
Kingdom in exchange for supplies ex Abadan for South and East Africa, and India. 
2. Socony-Vacuum, under which Anglo-Iranian lifted supplies at Aruba in exchange for 
supplies ex Abadan for Egypt and the Levant. 
3. Atlantic Refining Company, under which Anglo-Iranian lifted supplies at United States 
Gulf ports in exchange for supplies ex Abadan for South Africa. 
4. Asiatic, the Shell marketing subsidiary, under which Anglo-Iranian lifted supplies of 
fuel oil at Curacao for the United Kingdom in exchange for their drawing ex Abadan for 
the eastern areas generally. 14 
Only minor modifications were needed to these agreements at the beginning of the war. 
However problems began to occur with the tanker shortage for it became difficult to 
compute freight savings since freight rates were extremely varied. Before the war they had 
not been based on the fluctuating spot rates for single voyages, but rather on long-term 
averages. '5 During the war, British Government fixed rates were low, but neutral ships could 
charge more. Moreover, oil loaded from the Americas was, for the most part, sold free on 
board (f. o. b. ) to the Petroleum Board. Anglo-Iranian could not, therefore, benefit from the 
13Bp 71480, Company War Record, Chapter Four, Section Four, part a. 
14BP 78233, Intra-Group Agreements Branch. AIOC. -Shell Supply Agreements. 15J. E. Hartshorn, Oil Companies and Governments, 140. 
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freight saving except to the extent of the origin differential, which was a series of tariffs 
attached to oil coming from different sources, which is discussed below. These origin 
differentials were not finally agreed until mid-1941, but before this happened Anglo-Iranian 
had agreed a basis for calculating the freight savings in respect of 1940 and the first half of 
1941 in order to continue the exchanges. It was impossible to revise this agreed price later 
and Anglo-Iranian's loss was considerable; after June 1941 they were unable to continue the 
freight saving element of exchanges. 16 However, the use of exchanges proved very 
important for the supply position, since it provided an incentive for American firms to 
provide tankers and thus allay the tanker shortage in the period of neutrality. 
It is considered advisable that exchanges on these lines should still be carried out. 
One of the principal reasons for this is that American suppliers disposing of free 
tonnage, and therefore not in any way bound by the short-haul policy, would be 
more likely to fall into line if the system of sharing freight savings on exchange of 
products were maintained. '? 
The exchanges ended with the advent of Lend-Lease. From the beginning of July 1941 
Lend-Lease was made applicable to all imports of petroleum products into Britain from 
American sources. This resulted in stricter application of the short-haul policy which 
stipulated that supplies had to come from the nearest supply point. When it was no longer 
possible to make longer voyages than those made under short-haul, there were no freight 
savings to share. 
16BP 63800, Memorandum on Opake from Abadan, 1939-1943,22 December 1943,3. 
1 Shell SC7, P19, "Note on Product Exchanges", n. d. 
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5.3.1 THE GOVERNMENT AND THE SHORT-HAUL POLICY 
What is interesting about the product exchange system is that the companies should 
have been able to maintain this pre-war system during the first two years of war at all. From 
the outbreak of war the voyages of British flag tankers were controlled by licenses. Then, in 
January 1941 the Ministry of Supply requisitioned all tankers. Under either system the 
companies lost control of the final destination of their tankers in principle. '8 In practice, 
through their position in the Allied oil programme, they maintained a considerable degree of 
control. Anglo-Iranian's War Record states that, "The term short-haul implies that all 
requirements should be shipped from the nearest supply point and to this extent it could be 
said that it was the guiding principle of shipping policy from the beginning of the war. "19 
This is not quite true. Other considerations were important, for instance, the link between oil 
supplies and the "export of foodstuffs and commodities essential to the Allies" which 
Argentina and Brazil might prevent if their supplies were limited. 20 
Another important factor was the currency position. Stringent application of short- 
haul would reduce the production of sterling oil in the Middle East since the Axis control of 
the Mediterranean had forced tankers to go around the Cape of Good Hope. After July 1940, 
however, when the Norwegian and Dutch merchant navies had been co-opted, there was 
little more that could be done towards increasing available tankers apart from new 
constructions since the American neutrality laws still made it impossible to use United 
18BP 63800, Memorandum on Offtake from Abadan, 1939-1943,22 December 1943,1. POWE 33, 
605,1937-1938, Tanker Tonnage: Control of Shipping in Time of War, PE 12/2. 
19BP 71480, Chapter Four, Section Three, part a; see also, POWE 33,632,1940-1941, Tanker 
Tonnage, Short-haul scheme for Supply Programme. 
20Shell SC7, P13, W. Richardson, Secretary Overseas Supply Committee to Chairman of the Petroleum Board, 5 January 1940; for a fuller discussion on Argentina see POWE 33,1056,1940, Exchange Requirements Committee: Exchange Questions Arising from Proposed Disposal of Oil to Argentina against Imports of Wheat into Peru. 
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States registered vessels in dangerous waters. U-boats had made the Atlantic as well as the 
east coast of England unsafe. This early tanker crisis was eased by the collapse of France 
and the other continental European Allies as the existing tankers could now concentrate on 
supplying Britain. However, by September 1940 the continuing loss of tankers to enemy 
action had made it imperative to enforce the short-haul policy effectively, whatever the 
consequences for production in sterling areas. Astonishingly, given the grave implications 
for the balance of payments, this decision was initiated, without the knowledge and in spite 
of the reservations of public officials and representatives, by the companies themselves. 
Hence, by the end of March 1941 loadings from Abadan for the United Kingdom 
had virtually ceased. As clarified in the preceding chapter the passing of the Lend-Lease Act 
in March 1941 pointed the way to the solution of any currency difficulties arising out of the 
reduction in sterling production. However, by this time the short-haul policy had already 
been in operation for six months on the initiative of the companies and unknown to 
Government officials. The enforcement of short-haul during the winter of 1940-41 had made 
it necessary for Anglo-Iranian to draw supplies for Australia from the Netherlands East 
Indies and an exchange was, therefore, made with Asiatic, a Shell subsidiary. Under this 
exchange Anglo-Iranian eventually drew some 90,000 tons of crude oil and 75,000 tons of 
other products. This was tie last major exchange which was dealt with in this manner and, 
subsequently, everything was handled on a purchase and sale basis. 21 
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5.3.2 THE COMPANIES AND THE SHORT-HAUL POLICY 
In April 1941, having read three Memoranda submitted by Godber and a further note 
bringing their knowledge up to date, the Development and Co-ordination Committee 
reported: 
1. STARTING DATE 
It is not clear when short-haul policy was laid down, but it is known that 
approximately since some time towards the end of 1940 tankers were being 
routed in such a way as to carry products to markets from those sources of 
origin which are the nearest... in so far as supplies and tonnage for various 
markets are under the control of H. M. G. or the industry in the U. K., what is 
known as short-haul routeing will be shortly completely in effect. There may 
not be great practical importance in this point except to draw attention to the 
fact that the effect of short-haul routeing may extend back into 1940-22 
It was only in March 1941, following the passage of Lend-Lease, that the companies 
admitted to implementing a policy which had not been officially adopted. A year earlier, 
Godber had written to Sir Cecil Kitsch, a senior official in the Petroleum Department, 
attempting to persuade him to reverse the Government decision not to implement short-haul 
routeing. He confirmed that: 
... the Government have decided that no steps should be taken 
for the present to 
re-route our OR Supplies so as to increase the imports from Venezuela and the 
Gulf at the expense of supplies from Iran ... No re-routeing, so 
far as I am 
aware, has been arranged and therefore, to give effect to the decision referred 
to above requires no action. 
Yet at some point in the following months the companies unofficially adopted the 
short-haul policy which they had been considering seriously since January 1940. Godber 
21 BP 71480, Company Record, Chapter Four, Section Four, Part g. 
22Shel1, SC7, P13, Development and Co-ordination Committee, Report on Short-Haul Policy, 17 
April 1941. 
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lobbied strenuously to persuade Government finally to adopt this policy and it is in the light 
of this correspondence that one may appreciate the independence of the companies' earlier 
action. In March 1941 he wrote to Geoffrey Lloyd, the Minister of Fuel and Power, "Having 
regard to the present tanker position, therefore, and to the imperative need of making the 
maximum possible use of the available ships, it is the strongly held view of the Trade 
Control Committee that the present situation demands the universal adoption of short-haul 
routeing. "23 Geoffrey Lloyd responded the next day: 
I fully appreciate the motives behind this suggestion and the self-sacrifice it 
represents on the part of some of the Companies, but the political situations are 
such that I do not think we can give effect to it until it has been submitted to, 
and approved by, a higher authority. 24 
A week later, Kitsch wrote to Godber: 
... it does not seem that we are yet within sight of even balancing consumption 
with imports, and this means a continuation of the declining stock position. I 
shall endeavour at this afternoon's meeting to rub this point home in the light 
of the paper we have put in, and appeal to the Admiralty to help us, since I feel 
sure that the possibilities of material time-saving within the trade control are 
getting pretty well exhausted 25 
Godber provided Kitsch with an astonishing response: 
6 
Fortunately we are in practice operating on the short-haul principle although I 
am sorry to say some of your august bodies have not yet grasped the nettle and 
taken the decision. However, I feel sure that circumstances will at last force the 
issue. 
I am glad to read the last paragraph of your letter. It seems to me that the 
tanker position is the key to the whole situation and you who have more 
23Shell SC7, P19, Godber to Geoffrey Lloyd, M. P., Petroleum Department, 11 March 1941. 
24Shell SC7, P 19, Geoffrey Lloyd to Godber, 12 March 1941. 
23Shell SC7, P19, Sir Cecil Kitsch to Godber, 19 March 1941. 
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influence than the Trade with controlling bodies like the Admiralty and the 
Ministry of Shipping, should miss no opportunity of pointing out two things - 
1. the need for more tankers, either by purchase or charter, particularly from 
the USA, and 
2. the saving of time in convoys and assembly points and in fact anywhere 
where the Admiralty requirements may hold back the free movement of 
ships 26 
Having stated that the short-haul policy was in operation whatever the "august 
bodies" might have to say about it, Godber brushes aside any disbelief on the part of his 
reader who is at this point still negotiating for the change which has, he has just realised, 
been implemented in any case. Godber goes on to make two further suggestions. This 
episode could be interpreted in either of two ways, either as evidence of deliberate covert 
action or, more weakly, as companies implementing short-haul measures before it became 
official policy. This weaker reading of the evidence is sufficient for my case which is that 
the oilmen, rather than official bureaucrats, were the significant implementers of the Allied 
oil policy. 
In this context, his memoranda; and the subsequent April report were thus an attempt 
to fill in and gloss over official ignorance of the supply arrangements that had been initiated 
by the companies. Knowledge that the state depended on the companies for the American 
connection, as discussed in the previous chapter, strengthened the hand of the companies. 
They expected and received no retribution for this insubordination. While they regarded the 
Ministry of Shipping as a limiting factor on their activities, they enjoyed close relations with 
the Petroleum Department. For example, Fraser wrote to Godber, comparing the Ministry of 
26Shell SC7, P19, Godber to Kisch, 21 March 1941. 
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Supply's 's own figures for voyage times with those of the Petroleum Department which he 
described as "ours". 27 
The Ministry of Shipping calculated that forty-two rather than twenty-four tankers 
would be saved by switching the supply pattern from Abadan in Iran to Curacao. Fraser 
would have appreciated at once that such figures very much damaged the possibility of 
using Abadan as a major source of supply, and indeed Abadan's offtake reduced 
considerably in the period before the development of aviation production facilities there as is 
discussed below. 28 Moreover, the Development and Co-ordination Committee meeting on 
26 March 1941 noted that, "political considerations arising from the relationship between 
the British Empire and the Shah of Iran are very much involved in this question. "29 
However, the tanker shortage was limiting the imports of oil into Britain. 
Even if all tankers were re-routed for their shortest journeys, the tanker shortage 
could only be dealt with by hiring American tankers. A letter form the Jersey director, 
Bedford, to the Director of the Petroleum Department noted that the companies were unable 
to charter tonnage to meet requirements though prices for transport had risen from 18c. to 
70c. per barrel coastwise. 30 American ships were unwilling to sail in dangerous waters. One 
solution would be to buy oil from the Americas. This way the long and hazardous cape of 
Good Hope route could be replaced by a crossing of the Atlantic. However, since Persian 
Gulf production was paid for in sterling while production from the Americas would have to 
be paid for in dollars, such a switch would worsen the dollar shortage. Aware of possible 
27Shell SC7, P13, Fraser to Godber, n. d. 
28BP 63800, Memorandum from Oüiake from Abadan; J. H. Bamberg, The History of The British Petroleum Company, vol. 2, the Analo-Iranian Years 1928-1954 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1994), 238-242. 
29She11 SC7, P19, The Development and Co-ordination Committee, 26 March 1941. 
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political objections Bedford suggested that buying in the dollar area should be offset against 
current payments to charterers which were converted into dollars in any case. But he had 
been repulsed when, two months earlier, at the first meeting of the Petroleum Board, 
Bedford had suggested the short-haul policy, at that time, labelling it the "ideal solution". 31 
Gass, an Anglo-Iranian director, hastily dictated and pencilled a note the next morning. 
I was so fogged and even mesmerised by Bedford's formula that every 
Company must desire the minimum number of vessels employed at the present 
time, which led in turn to the decision to explore the `ideal' solution of the 
nearest sources of supply, that I almost persuaded myself at the time that this 
was also in the National Interests sic . 
He added in pencil, 
P. S. I should of course have been quick witted enough to say this at the meeting 
but I could not at the time see through Bedford's smokescreen. 32 
The effect of re-routeing would have been a loss of sales from the Persian Gulf of 
4,173,598 tons of which Anglo-Iranian would lose 4,144,150 tons. Bedford's proposal was 
that this loss would be made up from increased liftings from the Americas. Anglo-Iranian 
and Jersey represented production from the Persian Gulf and Americas, respectively. Shell, 
possessor of both eastern fields (Indonesia) and western fields (South America and United 
States) stayed neutral. Thus, tho industry found it hard to develop a unified line on this issue 
for the Government. The first industry memorandum went through two revisions as a result 
of Gass's observation. The copy which was sent to Anglo-Iranian for their approval is 
30BP 37134, Bedford to Director, Petroleum Department, 27 March 1940. 
31BP 37134, Minutes of first Oil Control Board meeting, 19 January 1940. 
32BP 37134, Note by Gass, 20 January 1940. 
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crossed through in pencil. Mention of exchange was subsequently deleted altogether in the 
final version of Memo 1.33 
Gass's calculations were not altogether accurate. Shell would also sustain a loss in 
the Netherlands East Indies amounting to a net reduction of 523,000 tons. However, this 
reduction would be shared between Shell and Standard-Vacuum. 34 In the Persian Gulf, 
Anglo-Iranian would have to bear the loss of production on their own. Their position was 
also complicated by the suspicion that the Caltex group (Socal and Texaco) would take 
advantage of Anglo-Iranian's reduction due to short-haul to increase their own trading. 35 
When the suspicion was confirmed the struggle between Anglo-Iranian and Caltex was to 
develop into open Anglo-American antagonism, with American companies trying to alter 
the pre-war restrictions on production levels and new companies in the Persian Gulf. These 
issues underlay the talks at the intergovernmental level in the Anglo-American Oil 
Agreements of 1944 and 1945. To better comprehend the status of those talks it is important 
to review the state of war between the companies in this chapter. The state of war between 
the, companies is also interesting in its own right as it demonstrates the difference between 
war in an undifferentiated international anarchy and war in an international society. 
5.4 INTERFIRM RELATIONSHIPS DURING THE SECOND WORLD WAR 
A private note in the Anglo-Iranian archives states that "the objective to which we 
are working is: - All parties to make available all their tankers, whether owned or chartered, 
33BP 37134, Allied Requirements of Petroleum, 24 January 1940. 
34BP 37134, Cable from Bedford to Harper of Jersey, New York, 20 January 1940, No. 512, 
"Assume you expect to maintain your proportion annual supply and find tonnage to move 
same... Please advise first estimated market requirements your and Standard-Vacuum interests in 
markets referred to market by market and product by product. " 35POWE 33,634,1941-1943, Abadan and Bahrain in Relation to Short-Haul Policy. 
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which tankers will be treated as common carriers and allotted to each supply base in 
numbers sufficient to carry the supplies which are to be drawn from that base. Any rationing 
of tankers that may be necessary to be applied to the respective supply bases on a fair 
proportionate basis. The respective `as is' distribution positions of each group to be 
maintained either by means of exchanges or where this is not possible, by purchase of the 
short supplier on an equitable basis having regard to the circumstances. "36 
Some writers seem to have assumed the companies distributed the petroleum and 
petroleum products as they were directed. Yergin, for instance, asserts that, "in large part, 
any surviving 'As-Is' activities came to an end in September 1939, with the outbreak of 
World War ]j. 1'37 The FTC Report states that, "These agreements covered the period from 
1928 to the outbreak of World War II. 1138 In fact, the previous chapter demonstrated the 
considerable delegation of powers to the companies. It has already been suggested that one 
of the main reasons for their willingness to work for the Governments was prudential. It 
made sense to concede what they could not withhold, and such concession provided the 
opportunity to delineate the `national interest' in the way least antagonistic to corporate 
interests. Hence, "The fact that Caltex (Standard of California and Texas Company) was not 
permitted to market in areas west of Suez until after the Jersey-Socony [Socony-Vacuum]- 
Aramco agreement is an indication that the `as is position' for sharing markets, which was in 
operation in 1941, may have continued to be the international oil companies' modus 
operandi as recently as 1947. "39 This appears to be an example of this class of agreement 
surviving the Second World War unchanged. 
36BP 37134, "Note", unsigned, 2 February 1940. 
37Daniel Yergin, The Prize, 268. 
38FFC, Report, 197. 
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Market sharing was integral to As Is. But the lack of tankers led to a drastic cut in 
deliveries of oil products from the Middle East to Europe. Since the As Is pricing 
mechanism focused on identical prices for the purchaser and elimination of price 
competition among the producers, whenever the product exchange was of an identical 
product the value of the oil at the source of supply had never affected the calculations. 
However, the fixing of `origin differentials' by the Petroleum Board, whereby the f. o. b. 
price which it paid for the oil varied in accordance with the place of origin, raised new 
issues. These differentials were introduced to assist in the dollar shortage. At the Gulf of 
Mexico, the f. o. b. price was the "basic price", while oil from the Persian Gulf carried a 
differential of twelve shillings per ton less than this price, and oil from Aruba was charged at 
four shillings and three pence per ton extra. The result would be that, in the example given, 
the Petroleum Board would be asked to pay sixteen shillings and three pence per ton more 
for the oil from Aruba than it would have done had the oil been shipped from the Persian 
Gulf. 
Shell was also a producer in the Americas and suggested that Anglo-Iranian pay 
compensation to those producers whose supply was being targeted. 40 Unsurprisingly, Fraser 
argued to the contrary, that as regards any benefit, "it should be employed in the first place 
to adjust the position of those suppliers whose offtake has been detrimentally affected by 
short-haul routing. "41 Fraser's obstinacy prevented any industry recommendation to the 
Government. Shell and Jersey who both had operations in Venezuela and the United States 
now tried to create a private global agreement on price. Bedford of Jersey wrote to Fraser, 
39FrC, Report. 122. 
40Shell SC7, P19, Note on Product Exchanges, 17 April 1941,2. 
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... in view of our varied contractual relations both with local affiliated 
companies with minority interests and local Governments, it would be 
extremely complicated and not practical to envisage anything but a world 
market basis less a certain per centage. 42 
In a later letter he suggests what price this might be: 
... if and when it becomes necessary for the Anglo-Iranian to contract for and 
purchase supplies from the Jersey group from the Caribbean, you agree to the 
price basis which Jersey has indicated, namely the low of Platt's in the Gulf less 
5% f. o. b. Aruba,... I think I have already made it clear that Jersey will require 
payment to be made in U. S. currency. 43 
As far as Bedford was concerned the same price basis would apply for Jersey 
purchases from Abadan. He further opined, "I also take it that this understanding would 
constitute the mutual basis to be observed by both parties for the duration of the war. "' 
Fraser was unmoved. In the meantime, Godber had written to Bedford, despatching a copy 
for Fraser, suggesting a split on geographical areas and confirming agreement with 
Bedford's offer for wartime prices. Fraser was unhappy with this apparent fait accompli 
through the letter to Bedford, and unwilling to accept the suggested limits on geographical 
areas and price fixed for war. He replied to Godber's letter on 5 March, and sent a copy to 
Bedford with counter-proposals. The latter replied the next day: 
" While I am not critical of this conception it, of course, takes the matter 
completely out of the category of an agreement of any kind, and puts it on the 
plain of an exchange of views as to the price basis which should be applicable as 
between buyer and seller... 
41Shell SC7, P19, Sir William Fraser, 18 March 1941, in Development and Co-ordination Committee of 26 March 1941. 
42BP 37134, Bedford to Fraser, 21 February 1940. 
43BP 37134, Bedford to Fraser, 27 February 1940. 
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Fraser's response was terse and to the point. 
Many thanks for your letter of 6"' March. I quite agree with the definition you 
give in the last paragraph, which is in accordance with my own understanding 
of the matter. 45 
That ended attempts between the `big three' to define a general inter-company 
agreement for the war. While the Governments - as buyers - continued to purchase oil 
based on Gulf prices, between the companies themselves there was something of an open 
market. With Iran's cheap production, this would seem a positive development from the 
perspective of Anglo-Iranian, but a combination of short-haul routeing which shifted 
Britain's source of supply from the Persian Gulf to the Americas, and unrestricted 
production from Caltex in Bahrain limited the advantages of Fraser's defection on the issue 
of price. The price advantage of the origin differential and the opportunity to undercut in the 
eastern markets were his only consolation as the short-haul policy reduced Iran's supplies to 
Britain. Also, Fraser was apprised of how serious the inability to reach agreement might 
prove. On 6 February, Jackson had urgently telegrammed him from New York: 
Sparks cabling tonight urging broad view minor irregularities and prompt 
action to fuse rates. Major friends here strongly support scheme but delay 
causing concern and serious danger defection. Earnestly invoke your assistance 
influence avoidance further delay. 4 
Internal correspondence reveals that Fraser consciously wanted to escape the binds 
of the As Is agreement, at least as far as the Middle East and Asia was concerned. In a letter 
dated 15 February 1940, Fraser observed that, "If it were possible to incorporate in the deal 
a cancellation of all 'As Is' outstanding claims, as a make weight, it would be a most 
` 4BP 37134, Bedford to Fraser, 21 February 1940. 
45BP 37134 provides a record of the correspondence between Fraser, Godber, and Bedford. 46BP 37134, Telegram from Jackson, New York to Fraser, 6 February 1940. 
136 
valuable help to A. LO. C.... Taking a broad view, I think so far as our actual sales from 
Abadan are concerned, we will probably do better than he estimates. It is obvious that we 
will get the cream of the business because prices will be fixed at Gulf prices on which basis 
it will be uneconomical for competitors to supply. Also, outside competition will be 
eliminated. I would even go so far as to hazard an opinion that if `As Is' were suspended, 
and A. I. O. C. took just its geographical trade, then we would make as much money off 
4,500,000 tons as we were doing on prewar 10,000,000 tons. "47 
However, it was not until 1942 that this potential could be exploited. At that point in 
the war, the Pacific War with Japan eliminated competition from Far Eastern sources which 
were destroyed in denial operations in Burma and the Dutch East Indies. Simultaneously, 
demand from the Allied fleets was growing. Following pressure from the Governments over 
phantom freights, oil products were supplied to the Allied fleets at Persian Gulf f. o. b. prices, 
rather than Gulf of Mexico f. o. b. prices for all. This led to price competition between these 
sources. Certainly, the prices of crude and of products were still fixed at the prevailing level 
of the Gulf of Mexico, but the difference in actual transportation costs led to the creation of 
a natural market in which freight rates would be cheaper from the Persian Gulf than the Gulf 
of Mexico. The watershed where the prices would become equal was around Italy. East of 
this point it would make more sense to obtain supplies from the Persian Gulf. In the post- 
war period, the ongoing dollar shortage led to the creation of refineries in the consuming 
markets to reduce the dollar outlay on petroleum products. Moreover, the European 
Cooperation Administration were determined not to pay more than any other substantial 
buyer. As a result, Persian Gulf prices fell twice in 1949, and by September 1949 the 
equalization point for delivered price competition was the eastern seaboard of the United 
States. In 1950, Socony-Vacuum started posting prices, meaning that they would sell to all 
47BP 37134, Letter from Sir John Lloyd to Fraser, 15 February 1940. 
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at these prices. This was linked with the shift from royalties to income taxes in their 
concession agreement. Host Governments became interested in pricing as these became 
benchmarks for tax purposes. 48 
Thus, Fraser's defection should not be taken to imply that the trade war between the 
parties took place in an anarchy. For one thing, it was a measured response to the changing 
pricing forced on the companies by the war and the custom of the naval fleets. For another, 
many of the regional arrangements incorporating As Is principles were merely shelved 
rather than discontinued. The trade war took place as companies tried to protect themselves 
in an uncertain period, and also to effect changes to prewar agreements where better options 
could now be seen. The norm of private arrangements governing relations was not lost. A 
letter from Godber to Anglo-Iranian in 1946 referred back to the pre-war arrangements. 
We have your letter of 22nd March and agree your statement of the position 
that, failing agreement by both of us, supplies cannot continue to be drawn 
from Abadan under sale for or delivery to the Red Area. The fact that there 
will be a continuing call on Abadan for supplies to some or all of the companies 
you have named for their outlets in the Consolidated area, is the very condition 
that was contemplated and dealt with in Clause 16 of the Consolidated 
Agreement of 19th December 1933. 
He continued, 
6 
We would, however, be prepared to agree the continuance temporarily of such 
sales despite the provisions of Clause 16 of the Consolidated Agreement and 
you may take it that it will be in order for you to continue as heretofore to 
supply the companies you have named until we give you notice of one month 
that the provisions of the Consolidated Agreement are again to apply in their 
full force. For your information we may add that it is not at present our 
intention to give this notice so long as we are satisfied that the supply of oil 
48J. E. Hartshorn, Oil Companies and Governments, 146-149. 
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products to the Red Area continues to be effected sic], as at present, under the 
direction and control of the Overseas Supply Committee. 49 
The close intersection of corporate and British Government programmes contrasts 
with the Americans. For instance, in the first meeting of the Oil Control Board it had been 
agreed under the heading of "Groups' Interests" that, "When re-routeing the supplies 
according to geographical position, it should be remembered that existing interests should be 
carefully considered, as an improvement in sources of supply, while reducing the number of 
tankers required, may have a disastrous effect on the general position of any one of the 
suppliers, which might not necessarily give counter advantages. "50 This idea was more 
practicable in Britain, where there was implied consent for the inter-firm contacts, than in 
the United States where the State Department became very uneasy about exchanges between 
Standard Oil Company of New Jersey and Shell. There, it became necessary to surrender 
control over any such arrangements to officials in the regional committee. 
The question of the division of market between Shell and Standard, which has 
caused a certain amount of uneasiness in the State Department, is, we hope, 
about to be settled by bringing supplies to Spain under the same arrangements 
for division between Willemstad and Aruba as are already in operation for 
other markets. The Caribbean Committees in London and New York will make 
the allocations in consultation, having regard solely to supply considerations. 5' 
These committees were likely to be less sensitive to the interests of the oil 
companies. One example which took place at the end of the war involved Mexican oil. 
Godber wrote to Wilkinson recording that he had been "considerably disturbed lately" by 
the Petroleum Administation for War "choosing outlets for these products in a somewhat 
49She11 SC7, P2r3, Godber to the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, 5 April 1946. In a subsequent letter of 15 May 1946, Godber clarified that the `companies' referred to were Standard-Vacuum, Vacuum, Atlantic and Caltex. 
50BP 37134, Minutes of first Oil Control Board meeting on 19 January 1940. 51 Shell SC7, P5/2/1, Godber telegram, No. 133 Arfar, 15 January 1943. 
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haphazard manner and without regard to the possible disturbance to the established trade of 
the oil companies which might result as a consequence. "52 Later in the war there were to be 
similar complaints about the movements of light Venezuelan crude oil to the North 
Atlantic. 53 Thus, even when the agreements were undermined by the defection of firms or by 
state agendas which affected the payoff from the agreements, the main point is that the 
companies continued to make them. Thus, after the American companies officially came 
into the war, an international agreement was signed setting out the arrangements for a global 
exchange system. It provided that: 
Accounts will be maintained by each company for these exchanges in which the 
companies will evaluate the tonnage supplied and received on the basis of the 
calculated cost, at a time charter to be mutually agreed upon each six months, 
in a theoretical 12,000 D. W. T. diesel tanker 11.5 knots with a daily fuel 
consumption of 13 tons at sea and 3.5 tons in port at bunker prices to be agreed 
upon from time to time. 
It is expected that occasions will arise when actual voyages (converted to a 
voyage by the theoretical ship) may be in substantial excess of the time allowed 
for a normal voyage by the theoretical ship, due to interference by reason of 
war conditions (not allowed for when calculating the original theoretical 
voyage). In such cases it will be open to the company affected to claim a fair 
and equitable basis of adjustment in the account for excess time consumed on 
any particular voyage. 
If there are sizeable outstanding balances in the accounts in favour of any of the 
companies, repayment of which in tonnage is not immediately possible, such 
outstanding balances will if requested be settled by cash payments. 
When there is a credit balance for which cash settlement has been requested, 
this shall be made in dollar and/or sterling currencies in proportion to the total 
value of dollar and sterling costs incurred in the freight account of the party 
claiming, and where it is necessary to pay the whole or part of this in dollars, 
the rate of exchange shall be the Bank of England selling rate for dollars at the 
date of payment. Where the claim has been based upon freight having been 
52Shell SC7, P2/2, Godber to Wilkinson, 24 July 1945. 
53Shell SC7, P7/2/1, Godber to Sir William Brown, 30 September 1943. 
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paid from convertible sterling, this for the purpose of the account shall be 
treated as a dollar payment. 54 
The terms of this agreement were quickly made redundant by the ongoing sterling 
crisis and by the development of Lend-Lease, but the spirit of private agreement as the 
proper way to operate was to lead directly to the negotiations around the Anglo-American 
Oil Agreements investigated in chapter six. It also shaped the defection of Anglo-Iranian in 
the Asian market. 
5.5 THE CONSOLIDATED AREA AND THE FAR EAST 
Before the war, world trade in oil consisted predominantly in products rather than 
crude. Refineries were located at source and this was aimed at preventing the cross-hauling 
of products which local markets might not absorb. The movement of American crude was 
initially coastwise from the Gulf of Mexico to refineries in New Jersey. Later, Caribbean 
refineries on Curacao and Aruba were constructed which were nearer the sources of 
production and so western Europe, Latin America and the north-east United States were 
supplied from there. Products refined from Abadan were supplied to the Near and Far East, 
and from Iraq to the Mediterranean and Persian Gulf partly as products and partly as crude 
for the limited refineries in France and Italy. There was comparatively little supply from 
Saudi Arabia or Kuwait. This geographically logical system was possible because of product 
exchanges. " 
As discussed above, the exchange between Anglo-Iranian and Asiatic during the 
winter of 1940-1 was the last product exchange Anglo-Iranian made during the war. 
54She11 SC7, P26/2, Compensation for Tanker Tonnage Balances between the Companies, 19 
November 1941. (Whole text reproduced. ) 
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Supplying the Australian market from the Netherlands East Indies provided plenty of 
`phantom freight'. This arrangement had a long history, pre-dating the As Is agreement of 
1928. Indeed, the Benzine Agreement with the Asiatic had been in existence since 1922. It 
was revised in 1927 and then again modified to accommodate the As Is arrangements in 
1931.56 Substantial quantities were lifted under the agreement. There was between 400,000 
- 500,000 tons per annum of motor spirit and gas oil. Between 1930 and 1938, this 
agreement provided between fifteen and twenty per cent of Anglo-Iranian's total motor 
spirit sales. 57 
Delivery was made to Asiatic f. o. b. Abadan and, in spite of As Is, in practice Asiatic 
were free to ship to any market which suited them. In general they supplied the United 
Kingdom, -the Far East, and Continental markets. As the Axis occupation proceeded they 
pleaded force majeure in respect of the supplies for the Continent. They also protested about 
difficulties supplying the United Kingdom market because of tanker shortages and the set-up 
of the Petroleum Board. After an extended period of discussions, in 1941 a revised 
agreement was=. signed which addressed Asiatic's concerns. Even so, arrears continued to 
mount up. 58 Clearly, the main cause was the fact that Asiatic, in the same way as Anglo- 
Iranian, could not deliver outside the bounds of the short-haul area. However, the difficulties 
were exacerbated by an exchange arrangement which they made with Caltex in late 1940. 
They drew supplies from the Netherlands East Indies for deliveries in their Far Eastern 
markets which would normally have been supplied from Abadan. 59 
55J. E. Hartshorn, Oil Companies and Governments, 140. 
56Jim Bamberg, History of British Petroleum, 120-122. 
57Calculations from information in BP 109194. 
58BP 71480, Company War Record, Chapter Four, Distribution, Section 4.4. e. 59BP 71480, Company War Record, Chapter Four, Distribution, Section 4.4. f. This arrangement 
ensured that certain tankers which were under the control of Caltex were used on short-hauil lines to 
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Figure 2. Main Oil Movements, 1938, above and 1965, below. J. E. Hartshorn, Oil 
Companies and Governments-, Account of the International Oil Industry in its Political 
Environment. 2d rev. ed. London: Faber and Faber, 1967,188. 
Since the oil industry itself was at the heart of the oil executive of the British 
Government these new arrangements were organised with only cursory reference to non- 
consisted of Benzene - were handled in this manner before the end of 1941 when the exchange broke down as a result of the Japanese invasion of the Netherlands East Indies. 
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oilmen. Shell director, Duggan, now at the Tanker Division, wrote to Anglo-Iranian director, 
Heath Eves, chairman of the Tanker Tonnage Committee, on 11 December 1940. Referring 
to the Norwegian tonnage owned by Texas and used by Caltex in the Eastern and Australian 
markets he observed that shipments could also be made from Bahrain to New Zealand, 
Australia, Phillipines and China Almost apologetically, he noted that a copy of the letter 
was also sent to Starling, "since it is necessary to have Petroleum Department collaboration, 
since the issue involves supplies as well as tonnage. " Nevertheless the letter closed, "You 
will appreciate that it is most desirable that this proposal should not be mentioned to the 
Texas people until we have had an opportunity of approaching them officially. "60 
In other words, during the war the companies continued to maintain the initiative in 
global oil matters as in the inter-war period. The main difference was that the network of 
intercorporate action now had an additional loop, the Government. This did not mean that 
the network was now redundant. Duggan had obviously also sent a copy to his chairman in 
Shell, Godber, who replied to Duggan that, "The point you raise is also one that concerns 
Abadan because similar shipments are also being : made from that centre. With a view to 
eliminating cross haul, the Overseas Supply people here had already taken in hand an 
exchange arrangement by which additional quantities would be shipped from Bahrain and 
Abadan to Suez and Greece, whilst supplies needed from New Zealand, Australia, 
" 
Phillipines, etc. would come from the N. E. I. [Indonesia]. "61 Godber, it will be recalled was 
serving as chairman of the Overseas Supply Committee. 
However, despite being part of the loop, Government officials simply lacked the 
working knowledge of the industry common to company personnel. Continuing this set of 
60Shell SC7, P19, Duggan to Heath Eves, 11 December 1940. 
61 Shell SC7, P19, Godber to Duggan, 13 December 1940. 
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exchanges with Duggan, Godber had to write a letter whose contents explained the recent 
developments in inter-firm relations which had been discussed with Duggan in his official 
capacity. The tone and content of many similar letters is reminiscent of a company 
publication for the benefit of shareholders. Godber informs the public official Faulkner, "I 
should explain that some of these exchanges have been in operation between the Groups for 
quite a considerable time and as such they are not additional savings in tanker tonnage. The 
more recent exchanges refer principally to the Caltex and the Anglo-Iranian insofar as the 
Far Eastern requirements will now be supplied from the N. E. I. [Indonesia] instead of from 
Bahrain and Abadan respectively. These exchanges have only recently become possible. "62 
At this time, because of the location of Abadan and short-haul routeing Anglo- 
Iranian experienced a huge reduction in its offtake for the markets west of Suez from three 
million tons each year to almost nil. 63 However, after 1942 and the collapse of the 
Netherlands East Indies, Abadan supplied the marketing needs for three of the biggest 
producers from that area, Socony-Vacuum, Shell/Asiatic and Burmah. Moreover, this policy 
was congruent with the objective of the Allied Governments of increasing Abadan's 
contribution to 100 octane aviation fuel production and supply, and the United States 
provided equipment to increase its production. 64 
The introduction of short-haul routeing resulted in Anglo-Iranian failing to keep to 
their quota in Shell-Mex and B. P. for the Petroleum Board. 65 The Shell-Mex and B. P. Ltd 
had come into being in 1932 as a result of an agreement between the Anglo-Persian Oil 
62Shell SC7, P26/1, Godber to Duggan, Petroleum Department, Ministry of Shipping, 6 January 
1941, and same letter to Faulkner, Petroleum Department, 6 January 1941. 
63BP 63800, Memorandum on Opake from Abadan, 1939-1942,3. 
64BP 71485, Company War Record, Chapter Twenty-Two, Abadan Refinery, Section I. a. 65Shell SC7, P30, Supply Companies Quota Position, May 1940 - January 1942. 
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Company and Shell to combine their marketing activities in the United Kingdom in a joint 
venture. 66 In contrast to Anglo-Iranian's earlier attitude, there was an attempt to establish a 
price basis between the majors so that they could make purchases in the Americas to fulfil 
their quota. The strengthening of their position due to the collapse of competitors producing 
in the Far East was also an important factor. When therefore in October 1941, Standard- 
Vacuum approached them regarding supplies to replace losses in the Netherlands East 
Indies, Anglo-Iranian suggested the price basis adopted by the Petroleum Board for the 
United Kingdom; that is, the mean of Platt's export quotations f. o. b. loading port. The 
negotiations with the Standard-Vacuum took place over a long period of time and were 
influenced by different outside factors. 67 
The foremost was that Caltex offered to underprice them. However, on the other 
hand, the collapse of production from the Netherlands East Indies meant that necessary 
replacement offtake from Abadan would be considerable. Thus, Anglo-Iranian became less 
concerned about the maintenance of a relatively high price level. 68 Moreover, by January 
1942 Standard-Vacuum was prepared to offer Anglo-Iranian their whole business. One 
reason was that Caltex could only supply part of their requirements. Of greater importance, 
however, was that before the Second World War Standard-Vacuum and Caltex had been 
bitter rivals in the Asian and Australasian markets, where they had been involved in 
skirmishes over prices for bunkers, whereas trading relations with Anglo-Iranian had always 
been friendly. 69 
66Jim Bamberg, History of the British Petroleum Company, 119. 
67BP 71480, Company War Record, Chapter Four, Distribution, Section 4.4. i. 
68BP 71480, Company War Record, Chapter Four, Distribution, Section 4.4. i. 
69BP 71480, Company War Record, Chapter Four, Distribution, Section 4.4. i. 
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At first, Anglo-Iranian was hesitant regarding Standard-Vacuum's offer for black oil 
prices, which was based on the Caltex offer to them. 70 However, they eventually accepted 
the offer and Standard-Vacuum began to draw virtually all their supplies from them. 7' After 
July 1942, the Standard-Vacuum agreed to increase their prices for black oils, and finally, at 
the end of the year accepted an Anglo-Iranian price. This was the low of Platt's quotations in 
respect of all products with a discount of five per cent. This price level became the 
recognised selling price for supplies between the majors. 72 One of these companies was 
Asiatic, the Shell subidiary, who, after the loss of their Caltex supply from the Netherlands 
East Indies, had immediately given notice that it was their intention to take up their arrears 
under the Benzine Agreement as early as possible. These arrears amounted to 450,000 tons 
at the end of 1941. Hitherto, they had been supplied f. o. b. Abadan at a price some thirteen 
shillings per ton below the United States Gulf figure. Anglo-Iranian wanted to extend the 
new pricing structure agreed with Standard-Vacuum. Simultaneously, they were anxious to 
make an agreement which would also provide supplies in the Americas and thus enable 
them to implement their quota in the Shell-Mex and B. P. 73 Eventually, the Reciprocal 
Supply Agreement was signed on 1 October 1942.74 
The agreement developed the nature of cooperation between Anglo-Iranian and 
Asiatic since a common price applied whether the oil was drawn from Abadan or the 
Americas. Previously, the Asiatic had argued for a premium for supplies from Curacao over 
7°It should be added that Ministry of War Transport freight rates subsequently put shipments from 
Abadan and Bahrain at the same level, thus leaving buyers from each refinery on the same basis. 
Subsequently, in 1944 a differential of 1/6d. per ton was reintroduced but, by that date, the 
competitive element had largely been removed by other factors. 
71BP 45882, Socony-Vacuum Oil Company - Four Year Agreement with Supplementary Freight Saving Economies. 
72BP 43853, Oil Industry - Intercompany Relations: War Period and Post-war Problems, draft 
agreement between Shell and A. I. O. C. 
73BP 71480, Company War Record, Chapter Four, Distribution, Section 4.4j. 
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the United States Gulf prices on the basis that freight costs to the United Kingdom would be 
lower since it was closer. On the same basis, they tried to purchase at prices below Gulf 
parity from Abadan since it was more distant. Furthermore, exchanges involving the sharing 
of joint freight savings had always led to a payment being made to the Asiatic. 75 
The loss of Rangoon after the invasion of Burma in February 1942 eliminated the 
production of the Burmah Oil Company. Under the Burmah-Shell Agreement for the Indian 
market which came into force in 1928, Burmah were entitled to supply up to the total 
requirements of any grade of petroleum from indigenous production. Moreover, they could 
bring up to half of the requirements of benzine and kerosene from any source. In practice, 
the balance was imported by the Asiatic and the Anglo-Iranian on a fifty-fifty basis. 76 
Unable to maintain their production Burmah approached the other two companies for a 
modification which was agreed later in 1942. Due to tanker shortages, exchanges were 
carried out from Abadan at the new international price charged to Socony-Vacuum and 
Asiatic. 'n In sum, the As Is price formula had been modified, but not destroyed, by the war. 
Supplies from Abadan substituting for Dutch East Indian oil arrived on India's west 
coast (Bombay) rather than its east coast (Calcutta). 78 In the context of Japanese success in 
Asia, Shell, Burmah, and Anglo-Iranian arrived at a `Joint Statement of Aims'. It confirmed 
that the companies would not take advantage of each other in the wartime situation and that 
74BP 65360, Asiatic and AIOC Reciprocal Supply Arrangements. 
75BP 71480, Company War Record, Chapter Four, Distribution, Section 4.4. j. 
76BP 37143, Fraser to Eady (enclosing note on India), 20 December 1944. 77BP 71480, Company War Record, Chapter Four, Distribution, Section 4.4. k.. 
78She11 SC7, P3/1, Faulkner to Sir D. Monteath, India Office, Supply of Petroleum Products to India, 18 May 1942. 
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they would try and re-establish market positions. 79 This, of course, implied the re- 
establishment of As Is market share. However, total trade in India by the middle of 1944 
was seventy per cent higher than in 1939. Shell felt that these special arrangements should 
be discontinued, and called for a reversion to the basic agreement from the beginning of 
1945. Godber confessed, 
My feelings I must admit are also somewhat reinforced by the knowledge that 
your Company's large interests in the Anglo-Iranian must be providing you 
with a very considerable set off to your loss of revenue from Burma, whereas 
our Group's losses of production have no similar compensation. 8° 
The question of Indian oil, and the Burmah-Shell agreement was linked to the wider 
issues of the Far Eastern trade and also involved Socony-Vacuum and Caltex. Thus, in spite 
of inadequate information - "largely because the transport has been in the hands of the 
Americans, it has been impossible for any reliable information to be obtained" - Shell felt 
that "we ought not any longer to defer getting together to agree upon some arbitrary figures 
of trade over the past three years which could reasonably be regarded as China trade and 
consequently as calling for adjustment between the companies interested in the Indian trade 
and those interested in the trade of China. "8' In their war with Japan Chinese armed forces 
were being supplied from India. The use of a formula basis for apportionment of trade 
would be extended to Socony-Vacuum and Caltex. 
Since both the S. V. O. C. and Caltex are participants with us in the China trade 
both the American companies will be entitled to retain the proceeds of their 
Indian trade which would then be regarded as having accrued to their China 
business... The position as between us and the American companies is that, 
79BP 106600, Joint Statement of Aims, 30 September 1942. The pattern of their co-operation in 
1938 is clarified in BP 59544, while BP 53131 provides a more general account. BP 1474 contains a 
copy of the original agreement of 20 March 1928. 
80Shel SC7, P2/2, Godber to RI. Watson, 5 Febraury 1945. 
81Shell SC7, P2/2, Godber to RI. Watson, 5 Febraury 1945. 
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whereas we have a complete understanding with the S. V. O. C., we cannot say 
the same of Caltex and I can see no prospect of reaching agreement with that 
company either in respect of what share of the trade is to be regarded as their 
due or in respect of their past overtrading and how it is to be settled between 
us. 82 
Godber's suggestion was that if Burmah settled with Shell for both India and China, 
then Shell would settle with Socony-Vacuum. Caltex continued to cause problems because 
of their tendency to break quotas. Finally, in 1946, they tried to leave the wartime machinery 
which had curtailed, to a considerable extent, their freedom of action. In 1946, a Shell 
memorandum observed that, "Caltex have now advised that they can no longer continue to 
agree to the existing principle for division of imports, in territories where such a ruling is not 
imposed by the existence of Government pools or other regulations. "83 Shell's negative 
reaction towards this suggestion is explicable in terms of self-interest - the almost certain 
loss of market share while they were rebuilding their production facilities in East Asia. 
However, it is also explicable in terms of a conception of the general interest, an interest that 
was protected through cooperation between the companies leading to balanced rather than 
cut-throat competition. This line of argument becomes more plausible when one recalls that 
the reasons for the poor relations which Standard-Vacuum and Anglo-Iranian suffered with 
Caltex were the result of the latter's tendency not to cooperate. When referring to the Caltex 
proposal for unilateral secession from the machinery, the memorandum warns: 
6 
This would be a confession of failure on the part of industry and certainly a 
retrograde step at a time when every effort is being made to maintain free and 
competitive trading. It is certainly no wish therefore to continue controls, or to 
avoid free and open competition between parties, that prompts the request by 
O. S. C. [Overseas Supply Committee] for continued cooperation but merely the 
fear or certainty of a breakdown, which might in fact result in undue extension 
and re-imposition of more than is necessary. 84 
82Shell SC7, P2/2, Godber to R. I. Watson, 5 Febraury 1945. 
83Shell SC7, P3/2, Richardson to Keefe, 7 August 1946. Attached Memorandum, 7 August 1946,2. 
84She11 SC7, P3/2, Richardson to Keefe, 7 August 1946. Attached Memorandum, 7 August 1946,3. 
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This was a pertinent fear in the post-war period, which is examined in the next 
chapter. But during the war itself the emergency conditions had deterred Governments from 
probing too closely into corporate plans. Reliance on the companies gave them a key role in 
agenda-setting and confirmed their control of information. On some occasions, their inter- 
firm agreements set the agenda and were adopted through the relevant official channels. An 
agreement for sharing tankers between the companies was adopted without any change by 
the Petroleum Administrator for War as Plan Number 26 by the Near East and Far East 
Committee. As discussed in the previous chapter, this sub-committee of the Foreign 
Operations Committee was closely associated with the industry. The Plan reads, 
It is proposed as a necessary and essential... measure and to facilitate the 
exchange of tanker tonnage that in order to maintain adequately with the 
tonnage available the most satisfactory level of stocks in all markets with as 
little as possible disturbance to the interests of the Companies involved, the 
tanker tonnage used by all the above Companies serving the Far East and Near 
East territories shall be shared in such a manner as to allow each Company to 
maintain their relative market position in each field with their own produced, 
purchased or otherwise obtained supplies from broadly speaking nearest 
available sources. It is understood that the tanker tonnage thus to be shared 
will be that available after allocating to parties not subscribing to this 
agreement sufficient tonnage to maintain their relative market position-85 
Each company was to make a joint monthly forecast for three months ahead from 
December 1941. Three things were involved: opening stocks at beginning of three month 
period, estimated monthly omake, and tanker arrivals required month by month. This was to 
be part of a joint composite picture within local Government targets for consumption and 
stock levels, described as a "proper relative position and a safe working stock. " The 
allocation of tankers would take place as London and New York continued to share a 
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complete list of all vessels with information about cargo capacity, speed and location for two 
zones - Near East Zone (Abadan / Suez / Haifa / Bahrain) or Far East Zone (Netherlands 
East Indies / Borneo / Rangoon). Further, the home office of each company would have its 
own loading schedule based on tanker arrivals required. 86 
This example shows the interrelationship between the principle of the `twin 
committee' system in defiance of some United States public authorities examined in the 
previous chapter, the central position of the company experts within the Allied cooperation, 
and the continuing development of private cooperation during the war. The war certainly 
disrupted many of the pre-war arrangements, but this only meant that the form which 
cooperation took changed; it did not mean that cooperation ended. 
5.6 CONCLUSION 
The war was a catalyst for the breakdown of the As Is agreements. These had been 
designed as a buffer against the Depression and to contain the growth of Middle Eastern oil 
which, being cheaper to exploit, threatened established market positions. During the 1930s 
this system worked fairly well and the contact among these corporate diplomats was the 
basis for the Allied oil committees. It has been assumed that the As Is system simply 
collapsed during the war because oil supply was a matter for Allied cooperation rather than 
interfirm cooperation. However the oilmen managed the Allied cooperation; thus, many of 
the same individuals were able simultaneously to manage both Allied cooperation and 
"Shell SC7/ P26/2, Memorandum. Scheme for Sharing Available Tanker Tonnage in Eastern Areas 
between Shell, Anglo-Iranian, Burmah Oil Company, Standard-Vacuum, Socony Vacuum and Caltex 
companies. Shell SC7, P21 has a copy of the Petroleum Administrator for War Plan, Number 26. 86Sh 
,U SC7/ P26/2, Memorandum. Scheme for Sharing Available Tanker Tonnage in Eastern Areas between Shell, Anglo-Iranian, Burmah oil Company, Standard-Vacuum, Socony Vacuum and Caltex 
companies. 
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ongoing interfirm cooperation. In brief, this chapter establishes that specific As Is 
arrangements and more broadly conceived private cooperative activity continued after 1939. 
There were changes to the As Is inspired agreements, in part due to the exigencies of 
war, but also because of pressures building from the anticipated post-war competitive edge 
of Middle East oil over production from the Americas, and the result of these pressures was 
a trade war between the companies. Yet in spite of breaches of specific agreements, the 
norm of private agreement remained. The aim of the trade war was the creation of a new 
order, not the end of private international order. Through their role in supply matters the 
trade war between the companies became an element in British foreign oil policy. Yet this 
factor in British foreign policy would have remained obscure without an investigation of the 
company records. Since consideration of the trade war was an important element in the 
minds of the foreign policy decision-making and implementing company officials it 
becomes harder to disentangle the threads of national and corporate policy. The trade war 
affected many of the schemes for private global governance during the Second World War. 
Officials in the United Kingdom were generally unconcerned about private arrangements. In 
the United States, however, the public authorities took a much more regulatory approach. 
The Justice Department became involved in an investigation of the role of the United States 
companies during the war. In the post-war era they were to launch criminal suits against the 
companies. Both the State Department and the Petroleum Reserves Corporation also 
proposed various public measures which would lead to the termination of the society of 
majors, which are examined in the next chapter. In this way, the trade war also impacted 
upon schemes for private global governance of oil in the post-war period. 
153 
The intermingling of corporate and national goals shows the limits of the assumption 
that state policies are the product of rational procedures by state actors to discern the 
national interest. It squarely poses the question of whose interest is the `national ` interest. 
Another theoretical issue is that the national interest may not be established by any kind of 
decision at all; it may be established in the process of implementation. In other words, 
British policy regarding As Is activities was what the companies made of it - it was what 
they were doing. There is a link between the main theoretical and historical point. The 
laissez-faire attitude of the British state with regard to the companies provided them with a 
wide scope for implementing policy which, in practice, meant establishing policy. One of 
the policies was to negotiate for the continuance of the As Is arrangements during the trade 
`war' sparked by wartime conditions which accelerated the growing importance of Middle 
East oil. 
From the late 1920s till the mid-1950s (the terminal date for this thesis) the 
companies constantly developed and reshaped their collaborative global web. A thread of 
interconnections was woven by the interlocking directorates in the joint ventures. "The 
boards of directors that manage the labyrinth of foreign corporations, which are jointly 
owned by the major international oil companies, provide organisational opportunities for 
joint action and the establishment of a common oil policy throughout the world. "87 When it 
seemed that the United States Supreme Court would begin to take action against the 
international oil cartel in the late 1940s, senior managers at Anglo-Iranian balked. After 
American overtures in As Is and the Mesopotamian concession, Anglo-Iranian "had then 
gone on building a barrier against unrestricted competition with the waste and price cutting 
87FTC, Report, 31. 
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which it implied... Sir William Fraser had taken an active part from 1928 onwards in 
formulating this policy and in endeavouring to preserve the security of the structure which 
had been thereby erected. It was hardly fair to expect him to take the first step in destroying 
what he himself had helped to build, merely because a democratic Supreme Court in the 
United States had placed a new and radical interpretation upon an old law. "88 
88BP 43855, Kuwait Oil Company, Note, Folder 10/3. 
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CHAPTER SIX: LAW AND GOVERNANCE OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL OIL INDUSTRY IN THE POST-WAR 
PERIOD: PRIVATE ARRANGEMENTS AND THE MYTH OF 
AMERICAN HEGEMONY 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
In 1944 and 1945 two separate Anglo-American Oil Agreements were signed. 
However, the failure to secure Congressional ratification meant that the necessary 
enabling legislation was absent. Thus, the Agreements never passed into law. This is one 
reason why scholars have relatively overlooked them. The only existing detailed study is 
based exclusively on United Kingdom and United States Government archives and the 
archives of public figures. Corporate archives have not been used. 1 A study of the events 
surrounding the negotiations and the reasons for the non-ratification by the Senate sheds 
light on the processes of foreign policy. The bureaucratic rivalry between the Petroleum 
Reserves Corporation (PRC) and the State Department and the influence of lobby groups 
in the United States political system were important factors during the negotiations. On 
the British side the Treasury, Foreign Office and Ministry of Fuel and Power were all 
involved. Also important was the role of Anglo-Iranian and Shell in the British foreign 
policy process. The contrast between the process in the United Kingdom and the United 
States is instructive because the different treatment of the firms impacted on the 
negotiations and their outcome. ' 
The British intended to promote greater American company participation in the 
Middle East through parent Government tolerance of inter-company agreements along 
the lines of the pre-war informal entente. The chief importance of these talks lay in their 
articulation of transnational law. Such law governs those situations where neither 
domestic nor public international law are appropriate, for instance, in cases of 
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nationalisation. 2 Bull had argued that international law contributed to international order 
in three ways - it identified the basic principle of organisation, stated the basic rules of 
co-existence, and mobilised compliance with the rules of international society. 3 The 
Agreements first clarified that the international oil industry would be populated by 
privately managed firms; second, that it would be regulated and re-shaped from within to 
develop a new balance of power to underpin the society of majors; and finally, that it 
was lawful to relax the Red Line agreement effectively limiting American participation 
in the Middle East as a prelude to creating new legal instruments to include the 
Americans so that the trade war could end. 
According to Claire Cutler, "the law merchant is a crucial mediator of domestic 
and global political/legal orders. It establishes the fundamental rules governing private 
property and contractual rights and obligations operative across the full range of 
international commercial activity. "4 It provides for the extraterritorial application of 
national commercial laws, but without direct Governmental regulation. As such it is part 
of the "embedded liberalism" which John Ruggie argued characterised the early post-war 
period. This combined domestic interventionism to support the national economy and 
multilateral liberalism to promote world economic growths However, the role of private 
power in the construction of global authority has been overlooked as realists restrict 
study to official Governmental instruments. This has also led to overlooking the 
resources of the firms. They played an important role in the international negotiations 
which led to the Anglo-American Oil Agreements, and together with the British 
1Michael B. Stoff, OiL War and American Security: The Search for a National Policy on Foreign 
Oil. 1941-1947 Yale historical publications, no. 125 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980). 
2Louis Henkin, Richard Pugh, Oscar Schachter, and Hans Smit, 2d ed. International Law: Cases 
and Materials, American Casebook Series (St Paul. MN.: West Publishing, 1987), 1128.1130. 
3Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society A Study of Order in World Politics (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1977), 141. 
4Claire Cutler, "Locating `authority' in the global political economy, " presented at British 
International Studies Conference, Leeds, 15 -17 December 1997. 
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achieved their objective of a new legal order, which would not be publicly regulated. 
Working together they defeated various United States initiatives in this period intended 
to achieve greater control over the companies. The chapter divides into nine sections 
dealing with three American initiatives - the Arabian concession, the Arabian pipeline 
and the Anglo-American Oil Agreement. 
6.2 THE SAUDI ARABIAN CONCESSION 
Middle East oil was used to fuel the economic recovery in post-war Western 
Europe and conserve strategic reserves in the Americas. The expansion of Middle East 
production was, therefore, an important goal of United States post-war planning. 6 The 
Saudi Arabian concession originally held by Standard of California (Socal) was 
developed into a joint venture in 1936, when Texaco bought a half-share in the 
California Arabian Standard Oil Company (Casoc). Texaco also bought a half-share in 
Socal's Bahrain Petroleum Company (Bapco) and turned over its marketing east of Suez 
to a Bapco subsidiary, the California Texas Oil Company (Caltex). This was to prove 
important as Socal had useful connections with Government departments.? 
Socal had originally achieved the concession in 1933 because King Saud had 
been impressed that Socal was not British and because it had offered him the most 
money. 8 Financial considerations were to remain crucial to his relations with the 
companies. From 1933 to 1939 the Caltex group loaned the King over two and a half 
million dollars above the royalties and other rents accruing from the concession 
SJohn G. Ruggie, "International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the 
Postwar Economic Order, " International Qcaanization 36 (1982): 379-415,393. 
6Simon Bromley, American Hegemony and World Oil (Cambridge: Polity, 1991), 112-113. 
7Aaron Miller, Search for Security Saudi Arabian Oil and American Foreign Policy. 1939-1949 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 1980), 24. 
8Leslie McLoughlin, Ibn Saud: Founder of a Kingdom (London: Macmillan, 1993), 126-8. 
Aaron Miller, march for Security, 19-20. 
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agreement. The King could expect the company to increase these payments should he 
wish to. 9 With the cutback in production due to the closing of the Mediterranean in the 
war he did. In 1941, King Saud demanded $6 million per annum for the next five years. 
At this point the company was only paying $1.5 million in royalties. In seeking aid from 
the United States Government they approached James A. Moffett. During the First 
World War he had supervised petroleum purchases for the Allies through the United 
States Fuel Administration. At that time he was working for Jersey and after 1924 he 
became senior vice-president. In 1933 he left to work with Socal and also helped draft 
the Oil Code which introduced a measure of regulation to the domestic industry in the 
United States. "[O]ver the years Moffett became [President] Roosevelt's unofficial 
adviser on oil matters. "lo 
Another important Socal employee was Max Thornburg. Thornburg was an 
executive in the Bahrain Petroleum Company (Bapco) who continued to receive twenty- 
nine thousand dollars annually in addition to his eight thousand dollar Government 
salary. Though this practice was not unusual for senior company executives, it was 
usually revealed. The concealment in this--case may be explained by the fact that 
Thornburg continued to see himself as a company man. The copy of an exchange with 
Socal vice-president R. C. Stoner about a Government-sponsored project in Saudi Arabia 
is revealing. "I don't see any good coming out of getting another man [a non-company 
man] into our part of the picture. And, of course, his interests are not ours. "" Unlike 
Ickes' deputy, Ralph Davies, also of Socal, who withdrew from any issue which might 
affect his company and was consequently sacked after the war, Thornburg actively 
pushed Socal interests. 
9Rodgers memorandum, 27 April 1944, reprinted in Petroleum Agreements with Saudi Arabia, 
80th Congress, 2d session, Washington, 1948, hereafter cited as Arabian Oil Hearings, 25380-87. 
10Michael Stoff, Oil. War and American Security, 48; Benjamin Shwadran, The Middle East. Oil 
and the Great Powers (New York, Praeger, 1955), 315-317. 
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Thornburg became the petroleum adviser to the State Department in July 1941. 
His job was to assist Herbert Feis in the accumulation of strategic raw materials and 
advise the State Department generally. 12 He quickly began, in the words of his 
immediate senior Feis, "operating as a semi-independent branch of the department. "13 
His expertise enabled him to draft the contours of policy within the department. The 
internal Governmental struggle with the Office of the Petroleum Co-ordinator, where 
Ickes and Davies were based, only increased his influence within the State Department 
until he was asked to resign in December 1943 by Secretary of State Cordell Hull when 
the payments from his company became known. 
63 PETROLEUM RESERVES CORPORATION 
The State Department proposed setting up a Petroleum Reserves Corporation 
(PRC), a Government body to purchase options on overseas oil starting with Arabian oil. 
After hearing of these proposals from the State Department Ickes, the Petroleum 
Administrator for Oil, sent his own proposals to Roosevelt which entailed the federal 
control of oil, which he had wanted from the early days of the New Deal. "Mr Ickes is an 
honest believer in the necessity of extending Federal control over the oil industry. " 14 His 
version of the PRC would not merely purchase oil; it would also own shares in the oil 
companies and manage them. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had an even more interventionist 
plan, adding a certain twist to Ickes' proposal by suggesting that the PRC should also 
negotiate a new concession agreement in Saudi Arabia. The inter-departmental 
11Thornburg to Reginald Stoner, 29 September 1941, reprinted in Arabian Oil Hearings, 25444- 
5. 
12On Thornburg, Arabian Oil Hearings, 25272,25273,24857,25213. 
13MyChae1 Stoff, Oil. War and American Security, 66. 




committee that sorted through these three visions of the PRC broadly came out in favour 
of Ickes' plans. 15 
Ickes was very keen to remove the restrictions of the pre-war agreements, an 
objective shared by all five American majors. The Red Line agreement which was linked 
to the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC), prohibited members from seeking other 
concessions within the area of the Red Line, except through the IPC. This particularly 
affected Jersey and Socony-Vacuum who were part of IPC, but were also interested in 
expanding their concessions. Socal and Texaco - the Caltex Group - continued to 
develop an advantage through their defection from pre-war agreements. They wanted 
these pre-war agreements to be reviewed. They were able to combine cheap Middle East 
production with an established marketing base in the Far East, but now wished to enter 
other markets, especially in Europe. Gulf was also critical of Angro-Iranian. In the joint 
venture which had established the Kuwait Oil Company (KOC), Anglo-Iranian was 
effectively given control of the pace of development through, for instance, clauses 
requiring Gulf to obtain oil from Anglo-Iranian in Iran and Iraq in place of increased 
Kuwaiti production. In addition, there were clauses preventing Gulf :. from selling its 
portion of the limited production from KOC in Anglo-Iranian's markets, in other words, 
all the pre-war outlets for Kuwaiti oil in the Far East. 16 
During the spring of 1943 Gulf saw the possibilities for Kuwaiti oil for the Far 
East and for Europe after the war. They tried to remove the restrictive clauses by 
informing Anglo-Iranian that the clauses were in violation of American antitrust laws. 
Anglo-Iranian remained unimpressed and refused to accept any modification until the 
scope and jurisdiction of United States legislation had been cleared through an 
intergovernmental accord. It was rightly suspected that an application of the Sherman 
15Aaron Miller, Search for Security, 74-82. 
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Antitrust Act to the Kuwait Oil Company would imply the United States claiming extra- 
territorial jurisdiction. '7 
While this would be opposed by other states, the American companies who 
would be concerned about the precedent it would set for political control of worldwide 
operations would also oppose it. On the other hand, it was clear that new international 
agreements were needed to accommodate the growing importance of Persian Gulf oil. 
Without an agreement there would continue to be wasteful trade wars of the kind 
examined in the previous chapter. These would be exacerbated in the post-war period, as 
local states would insist on higher production to secure higher royalties. An agreement 
on the scope of the antitrust legislation was a prerequisite for new global governance 
arrangements designed to facilitate and accommodate increased Persian Gulf 
production. 18 
In April 1943 Basil Jackson of Anglo-Iranian met Terry Duce of California 
Arabian Standard Oil Company (Casoc), which was a subsidiary of Standard of 
California, and, therefore, part of the Caltex interests. He was on temporary leave to 
head the Foreign Division of the Petroleum Administration for War. They decided that 
the huge quantities of post-war oil could only be managed through adjustments to the 
present regime including the clarification of the law of antitrust. In Britain, one month 
before the PRC was created, Jackson proposed an Anglo-American meeting on the basis 
that since American policy had not been fixed the British could gain a hold upon events 
through a conference. Churchill rejected the idea put forward in May 1943 as premature 
possibly because it might betray fear on the part of the British. Harold Wilkinson, the 
British Petroleum Representative, soon supported Jackson's efforts. He supported 
16pamn Miller, Search for Security, 83. 
17BP 43855, Note, "Kuwait Oil Company, " 15 July 1943. 
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Jackson's analysis that concern about domestic reserves was dominating all consideration 
of oil matters. He regarded the PRC with suspicion, describing it as a "Washington Santa 
Claus bidding for... concessions with the lush money bags of the Treasury and Fort 
Knox. " He preferred, along with Jackson, cooperation among private parties as the "only 
solid basis to a real and lasting United Nations' oil policy. " 19 
Wilkinson started activities to change British policy regarding oil talks. When 
Ickes proposed talks Wilkinson implored officials at the Ministry of Fuel and Power to 
accept this informal invitation. Meanwhile, Jackson provided copies of his 
correspondence with Fraser which had stressed the dangers of current American 
directions to Ronald Campbell, charge d'affaires at the British embassy in Washington. 
Campbell repeated the arguments, passing them off as his own and providing no 
indication for the source of his knowledge. Thus, advice from both corporate staff and 
officials in Washington dovetailed. 20 
6.4 CONFLICTS OVER MIDDLE EAST OIL IN 1943 
Some Americans continued to believe that the British were hoarding Persian 
Gulf oil in order to dominate post-war markets, although during the Second World War 
supply factors limited the usefulness of Middle East supply. These factors included the 
b 
closing of the Mediterranean, the length of the haul from the Persian Gulf to Europe, and 
the shortage of tankers. 21 Now there was a scramble for oil concessions in Iranian 
Azerbaijan. Since February 1943 there had been wooing of American companies to seek 
concessions in the northern territories of Iran by the Iranian commercial attache in 
18Daniel Yergin, The Prize: The Epic Ouest for Oil. Money and Power (London: Simon and 
Shuster, 1991), 400. 
19PRO FO 371,34210, Harold Wilkinson to Sir William Brown, September 2 1943, Wilkinson 
to Brown, 29 September 1943. 
20N ichael Stoff, Oil. War and American Security, 98-99. 
163 
Washington. From the Iranian perspective it seemed that American commercial interests 
would involve American Government support for the independence of Iran and offer a 
counterbalance to Anglo-Russian rivalry. The approach to Jersey in February was 
followed up by Standard-Vacuum, the subsidiary of Jersey and Socony-Vacuum after 
hesitation due to the bitter memories of the negotiations of 1940.22 
Nevertheless, in spite of State Department support for Standard-Vacuum, Anglo- 
Russian objections forced the Iranians to suspend the offer. Although it culminated in a 
non-event the scramble for Iranian petroleum resources was important. In the short term 
it was one of the factors precipitating the Anglo-American oil talks of 1944, while in the 
longer term it contributed to the Azerbaijan crisis of 1946. The Iranians failed to realise 
that the Soviets would not so easily be thwarted in their attempt to maintain a sphere of 
influence in northern Iran. United States authorities failed to see how their support for oil 
interests would undermine their efforts to protect Iranian territorial integrity and 
sovereignty by provoking Soviet fears along its southern flank. Furthermore, the 
possibility of losing oil to the United States worried the directors of Shell who, having 
received the assent of the British Government sent their own representative to Tehran in 
November 1943. In particular, Shell's move was supported by the Petroleum Division 
and the Treasury who, motivated by the dollar shortage and debt to the United States, 
could not afford to lose any source of sterling oil. 23 
21PRO FO 371,34210, Butler minute, "America and Oil, " 1 October 1943. 
22PRO FO 371,47685, Wilkinson to Lloyd, 12 December 1943. Benjamin Shwadran, The 
Middle East. Oil and the Great Powers, chapter four. 
23PRO FO 371,35127, Maurice Peterson to William Brown, 23 September 1943; PRO FO 371, 
35127, Peterson minute, 25 October 1943; PRO FO 371,35127, Hankey minute, 23 October 
1943; PRO FO 371,35127, Peterson minute, 23 September 1943; PRO FO 371,35127, Lloyd to 
Law, 20 October 1943. 
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The Foreign Office argued that the Shell bid was imperative since the United 
States would not share the concession with the British should they win it. 24 At the same 
time most officials in the Foreign Office agreed that, if necessary, an Anglo-American 
consortium could be created after Shell had won the concession. The heart of their 
proposal was for joint ownership and management of the concessions. Indeed, the 
Petroleum Division took the same view. His fellow directors and the officials in the 
Petroleum Division accepted Wilkinson's warnings. Geoffrey Lloyd, the minister in 
charge of petroleum matters in the Ministry of Fuel and Power, followed the view of his 
department and, suggested that British policy "should aim at an orderly development 
with considerable intertwining of British and American interests. "25 The two 
departments however differed on the tactics of Shell's concession seeking. For whereas 
the Petroleum Division were convinced that the United States would never share a 
concession, and so Shell must apply in their own right even if they would later share the 
concession, the Foreign Office felt that the Petroleum Division could have proposed joint 
application. 26 This Anglo-American competition over petroleum resources increased 
Soviet interest in Iran's northern provinces which helped provoke the Azerbaijan crisis 
which Louise Fawcett has identified as among the first of the Cold War crises, and 
which is examined in the next chapter. 
During October 1943 William Brown, the Deputy Secretary for Petroleum 
produced a draft set of principles, which would contribute to cooperation between both 
Governments and their companies. 27 The idea of an oil pact was supported by the 
Foreign Office, which also had plans for civil aviation, international monetary policy and 
24PRO FO 371,42685, Hankey minute, 18 January 1944; PRO FO 371,42686, Butler minute, 
26 January 1944. 
25PRO FO 371,34210, Lloyd to Churchill, 22 October 1943. 
26PRO FO 371,35127, Law minute, 15 October 1943; FO PRO 371,34210, Hankey minute, 30 
October 1943. 
27PRO FO 371,34210, Butler minute, "America and oil, " 1 October 1943, P. Mason minute, 8 
October 1943; PRO FO 371,34210, Brown, "Draft Oil Principles, " 5 November 1943. 
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collective security, and feared that friction over oil now threatened all schemes for post- 
war economic cooperation. 28 However, the plan was resisted by some in the Petroleum 
Division such as Bridgeman who observed that, "It would be unfortunate if we had to 
regard it as an accepted principle that no British interest in the Middle East is safe unless 
an American company is established next door to give it the necessary support. "29 There 
were also disgruntled noises from the industry. Godber, like Jackson, wanted the 
companies to retain the initiative in Anglo-American cooperation over oil, yet whereas 
Basil Jackson and Anglo-Iranian in general were willing for Whitehall to frame general 
rules, Godber wanted in the words of Michael Stoff, "first to transact, then to consult. " 
This, of course, was precisely the strategy which Godber had employed earlier over 
product exchanges. Stoff explains this approach to the international Agreement as "a 
strategy that typified the less intimate relations his company had always had with 
Whitehall. "30 
Early in October 1943 Godber observed that the issue of greater United States 
participation in Middle East oil development "is not one in which the Governments of 
the two countries should plunge, but that it should be in the first instance the subject of 
negotiations between the British, Dutch and American oil companies. "31 If the American 
Government had not intervened in the industry or at least not threatened to do so, then 
the broad tendency of the British Government would have been to accept private cartel 
10 
arrangements. They had worked easily with the cartels and had benefited from this close 
working relationship. The response to the creation of the PRC was to enter into talks in 
order to protect the system from Government-sponsored competition. 
28PRO FO 371,34210, Mason minute, 13 October 1943; PRO FO 371,34210, Scott minute, 14 
October 1943; PRO FO 371,34210, Law minute, 15 October 1943. 
29PRO F0371,34210, Butler to Campbell, 21 October 1943; PRO FO 371,42690, Bridgeman 
to LeRougetel, 17 March 1944. 
30Michael Stoff, Coil. War and American Security, 108. 
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6.5 EARLY INITIATIVES FOR AN OIL AGREEMENT 
Late in October 1943 Petroleum Secretary Lloyd recommended to Churchill that 
the British invite the United States to discuss oil policy. According to Neville Butler of 
the North American Department of the Foreign Office Churchill turned down Lloyd's 
suggestion on the advice of Lord Leathers who recommended leaving discussions to the 
companies. 32 The visit of a State Department mission to London to discuss Anglo- 
American problems in the Middle East provided an opportunity to discuss the oil issue. 
The Foreign Office seized the initiative. Charge d'affaires Ronald Campbell informed 
the United States that "we and the Oil Board would be very ready to have explanatory 
talks regarding the general principles which our two Governments would adopt towards 
oil resources in all parts of the world, if the United States Government cared to send 
representatives of their Petroleum Administrator for War with Mr Murray [the Near East 
Division chief who accompanied the group] and his party. "33 
Deadlock over the Petroleum Reserves Corporation (PRC) led the Americans to 
prefer an Oil Agreement. Indeed, Ickes claimed that the PRC was simply a means of 
increasing leverage in the talks. 34 "It was indicated in subsequent discussions between 
Mr Ickes and Mr Wilkinson, the British Petroleum Representative, that the arrangement 
between the Petroleum Reserves Corporation and the American oil companies is still in a 
very nebulous state... he hoped that the injection of this somewhat explosive proposition 
would serve to overcome the inertia which he felt was retarding the initiation of Anglo- 
American oil discussions. "35 Since March 1943 the United States Government had 
begun looking more favourably on the idea of an oil pact. Feis supported such talks. 
31 PRO FO 371,34210, Butler minute, "America and Oil, " 1 October 1943. 
32PRO FO 371,34210, Butler minute, "Oil, " 4 November 1943. 
33PRO FO 371,34210, Scott mission, 4 November 1943; PRO FO 371,34975, Campbell to 
Foreign Office, 2 November 1943. 
34Aaron Miller, Searc Secunty, 89. 
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They would prevent misunderstandings about American intentions from the Allies - 
Russian and British - and also provide an alternative since the attempt to acquire a 
company had failed. Finally, it would establish the primary role for foreign oil policy 
with the State Department. However, Ickes had also been persuaded of the usefulness of 
the talks through Terry Duce of Socal who had been persuaded by Jackson of the need 
for rationalising oil development along the Persian Gulf. 36 They had agreed on the 
problems caused by antitrust legislation and pressures from host Governments, which 
would require a clear policy from the parent Governments. Ickes agreed to the talks but 
continued his search for the unilateral solution - Government ownership of Caltex's 
Arabian subsidiary, Casoc, along the lines of the British Government ownership of the 
Anglo-Iranian. This analogy was false since while the relationship was based on close 
support there was no Government interference in Anglo-Iranian; it was a purely financial 
'sleeping partnership' as the British kept repeating to the United States in 1943 and 
1944.37 
Moreover, the American industry was set against the PRC. The Foreign 
Operations Committee on which Jackson and Wilkinson also sat reported in November 
that private initiative was the best for oil development, and in December the Petroleum 
Industry War Council asked for the federal Government to stay out of the international 
industry. Even the small producers in the Independent Petroleum Association of America 
passed a resolution in December repudiating overseas Government ownership. 38 In 
December 1943 Hull requested talks with the British and by February 7 the British had 
agreed to meet. 39 During the first few months of 1944 Ickes and Hull took their cases to 
35BP 43761, Preliminary discussions, 7 March 1944,13. 
36Mchael Stoff, Oil. War and American Security, 112. 
37PRO FO 371,42690, Wright to Eden, 13 March 1944; PRO FO 371,34210, Wilkinson to 
Brown, 2 September 1943. 
38p&On Miller, Sc=h for Security, 78-82. 
39PRO FO 371,42685, Memorandum by Ministry of Fuel and Power, "Anglo-American Oil 
Policy, " circa January 1944; PRO FO 371,42686, Law to Lloyd, 18 January 1944; PRO FO 371, 
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the president. This bureaucratic battle was sorted out in the compromise presented to the 
British side which, however, prejudged the site and level of the talks, issues which the 
British had thought were open-40 The main compromise was that Hull would head a 
cabinet-level delegation to the oil conference and that Ickes would serve as vice- 
chairman. The British did not welcome these changes from the original Hull offer. 4' 
When the Hull offer had originally been made in December 1943, the British had 
assumed that it would involve a staff level meeting in London where they would have 
ready access to the corporate teams of Anglo-Iranian and Shell. These technicians would 
be shielded from the political pressures of Washington in an election year, and going to 
America to discuss oil might be interpreted as expressing a change of leadership in the 
Middle East. 42 
6.6 PROCEDURAL DISCUSSIONS PRIOR TO THE TALKS 
Foreign oil was crucial to Britain's future after the war. With declining coal 
b 
reserves and no known petroleum resources, the United Kingdom depended on oil from 
abroad to meet its industrial and military requirements. Oil was also one of the country's 
most valuable overseas sources of income. Petroleum sales generated much capital for 
British firms and tax revenues for the British Government. Of immediate importance 
they served as a vital source of foreign exchange. The United States policy of holding 
down British gold and dollar balances, the blow of a recent forced reduction in Lend- 
42685, LeRougetel to Law, 25 January 1944; PRO FO 371,42685, LeRougetel minute, circa 
January 1944. 
40PRO FO 371,42687, Halifax to Foreign Office, 15 February 1944; PRO FO 371,42688, 
Halifax to Foreign Office, 20 February 1944. 
41PRO FO 371,42687, Halifax to Foreign Office, 15 February 1944; PRO FO 371,42688, 
Halifax to Foreign Office, 18 February 1944. 
42PRO FO 371,42685, Memorandum by Ministry of Fuel and Power, "Anglo-American Oil 
Policy, " circa January 1944; PRO FO 371,42685, LeRougetel minute, 13 January 1944; PRO FO 
371,42686, Lloyd to Law, 20 January 1944; PRO FO 371,39984, Hankey minute, 26 January 1944; PRO FO 371,42688, Law to Churchill, 19 February 1944. 
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Lease assistance, and repayment of the dollar debt shaped the policy options with regard 
to foreign oi1. a3 
The British remained suspicious of American intentions. On three occasions 
there had been demands for British oil concessions. In October 1943 James Byrnes, the 
director of the Office of War Mobilization, had suggested one-third of the Iranian 
concession as payment for the Lend-Lease petroleum products. In February 1944, Harold 
Ickes suggested that the British turn over the Anglo-Iranian half-share of the Kuwait Oil 
Company to the Petroleum Reserves Corporation. Finally, there had even been demands 
for British oil concessions in a Congressional report. 44 
However, in reality it seems that the United States preferred cooperation to 
compensation. In January 1944 Roosevelt told Halifax that he wished to pool resources. 
Ickes followed with a suggestion for developing Persian Gulf oil resources under the 
aegis of a joint Anglo-American Middle Eastern Holding Company. 45 While these 
comments may have reflected long term aims, in the short term they reassured the British 
about American intentions in the conference. 46 
Apart from these carrots the United States also employed sticks. On February 6 
1944 Ickes announced that the Petroleum Reserves Corporation was building a pipeline 
5 
43PRO FO 371,42685, Memorandum by Ministry of Fuel and Power, "Anglo-American Oil 
Policy, " circa January 1944; PRO FO 371,42686, Petroleum Division memorandum, "Anglo- 
American Oil Policy, " 27 January 1944; PRO FO 371,42687, Beaverbrook to Churchill, 14 
February 1944; PRO FO 371,42688, Memorandum by Albert V. Alexander, First Lord of the 
Admiralty, "Oil Conference with the United States of America"; PRO FO 371,42686, Petroleum 
Division Memorandum, "Anglo-American Oil Policy, " 27 January 1944; PRO FO 371,42691, 
Petroleum Division Memorandum, "Oil Policy, " March 1944. 
44Byrnes to Roosevelt, October 15,1943, reprinted in Arabian Oil Hearings, 25430; PRO FO 
371,42687, Halifax to Foreign. Office, 11 February 1944; PRO FO 371,42688, Halifax to 
Foreign Office, 20 February 1944. 
45PRO FO 371,42685, Halifax to Foreign Office, 19 January, 1944; PRO FO 371,42687, 
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46PRO FO 371,42688, Halifax to Foreign Office, 18 February 1944. 
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from the Persian Gulf to the Mediterranean. 47 The cost of the pipeline was estimated at 
between $130 million and $165 million. In return, the Government would get an 
underground reserve of one billion barrels, which the Government could purchase at a 
discount of twenty-five per cent of market price in the United States. The Government 
would also enjoy a veto on the sales of the production to other countries and in the case 
of war it would enjoy pre-emptive rights to buy all the oil produced. Moreover, the 
charges for use of the pipeline would repay the investment in twenty-five years. 48 
The origins of the pipeline lay with the industry. Max Thornburg, the former 
petroleum adviser, now with Aramco, mentioned the need for State Department support 
to secure the necessary transit rights in December 1943. Ickes's PRC soon became 
involved however. Everette Lee DeGolyer was the geological consultant to the PRC His 
report of January 1944 concerning the shifting of the centre of world production from the 
Americas to the Middle East also contributed to Ickes' determination to enter the Middle 
East. DeGolyer was a pioneer in the study of geophysics. He had been the chief geologist 
of the British firm, the Mexican Eagle, which had been owned by Lord Pearson. When it 
was sold on to Shell, DeGolyer left and started his own oil exploration firm. His views 
about the relationship between British oil interests and political interests were published 
in 'Time'. He argued that, "It is difficult for our people to realise the degree to which the 
Chancellories of the great European nations are willing to interfere particularly in 
support of the business interests of their nationals or the degree of economic vassalage 
accepted by the smaller states of the Persian Gulf in the treaties by which they are Allied 
to Britain. Able as American business may be, it cannot support itself against such 
inequal ic] competition. "49 
47PR0 FO 371,42688, Halifax to Foreign Office, 18 February 1944. 
48PRO FO 371,42687, Halifax to Foreign Office, 11 February 1944. 
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Commodore Carter, the executive officer of the Army-Navy Petroleum Board 
who worked so closely with Wilkinson as discussed in chapter four, was another oil 
man. He provided a means for the PRC to become involved for on returning from Saudi 
Arabia he suggested PRC ownership of the pipeline. The various agencies of the 
Government supported the pipeline agreement but the industry was hostile. Apart from 
the three companies involved - Gulf in the Kuwait Oil Company, Socal and Texaco in 
Aramco - the industry condemned the proposal. The Texas Railroad Commission set up 
under the New Deal and the wartime cooperation with the Government both involved 
public-private cooperation. However, in these cases under various umbrella 
organisations the industry still made national policy for oil. The Government supervised 
but did not direct policy. The Arabian pipeline would represent an entering wedge for 
Government interference in the industry. so 
The Pipeline polarised the Allies. Certain Americans continued to maintain that 
the British were deliberately keeping production down in the Middle East. " On the other 
side, the Petroleum Division noted that industry criticism in the United States might kill 
it. 52 But some in Britain adopted a less hostile attitude, arguing that a Government- 
sponsored pipeline terminus might involve the United States in sharing great power 
obligations in the Mediterranean. S3 On 19 February 1944 Anthony Eden reminded the 
War Cabinet of the wider importance of oil. Outstanding issues included international 
49Everette Lee DeGolyer, Time, April 3,1944, quoted in Richard O'Connor, The Oil Barons: 
Men of Greed and Grandeur (Hart Davis MacGibbon: London, 1972), 341. 
50Michael Stoff, Oil. War and American Security, 134-7,140-2. 
51PRO FO 371,42688, Wilkinson to HE., The Ambassador, 16 February 1944; PRO FO 371, 
42691, Petroleum Division memorandum, "Oil Policy, " 17 March 1944, especially part 7; PRO 
FO 371,34978, Memorandum, "Development of Oil Supplies in the Middle East, " 11 January 
1943; PRO FO 371,42690, Cheetham to LeRougetel, 6 March 1944. 
52PRO FO 371,42691, Petroleum Division memorandum, "Oil Policy, " 17 March 1944, 
especially part 7; PRO FO 371,42690, Hankey minute, 7 March 1944; PRO FO 371,42690; 
Cheetham to LeRougetel, 6 March 1944. 
53PRO FO 371,42693, Report by the Chiefs of Staff, "Strategic Aspects of the Discussion on 
Oil Policy, " 5 April 1944; PRO FO 371,42686, Hankey minute, 5 February 1944; PRO FO 371, 
42686, Butler minute, 24 February 1944. 
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monetary policy, civil aviation, and Lend-Lease. "In these circumstances to deny the 
United States Government an opportunity even to discuss oil problems would almost 
certainly prejudice the development of our oil industry after the war... and would also 
play into the hands of all enemies of Anglo-American co-operation. 1154 The British had 
agreed to the talks and now tried to adjust the terms. Lord Halifax continued trying to get 
the talks to London at the staff level, and also to exclude existing concessions from the 
discussions. 55 Churchill maintained this stance and insisted that the British were 
prepared to talk at the technical level and that no changes to concession ownership 
would be proposed. Roosevelt had argued with Churchill over their true intentions and 
the British and Americans drew lines on a map indicating their relative share of Middle 
East oil. Roosevelt realised that compromise was necessary and agreed to technical 
talks. 56 Their change in attitude was also prompted by press speculation about an Anglo- 
American rift over oil. 57 
By mid-March the Americans had selected their team. It was headed by Charles 
Rayner, the petroleum adviser to the State Department, with Ralph Davies of the PRC as 
vice-chairman. Rayner had worked for Socony; later in 1922 he became owner of an = 
`independent' in Texas. Sir William Fraser referred to him as "Charlie" in private 
correspondence, while continuing to refer to Harold Ickes as Mr Ickes. 58 Rayner knew 
the industry well. It wanted an Agreement with Britain as evidenced from a report on 6 
national oil policy submitted by the Foreign Operations Committee of the Petroleum 
Administration for War and endorsement by the National Oil Policy Committee of the 
54pR0 FO 371,42688, Eden memorandum, "Oil, " 19 February 1944. 
55PRO FO 371,42687, Halifax to Foreign Office, 15 February 1944; PRO FO 371,42688, 
Halifax to Foreign Office, 18 February 1944; PRO FO 371,42688, Halifax to Foreign Office, 18 
February 1944. 
56PRO FO 371,42689, Halifax to Foreign Office, 2 March 1944; PRO FO 371,42690, Churchill 
to Roosevelt, 6 March 1944. Daniel Yergin, The $ 401. 57PRO FO 371,42689, Halifax to Foreign Office, 2 March 1944. Aaron Miller, Search for 
urity, 102. 
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Petroleum Industry War Council. 59 Nevertheless, he knew that they would not accept 
any Agreement. In meetings in April the domestic producers stressed that they would 
suffer no interference from foreign Governments, while the majors wanted to take part in 
the negotiations directly. 60 
fo 
Officers from the British companies were automatically chosen for the 
discussions. Sir William Fraser of Anglo-Iranian and Sir Frederick Godber of Shell 
were regarded as absolutely vital to the success of the negotiations. They were 
accompanied by Sir William Brown, head of the Petroleum Division of the Ministry of 
Fuel and Power who served as chairman of the group, by the career diplomat John 
LeRoutegel, chief of the General Department of the Foreign Office, Frederic Harmer, a 
young Treasury official specialising in currency exchange, Commodore A. W. Clarke 
representing the three service departments, and Frederick C. Starling and V. S. Butler of 
the Petroleum Division. 61 
The Americans remained sceptical of such close links between Government and 
industry. The State Department pressed for a list of delegates which the Foreign Office 
provided although such a request was contrary to diplomatic protocol. The Foreign 
Office list was by name only. The Foreign Office wished "to avoid discussion as to the 
proper description to be attached to.. . Fraser and 
Godber, though there must be no doubt 
about their status as members of the official delegation. "62 American officials suspected 
the close links between state and firm in Britain. They asserted that they were "so 
intimate that it is difficult to discuss where the oil companies end and where the 
Government begins... The Government, wherever it has a shadow of influence, uses its 
59PRO FO 371,34978, Wilkinson to Starling, 3 December 1943. 
60Michael Stoff Oil. War and American Security, 153. 
61 PRO FO 371,42693. "Report by the Ministerial Oil Committee, " 5 April 1944. 
62Winant to Roosevelt, March 19 1944, FRUS (1944), volume 3,107. 
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power by fair means or underhand to secure markets or concessions for its British owned 
companies. "63 
The War Cabinet instructed the delegation that they could not make any 
commitments, that they should widen the discussions from the Middle East to the whole 
world, that they should not accept to discuss any transfer of property, that they should 
ensure no impediments to oil production to secure Britain's military and economic 
future, that there should be pledges to support each other with supply in war and support 
each other's concessions in peacetime. " This was important since the British were aware 
of the traditional support given by the State Department to oil interests and the desire of 
"securing an amelioration of the unfavorable discriminatory conditions under which 
American nationals were able to obtain rights before the war. "65 
Evaluating the talks Stoff writes that, "As with many of the Anglo-American 
negotiations carried on in the closing years of the war, the American draft served as the 
working model. Since the Americans generally had a stronger economic hand, the 
finished product followed primarily American lines, although the British were able to 
obtain some of the assurances they were seeking. "66 Though plausible, this assessment is 
hard to sustain as I will show from a detailed examination of the negotiations. 
6 
63Testimony of U. S. State Department's World War 11 Petroleum Attache in the Near East, 
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6.7 THE TECHNICAL DISCUSSIONS DURING 
THE FIRST ANGLO-AMERICAN OIL AGREEMENT 
It is interesting to examine the negotiations for the first Anglo-American Oil 
Agreement of August 1944 carefully since the second Anglo-American Oil Agreement 
of 1945 followed it fairly closely. The most significant meeting in this preparatory stage 
was the ninth, which was a review of informal talks which had concluded that oilmen 
would effectively implement the broad outlines of the Agreement, which were the 
elimination of certain public and private restrictions. 
The first technical discussions began on April 18 1944 in a one hour meeting. 
Rayner immediately relaxed the atmosphere by conceding to the British position that 
there was no shortage of oil, and the main issue was the sharing of increased production. 
He provided a Draft Memorandum of Understanding, which was the basis for the 
discussions. The main difference between the parties was that the British thought that all 
that was necessary was a broad, informal Agreement on principles with details to be left 
to the private parties, while the Americans still wanted multilateral public supervision of 
the international industry, even if they had now given up on public participation in the 
industry. They wanted "an international agreement on petroleum to which all interested 
nations would subscribe. "67 There was to be discussion on this point in the sixth and 
seventh meetings as the Americans wanted the Agreement to achieve multilateral status 
"as soon as possible. " However, the British preferred such progress to be "as soon as 
practicable" - the British view prevailed. 68 
To achieve these goals it was felt necessary to create a joint Anglo-American 
Petroleum Commission with certain defined duties and responsibilities. "We feel that the 
67BP 43730, Fraser, Visit to America, April-May 1944,3. 
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implementing procedure we have suggested is the minimum necessary for the 
application of agreed principles to specific situations. "69 However, the British 
perspective was that, "while it would be for the Governments to aim at agreement or 
broad essential principles, the filling in of the detailed background of technical and 
commercial operations can only be done through discussion between the British and 
American companies concerned. "70 
In particular, they were adamant that the Joint Commission should not have 
detailed, particularly not executive, functions - they argued that it was not practical. 
They feared the sort of control that might be envisioned vis-ä-vis the majors might 
actually fail in practise. For instance, public input into distribution problems could 
hardly lead to useful results unless there were developed such controls over 
transportation and similar distributive mechanisms as would be impracticable. To take 
responsibility for executing approved recommendations was not practical unless there 
were adequate sanctions and an enforcement machinery. It was doubtful whether either 
Government would grant to the commission requisite authority to take executive action. 
The United Kingdom delegation was inclined to favour an arrangement by which the 
proposed joint commission would have primarily a consultative or advisory function 
rather than executive responsibilities. 
The British still held to the traditional view of private international governance 
supported by Government power limited to providing support to enforce contracts. In the 
fourth meeting, 21 April, Sir William observed that the United Kingdom delegation 
would be glad to consider any proposals for a reciprocal undertaking between the two 
Governments to use every endeavour to assure to each other supplies of oil from sources 
68BP 43730, Fraser, Visit to America, April-May 1944,25,30. 
69BP 43730, Fraser, Visit to America, April-May 1944,4. 
70BP 43761, Preliminary discussions, 7 March 1944,3. 
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under their control in times of national emergency. He took the opportunity to state that 
the British would be prepared to go further than a commitment to respect all valid 
concession contracts and would be willing to undertake, so far as might be within its 
power, to ensure that the terms of such concession contracts would be covered by all 
parties involved. '' The British continued this theme in the fifth meeting, held on 22 
April. 
In that meeting the other main outstanding issue related to the composition of the 
proposed Commission. Sir William Brown argued that for membership of the proposed 
Joint Commission, "the United Kingdom participation in the Commission might 
appropriately consist of one full-time official of the British Government and three 
outstanding men with wide knowledge of the petroleum industry, these men to be drawn 
from the industry and to remain active members of the industry during their participation 
in the work of the Commission. "72 The United States preferred to leave the issue of the 
composition to the Government committees, which would ratify any proposals of these 
technical groups. 
The British continued to insist on the importance of protecting the sanctity of 
concession agreements. In the sixth meeting, on 24 April, Sir William Brown again 
urged for more support for the principle of sanctity of contract embodied in article one, 
paragraph five, of the Draft Memorandum. He suggested that it be strengthened, either 
by adding words such as "and shall use their best endeavours to ensure that the terms of 
such concession contracts are observed by the parties thereto" or perhaps more 
moderately by providing that "the Government of each country ... shall respect and 
support all valid concession contracts. " Rayner pointed out that such provisions might 
involve commitments of rather large scope and duration and would have to be 
71 BP 43730, Fraser, Visit to America, April-May 1944,16. 
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considered in the light of relevant foreign policy considerations, but agreed to take the 
amendment under advisement. 73 
The British continued to press this issue in the next meeting, held on 25 April. 
Sir William wanted assurances, which Rayner carefully avoided. Davies suggested a 
compromise. "One would require firm intervention in concession disputes, intervention 
by armed forces perhaps in certain cases. The other would require no intervention 
whatever but merely reciprocal assurances by the two Governments and their nationals 
of non-intervention with one another's contracts or rights. He thought that perhaps some 
middle ground could be reached, the terms of which would have required that the United 
States Government consider more carefully the effect of its policy and actions with 
respect to particular situations that had arisen in the past. "74 The background of this 
discussion was the different responses of the British and American Governments to the 
unilateral cancellation of the Iranian concession in 1932 and the expropriation of the 
Mexican concession in 1938. It was then proposed to discuss specific problems in small 
groups, all discussions to be held without minutes. The British requested Wilkinson's 
participation since he would have to carry on such further discussions after the British 
delegation had returned to London. A revised draft memorandum dated April 26 was 
distributed that day in the eighth meeting; all subsequent discussion was based on this 
revised draft and changes to the preamble were accepted without discussion. 75 
Small groups were constituted on an ad hoc basis to discuss current operating 
problems of mutual interest to United Kingdom and United States companies for it was 
72BP 43730, Fraser, Visit to America, April-May 1944,20. 
73BP 43730, Fraser, Visit to America, April-May 1944,25. 
74BP 43730, Fraser, Visit to America, April-May 1944,29. 
75 BP 43730, Fraser, Visit to America, April-May 1944,31. 
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S 
feared that some of these outstanding issues would provide thorny problems for the new 
Joint Commission. A review of these meetings was held in session nine. 76 
The issues raised in these informal subcommittee talks included Kuwait and Iraq. 
Reviewing these talks Davies pointed out that so long as it was recognised that the 
intercompany contractual limitation upon marketing operations of the Kuwait Oil 
Company would be inconsistent with the objectives and character of the Memorandum 
and some appropriate form of action could be initiated promptly, then the actual removal 
of the restrictive marketing clause would be a private matter for the two companies, the 
Anglo-Iranian and Gulf. Similarly, discussions took place regarding the Red Line 
agreement which had been linked to the formation of the Iraq Petroleum Company. The 
same conclusion - that these agreements were in violation of the Memorandum and 
would have to be changed accordingly promptly, but through private party negotiations - 
was reached with regard to the Iraq Petroleum Company as the Kuwait Oil Company's 
marketing provision. There was also "considerable discussion" of the restrictions 
imposed by the Indian Government on American companies, which would have to be 
reviewed should the British Government adopt the Memorandum. 77 
The minutes continue: "The items enumerated... do not constitute an exhaustive 
list-Other matters had also been taken up and satisfactorily investigated, including 
particularly political treaties and agreements in the Middle East. Mr Davies stated that 
the result of all these informal talks was the establishment of an understanding about the 
applicability of various clauses in the proposed Memorandum of Understanding to 
existing specific situations. "78 A demonstration of the remarkable degree of industry 
cooperation, which had been reached, is provided by the treatment of pipeline projects. It 
76BP 43730, Fraser, Visit to America, April-May 1944,35. 
77BP 43730, Fraser, Visit to America, April-May 1944,36. 
78BP 43730, Fraser, Visit to America, April-May 1944,37. 
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was felt that the Trans-Arabian pipeline and additional Iraq Petroleum Company pipeline 
from Kirkuk to Haifa should be referred to the Joint Commission on the basis that one of 
its main roles would be to recommend long-term rates of development and exploitation 
from various areas so that the economic merits of any proposed pipeline project could be 
judged only in the light of the probable production from the area from which the pipeline 
would originate. 79 The extent to which these informal talks were based on personalities 
is illustrated by the presentation of the pipeline talks. "Since Commodore Carter had not 
been able to be present during the entire discussion of the pipeline problem in the 
informal subcommittee meetings, Mr Davies took this occasion to ask if Commodore 
Carter had any comment to make with respect to the statement which had been made by 
Mr Davies and endorsed by Sir William Brown. " The final draft of a Memorandum of 
Understanding on petroleum was approved by a Joint Session on 29 April. 80 
6.8 FROM THE TECHNICAL DISCUSSIONS TO THE TWO AGREEMENTS 
First, Stoff acknowledges the British victory in the insertion of a clause in the 
preamble stating that petroleum supplies would be sufficient to cover demands. This 
took the teeth out of the main American concern about depleting supplies. 81 Moreover, 
the `open door' principle received affirmation in two provisions, each arising from 
charges from the British and American companies. The Americans made charges about 
the Middle East while Shell retorted that the United States Government and companies 
79BP 43730, Fraser, Visit to America, April-May 1944,37. 
80BP 43730, Fraser, Visit to America, April-May 1944,38. 
81Michael Stof Oil. War and American Security, 157; PRO FO 371,42696, Report of the Ministerial Oil Committee, "Oil Discussions with the United States Government at Washington, " 24 May 1944. 
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were trying to keep them out of Latin America. 82 Shell complained about rumours that 
the PRC wanted exclusive concession rights in Peru. 83 
Indeed, the British technicians were satisfied with the draft Agreement called the 
`Memorandum of Understanding' and urged the cabinet to finalise the international 
Agreement. 84 Beaverbrook carried on correspondence with Fraser of Anglo-Iranian. 
Fraser argued that, "I have felt bound to suggest the deletion of new oil policy as this is 
the first time I have seen consideration directed to the formulation of any national oil 
policy at all! "85 Beaverbrook replied a few days later, observing that, "your suggestions 
have been substantially adopted as oil policy. "86 The experts had considerable influence 
on the decision-making process. On two issues only the British delegation had failed. 
They had failed to obtain a clause for the mutual support of concessions in peacetime. 
However, in the American view, an international commission would prevent episodes 
such as the Mexican expropriation in the future. 87 
The other failure was more serious. Britain's currency positions after the war 
looked precarious. The Treasury had hoped to sell sterling oil in dollar areas to earn 
foreign currency and to bar dollar oil imports into Britain but that now looked as if it 
would violate the Agreement. 88 Brown tried to reassure the Treasury that the provision 
for "relevant economic factors" covered the currency position. But the Treasury wanted 
82PRO FO 371,42690, John London to Frank J. Hopwood, 3 March 1944. 
83PRO FO 371,43690, London to Hopwood, 3 March 1944; PRO FO 371,43690, Wright to 
South American Department of Foreign Office, 9 March 1944. 
84PRO FO 371,42696, Report by the Chairman of the United Kingdom Delegation, "Oil 
Policy, " 13 May 1944; PRO FO 371,42696, Minutes Ministerial Oil Committee, Meeting of 16 
May 1944; PRO FO 371,42696, Minutes Ministerial Oil Committee, Meeting of 8 May 1944. 
85BP 43761, Fraser to Beaverbrook, 30 November 1944. 
86BP 43761, Beaverbrook to Fraser, 6 December 1944. 
87PRO FO 371,42696, Minutes Ministerial Oil Committee, Meeting of 16 May 1944. 
88PRO FO 371,42696, Report of Ministerial Oil Committee, "Oil Discussions with the United 
States Government at Washington, " 24 May 1944; PRO FO 371,42697, LeRougetel minute, 15 
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an express provision which would allow for this. They argued that such a provision 
would make for British self-sufficiency in oil which would be comparable to the United 
States, whose domestic production would be untouched by the Agreement. 89 
Ickes and the State Department tried to put the Agreement into force as an 
executive agreement. Yet the Senate realised that this might prove a dangerous precedent 
for future commodity agreements and they were anxious to play a major role in framing 
foreign policy. In August 1944 Ickes conceded to the Senate's position and Roosevelt, 
remembering the doomed fate of Woodrow Wilson's internationalism after the First 
World War, agreed. At that time, opposition prevented American entry into the League 
of Nations. The Oil Agreement was one among many international projects. If the Senate 
wanted they could destroy all of them. After two meetings in the autumn of 1944 the 
Petroleum Industry War Council were ready to recommend against Senate ratification 
and Ickes only avoided this by suggesting that they provide an alternative version. They 
produced one by December 1944.90 In mid-January 1945 the Senate returned the 
Agreement and the amended version won unanimous support from the Petroleum 
Industry War Council in January 1945.91 
From then till late spring a special interdepartmental committee under Ickes's 
supervision blended the original Agreement and the industry alternative. While keeping 
11 
to the form of the original there were two main changes. Domestic operations were 
explicitly exempted and the powers of the Petroleum Commission were further curtailed. 
In June 1945, Roosevelt's successor, President Truman authorised a second oil 
89PRO FO 371,42696, Minutes Ministerial Oil Committee, Meeting on 8 May 1944; PRO FO 
371,42697, Report of the Special Oil Committee, "Oil Discussions with the United States Government, " 14 June 1944. 
90Michael Stoff, Oil. War and American Security, 178-82. 
91BP 27775, New York Office, War Diary. September 1939 - May 1945,15/1/h. 
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conference. 92 The British wished to postpone this since the forthcoming General Election 
was already making it difficult to prepare for the Potsdam conference in mid-July. 93 
After the election Labour under Clement Attlee replaced the Conservatives led by 
Winston Churchill. Foreign policy did not change much. The main structural constraint 
was the currency crisis, which had been exacerbated by the abrupt end of Lend-Lease in 
August 1945. The Treasury wanted to sort this out before oil talks though those who 
thought that the Americans would be kinder after an Oil Agreement overruled them. 94 
Among these the most important person was Emanuel Shinwell, the new Minister for 
Fuel and Power. He looked upon the Agreement as an entwining of British and 
American oil interests which would support British commercial and, therefore, imperial 
interests in the Middle East. "At the same time under the terms of the Agreement, we 
should have equal opportunities with the Americans to secure new openings in South 
America. "95 
The second oil conference, which opened on September 18 1945, led to further 
concessions to the British position. British protectorates and possessions would now be 
considered part of the United Kingdom. This would increase the size of Britain's 
domestic reserves bringing it nearer parity with America's huge reserves. Further, the 
import-limitation clause, put in at the insistence of the American domestic producers, 
92Mjchael Stoff; Oil. War and American Security, 183-5. 
93PRO FO 371,42686, Law memorandum conversation with Ickes, Davies, and Rayner, 26 
January 1945; PRO FO 371,42699, Gallop minute for Secretary of State, 28 August 1945; PRO 
FO 371,42699, "Anglo-American Oil Agreement: Historical note on what has happened since 
the agreement was signed in Washington last year, " 28 August 1945. 
94PRO FO 371,42700, Minutes Ministerial Oil Committee, M. O. C. (45), Ist Meeting, 12 
September 1945; PRO FO 371,42701, Minutes Ministerial Oil Committee, M. O. C. (45), 2nd 
meeting, 22 September 1945. 
95PRO FO 371,42701, Minutes ministerial oil Committee, M. O. C. (45), 2nd Meeting, 22 
September 1945. 
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made it possible to restrict imports of dollar oil. Finally, the International Petroleum 
Commission was now confined to fact-finding only. 96 
Hugh Dalton, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, agreed to Shinwell, Minister of 
Fuel and Power conducting the negotiations "subject to reference to myself and other 
Ministers having an interest in the matter. "97 His interest was related to the exclusion of 
dollar oil. In the first Agreement there was a concession to "relevant economic factors. " 
This provision was now covered by article 7 (2). The Foreign Secretary had attended the 
first meeting, and the Chancellor the first and last meetings. 98 Dalton insisted that before 
signing Ickes must have his "definite and recorded consent" to the exclusion of dollar 
oil. 99 His opposition might make it impossible to secure the pact. 100 The Prime Minister 
was willing for the Agreement to be signed providing an understanding could be reached 
with the Foreign Secretary and Chancellor. 101 The Ministerial Oil Committee had its first 
meeting on 12 September. On its sixth meeting on 21 September, Shinwell revealed that 
though the Americans were willing to accept the regulation of imports, to exclude dollar 
imports completely would be inconsistent with the general objectives of the 
Agreement. 102 The Prime Minister now clarified that "subject to the point he raises being 
disposed of I authorise you to sign the Agreement. "103 Shinwell proposed that minutes 
96PRO FO 371,42701, Minutes Ministerial Oil Committee, M. O. C. (45), 2nd Meeting, 22 
September 1945; PRO FO 371,42701, Anglo-American Conversations on Petroleum, Minutes of 
Plenary Sessions 1 and 2,18 September 1945,20 September 1945, Minutes of Joint Official 
Subcommittee Meetings 1 and 2,19 September 1945,20 September 1945; PRO FO 371,42701, 
Minutes Ministerial Oil Committee, 2nd Meeting, 22 September 1945. 
97PRO PREM 8,857, Hugh Dalton to Attlee, 23 September 1945. 
98PRO PREM 8,857, Watson to Rowan, 14 September 1945. 
99PRO PREM 8,857, Dalton to Shinwell, 23 September 1945. 
100PRO PREM 8,857, Rowan minute, 22 September 1945. 
101pR0 PREM 8,857, Attlee to Shinwell, 20 September 1945. 
102pR0 PREM, 8,857, Minutes of meeting of Ministerial Oil Committee, 21 September 1945. 
103pRO PREM 8,857, Attlee to Shinwell, 23 September 1945. 
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from the negotiations could be used and Ickes provided permission for the revised 
minutes of the second plenary session to be quoted. '°4 
The new Agreement was signed with the Prime Minister's approval on 24 
September 1945. The Chancellor clarified that dollar oil imports could be restricted, that 
the International Petroleum Commission would only be a fact-finding and advisory body 
and that the American proposal for a multilateral Agreement had been squashed. 
Domestic interests in the United States had prevented ratification of the first Agreement, 
"But it is believed that, as the advisers to Mr Ickes who represent the domestic oil 
industry support the new Agreement, it will be ratified by the United States Senate. "105 
Although the major trade organisations supported it this time, the Texas Independents 
were still suspicious that more foreign oil would be imported thereby undermining the 
local economy. In February 1946 Ickes had resigned and the Agreement lost this most 
pressing advocate. Facing an election in 1948 Truman needed every vote. Thus, even 
though the Foreign Relations Committee approved the Agreement near-unanimously, the 
sole dissenting voice of Texan Tom Connally proved decisive. Truman abandoned the 
Agreement and at Connally's request in 1952 Truman finally recalled the Agreement 
noting that it had become "obsolete. " 106 
When it looked like it might be ratified the Foreign Office view was Sought. 107 
Sir Orme Sargent set forth a memorandum detailing the three continuing reservations of 
the Senate regarding the Agreement. These were that there was to be no control of the 
American industry locally or globally, there would be no power to review or assess any 
concession, and no world body would assume either of those powers. Any world body 
104PRO PREM 8,857, Shinwell to Attlee, 23 September 1945; Shinwell to Dalton, 24 
September 1945. 
105PRO PREM 8,857, Memorandum by Emanuel Shinwell, "Anglo-American Oil Agreement, " 
26 September 1945. 
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would be only advisory, not enforcing. 108 The Prime Minister recommended that the 
advice of the Chancellor of the Exchequer be taken. 109 This was a clear indication of the 
importance of economic considerations to oil questions in 1948, a situation which was to 
influence British oil relations. A Government policy of limiting dividend payments was 
leading to financial difficulties in Iran as the Iranian Government also received dividend 
payments from the Anglo-Iranian. The policy was to lead to talks between Iran and the 
company, the failure of which led to the nationalisation crisis examined in chapter eight. 
6.9 CONCLUSION 
Since the Anglo-American Oil Agreement never became international law it has 
not received much scholarly attention, even though a re-examination of the oil 
negotiations as a mood-setting trial for Bretton Woods and other post-war agreements is 
useful. The post-war order was largely shaped according to the agendas of the companies 
yet this situation was not inevitable. Due to their privileged position in the wartime 
Allied oil committees the companies had been able to ensure minimal disruption to pre- 
war arrangements. The changes which the Second World War and the widely anticipated 
post-war rise of Middle East oil had wrought in the arrangements had been shaped 
through informal understandings between the companies. However, as the Middle East 
became the most lucrative and productive emerging oil-producing region many 
companies wished to make more fundamental changes to the status quo regarding 
concessions and market quotas established in the As Is agreements, Red Line agreement, 
and the establishment of the Iraq Petroleum Company and Kuwait Oil Company. 
Fundamentally, the American companies wanted a greater share of more productive and 
cheaper Middle East concessions. It became increasingly feared that in the post-war era 
107PRO PREM 8,857, Farrell to Hunter, 20 November 1947. 
108PRO PREM 8,857, Sir Orme Sargent, "Anglo-American Oil Agreement of 14 September 
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the European market would be supplied from the Middle East rather than the Americas. 
This private war during the war was concluded successfully during these negotiations, 
which functioned effectively as intercorporate peace talks. 
The failure of Britain and the United States to reach a formal agreement 
reaffirmed the principle of private governance of the international oil industry, by 
default. However, one could argue that the British and the majors had secured victory 
over the American plans to formally introduce public interests - whether equity 
ownership or regulation - into the international oil industry. From the provisions 
regarding the advisory nature of the International Petroleum Commission, the slow pace 
of expansion regarding the number of states ratifying the Agreement, and the formal 
acknowledgement that private global governance would resolve the outstanding issues in 
practise, as explained in the ninth meeting of the technical discussions, study of the 
negotiations casts doubt on the claims of realist versions of hegemonic stability theory 
that the United States were able to impose multilateral agreements on the world economy 
following the Second World War. 110 
From 1946 the British and American companies were to use this clarification of 
the Governmental position to settle their own war. The Red Line agreement could be 
challenged which would lead in time through a new series of private agreements to a 
new balance of power in Middle East oil. At the same time, governance in the industry 
would remain in private hands as American Governmental initiatives had been resisted. 
While the Agreements failed to achieve the United States objective of introducing 
intergovernmental regulation, they were a success from the British and corporate 
perspectives. They set limits to American Governmental interference in the inter- 
109PRO PREM 8,857, Attlee to Sargent, 2 January 1948, handwritten. 
110Robert Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy 
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company agreements which divided up the production and marketing of Middle East oil 
in the post-war period and which are analysed in the next chapter. 
The academic neglect of the Agreement also betrays a simplistic understanding 
of the relationship between international law and global governance. This is because 
realists are basing their view of law and governance on a flawed analogy with the 
sovereign state's domestic jurisdiction. The importance of the Anglo-American Oil 
Agreement was not in the establishment of a coercive instrument such as might exist 
within a state, but in the review of international norms and procedures in the 
international oil issue area. In effect, the companies and states agreed to increase Middle 
East production and increase the involvement of United States companies by relaxing the 
Red Line agreement, while winning concessions on the rights of existing British 
concessionaires and restriction of currency in favour of sterling balances. Having agreed 
the basis for an end to the trade wars analysed in the previous chapter, the companies 
reformed their firm-firm relations to build the Middle East oil cartel which is examined 
in the next chapter. 
From the point of view of the British Government the Agreement was 
successfully negotiated. It defeated American plans to enter the international industry 
through the PRC, plans to bring public accountability and regulation into the industry in 
the Petroleum Commission, and plans to change British concessions and restrict the use 
of oil to solve the pressing currency crisis. The Americans only won concessions on the 
right of their companies to participate more fully in Middle East oil which the British, in 
many cases, welcomed as it promised more stability for their concessions. This is 
International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987); Stephen Krasner, "State 
Power and the Structure of International Trade, " World Politics 28 (1976): 317-347. 
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another example of an occasion when the British were able to shape American plans for 
the immediate post-war period. Ill 
111Peter Burnham, The Political Economy of Postwar Reconstruction (London: Macmillan, 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCESSION-SEEKING AND THE COLD 
WAR IN THE PERSIAN GULF 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
Commercial rivalry between British and American oil corporations as well as 
intergovernmental rivalry between the United States and Soviet Union shaped the Cold 
War. The companies engaged in balance of power manoeuvres with each other. Vattel 
has provided the classic statement of the balance of power: "such a disposition of things 
that no one potentate or state shall be able, absolutely, to predominate and prescribe laws 
to others". 1 To balance the expansion of other companies' Persian Gulf activities Anglo- 
Iranian and Shell tried to increase their own stakes through concession hunting in the 
northern provinces of Iran. When this failed, and when the Anglo-American Oil 
Agreements confirmed that it would be legal to do so, they supplemented this internal 
strengthening with external alliances. The main mechanism for alliance-building was 
developing joint venture partnerships. 
Two forms of joint venture were used - the equity joint venture in which the 
companies held shares in a subsidiary and the contractual joint venture through which 
companies blended core activities while remaining formally separate. The contractual 
joint ventures established in this period include the two sale of oil contracts between 
Anglo-Iranian and Socony-Vacuum, and the sale of oil agreement between Anglo- 
Iranian and Jersey, and Gulf and Shell. This supports the argument that the balance of 
power was contrived rather than fortuitous, and that in terms of Bull's distinctions we are 
examining an international society rather than an international system. Hedley Bull 
clarifies the distinction by referring to the aims of the parties. A fortuitous balance would 
be "simply a moment of deadlock in a struggle to the death. " By contrast, a contrived 
Kited in Martin Wight, Systems of States (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1991), 166. 
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balance "presupposes that at least one of the parties, instead of pursuing the goal of 
absolute expansion of its power, seeks to limit it in relation to the power of the other. "2 
All the parties had a societal interest in an orderly expansion of production and 
consumption. Since the negotiations around the Anglo-American Oil talks had clarified 
the scope of private global governance agreements, the companies now seized the 
opportunity to compete for positions in the Middle East, while simultaneously 
cooperating to ensure an orderly expansion from which they would all benefit. Martin 
Wight argued that the balance of power served three important functions in an 
international society. First, that the balance of power maintained the independence of 
states. Second, since the balance of power guaranteed independence, the stability that a 
balance promoted might be considered in the longer-term interests of all states in 
contrast with a short-termist policy of national-oriented power maximisation. Finally, 
Wight proposed that international law could only be effectively established on the 
foundations of a balance of power. He approves Oppenheim's argument that: "an over- 
powerful state will naturally try to act according to discretion and disobey the law. "3 
Analyses of the origins of the Cold War may be placed into three categories - 
orthodox, revisionist, and post-revisionist. 4 The orthodox case was that the Soviet Union 
followed an aggressive ideology, which predisposed it to world domination. The United 
States was forced into a defensive strategy, which led to the Cold War. The revisionist 
accounts of the origins of the Cold War, which became popular contemporaneously with 
the Vietnam War, stressed that economic development in the United States had reached 
such a point that further corporate expansion tended to be international. The Government 
2Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society A Study of Order in World Politics (London: Macmillan, 
1977), 105. 
3Martin Wight, Systems of States, 167. Also, H. Bull, Anarchical Society, 106. 
4John Lewis Gaddis, "The Emerging Post-Revisionist Synthesis on the Origins of the Cold War, " Diplomatic History 7 (1993): 172. 
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supported this expansion and, therefore, laid the foundation for American imperialism. 
However, neither of these stories was archive-driven. 5 
The post-revisionist case restates the primacy of politics in the containment 
strategy, in particular uncertainty about Soviet designs, and also supports the original 
claim that the pro-American powers during the Cold War frequently invited American 
influence. However, it also specifies the ways in which economic means were used to 
attain political ends, and thus, concedes a link between corporations and Government to 
serve mutual ends. Examination of American policy in Saudi Arabia highlights the 
mutual element of the relationship. Over Middle East oil United States corporate and 
Government short-term aims were clearly linked. Yet British companies and the 
Government still held the dominant position in these territories. The way in which the 
British actors, specifically the oil companies, sought to maintain their position becomes 
crucial in understanding the unfolding of the Cold War in the Persian Gulf 
The six sections examine how the companies were engaged in balance of power 
manoeuvres while the Governments stumbled into the Cold War in the Persian Gulf The 
fact that the United States Government and companies entered into negotiations for 
concessions in the northern territories of Iran, in Iranian Azerbaijan, increased Soviet 
insecurities over its borders, and thus precipitated the Azerbaijan crisis. However, they 
were invited in by the Iranians themselves, who were, in turn, responding to British oil 
policy in Iran. 6 Thereafter, American companies and Government developed common 
interests while playing different games in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. 
51bid., 172-181. 
6Lloyd C. Gardner, Economic Aspects of New Deal Diplomacy (Madison, 1964), 229; L. P. 
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7.2 BACKGROUND TO THE AZERBAIJAN CRISIS 
On 18 June 1945 there was a meeting between senior directors of Anglo-Iranian 
and Jersey. Orville Harden observed that, "Jersey - for reasons which were well known 
could not adhere formally to 'As-Is' but they wanted no greater percentage of the trade 
than they had previously enjoyed and they were ready to continue to observe the 
principles which had governed the trading of the groups over the last fifteen years. " The 
alternative to "orderly adjustments between the half dozen companies concerned" would 
be a struggle for markets, and it was "urgent for all concerned to try and work out a 
peaceful solution. " Jersey and Shell needed to purchase oil products and Anglo-Iranian 
wanted Iranian production to enjoy pre-war levels of world market share. There were 
fears that Caltex would cut prices worldwide in order to establish markets for 
themselves. Jersey were frustrated since they had markets for these products but found 
themselves limited in their relationship with Caltex by the Red Line agreement. The 
parties agreed to meet again, next time also including Shell.? Until these issues were 
resolved, the companies which were short of products, such as Shell and Jersey began a 
struggle for a concession in Azerbaijan to strengthen themselves internally. Once it was 
clarified that the pre-war arrangements such as the Red Line agreement and restrictive 
clauses could be removed, during the Anglo-American oil negotiations, the companies 
made compensating external alliances matching the strengths of other companies, for 
instance, the Gulf Oil Company's share of Kuwait Oil Company production with Shell's 
need for products. 
The role of the Iranian crisis as a turning point in relations between the wartime 
Allies has been widely noted. Some have interpreted it as a classic Great Power 
scramble, others as a United States reaction to Soviet aggression, yet others as a 
ABP 43853, Basil Jackson, "Summary of meeting at Britannic House on 18 June 1945, " 25 June 1945. 
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confluence of United States domestic economic, and international, state agendas. 8 More 
recently, Louise Fawcett has demonstrated the extent of the British contribution to the 
crisis and thus the importance of the United Kingdom as a Cold War actor, and also of 
the non-European space in the development of the Cold War. 9 However, one drawback 
of her account in common with much of the existing literature has been the limits 
imposed by its examination of the story from the perspective of the great powers. 
Stephen L. McFarland who looks at local Iranian factors pulling in the United 
States has provided the best counterbalance to this bias. 1° However, the importance of 
the local factor in Iran can only be appreciated in the context of British policy in Iran, 
which threatened the territorial integrity of Iran, and the decisive factor in British policy 
in Iran at this time was British capital. Balance of power manoeuvres aimed at the 
American majors were the motive force behind British capital. Hence, the Azerbiijan 
crisis of 1946 must also be understood in the context of Anglo-American commercial 
rivalry. 
Britain remained the dominant foreign power in Iran till the Allied occupation of-- 
Iran. Operation Barbarossa, the Nazi attack on the Soviet Union on 22 June 1941, 
brought about a rapprochement between the Soviet Union and the Allies, who had been 
disenchanted since the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. Soon afterwards the new Allies 
8Richard Cottam, "The United States, Iran and the Cold War, " Iranian Studies 3 (Winter 1970): 
4-5; G. R. Hess, "The Iranian Crisis of 1945-1946 and the Cold War, " Political Science Quarterly 
89.1 (March 1974): 119,146; Richard Pfau, "Containment in Iran, 1946: The Shift to an Active 
Policy, " Diplomatic History 1 (Fall 1977): 359,372; Daniel Yergin, Shattered Peace: The 
Origins of the Cold War, Rev. ed. (New York: Penguin, 1977), 179; Bruce Kuniholm, The 
Oristins of the Cold War in the Near East: Great Power Conflict and Diplomacy in Iran. Turkey 
and Greece (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), 304. 
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invaded Iran claiming that Iran was a base for Nazi efforts in the Middle East. I1 What is 
clear is that the invasion made it possible to secure objectives including the 
establishment of a supply route to the Soviet Union, and the complete use of Iranian 
assets, primarily oil, without any interference from the Iranian Government. 12 The Allied 
economic policies have been described as "a case of armed robbery against a desperately 
weak and poor nation. "13 
The British also dominated the political system. While they replaced the autocrat 
Reza Shah with his weakwilled and inexperienced son, Muhammed Pahlavi, they did not 
support the creation of a constitutional monarchy. The lower house, the Majlis, was 
continuously infiltrated and undermined. A report on Majlis `intrigues' led the Foreign 
Office to comment that "Persia was not ripe for democracy... unless the Majlis is sat on, it 
becomes a nuisance. " r-4 Thus, British-supported candidates headed six of the ten 
administrations during the occupation. A sample of the interference from the British 
Embassy in Tehran is provided by the case of Muhammed Ali Furughi who became 
Prime Minister while Reza Shah was departing. He was instructed by the Foreign Office 
to provide an eulogistic account of British policy. It should be "written from the British 
viewpoint, but so as to appeal to Iranians". 15 Just as Reza Shah had tried to combat 
British dominance by turning to Germany, so his successors would turn to the United 
States employing the age-old Iranian strategy of movazaneh (equilibrium) to play off the 
11PR0 FO 371,27206, FO to Jeddah, 22 August 1941; PRO FO 371,35069, "Middle East 
Security Summary, " 13 January 1943. 
12PRO FO 371,27184, Tehran to FO, 15 August 1941; Leopold Stennett Amery, The Empire at 
Bay. The Leo Amer' Diaries. 1929-1945 ed. John Barnes and David Nicolson (London: 
Hutchinson, 1988), 711; Frank Brenchley, Britain and the Middle East: An Economic History 
1945-1987 (London: British Academic Press, imprint of I. B. Tauris, 1989), 54. 13Homa Katouzian, Political Economy of Modern Iran (London: Macmillan, 1981), 143. 
14PRO FO 371,31385, FO minute, 10 April 1942. 
15PRO FO 371,27185, Tehran to FO, 26 September 1942. 
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foreign powers against each other. 16 In part, this involved offering oil concessions to the 
United States. 
Meanwhile, the political interference of the British was not restricted to Tehran. 
Britain had long maintained relations with the southern tribes such as the Bakhtiari 
Khans. Britain's oil interests were also in the south and it was felt that these interests 
might be promoted through relations with the tribes in case the domination in Tehran 
was weakened. '? A policy of closer relations with the tribes was thus held in reserve, 
even though some senior officials such as ambassador Bullard in Tehran opposed it. He 
pointed out that it was "undesirable to encourage the tribes.. . the object 
is to get the civil 
administration running, and we cannot have one policy at the centre and another in the 
tribal areas. "Is 
However, Bullard's view was not decisive. It was widely rumoured that General 
Wilson, Commander-in-Chief in the Middle East, was subsidising the activities of Nasir 
Khan and the Qashga'i tribe. He reasoning was, "If you don't fight and don't bribe, what 
do you do? "19 At first blush it appears that Bullard and Wilson were supporting 
contradictory policies and thus this episode might be used as evidence of bureaucratic 
rivalry in policy making with Bullard promoting the role of the Embassy and Wilson that 
of the military. However, on reflection it becomes clearer that the bureaucratic pplitics 
took place, not in policy formulation (where the `bureaucratic politics' approach is 
usually applied), but in the implementation of `policy'. For one does not find a carefully 
formulated London policy being applied in Iran; rather, different agencies took different 
initiatives. In practise, there were contradictory policies in Iran, one of promoting 
16Homa Katouzian, Musaddig and the Struggle for Power in Iran 
56-61. 
(London: I. B. Tauris, 1990), 
17PRO FO 371,27169, FO to Tehran, 6 December 1941. 
18PRO FO 371,27233, Tehran to FO, 1 October 1941. 
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efficient civil administration on a nation-wide level through the Embassy, and another 
supporting tribes through bribes in the provinces. Local agencies had developed set 
procedures for dealing with situations and implemented them regardless of the other 
Government agencies. 
In the early days of the occupation it was suggested that Britain and the Soviet 
Union form a joint commission, which later developed into Bevin's proposals for a 
tripartite commission. 2° The Tripartite Treaty, signed in January 1942, was only 
reluctantly accepted by the Iranian Government for in practice both the Soviets and 
British ignored clauses six and seven of the Treaty, which protected Iranian 
sovereignty. 21 When Sayyid Zia, a pro-British Prime Minister, produced a long list of 
complaints against the Soviets for British consideration in 1944, they only took up the 
issue of unpaid customs duties. One Foreign Office specialist reasoned: "If the allies win 
the war, we will owe the Russians a great deal, and whatever happens we owe the 
Persians nothing. If therefore the Russians are determined to protect their southern 
frontiers by acquiring further territory in the north, and if we have no means of 
preventing it, it would surely be advisable to put the best face we can on the matter. "22 
The Petroleum Division also decided "not to resist the granting of a concession to the 
Russians because the ultimate depiction of Iranian independence is in any case 
conjecture. "23 An example of Britain's willingness to accommodate Soviet plans was 
Bullard's idea of introducing a form of local self-government through the establishment 
19PRO FO 371,31386, War Office to FO, 4 November 1942; ibid., FO to War Office, 26 
November 1942. 
20PRO FO 371,27233, Memorandum to the Soviet ambassador in London, 27 September 1941. 21Treaty of Alliance between the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union and Iran. HMSO, 1942. 22PRO FO 371,31413, FO minute, 22 April 1942; PRO FO 371,31388, FO minute, 17 January 1943.59. 
23BP 79663, Folder 18, Discussion in Petroleum Division, 3 January 1945, Official Note, 8 
January 1945. 
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of provincial councils. 24 Local Government would provide all provinces with a measure 
of autonomy, so that through its representatives in the south Britain could ensure that its 
interests were protected. Moreover, it might forestall a demand from Azerbaijan for 
wider concessions. This scheme came to nothing though Bullard continued to raise this 
issue with every subsequent Prime Minister. It convinced the Iranians that the British 
wanted to conciliate the Soviets. 
United States policy in the developing world was influenced by two main 
considerations - the first being the containment of communism, the second was the fear 
of mineral shortages in the United States. By promoting raw materials production in the 
developing world it was hoped to prevent a United States shortage while simultaneously 
promoting development as a buttress against communism. During the inter-war period 
the United Kingdom and United States controlled, commercially or militarily, an 
estimated forty-eight per cent of the world's iron reserves, fifty-three per cent of coal, 
seventy-four per cent of zinc, seventy-six per cent of petroleum, seventy-nine per cent of 
copper, and eighty-one per cent of lead. Anglo-American naval dominance made it 
possible to deny these critical materials to the Axis powers. Despite shipping problems 
in the first phases of the war, the Allies suffered no shortages of critical raw materials. 
Yet consensus regarding the depletion of United States reserves, the underestimate of 
current mineral reserves in the United States, and the overestimate of future consumption 
levels provided an impetus for negotiations with the British and also with developing 
world countries. In the case of oil this implied Middle Eastern countries. 25 
However, Britain maintained an independent policy as regarded the Soviet 
Union. Relations between 1917 and 1941 had been suspicious and hostile. Once the 
24PRO FO 371,27233, Memorandum to the Soviet ambassador, 2September 1941; ibid., India Office to FO, 27 September 1941. 
25Robert A. Pollard, Economic Security and the Origins of the Cold War, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985), 199. 
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threat of Germany had been removed they resumed the normal pattern. Britain would not 
provoke tensions and was prepared to accept a Soviet sphere in eastern Europe but not 
into the region of British interests. So long as the Soviets did not encroach upon British 
interests they could expand their own sphere of interests. 26 While the British became 
increasingly concerned about the growth of Soviet influence in Iran, this concern was 
directed towards the preservation of British interests, not the exclusion of Soviet 
interests. In particular, there was recognition that the Soviets might want a belt of 
territory in Iranian Azerbaijan to ensure the safety of the Caucasian oil fields. 27 
This was very typical of the generally pro-Soviet view taken by many Foreign 
Office people and by E. H. Carr writing in `The Times'. 28 The reasoning was that the 
Soviets were entitled to a defensive sphere of influence and, moreover, that the United 
States would withdraw into isolationism again after the war, leaving Britain and the 
Soviet Union dominant in west and east Europe, respectively. In this case concessions to 
the Soviets could be justified on the basis of ensuring post-war good relations in Europe, 
as well as essential for the security of British interests in the Middle East and Asia. 
Applied to Iran this policy was to lead to a collapse of British power. 
7.3 SOVIET PRESSURE IN AZERBAIJAN 
" 
The conciliation of the Soviets came to a head over the issue of oil concessions 
in the northern provinces. The scramble for a new concession can be traced to the trade 
war discussed in chapter five and concern over Middle East oil which was being 
discussed at this time in Washington in the Anglo-American oil talks. The political 
26Geoffrey Warner, "From ally to enemy: Britain's relations with the Soviet Union, 1941-1948, " 
in D ulomacv and World Power: Studies in British Foreign Polgy. 11890-1950 ed. Michael Doclmll and Brian McKercher (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 221- 243. 
27PRO FO 371,31388, Kiubyschew to Foreign Office, 18 January 1942. 
28Charles Jones, E. H Caa and International Relations: A Duty to Lie (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998). 
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results were that the United States supported concession seeking by its nationals, which 
the British also did. 29 This Anglo-American scramble for oil provided the Soviets with 
an opportunity to press their own claims in the northern provinces. Correspondence 
between Beaverbrook and Fraser reveals that Fraser was aware that Shell "with the 
support of H. M. G. " had sought a concession in the south. So, also had the Sinclair Oil 
Company, like the Getty Oil Company, one of the larger `independents'. Yet another 
interested party was Standard-Vacuum, the joint venture between Socony-Vacuum and 
Jersey. As these negotiations became public, the Soviets formally asked for a concession 
in the north toward the end of September. Fraser argued that the Iranians were "foolish 
not to anticipate it [the Soviet demand] and not to have refused discussions with other 
interests", but remained confident that Anglo-Iranian could compete with the Soviets 
provided that the concession involved "normal commercial terms. "30 
Bullard observed: "As to Russia's need for oil, it is certainly no part of our policy 
to prevent Russia from obtaining oil in north Persia. Indeed the Soviet Union is the 
natural market for north Persian oil. We do not wish to put any obstacle in the way of the 
Russians obtaining a concession in Persia by normal methods if and when the Persians 
are prepared to negotiate. "31 The Majlis decision to postpone the oil discussions worried 
the British more in the possible negative consequences for its own assets, than the 
exclusion of the Soviets. The Ministry of Fuel and Power observed: 
We are naturally very concerned that any designs which Russia may have 
on Persia should not adversely affect our established position there, or the 
possibility of our getting the additional concession now being negotiated by 
Shell. One wonders if the Persian Government is going to deny the 
aspirations of the Russians in the north, it might not have the effect of 
increasing Russian interest in Persia in areas in which they are apparently 
not concerned. If means could be found for an amicable settlement, 
29PRO FO 371,40241 for details of the British application. 
30BP 43853, William Fraser to Beaverbrook, 18 October 1944. 
31PRO FO 371,40188, Tehran to FO, 10 November 1944; PRO FO 371,43430, Eastern 
Department minutes, 20 January 1946. 
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resulting in the grant of a concession to Russia at the same time as the 
Persians grant a concession to Shell, one would have thought from the point 
of view of British interests on oil, that such a solution would have much to 
recommend it 32 
The real problem for Britain, as elucidated by W. H. Young at the Foreign Office, 
was the conflict between Britain's petroleum and political interests. 33 Although Bullard 
felt that the risks inherent in the Soviets obtaining a northern concession were "far 
graver" than the risk of its attempting to cancel the Anglo-Iranian concession, the 
Ministry of Fuel and Power won the day, arguing the financial case for a new British 
concession. While aware of the possible political consequences arising from the award of 
a northern concession to the Soviets, the Ministry of Fuel and Power insisted that if only 
"political considerations" could be excluded, the best course would be for the Soviets to 
get its concession. 34 No public statement was made against the Soviet demand, nor did 
the British Government attempt to close the door on future negotiations. 
British appeasement was largely responsible for the more aggressive Soviet 
posture in the north of Iran yet unable to contain this, they increasingly relied on the 
United States. After the Yalta Conference of January 1945 failed to produce any Soviet 
guarantees about intentions in Iran, Churchill wrote to Roosevelt warning of Soviet 
departure from the Tehran Declaration and of the danger that "Russia would get what it 
wanted by use of the big stick. "35 The surrender of Iranian Government troops to the 
Azerbaijan nationalists supported by the pro-Soviet Tudeh party in the autumn and 
winter of 1945 only confirmed to officials such as Bullard that the Iranians were 
32PRO FO 371,40241, Ministry of Fuel and Power to FO, 10 October 1944; ibid., 18 October 
1944. 
33PRO FO 371,40241, FO minute, 11 October 1944. 
34PRO FO 371,40243, Ministry of Fuel and Power to Cadogan, 15 December 1944; ibid., 
Tehran to FO, 29 December 1944; PRO FO 371,40241, FO minute, 11 October 1944. 35PR0 FO 371,45433, Tehran to FO, 20 July 1945. 
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incapable of self-government and that the United States was the only chance for a united 
Iran. 36 
Realisation that Britain was prepared to see Iran fragmented through its attitude 
to Soviet pressure in the north and its support for local autonomy provoked a nationalist 
backlash. Once the connection had been made between national unity and oil 
concessions the position of the Anglo-Iranian was seriously weakened. Even in 1944 one 
Majlis deputy attempted to find support for a bill to revoke the Anglo-Iranian 
concession. 37 The Iranians looked to the Americans to maintain their territorial integrity 
while the British looked to them for support against the Soviets. However, in the longer 
term such involvement would prove inimical to Britain's twin interests in Iran - the oil 
concession and its informal influence. For the United States were equally determined to 
promote their own oil interests and to dismantle Britain's Empire, formal and informal. 38 
This did not alter Britain's greater concern for oil interests than Iranian 
sovereignty. They supported the linking of the withdrawal of Soviet troops with the 
granting of a concession to the Soviets. This was a major miscalculation, for the failure 
to agree on troop withdrawals meant that these troops were available for use in support 
of the Azerbaijan nationalists/secessionists later. At the time the British hoped that the 
strong-arm tactics might restart oil negotiations. In March 1946 representatives from 
Shell had called to suggest the resumption of the negotiations which had been broken off 
in 1944. The Ministry of Fuel and Power gave their support to these new talks in May 
1946.39 
36PRO FO 371,45434, Tehran to FO, 21 August 1945. 
37PRO FO 371,40243, Tehran to FO, 4 December 1944; L. P. Elwell Sutton, Persian Oil, 111- 
112. 
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In a circumvention of the 1944 Majlis decision the Soviets were indeed granted 
an oil concession. Britain's only objection to this agreement which was clearly made 
under duress in violation of the Tripartite Treaty was that the proposed Irano-Soviet 
company appeared to offer more favourable terms to Iran than the Anglo-Iranian 
concessionary agreement of 1933.40 A draft report on the question of southeast Iranian 
oil stated: "A mixed company of the kind suggested would make it impossible to secure 
the essential flexibility in the operation of British oil resources. During the recent war, 
British and American companies have been able ... to 
increase or decrease production as 
required. This would not have been possible had the exploitation of the oil resources in 
question been operated by joint companies through which the local Government would 
have been able to insist upon a rate of output to accord with their view of their own 
interests. It would hamper the British companies at every turn in the task of obtaining the 
best possible results from an oil field, if the local Government were associated with them 
in the ordinary day-to-day operations in the field. "41 Soviet-supported rebellions in 
Azerbaijan were expected although the British did not subscribe to the annexationist 
theory of Soviet policy. However, developments in Azerbaijan caused a reassessment. 
Russian activities in Persia do not square with the theory of a defensive policy. 
They square well with the theory of a tentative, but essentially offensive policy. If the 
Russians, seizing a moment of Anglo-American discord, chanced their luck and got 
away with the absorption of Persia without having to fight for it, their position would be 
immeasurably strengthened, both for defence and for eventual future aggression. They 
would acquire the warmwater ports which have been almost a pathological craving since 
Peter the Great. They would interpose between Baku and India a vast defence 
39PR0 FO 371,52728, FO to Tehran, 1 March 1946; ibid., Ministry of Fuel and Power to FO, 3 May 1946. 
40PR0 FO 371,52667, Moscow to FO, 13 March 1946. 
41PRO FO 371,52728, Draft report on southeast Persian oil (undated, circa April 1946). 
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area.. They would acquire oil resources of great value, and shake Britain's whole position 
in the Middle East to the point of collapse. 42 
The advent of the Azerbaijan nationalists to power led to an assessment that the 
situation in Azerbaijan was as near to the "classical pre-revolutionary situation of the 
Leninist textbooks as nature and art can make it. "43 Soviet and American involvement in 
Iran began to displace British dominance. When Qavam became Prime Minister in 
January 1946 Young thought that he was neither pro-German nor pro-Allied but was 
"merely concerned to be well in with both sides without committing himself to either -a 
normal Persian game. "44 In fact, Qavam was anti-British rather than pro-German. Rather 
than recognising the election of Qavam as the result of widespread anti-British 
sentiments, it was analysed as due to the "frivolity and irresponsibility of the Persian 
character". Allegedly, the Majlis vote, which confirmed Qavam, was "an absurd 
operation" whereby the Majlis Speaker "sodden with opium" cast the decisive vote to 
shift the balance in Qavam's favour. 45 This was not fair though it seems from the records 
to have been not untypical for the `old hands' of his generation. For this reason it could 
also be found in the attitude of the Anglo-Iranian board and it was to become an 
important, though unquantifiable factor in the nationalisation crisis examined in the next 
chapter. In fact, a more important factor in the weakness of the Majlis was the lack of a 
party system. 46 
42PRO FO 371,45434, FO minute, 10 July 1945. 
43PRO FO 371,45478, Tabriz, "Six monthly report", 23 August 1945. 44PRO FO 371,40180, Tehran to FO, 26 January 1944; ibid., FO minute, 28 March 1944. See 
also PRO FO 371,56278, "The devious way of Mr. Qavam, " 24 April 1946, report by Michael Foot, Member of Parliament, following a visit to Iran. 45PRO FO 371,52667, "Russia and north Persia, " 15 March 1946. 
46Ervand Abrahamian, "Factionalism in Iran: Political Groups in the 14th Parliament (1944- 
1946), " Middle Ent-orn Studies 14 (January 1978): 32-35; L. P. Elwell-Sutton, "Political Parties 
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7.4 THE DECLINE OF BRITISH STATE AND CAPITAL IN IRAN 
Meanwhile the conspicuous role of the Tudeh in the labour unrest presented the 
opportunity for a different strategy. Significantly, LeRougetel, who had played an 
important role in the negotiations surrounding the Anglo-American Oil Agreements, had 
replaced Bullard as ambassador. This appointment reflected the link between British oil 
interests, the foreign policy system, and Iran. He thought that the southern unrest was 
symptomatic of a new countrywide trend in which the right was losing out to the left. 47 
The growing threat from the left provided Britain with the opportunity to rally further the 
support of the United States on issues that had become the chief focus of concern for 
them - the Soviet threat and the credibility of the United Nations. One minute noted that, 
"Neither we nor the United States Government can view with indifference the prospect 
öf Persia's reduction to the status of a satellite under the very eyes of the Security 
Council with the consequent weakening of world confidence in the United Nations 
Organization. Further, neither of us wish our great oil interests in the Middle East to be 
at the mercy of the Soviet Union acting through satellite Governments or subversive 
agents. The Soviet campaign of weakening what they regard as the Anglo-US combine 
has begun with Tudeh agitation against the AbOC [Anglo-Iranian] and may well be 
extended to Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia. "48 
To prevent any future problems the Government made suggestions to the 
company, but there were limits to the British Government's influence over the company. 
Though Anglo-Iranian had once conducted its affairs through the legation, now it acted 
independently, only "on matters of high policy keeping H. M. G. informed. "49 What 
argument could he give, the Foreign Secretary asked during a conversation with the 
47PR0 FO 371,52677, Tehran to FO, 9 June 1946. 
48PRO FO 371,52677, Tehran to FO, 9 June 1946, Dominions Office circular, 15 June 1946. 49BP 43850, Report of Meeting Sir W. Fraser and Sir Maurice Peterson (FO), 8,3,1943 
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Anglo-Iranian chairman William Fraser, to anyone who claimed the right to nationalise 
Persian oil, while the Labour Government was nationalising companies "left and right" 
in Britain? He even suggested that Britain abandon its concessionary rights and "follow 
the Soviet Union's example in offering a 50-50 deal. "50 
This early British version of the `domino theory' did, however, have special 
appeal to United States policy makers, many of whom were beginning to formulate their 
ideas about `containment' of the Soviet Union. Melvyn Leffler has argued that they were 
responding to British weakness leaving vacuums of power, and possible revolutionary 
movements drawing on socio-economic dislocation. 5' The United States and Britain did 
little to reassure the Soviets that mutual cooperation was possible, and of their peaceable 
intent. 52 In fact, recent research demonstrates that Stalin's role models were not Marx or 
Lenin, but Peter the Great and Ivan the Terrible. His motivations were less world 
revolution than Russian great power status. Although a native of Georgia he became a 
Russian patriot in the same way as the Corsican Napoleon and French nationalism and 
the half-American Churchill and British imperialism. 53 From 1945 through 1952 reports 
clarified that the Soviets were not ready for war. The Soviets were indeed far less 
aggressive than depicted in the United States writings which lent credence to the 
campaign in Azerbaijan in 1946, the 1947 Truman Doctrine arming Turkey and Greece, 
and the later policies confusing Third World nationalists as pro-Soviet, for instance, 
50PRO FO 371,52735, FO minute, 52735,20 July 1946; William Roger Louis, The British 
Empire in the Middle East. 1945-1951: Arab Nationalism, the United States and Postwar 
Imperialism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), 69-70. 
51Melvyn P. Leffler, "National Security and U. S. Foreign Policy, " in Origins of the Cold War: 
An International History, ed. Melvyn P. Leffler and David S. Painter (London: Routledge, 1994), 
15-52. 
52James L. Gormly, From Potsdam to the Cold War: Big Three Diplomacy. 1945-1947, 
(Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources) 1990. 
"Robert C. Tucker, Stalin in Power: The Revolution from Above. 1928-1941 (New York: 
Norton, 1990) 17-23,60-64,276-282,482-486. 
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Musaddiq and Nasser. 54 In this context we examine Le Routegel's fear of the possible 
extension of Tudeh and Soviet influence, as he spoke of the "prime necessity for 
establishing a definite frontier between the USSR and Iran". He became explicit when he 
suggested that the Persian Government "may be wise to run the risk of losing this rich 
province rather than allow the Azerbaijan communists to enter the new Majlis and 
jeopardise their national independence. "55 
In the event Qavam was able to secure Soviet withdrawal on the basis of 
promising the Soviets a concession. However, once Soviet troops had left Azerbaijan, 
and the United States and the United Nations stood prepared to guarantee Iranian 
territorial integrity, Qavam claimed that he was powerless to influence the Majlis who 
would not approve it. Iranian troops were able to take control of Azerbaijan once again. 
Secure of United States support, the Majlis overcame Soviet pressures and rejected the 
oil concession outright through the single article law of 22 October 1947.56 
The episode is significant, "For it was the first time that the new tougher 
American attitude took force as policy. It also represented a shift in the East-West 
contention from Eastern Europe to a new periphery of conflict that involved a collision 
in what had been traditionally British and Russian spheres. Finally, it became the first 
public breach among the superpowers. The United States also took the lead away from 
Britain and sought to make the Russians back down by playing to the gallery of world 
opinion. "57 British oil policies helped to establish the Azerbaijan crisis as a landmark in 
the emerging Cold War, while also contributing to the decline of British power in the 
54Richard W. Cottam, "U. S. and Soviet Responses to Islamic Political Militancy" in Nikki R. 
Keddie and Mark J. Gasiorowski (eds. ) Neither East nor West: Irm the Soviet Union. and the United States (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990), 265-288. 
55PRO FO 371,52685, Tehran to FO, 29 October 1946. 
56See PRO FO 371,61974, "Summary of the Soviet-Persian oil agreement", 13 October 1947. 57Daniel Yergin, Shattered Peace, 179. 
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region. 58 Awareness of Iran's strategic importance and attempts to maintain a balance of 
power in the region as Britain's influence waned attracted American intervention. 
The policy of containment developed before Kennan's famous `Long Telegram' 
from Moscow and was applied as a worldwide policy, and not only a policy for Europe. 
The United States aimed to reform not demolish colonialism, which partly explains why 
it misconstrued revolutionary nationalism. The wars in Korea and Vietnam paved the 
way to revive Japan's relationship with its Asian periphery. 59 Even if we conceive of the 
Cold War in strategic terms, the economic circumstances of developing countries were 
an important dimension of the conflict. The relationship between Government and 
business may have been as significant in the United States as the developing world. This 
link is central to the corporatist model which argues that the new, organised capitalism of 
technocratic instrumentality, transnational coordination, bureaucratic planning, 
associative politics, and state regulation straddled both sides of the Second World War-61 
However, corporatist writers may argue that American economic goals were not 
necessarily incompatible with Soviet security, and that Stalin's policy in Eastern Europe 
set up the Cold War. 61 In other words the link between Government and industry in the 
United States was an important, though not decisive, factor in the origins of the Cold 
War. Local conditions, actors, and struggles were also significant. 
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7.5 THE UNITED STATES. THE ARAMCO SETTLEMENTS. AND THE NEW 
CORPORATE BALANCE OF POWER 
The Red Army presence in Iran, the struggle between Communists and Royalists 
in Greece, and the Soviet territorial demands on Turkey together constituted a crisis in 
the Near East, an area traditionally within the British sphere. 62 The British Government 
did not seek to provoke a shift in American policy, but was merely responding to 
Britain's own economic imperatives, when Britain no longer provided aid for Greece or 
Turkey. This precipitated the `Truman doctrine'. 63 The link between oil and the Truman 
doctrine was not lost on contemporaries. One report noted that, "The loud talk was all of 
Greece and Turkey, but the whispers behind the talk were of the ocean of oil to the 
south. "" Another commented, "Observers generally agree that President Truman's aim 
behind giving dollar transfusions to Greece and Turkey is to keep Soviet Russia away 
from the Middle Eastern oilfields. Besides playing power politics, the U. S. is also 
playing the old game of oil diplomacy. "65 
Through the war years United States Government and corporate officers 
continued to maintain that the United Kingdom was undermining political and 
commercial interests in Saudi Arabia. 66 One way in which the United States tried to 
combat this tendency was to provide Lend-Lease for Saudi Arabia from February 1943; 
others included the proposed part-ownership of Aramco by the Petroleum Reserves 
62John W. Young, Winston Churchill's Last Camq. 4jgn Britain and the Cold War. 1951-1955 
(Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1996). 
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Corporation (PRC) discussed in the previous chapter. Since the oil companies were very 
important in the demise of the PRC. plan, it has also been assumed that they were 
important in the advent of Lend-Lease support. For instance, Benjamin Shwadran called 
Lend-Lease for Saudi Arabia "the crowning achievement of almost three years of effort 
on the part of The Texas Company and the Standard Oil Company of California. "67 
Many writers share this view. 68 They rely on a conversation between Texaco board 
chairman, W. S. S. Rodgers, and Harold Ickes in early February 1943 in which Rodgers 
spoke of the dangers of British policy and proposed a reserve in Saudi Arabia for United 
States military use. Ickes is supposed to have discussed these matters with Roosevelt on 
16 February, which resulted in the announcement of Lend-Lease for Saudi Arabia on 18 
February. In fact, Ickes' diary reveals that what he spoke about was the question of the 
United States Government buying into the Aramco concession. In other words, Rodgers' 
comments were a starting point for the PRC; Lend-Lease provision came from another 
source. 69 The Department of State Near Eastern Division came to see Arabian reserves 
as crucial. Thus, they established a consulate in Jidda in April 1942. Its head, Paul 
Ailing, had come to the decision, by December, that Saudi Arabia should be given Lend- 
Lease. His recommendation was authorised by Roosevelt on 18 February, two days after 
he had met Ickes to talk about the opportunity for Government financial interest in the 
(March 1977): 913-916,922,930-932; Barry Rubin, "Anglo-American Relations in Saudi 
Arabia, 1941-1945, " Journal of Contemn History 14: 253-267. 
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Press, 1974), 276-277; Gabriel Kolko, The Politics of War: The War and United States Foreign 
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1939-1949 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1980), 71. 
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Arabian concession. Indeed, Ickes categorically denied that he had discussed Lend-Lease 
with the President. 70 
To Anderson, this suggests that the decision was made for strategic rather than 
economic grounds, and that the effective recommendation originated from the executive 
rather than companies. 7' In mid-1944 Anglo-American rivalry in Saudi Arabia extended 
to aviation. The United States wanted to construct facilities in Dhahran to support the 
Pacific theatre. However, the construction of military projects was also aimed at 
providing the United States with a post-war advantage. General H. H. Arnold told the Air 
Transport Command in 1942 that it should "take action to insure [sic] that our military 
transport rules and facilities are establishing and furthering our post-war position in the 
air transport field. "72 The British were well aware of this dimension to the construction 
of air facilities. In 1938 they had carried half of all civil air traffic, 'the United States only 
one-ninth. However, the Lend-Lease agreements gave a near monopoly on the building 
of air transport planes and bombers to the United States and the Air Transport Command 
was United States-run. Excluding the Air Transport Command directed traffic, by 1943 
British air carriers were responsible for only twelve per cent, while the United States 
now carried seventy-two per cent of traffic. 73 Truman had made a speech about the Four 
Freedoms which would govern the post-war world. In November 1944 the United States 
presented the Fifth Freedom at the International Civil Aviation Conference being held in 
" 
Chicago. This meant deregulation of aviation on the terms of the United States. Later, 
some officials hinted that Lend-Lease and post-war aid might not be easily obtained 
701rvine H. Anderson, "Lend-Lease For Saudi Arabia: A Comment on Alternative 
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unless Britain agreed to the Fifth Freedom. 74 The United States were able also to offer 
financial largesse to the Saudis to establish their airport over British protests. By 1947 
the United States had replaced the United Kingdom as the major foreign power in the 
Kingdom. 75 
This change over was also visible in the construction of Tapline. It will be 
recalled that the domestic companies and the State Department opposed the Petroleum 
Reserves Corporation scheme for the Arabian pipeline. This meant that the international 
companies would have to find the money to build it themselves. To achieve this they 
sought to widen the membership of Aramco. This required some consideration of both 
the Saudi and United States Governments. In an interview, Dr Al-Saleh revealed that, 
"His Majesty Ibn Saud insisted that the new partners in Aramco be American companies. 
He was still suspicious of the intentions of the British Government regarding Saudi 
Arabia. Thus, before the membership of Aramco was enlarged to include Jersey and 
Socony-Vacuum in 1947, he specifically demanded assurance on this point, and only 
then he gave permission for the two new companies to join. "76 
The United States Government had also wanted to `solidify' the American oil 
concession by widening its membership. In this the State Department took advantage of 
the changes agreed during the negotiations for the Anglo-American Oil Agreements - the 
abrogation of the Red Line Agreement and the restrictive marketing agreement between 
Gulf and Anglo-Iranian in the Kuwait Oil Company. Moreover, the British companies 
also wanted to increase Middle Eastern production. The only losers were the French 
Government and Calouste Gulbenkian whose concern was that increased production in 
Saudi Arabia and Kuwait would limit the increased production from the Iraq Petroleum 
74John A. Miller, "Air Diplomacy, " 5-10,110-30. 
75James L. Gormly, "Keeping the Door Open in Saudi Arabia: The United States and the Dhahran Airfield, 1945-1946, " Diplomatic History 4.2 (Spring 1980): 197-203. 
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Company in which they held shares. Finally, a Group Agreement was signed in 
November 1948 which opened the way for a new order in Middle East oi1. M Socony- 
Vacuum and Jersey could provide the capital and market outlets in Europe, which would 
permit the further development of the Aramco concession, and Socony-Vacuum in 
particular had lost production facilities in East Asia. 78 
This new order in the Middle East was not only made up from changes to the 
equity joint venture in Saudi Arabia, but there were also contractual joint ventures 
formed by long-term sale of oil agreements. The sale of oil contracts were not 
conventional arm's length contracts. They involved long periods, large quantities, 
unusual pricing and conditions of sale, and restrictive marketing agreements. For 
instance, the 1947 agreement between Gulf and Shell regarding Kuwaiti oil was 
designed to last for twenty-two years. Profits would be shared by an intricate formula for 
calculating the amount of profits realised on the production, transportation, refining, and 
marketing of the oil sold to Shell. Gulf did not receive a fixed price for the oil but a fifty 
per cent financial interest in Shell sales in the eastern hemisphere. This system was 
referred to as netback pricing. 79 
The Anglo-Iranian agreements with Jersey and Socony-Vacuum grew out of the 
continuing negotiations in which Anglo-Iranian and Jersey were engaged after 1945. An 
early result was the Heads of Agreement with Jersey, which soon involved Socony- 
Vacuum as well. 80 These arrangements were soon formalised. 81 The sale involved 
76Dr Muhammed Al-Saleh, interview by author, 20 July 1998. 
77BP 20366. The Aramco Release. Iraq Petroleum Company Ltd 1948 Documents Heads of 
Agreement and Supplemental Documents. 45-7,3 November 1948. 
78Anthony Sampson, Rev. ed., The Seven Sisters, 139-142. 
79Daniel Yergin, The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil. Money and Power London: Simon and Schuster, 1991), 419-420. 
80BP 66823, Heads of Agreement between Anglo-Iranian and Jersey, and side letter adding Socony-Vacuum, 20 December 1946. 
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between one quarter and one third of Anglo-Iranian's daily production in Iran and 
Kuwait combined. "The two companies, in fact, acquired such a substantial interest in 
Anglo-Iranian's crude-oil production over a twenty-year period, with special terms as to 
price and other matters, that they became, in effect, junior partners in Anglo-Iranian's 
crude-oil-producing enterprises in Iran and Kuwait. "82 
11 
The selling price was calculated on a cost plus basis. For the Jersey contract and 
first Socony-Vacuum contract this was the cost of production and delivery plus a fixed 
money profit per ton. For the second Socony-Vacuum contract it was the cost of 
production plus one-third of the gross profits per ton. Such pricing terms would require 
knowledge of each item of cost. There were independent auditors specially retained for 
this task, and Anglo-Iranian were obliged to provide "any and all information" which 
Socony-Vacuum or Standard might "reasonably" request. The contracts also specified 
the target market. For Jersey, this was defined as the "reference area" - it included 
Europe, north and west Africa The first Socony-Vacuum contract of September 1947 
dealt with the "reference area" plus the countries and islands of the eastern 
Mediterranean, the second contract of March 1948 dealt with the United States. 83 
The Anglo-Iranian contracts were originally an integral part of the plan for the 
formation of Middle East Pipelines Ltd. (MEPL). While owned by Anglo-Iranian, 
Jersey, and Socony-Vacuum, some capacity would be also allotted to Gulf and Shell 
81 BP 26936, Supply Agreement between Anglo-Iranian and Jersey, 25 September 1947; BP 
62375, First Supply Agreement between Anglo-Iranian and Socony-Vacuum, 25 September 
1947; BP 64736, Second Supply Agreement between Anglo-Iranian and Socony-Vacuum, 1 
March 1948. 
82Congress, Senate, Staff Reuort of the Federal Trade Commission on the International 
Petroleum Cartel, Subcommittee on Small Business of the United States Senate, 22 August 1952, 
198. [Hereinafter FTC, Re rt] 146. 
83BP 20366, Folder 12, Heads of Agreement between Anglo-Iranian, Socony-Vacuum Overseas 
Supply Company and Socony Vacuum, 1 May 1952, contains a discussion of the previous 
agreements in the late 1940s. Folder 3 contains a copy of the agreement between the Anglo- Persian Oil Company and Gulf Oil Company, 14 December 1933, which gave rise to the 
restrictive marketing clauses. 
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based on their share in financing Anglo-Iranian's majority share of 60.9%. 84 When the 
pipeline was not constructed, Supplemental Agreements were made so that at least 
ninety-five per cent of oil should be shipped to the agreed destinations. If more than five 
per cent went to eastern markets, Anglo-Iranian would penalise the offending 
company. 85 One very important point was the importance of Anglo-Iranian, the pivot of 
these contracts. At its own discretion it could supply from either Iran or Kuwait, but its 
oil was going to agreed markets, whether in the Gulf contract with Shell for supplies 
from the Kuwait Oil Company, or Jersey or Socony-Vacuum contracts. Underlining this 
is a comment made about Anglo-Iranian director, Sir William Fraser, during the 1948 
negotiations with the Iraq Government over MEPL - "everyone in Iraq believed that it 
was he and he alone who had the final word with the [Iraq Petroleum Company] 
group s6 
Apart from these large-scale arrangements, there were many smaller agreements. 
In some instances, these were related to pre-war arrangements. For instance, the 
"cancellation of the reciprocal supply arrangement at present operating between the two 
companies automatically reinstates the Benzine Agreement of the 24`h May 1935, since 
its suspension was specifically related to the reciprocal supply arrangements by the 
memorandum signed... on the 1' October 1942. "87 However, in the changed 
circumstances new agreements needed to be established and a new Benzine Agreement 
was reached followed by a Mutual Supply Arrangement. 88 Across a range of issues 
84BP 59377, Memorandum of Articles and Association of Middle East Pipeline Ltd, BP 64734, 
Socony-Vacuum, Middle East Pipelines Ltd, and Jersey Middle East Pipeline Agreement, 23 
March 1948. BP 64735, Interim Supply Agreement with Socony, 24 March 1948. 
85BP 54006, Supplemental Agreement between Anglo-Iranian and Jersey, 5 April 1949; BP 
54006, Supplemental Agreement between Anglo-Iranian and Socony I, 5 April 1949; BP 64736, 
Supplemental Agreement between Anglo-Iranian and Socony II, 5 April 1949; BP 59376, 
Supplemental Pipeline Agreement, 5 April 1949. 
86FTC, Rert, 158. 
87BP 93975, J. P. Berkin to H. E. Snow, 27 February 1948. 
88BP 64661. Memorandum, "Summary of Supply Arrangements with Shell, 1933 - 1949, " 19 January 1949. Supplies were regulated by the Benzine Agreement of 1935 between January 1933 
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William Fraser of Anglo-Iranian and George Legh-Jones of Shell held talks between 
April 1948 and December 1949.89 Then, there were agreements covering benzine, 
aviation fuel, lubricants, and bunker fuels as well as the long term supply agreement 
between Anglo-Iranian and Shell. 90 At the same time, Anglo-Iranian entered into long- 
term contracts in the western hemisphere. 
These corporate manoeuvres also furthered United States domestic policy 
objectives as Middle East oil enjoyed a competitive advantage in price over domestic 
and Latin American production. Compared to their average cost of $1.28 per barrel, 
Middle East oil only cost about 90c. per barrel. The combination of American companies 
could, therefore, help develop an American overseas concession but also when necessary 
regulate production in favour of fields in the Americas. Thus, the Justice, War and 
Interior Departments approved the merger of December 1946. Socal, Texaco, and Jersey 
each took a thirty per cent share, while Socony-Vacuum took a ten per cent share in the 
consortium. 91 
The Socal and Texas directors in the United States took this more global view 
than the field operatives in Saudi Arabia. A global pricing and market share war with 
Jersey and Socony-Vacuum relying on oil from their bases in the Americas would reduce 
everyone's profits, and given the lack of market outlets, it was not a foregone conclusion 
that Socal-Texas, the Caltex interests, would win. The raids they had engineered during 
the trade war had not proved decisive, which was discussed in chapter five. In this 
context, the negotiations around the Anglo-American Oil Agreements were a series of 
to December 1941, by the Reciprocal Supply Arrangement of 1942 till April 1946 and thereafter 
by the Benzine Agreement of March 1946 and Mutual Supply Arrangement between May 1946 
and February 1948. 
89BP 66845, Negotiations with Shell. 
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peace talks and the new corporate balance of power in the Middle East a new corporate 
order. Here was an opportunity to win market share, and thus secure a larger share of the 
profits in the European market at the cost of reducing their shareholding from fifty per 
cent to thirty per cent. All of these benefits depended on the transport of oil from Saudi 
Arabia to the eastern Mediterranean for supply to Western Europe. Jersey and Socony- 
Vacuum immediately agreed to finance almost half of Tapline's costs though the formal 
widening of Aramco did not take place till three years later. 92 A Tapline Company was 
created to finance, build and run the pipeline. 93 Later, as the United States continued 
their support for the Zionist homeland the investment of the companies came under 
threat. 94 
The easiest way to reassure the King was to re-route the pipeline away from 
Palestine. Thus, negotiations started with Lebanon and Syria. The company had not 
decided which terminal to prefer. 95 The Maronite Christian dominated state suggested 
making the terminus near Beirut, which was fast becoming the financial centre of the 
Middle East. Negotiations with Quwatly of Syria were far more protracted. It was hoped 
that Quwatly might be replaced in the July 1947 elections. To this end, Miles Copeland, 
the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) station chief in Damascus during the late 1940s, 
later admitted to "promoting pro-American candidates" by a "discreet nudge here and 
there. "96 After Truman's recognition of Israel on 15 May 1948, it appeared even harder 
to get Syrian agreement. In January 1949 Aramco started spending money to get support 
in the parliament and press, while the CIA were considering a coup headed by Colonel 
92Henrietta Larson, Evelyn H. Knowlton, and Charles Popple, History of Standard Oil Company 
(New Jersey), vol. 3, New Horizons. 1927-1950 (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), 738. 
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Husni Zaim, Syrian chief of staff. On 30 March, he seized control, imprisoned thousands 
of `Communists', and started peace talks with Israel. He signed an agreement with the 
Tapline Company. The State Department promised the Tapline Company that even if 
Syrian radicals challenged the legality of Zaim's action, diplomatic support to the 
company would be provided. When Zaim was overthrown and executed in August, the 
State Department kept its promise. 97 Covert action in support of oil interests had become 
an established part of American strategy in the Middle East. 
In March 1950, George McGhee, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, 
South Asian, and African Affairs inspected the pipeline which had secured United States 
foreign policy goals, including halting the depletion of reserves in the Americas while 
providing cheap fuel for West European recovery, and revenues to pro-Western Arab 
states. 98 Weaving their separate agendas together, United States diplomats and oilmen 
had secured vital strategic interests. Shared interests rather than a hijacking of the state 
explain the close relationship between state and firms during this period. It challenges 
the view that, "The documentation shows how the petroleum industry has harnessed 
public law, Governmental machinery, and opinion to ends that directly challenge public 
rule... In the name of national interest it has received privileges beyond those accorded to 
other industries-In the name of freedom, the oil industry has received substantial 
immunity from public accountability. "99 
6 
However, it is important to realise just how wide-ranging and significant this 
cooperation was. "The outstanding characteristic of the world's petroleum industry is the 
97Douglas Little, "Pipeline Politics: America, TAPLINE, and the Arabs, " Business History 
Review 64 (Summer 1990): 275-280. 
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dominant position of seven international companies. "100 In 1949 they held sixty-five per 
cent of the world's proven oil resources. If we exclude the nationalised industries of 
Mexico and the Soviet Union, and the relatively competitive market of the United States, 
the figure rises to ninety-two per cent. The majors also controlled seventy-seven per cent 
of the world crude refining and eighty-five per cent of the world cracking capacity, 
outside of the United States and Soviet Union. Their control over the cracking process 
involved the creation of higher-valued products, including high octane fuels and 
chemical bases for synthetic rubber and many plastics. Thus, their control over cracking 
affected a broader segment of the world economy than crude-refining capacity. '°' 
The area of pipelines sheds light on a major feature of oil company behaviour, 
the "maze of joint ownership. "102 Jersey, Texas, Casoc, and Socony-Vacuum owned 
Taipline. In the areas of production and marketing Texas and Socal owned the Bahrain 
Petroleum Company, and the Iraq Petroleum Company comprised Jersey, Socony- 
Vacuum, Shell and Anglo-Iranian, with minority interests for the French national oil 
company - the Compagnie Francaise des Petroles - and Calouste Gulbenkian. Whereas 
the majors were pleased to ignore the Red Line agreement, the French company and 
Gulbenkian were less pleased and needed to be placated. 103 The Kuwait Oil Company 
comprised Anglo-Iranian and Gulf, while Socal and Texas made up the Caltex group 
which controlled the Bahrain Petroleum Company and Aramco, until Aramco ownership 
was widened to include Jersey and Socony-Vacuum as well. These global dynamics of 
alliance-building helped rebuild the corporate balance of power. Yet they also fed into 
Cold War strategic concerns regarding Saudi Arabia. For another example of 
Government intervention in the Aramco concession independently supporting the 
dynamics of corporate behaviour took place in 1950. 
100vrc, Report. 22. 
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Ibn Saud was demanding greater revenues and amid the tensions of the Korean 
War, in November 1950, George McGhee met with representatives of Aramco's parents. 
Recalling the Mexican expropriations of 1938 McGhee feared that a tougher negotiating 
stance would only encourage the nationalists. Furthermore, expropriation in these 
circumstances might further consolidate pro-communist forces in the region. The Middle 
East had become even more important in 1950 than it had been at the time of the 
Azerbaijan crisis of 1946. It is interesting to look closely at the Aramco agreement of 
1950 for many reasons. First, it established the fifty-fifty profit split between the host 
Government and companies in the Middle East, but it also demonstrates the role of the 
United States Government on the one hand and the activism of local political forces in 
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on the other. For it established "a concession agreement - 
or an economic development contract as it might well be called. "104 The `economic 
development contract' was also a form of contractual joint venture, a partnership 
between the Government and industry, and it led to an increase in revenue as the fifty- 
fifty share of net profits gave a three to four-fold increase. 101 
In his book, The Control of Oil, Blair argued that the United States Government 
used the foreign tax credit provision in the tax law which allowed Aramco to offset its 
increased liability to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia against its net liability to United 
States corporate taxes, as a means of subsidising the Kingdom. 106 However, Irvine H. 
Anderson, who is a major authority on the early history of Aramco, reveals that there is 
no documentary evidence for the exchange between the National Security Council and 
103Daniel Yergin, The Prize, 413-419. 
104Henry Catten, The Evolution of Oil Concessions in the Middle East and North Africa, Parker 
School of Foreign and Comparative Law (New York: Oceana Publications, 1967. vii, Foreword, Fred Davies, former chairman of Aramco. 
1051bid., 10. 
106John M. Blair, n Control of L (London: Macmillan, 1976), 196-199 
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Treasury with the former leaning on the latter. 107 Examining the Saudi side of the 
episode also supports such an interpretation. While there is no access to Aramco archives 
I was able to interview a leading expert, Dr Al-Saleh. His testimony was revealing 
insofar as he attributed the origins of the Aramco profit-split to the arrival of new 
American companies in the Kingdom. (Incidentally, this also demonstrates the 
usefulness of taking a longer timeframe for analysis as it brings out continuities that may 
be overlooked in studies of discrete events). He recalled that: 
The arrival of the Independents in the Middle East transformed the 
negotiating strength of the host states. The deal with Getty in the Neutral 
Zone in 1948-49 provided a royalty of 55c. per barrel, whereas the old 
concessions in Iran and Iraq only provided for royalties of 16 % c. '08 
Across the desert it was difficult to establish definite boundaries and by the Ojair 
agreement of 1924 a neutral zone was established in which tribes retained grazing and 
watering rights and along which no forts would be built. In June 1948 Sheikh Ahmad of 
Kuwait granted concession to Aminoil (a consortium of small American companies) and 
February 1949 J. Paul Getty's Pacific Western Company successfully bid for one from 
Saudi Arabia. 109 The growing awareness of the potential negotiating power of the host 
states coincided with a growing demand for finance. He continues, "Just as a financial 
shortage had been the catalyst for the original concession so also the fifty-fifty deal was 
born out of the decline in royalties during 1949. " He notes that, "We took a very pro- 10 
active approach to increasing the rent from the concession. We did not wish to hurt the 
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company through increasing the royalty payments. By retaining a tax consultant in the 
United States, it was discovered that a device existed called the foreign tax credit. 
Through imposing taxes on Aramco we would increase our rent from the concession. At 
the same time, this would not affect the company as they could deduct the tax paid in 
Saudi Arabia from their taxes to the United States Government. " 110 If royalties had been 
increased, this would affect the companies but through the tax credit, Saudi Arabia could 
increase her revenues without depriving the companies of any income. American 
taxpayers were effectively subsidising the increase in Saudi Arabian revenues. 
Dr Al-Saleh was both compelling and insistent when discussing the origins of the 
agreement. It appears that the Government had been informed of earlier use of the 
formula and pressed for it independently. This suggests that the fifty-fifty profit split 
agreement did not work itself downward from the United States Government to the 
Aramco consortium to the Saudi Government. Such a movement would confirm classical 
realist arguments about the primacy of state over firm (United States over Aramco), but 
also great power over small power (United States over Saudi Arabia). Quite the opposite. 
The local power took the initiative against a company, which was then accepted by its 
parent Government. While state enjoyed primacy over firm, the smaller power had its 
policy confirmed by the greater. 
6 
Plans to bring antitrust cases against the majors foundered as the State 
Department developed a mutuality of interests with them. Earlier the British Government 
had reacted strongly against the extra territorial assertion of American antitrust 
legislation. " They advised the Anglo-Iranian not to pass over any documents which did 
not relate to the United States or which might prejudice interests of the Her Majesty's 
110j Muhammed Al_Saleh, interview by author, 20 July 1998. 
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Government. 1 12 Now, however, the State Department rather than the Justice Department 
was considered more important in American policy. "Truman and Eisenhower believed 
it was necessary to rely on the major firms and understandably so considering that these 
firms were the only ones in the 1950s with established facilities for refining and 
distributing Mideast oil. "' 13 Domestic production, and imports from the Caribbean and 
South America met United States demand, but western European oil was supplied from 
Middle East which also supplied Africa and, together with the Netherlands East Indies, 
also supplied Asia. 114 Solberg claims that by 1950, "cooperation between Government 
and big oil had grown so close that the industry operated in every sense as an insider. " 115 
Oil was crucial to post-war United States strategy. Maintaining access to economically 
vital overseas areas provided the basis for a strategic force with overseas strike 
capability. 116 For instance, the Middle East was the most defensible location for a 
strategic air offensive. 117 
7.6 CONCLUSION 
The main historical point of this chapter has been to draw attention to the role of 
British Government and capital in creating the destabilising influences in the Persian 
Gulf which provoked the local states to seek United States assistance which was freely 
given as part of the containment strategy against Soviet communism. The key theoretical 
insight is the role of standard operating procedures, which frustrates attempts to portray 
Government policy as deliberate and `rational. ' The relationship between history and 
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War Era (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1978), 12. 
114BP 35983, Elmer Patman, Report on Third World Petroleum Congress. 
115Carl E. Solberg, Oil Power: The Rise and Imminent Fall of an American Euroire (New York, 
1976), 116. 
116Ian O. Lesser, Oil. the Persian Gulf and Grand Stra egv: Contemporary Issues in Historical Perspective (Santa Monica, CA, 1991). 
224 
theory is that the local agents of the British Government in Iran were accustomed to 
dominating the local political and economic system of Iran. When the British companies 
responded in `balance of power' manoeuvres to the uncertainties of the Anglo-American 
oil negotiations the local British agents followed standard operating procedures to 
support them. However, this only weakened the position of the British Government and 
companies, in the longer term. This chapter thus stands aside from the other chapters 
insofar as on this occasion support of the companies did not lead to greater resources in 
the oil issue area. 
Examination of corporate agendas and dynamics highlight the rivalry and 
cooperation of companies as well as states contriving a balance of power in Middle East 
oil. The corporate balance of power has two components, one internal based on 
increasing resources, and the other external based on alliance building to compensate for 
internal weaknesses and generate new strengths. After the failure of the companies to 
increase their individual strength through new concessions in northern Iran, the main 
mechanism for alliance building was the joint venture. Long-term sales of oil agreements 
constituted contractual joint ventures in marketing and sales, while joint ownership of 
pipelines and concessions tied companies together in equity joint ventures. Two features 
of this balance stand out - its careful and deliberate construction, and arising from this, 
its inclusive quality weaving together the majors into one web, rather than opposed 
camps. 
Another part of the originality lies in setting the Anglo-American oil negotiations 
and the Iranian crisis and Aramco settlement side-by-side. This exposes interplay and 
continuity between the events. British fear about the course of the oil talks of 1944 led 
them to prematurely support Shell in seeking a concession in Azerbaijan. This triggered 
117pc L. Hahn, The United States. Great Britain. and Eszwt 1945-1956-. Strate y and Diplomacy in the Early Cold War (Chapel Hill, CA: University of California Press, 1991). 
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the concession race, which precipitated the political crisis of 1946. It was British capital 
rather than Soviet expansionism or American capital, which lay behind the Azerbaijan 
crisis. Contemporaneously, the success of the oil talks opened the way for a new balance 
of power in Middle East oil. As American companies began to expand Middle East 
production the United States Government supported them diplomatically. In Azerbaijan 
this active support soon came into conflict with United States aims to support Iranian 
sovereignty. In Saudi Arabia the two interests dovetailed. 
The local state was significant. Both Iran and Saudi Arabia welcomed the United 
States Government and business as a way of reducing British influence, which supports 
the idea that the United States was frequently invited by local powers. ' 18 However, while 
United States anti-colonial rhetoric and financial assistance helped to partially displace 
British paramountcy in Iran and Saudi Arabia, experiences in Syria over the transit rights 
of the Tapline Company demonstrated clearly that the end of British Empire did not 
mean independence for the local powers. As the Cold War came to the Middle East the 
pro-western, indeed pro-American, alignment of the local state became an important 
objective. 
6 
118Bruce Kuniholm, The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East; Geir Lundestad, "Empire by 
Invitation? The United States and Western Europe, 1945-1952, " Journal of Peace Research 23 (August 1986): 263-276; John Lewis Gaddis, "The Emerging Post-Revisionist Synthesis on the Origins of the Cold War, " Diolomati History 7.3 (Summer 1983): 171-190. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT: THE NATIONALISATION OF THE ANGLO- 
IRANIAN OIL COMPANY 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
In 1951 the web woven by the oil majors was torn by the nationalisation of Anglo- 
Iranian. Although supplies from the refinery at Abadan ceased, the companies organised 
increased loadings from Kuwait. This shielded Anglo-Iranian from any financial loss and 
encouraged them in maintaining a consistently negative stance towards concessions to 
Iran. In Iran, the boycott of nationalised oil led to an acute financial shortage which 
increased social discontent and political instability. If a boycott had not been managed by a 
great power condominium of the majors the economic situation would have been very 
different. It would have been harder for the British Government to interfere in the political 
process, and the United States would have been less concerned about a communist 
takeover. Thus, the impact of the boycott should not be underestimated. 
The role of the majors is comparable to that Bull advocated for great powers. They 
respected each other's spheres of influence, most clearly in the Red Line agreement, but 
also in the market share agreements of As Is. The reverse side was that they unilaterally 
exploited their local preponderance based on established marketing positions to keep out 
smaller players, or to integrate them into local cartel arrangements not at variance with the 
general rules. Also, they managed their relations to preserve a general balance of power by 
allowing greater American participation in Middle East oil. Furthermore, they tried to 
avoid crises in their relations, for instance, through establishing diplomatic contacts and 
legal provisions to generate consensus around expectations. Moreover, if wars occurred 
they were limited by the desire to limit or contain them as demonstrated in chapter five. In 
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this chapter I focus on the formation of a great power condominium where joint action is 
taken. I There was a link between the joint action of the companies and the psychological 
dimensions of foreign policy during crisis. The corporate joint action secured Anglo- 
Iranian's market position and made them reluctant to offer concessions. At the same time, 
from the perspective of American policymakers the effects of the boycott seemed to 
presage a communist takeover and the British would use this bogey to involve the 
Americans in a coup. The boycott also affected Musaddiq's responses. 
In his mind the boycott was organised by the same imperialist power which 
penetrated the political system. To allow the company back would be to invite political 
slavery. Hence the return of the company was non-negotiable and the only issue to be 
decided was the compensation package. Even when the western states finally agreed to the 
exclusion of the company, he began to insist on a negotiated compensation package rather 
than international arbitration, since he feared that he would be removed by the British and 
the Iranian cause would not be properly represented. His failure to agree eventually 
alienated the Americans and they together with the British jointly executed a coup to 
remove him from office. Taking account of the dangers of hindsight and self-justification, I 
have referred to his Memoi throughout this chapter as his psychological inflexibility was 
a major factor in the crisis. 2 The chapter divides into five sections, the first setting out the 
introduction and the second looking at the crucial economic background to the crisis. The 
third examines the political intrigues sponsored by the British and the fourth the 
international negotiations in which the Americans played an important part. Section five 
concludes this final empirical chapter. 
1Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1977), 207. 
2Dr Muhammad Musaddiq, Musaddiq's Memoirs: The End of the British Empire in Iran, trans. 
Homa Katouzian (London: Jebhe, 1988). [`Musaddiq' is sometimes transliterated `Mossadegh'. ] 
Jim Bamberg also suggests that Musaddiq's inflexibility was the main factor in the failure of the 
228 
8.2 ECONOMICS 
Musaddiq's opponents tried to stimulate or mobilize resentments caused by 
economic difficulties arising out of the boycott. Among them was Senator Nikpur, the pro- 
Qavam chairman of the Chamber of Commerce. 3 He arranged for the expression of the 
top merchants' dissatisfaction with the Government in the form of a critical and gloomy 
report which was read to the Shah on 22 April by the influential merchant Muhammed 
Reza Kharrazi on behalf of the Chamber of Commerce. In April 1953 Maiski told a 
member of the United States Embassy that Musaddiq could not stay in office for more 
than two months as he needed to sell between five and eight million tons of oil to meet his 
.. financial commitments". a 
However, exports had been increased, bringing much-needed foreign exchange, 
and in January 1953 the Government had felt able to repeal the provision of 18 June 1948 
which had barred foreign merchants from importing foreign goods to Iran; it also began 
issuing foreign trading licenses to encourage exports. 5 In spite of the problems the United 
States Embassy continued to believe as late as August 1953 that the Government could 
"avert an acute financial crisis for an indeterminate period". 6 Musaddiq himself argued 
that the fundamental problem was that Anglo-Iranian had earned five billion pounds from 
the concession, but given the Iranians only one hundred and ten million pounds. However, 
"without any oil revenues or foreign aid, the Government managed to run the country. '117 
negotiations. Jim Bamberg, The History of the British Petroleum Company, vol. 2, The And 
Iranian Years. 1928-1954, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 489. 
3PRO F037198599, Middleton to Eden, 28 April 1952. 
4PRO F0371 104565, US Embassy Telegram, 10 April 1953. 
5BP 58238, Law on the Encouragement of Exports and the Issuance of Permits for Engaging in 
Foreign Trade, 4 December 1952, and subsidiary legislation. 
6PRO F0371 104569, US Embassy Report, 14 August 1953. 
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There is considerable disagreement whether the Iranians were able to cope with 
the sudden loss of forty per cent of Government revenue and two-thirds of foreign 
exchange earnings. 8 Clawson and Sassanpour have argued that the currency devaluation, 
import quotas, and imposition of tariffs reduced imports and increased non-oil exports 
reducing the trade deficit to more manageable proportions. They argue that "by 1952/53, 
the economy was in a sustainable balance of payments and fiscal position without oil 
income. The quick adjustment was largely due to active economic policies of the 
Mossadegh Government. "9 This interpretation has also been supported by Homa 
Katouzian and Mustafa Elm. '° The contrary view holds that the country fell into 
recession. Il Moreover, an analysis of the economic data used to support the claim that the 
economy flourished shows that much of it is unreliable. '2 Both Majd and Dadkhah point to 
the link between the continuing economic crisis and political events. "While economic 
factors may not have caused the movement's failure, the disastrous economic conditions 
prevailing in the spring and summer of 1953 clearly set the stage for Mossadegh's 
overthrow. "13 The loss of oil revenues was the fundamental economic factor. 
7Musaddiq, Memoirs, 317-318. 
8M. G. Maid, "The 1951-53 Oil Nationalization Dispute and the Iranian Economy: A Rejoinder, " 
Middle Eastern Studies 31.3 (July 1995): 457. 
9 Patrick Clawson and Cyrus Sassanpour, "Adjustment to foreign exchange shock: Iran, 1951- 
1953, " International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 19.1 (February 1987): 2. 
10 Homa Katouzian, "Oil Boycott and the Political Economy: Musaddiq and the Strategy of Non- 
oil Economics, " in Musaddig. Iranian Nationalism and Oil ed. James A. Bill and William Roger 
Louis (London: I. B. Tauris, 1988): 203-227; Mustafa Elm, Oil. Power and Principle: Iran's Oil 
Nationalization and Its Aftermath (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1992), 267-275; M. 
Hashem Pesaran, "The Iranian Exchange Rate Policy and the Black Market for Dollars, " 
International Journal of Middle East Studies 24.1 (February 1992): 106. 
11 Kaman Dadkhah, "rho Oil Nationalization Movement, the British Oil Boycott and the Iranian 
Economy 1951-1953, " in Essays on the Economic History of the Middle East ed. Elie Kedourie 
and Slyvia G. Haim (London: Frank Cass, 1988), 104-131. 
12M. G. Majd, "The 1951-53 Oil Nationalization Dispute and the Iranian Economy: A Rejoinder, " 
Middle Eastern Studies 31.3 (July 1995): 456. 
13Kamran Dadkhah, "rho Oil Nationalization Movement, the British Oil Boycott and the Iranian Economy 1951-53, " in Essays on the Economic History of the Middle East ed. Elie Kedourie and 
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During the dispute the National Iranian Oil Company, with sales of only 132,000 
tons of oil, generated less revenue than a single day's royalties from the Anglo-Iranian 
before nationalisation. 14 Cassidy observes that, "In the two years that followed the 
nationalization, Iranian revenues were less than a single day's royalties under the old 
system. "15 The majors did not merely passively refuse to handle the nationalised oil; they 
threatened all potential customers, whether private buyers or states with legal action for 
handling stolen goods. '6 The companies also persuaded the Governments to support the 
boycott. '7 The United States Government requested the American independents not to buy 
Iranian crude. "The companies had effectively defeated the nationalization itself with an 
effective boycott of Iranian crude oil. "18 The boycott caused economic chaos in Iran which 
contributed to widespread discontent which the British tried to channel into political 
action. The appeal to the Senate by ninety guild representatives was regarded as a 
success. 19 Dadkhah states that the oil boycott: 
overwhelmed the Iranian economy, and Mossadegh's short-run policies 
proved inadequate. The country suffered from many economic ills: lack of 
foreign exchange, low level of income, recession, inflation and 
shortages... While economic factors may not have caused the movement's 
failure, the disastrous economic conditions prevailing in the spring and 
summer of 1953 clearly set the stage for Mossadegh's overthrow. 20 
Slyvia G. Haim, 125; M. G. Majd, ". `The 1951-53 Oil Nationalization Dispute and the Iranian 
Economy: A Rejoinder, " Middle Eastern Studies 31.3 (July 1995): 457. 
14Christopher Tugendhat and Adrian Hamilton, Oil: The Biggest Business (London: Eyre 
Methuen, 1968), 141. 
15Ralph Cassidy, Jr., Price Making and Price Behaviour in the Petroleum Industry, Petroleum 
Management Series (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1954), 176-177. 
16 peter R Odell and Luis Vallenillon, The Pressures of Oil: A Strategy For Economic Revival 
(London: Harper and Row, 1978), 27. 
17BP 46596, London to Tehran, 12 August 1952. 
18Mira Wilkins, "The Oil Companies in Perspective, " in The Oil Crisis ed. Raymond Vernon 
(New York: W. W. Norton, 1976), 164. 
19PRO F0371 98599, Middleton to Eden, 28 April 1952. 
20Kamran Dadkhah, "Me Oil Nationalization Movement, the British Oil Boycott and the Iranian 
Economy 1951-53, " in Essays on the Economic History of the Middle East ed. Elie Kedourie and Sylvia G. Haim (Lond)n: Frank Cass, 1988), 125. 
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Majd explains the reason for the crisis. "With a sudden loss of two-thirds of 
foreign exchange earnings and 40 per cent of Government revenue, Iran was faced with a 
grave economic crisis which required speedy solution. As the crisis dragged on and the 
months turned into years, the economic and political situation deteriorated. With no 
solution in sight, Musaddiq was abandoned by his erstwhile supporters. "21 While this view 
suffers from economic determinism and minimises the role of British intrigues in the 
political crisis, if oil revenues had not been cut off a stronger economy would have 
provided more social and political stability. 22 In the two years of the effective 
nationalisation, "sales amounted to 132,000 tons yielding less revenue than a single day's 
royalties under the old company. "23 
Following the failure of the Stokes mission, examined in section 8.4 below, Anglo- 
Iranian issued a statement that it would protect its legal rights. 24 The embargo stayed firm 
and the company initiated legal proceedings in Aden, Italy, and Japan. " There was action 
in the Tokyo Court of Appeal to prevent disposal of oil shipped from Iran. 26 Hungary and 
Poland had wanted to purchase half a million tons of cut price oil, but the control of 
21M. G. Majd, "The 1951-53 Oil Nationalization Dispute and the Iranian Economy: A Rejoinder", 
Middle Eastern Studies, 457. 
22ldeed, some writers do believe that Musaddiq's counter-measures had effectively stabilised the 
economy, in spite of the loss of oil revenues. For them the coup is explained in purely political 
terms, rather than as a combination of political and economic factors. They include Patrick 
Clawson and Cyrus Sassanpour, "Adjustment to Foreign Exchange Shock: Iran, 1951-1953, " 
International Journal of Middle East Studies 19.1 (February 1987): 1-23; Homa Katouzian, "Oil 
Boycott and the Political Economy: Musaddiq and the Strategy of Non-oil Economics" in 
Musaddiq, Iranian Nationalism. and Oil ed. James A. Bill and William Roger Louis (London: I. B. 
Tauris, 1988), 203-27; Mustafa Elm, Oil. Power and Principle, 267-275. 
23Christopher Tugendfiat and Adrian Hamilton, Oil: The Biggest Business (London: Eyre 
Methuen, 1968), 141. 
24BP 100652, London to Athens, 5 September 1951. 
25BP 71837,1951 Dispute. The Chairman's Statement to Stockholders in the Annual Reports of 
1948,1949,1950,1951,1952 regarding the Company's interests in Iran; with a chronology of 
main events from 1948 to May 1953,9 May 1953, p. 23; Homa Katouzian, "Oil boycott and the 
political economy" in Musaddio Iranian Nationalism and Oil ed. James A Bill and William Roger 
Louis, (London: I. B. Tauris, 1988), 208. 
26BP 66260, Green copy, 22 September 1953. 
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tankers proved decisive. 27 The company made precautionary investigations into legal 
action in the United States. 25 However, the attitude of the United States Government to the 
embargo was sympathetic. "Truman and Eisenhower believed it was necessary to rely on 
the major firms and understandably so considering that these firms were the only ones in 
the 1950s with established facilities for refining and distributing Mideast oil. " This belief 
led the United States Government to continually lessen the charges in the cartel case 
brought by the Justice Department in 1953 till by 1968 the case was finally closed without 
any serious action having been taken. "The history of the cartel case makes clear just how 
successful the large integrated firms were in controlling the flow of oil from the Mideast. 
In this respect it underlines the mutuality of interests between Government and oil in the 
1950s and 1960s and oil's ability to harness public concerns for private ends... prosecution 
of the Mideast multinational giants was made subordinate to a perceived Soviet threat in 
the Third World... In this way the Cold War was able to intrude into the domestic affairs of 
the United States. "30 
However, the significance of the majors working together was not only in the 
bankrupting of the Iranian state; it was also in the prevention of disruption to global 
markets and distress to the Anglo-Iranian. "The key element in upsetting the 
nationalization attempt of the Iranians was the ability of the larger oil companies to 
mobilise production elsewhere in the world. "31 The terms of the long-term contracts 
analysed in the previous chapter were varied so as to accommodate increased production 
from Kuwait, Iraq, and Qatar in place of Iran, purchasing from other sources, and hiring 
27BP 18486, New York Times, January 31 1952. 
28BP 69514, Possibility of legal action in the United States challenging title to oil based upon 
nationalization of company's properties in Iran, March 1953. 
29B. I. Kaufman, -nW Oil Cartel Case- A DQguMgq , Study of Antitrust Activity in the Cold 
War Era (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1978), 14. 
301bid., 12. 
31Ralph Cassidy Jr., Price Making and Price Behaviour, 177. 
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refineries. For this the company was well placed. Not only was Fraser very influential in 
the Iraq Petroleum Company, but he also had great influence in the Kuwaiti industry, 
"From the beginning of drilling in the 1930s right up until 1970 there was no control over 
the operating practises of the oil companies. "32 While Anglo-Iranian was deprived of 
fifteen millions tons of Iranian crude, sales in 1950 were only down by two millions tons 
from thirty-eight and a half million tons. 33 The disruption to business was minimised. For 
example, a crude oil exchange was discussed with Caltex involving crude from Sumatra in 
the Netherlands East Indies, which might result in large freight savings for joint benefit. 34 
At the same time, there was discussion of the use of force majeure clauses and the 
availability of crude from Kuwait. 35 A legal opinion from 1951 had observed that unless 
there was a permanent deprivation from Iran, there was no issue of frustration of the 
contracts. 36 However, in spite of the general difficulty of the full load of production falling 
on Kuwait, force majeure clauses signalled the willingness of the companies to work 
around the changes. 37 Other subsidiaries also played a full role, in collaboration with the 
other companies. The Commonwealth Oil Refineries in Australia was a subsidiary of 
Anglo-Iranian and Burmah-Shell group helped distribution in India and Pakistan. 38 
32Youssif S. Fadel Al-Sabah, The Oil Economy of Kuwait (London: Kegan Paul, 1980). Due to 
this control Fraser could refer to the Kuwait Oil Company as the Sheikh's private property. BP 
67013, Kuwait Oil Company January 1941-December 1944, Fraser to H. H. Shaikh, 10 November 
1944 "your oil company. " For more information on Anglo-Iranian's position in the Persian Gulf 
and Fraser's importance within the Iraq Petroleum Company, see section 7.5 in chapter 7. 
33BP Search Room, Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, Limited: Annual Report and Accounts, 31 
December 1951,29. 
34BP 66259, H. E. Snow to W. D. Brown, 11 August 1952. 
35BP 66259, H. E. Snow to C. H. W. Smith, Jersey/ Socony-Vacuum contracts, 11 August 1952. 
36BP 113393, Linklaters and Paines, "Joint Opinion, " 9 August 1951. 
37H. E. Snow memorandum, Jersey and Socony-Vacuum main crude oil contracts, 11 September 
1951, BP 113393. The Jersey and Socony-Vacuum contracts had set out a specific procedure for 
calculating the amount of oil which would be delivered to the buyers if there was a problem due to 
force majeure. 
38BP 30852, E. L. Lomax, "Anglo-Iranian Oil Company Ltd. Expands Activities to Compensate 
for Iran Losses, " reprinted for World Petroleum, December 1951. 
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The companies had an important economic role to play in the rebuilding of the 
European and Japanese economies, but oil was also a strategic commodity. In 1950, the 
Korean war broke out and aviation fuel became very important. Abadan produced forty 
per cent of the total produced in friendly foreign states. The Petroleum Emergency 
Committee was the first voluntary agreement operating worldwide under the auspices of 
the Defense Production Act. The chairman of operations was Stewart P. Coleman, vice 
president and director of Jersey, and the vice chairman was A. V. Long of Texas. 39 During 
the Korean War greater amounts of petroleum products were consumed in the Far East. 
The companies were asked to arrange the logistics of supply. They agreed to do so jointly, 
thereby requiring the Government to ignore the antitrust laws. By developing a common 
strategy in negotiations they were able to get the National Security Council to decide in 
August 1953 that the enforcement of antitrust laws was secondary to national security. 
The cases lodged under these laws were modified from criminal to civil cases and then 
abandoned altogether. 40 
"The permeability of oil has extended throughout the peacetime machinery of the 
federal bureaucracy... The number of public officials with oil backgrounds or relations 
could begin with former Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. Until 1949 he was the 
senior member of Sullivan and Cromwell, the major law firm for the Jersey Standard 
empire... Herbert Hoover, Jr., a petroleum engineer and director of Union Oil whose 
major associations have been with oil, was the State Department's representative in the 
secret Iranian negotiations. He later became Undersecretary of State and was involved in 
questions of Middle Eastern policy and represented his Department in many of the top- 
39Shoshana Klebanoff, Middle East Oil and U. S. Foreign Policy (London: Praegar Press, 1974), 
86-90. 
40Mira Wilkins, "The Oil Companies in Perspective, " in The Oil Crisis ed. Raymond Vernon (New York: W. W. Norton, 1976), 164-165. 
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level Suez arrangements. 1141 Kermit Roosevelt who played a significant role in the coup 
which removed Musaddiq discussed below, left the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 
and joined Gulf, one of the members of the consortium which replaced Anglo-Iranian's 
concession, as Government relations director and in 1960 became a vice-president. 42 
The expanion of the interests of the United States majors in the late 1940s and 
1950s supported and was supported by greater United States strategic interest in the 
Persian Gulf. The action in Iran in 1946 and 1953 was part of a wider picture including 
the Aramco settlements, the Onassis affair and the Egyptian military advisors in Saudi 
Arabia, the Buraimi Oasis dispute, and responses to attempted arms sales by the Eastern 
Bloc-43 The continuing tension between Anglo-American oil interests and Soviet interests, 
particularly in Azerbaijan was a factor in the creation of CENTO in 1955.44 Oil was a 
factor in containing the Soviet Union by justifying military force to exclude it from the 
Middle East, while preventing Western European dependency on energy supplies from the 
Soviet Union. It limited conflict among the capitalist core as the oil-dependency of Japan 
and Germany provided the United States with leverage, it reduced class conflict through 
boosting recovery, and managed the incorporation of the periphery into the core through 
the oil majors backed, when needed, by parent Governments in spite of the end of formal 
European colonisation. 45 
lk 
41Robed Engler, The politics of Oil. A Study of Private Power and Democratic Directions 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961), 310. 
42Richard O'Connor, The Oil Barons: Men of Greed and Grandeur. (Hart-Davis MacGibbon: 
London, 1972), 381. 
43Dissertation Abstracts, Moiara de Moraes Ruehsen, The Advent of American Hegemony in the 
Persian Gulf. 1953-1956, Ph. D. diss., John Hopkins University, 1992. 
44 Peter K. OdeU, Oil and World Power (Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1986), 203. 
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8.3 BRITAIN'S PARLIAMENTARY CAMPAIGN 
Pressure for a review of the 1933 Anglo-Iranian concession grew after the 
Azerbaijan crisis. Just as the rejection of a Soviet concession was associated with the 
territorial integrity of the country, so it was hoped that the removal of Anglo-Iranian would 
eliminate British political interference in support of the company. "Their most fundamental 
grievance was that the company had not only turned an important part of the country into 
almost an autonomous colony, but that it indirectly ran the country as well. "46 It was 
hoped that revenues might increase as between 1915 and 1950 the company enjoyed 
profits of six hundred and thirteen million dollars, paying the British Government three 
hundred and sixteen million dollars in tax. 47 In 1948, out of profits of sixty-one million 
pounds, Iran had received nine million while the British Government received twenty-eight 
millions. Musaddiq and other nationalists made much of this. 48 
After the Iranians secured access to Anglo-Iranian records in Tehran there were 
many claims about `revelations' concerning bribes paid to deputies and other corruptions 
but these papers were never revealed to public scrutiny. The British Ambassador 
Shepherd noted how there was a note in a company safe, written by a company manager 
to the London Office stating it had been possible to "manage[d] to remove to safety or 
destroy some of the papers. " Shepherd himself claimed that, "As you are no doubt aware, 
most of the important and compromising documents are now lodged in my archives. "49 
The allegations against the company in the pre-1951 years are certainly not proven. 
Nevertheless, as the British Governmental interest in Iran was seen to focus on the 
45Simon Bromley, American Hegemony and World Oil (Oxford: Polity, 1991). 
46Homa Katouzian, Musaddig and the Struggle For Power in Iran (London: I. B. Tauris, 1990), 
64. 
47Fred Halliday, Iran: Dictatorship and Development (Harmondsworth,: Penguin, 1979), 141. 
48Musaddiq, Memoirs, 312. 
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concession the company was held responsible for the British penetration of the political 
system for the exclusion of the company would also remove British political involvement. 
For Musaddiq the issue was political, not economic. His aim was "getting rid of the 
domination of a great world power and recovering our freedom and independence. "50 
Mustafa Fateh was the most important Iranian employed by the company. He had 
worked in distribution, administration, and was the Adviser and Consultant on Employee 
Relations in 1950.51 His views are interesting insofar as they differ in tone and substance 
from those of the British employees of the company. There was a nationalist dimension to 
the crisis, even for a company man like Fateh. He argued that the real struggle was with 
the Tudeh rather than Musaddiq. In any event a rightist Government would not be 
accepted and so "it is in the interests of all parties including Britain and the Anglo-Iranian 
to see that Mossadegh does not fail. "52 He noted that Musaddiq believed that "the British 
dislike him intensely and will do their utmost to oppose him. "53 He claimed that if 
negotiations failed Musaddiq would undercut prices and offer supplies to the Soviet 
Union, India, and Japan. Britain must overcome anti-British feeling by abandoning 
reactionary elements in the opposition and support the Shah in constitutional roles only. 
Traditional pro-British politicians such as Sayyid Zia should be avoided, as he was "too 
much of a man wrapped up in the Union Jack. "54 
b 
The British actually acted in the opposite manner, in part because of their low 
view of the Iranians. "The great majority of Persian staff are deficient in ability and lacking 
in initiative compared with the average British employee. These disqualifications, 
49BP 112232, Shepherd to Foreign Office, 2 July 1951. 
50Musaddiq, Memoirs, 316-317. 
51 Jim Bamberg, History of the British Petroleum Company, 598. 
52BP 9249, Fateh to Gass, 13 May 1951. 
53Bp 9249, Fateh to Gass, 12 May 1951. 
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combined with the fact that they are serving in a foreign concern entirely governed by 
foreign methods, customs and language, creates an inferiority complex. "55 At this time 
there was a suggestion for "encouraging by promotion staff who show an aptitude for 
cooperating with Iranians and for encouraging British staff to learn Persian. "S6 A company 
director, Edward Elkington, whose responsibilities in Iran involved management had little 
trust in the Iranians. He regarded them as "the most tricky and machiavellian people on 
earth. "57 
The British credited neither the nationalist feeling of the Iranian people nor their 
ability to manage operations, which perhaps explains why it took two years before the 
company agreed to be excluded from Iran, the sole issue to be the level of compensation. 
British policy was influenced by the Americans but also by the company. As Louis puts it, 
"can British policy be aligned with that of the United States and, just as important, the 
policy of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company? "38 The other companies managed world 
production to limit the loss to Anglo-Iranian, which made them less flexible. But both firm 
and state shared in "the distorted perceptions that dominated the thinking of each side. " 
The British regarded the Iranians as backward and self-destructive, while the Iranians 
regarded the British as "satanically clever and shrewd manipulators. "59 Musaddiq shared 
this perception and regarded the British as responsible, in particular, for the weaknesses of 
the Iranian political system. 
54Bp 9249, Fateh to Gass, 27 March 1951. 
55BP 71069, Memorandum by Mr L. C. Rice on a discussion held in London on 26 October 1943. 
56BP 71069, J. M. Pattinson to Sir William Fraser, 28 February 1944. 
57BP 43859, Edward H. O. Elkington to Fraser, 19 August 1951. 
58w am Roger Louis, "Musaddiq and the Dilemmas of British Imperialism, " in Musaddia. 
Iranian Nationalism. and Oil ed. James A. Bill and William Roger Louis (London: I. B. Tauris, 
1988), 232. 
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The political structure of Iran was a major factor during the crisis. The pattern of 
weak executive authorities at the mercy of the Majlis resulted in many short-term 
ministries between 1946 and 1951. The Majlis was the lower house and together with the 
Senate comprised the legislative power. The Shah was required to approve legislation and 
appoint the Prime Minister. However, the Majlis was intended to be an advisory body to 
the Shah, rather than an executive authority. Thus, the procedures of the Majlis were 
easily manipulated to prevent stable governance, for instance, by breaking the quorum. 
The weak ministries from 1941 to 1953 reflected the lack of parties or other forms of 
organised groups in the Majlis. Hence, no stable parties had developed in Iranian politics 
which was factional, based on competing leaders with no fixed ideology. This reflected 
and contributed to the failure to develop any ideological consensus about how to fit into 
the modem world. 60 The structural weakness of the Majlis and Senate enabled the Royal 
Court and the British Embassy to maintain an important role in manipulating the Majlis to 
control the executive. 
The Labour Government's policy limiting dividend payments was a response to 
Britain's fiscal crisis, but it caused distress insofar as the Iranian Government received a 
sum equal to twenty per cent of the dividends paid by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company to 
its ordinary shareholders over the amount of £671,250.61 Dividend limitation acted as a 
catalyst for re-negotiations of the 1933 concession agreement. From June 1948 there were 
a series of discussions culminating in the Supplemental Agreement of 17 July 1949. 
Musaddiq, the leader of an ideologically diverse, nationalist mass movement called the 
National Front, filibustered discussion of the Agreement in the Majlis. There was a delay 
"James A. Bill, "America, Iran and the Politics of Intervention, 1951-1953" in Musaddig. Iranian 
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till after the next election and then it was decided to refer the matter to a parliamentary 
commission. Its report of December 1950 opposed the bill and the Supplemental 
Agreement was withdrawn from the Majlis. 62 
Until December 1950 the terms of the concession agreements and the receipts 
from the companies in Iran and Saudi Arabia compared favourably to the Iranians. 63 But 
as the 50-50 agreement between Aramco and the Saudi Government had become public 
knowledge, it became clear that the terms of the Supplemental Agreement would no 
longer suffice. While Anglo-Iranian had previously offered 50: 50 profit sharing terms 
these had not been made public by the Iranian Government. Even if they were revealed 
and offered again, it would seem like a belated response by the company to the Saudi 
Arabian agreement. Moreover, the reaction of the British Government was to try and 
change the administration in Iran. Court involvement in a backstairs intrigue was expected 
to result in the pro-British Sayyid Zia becoming Prime Minister. However, Musaadiq was 
offered the premiership because of the wide support for the National Front. He was 
expected to refuse and a variety of elder statesmen with close links with the British 
including Hussein Ala and Sayyid Zia were discussing the premiership with the Shah 
when Mussadiq accepted office. 64 
Musaddiq's sole purpose in assuming the premiership was to ensure the passage 
of the nationalisation bill. 65 This bill comprised the recommendation of the oil committee 
which Musaddiq had presided over. In spite of British threats the Majlis passed the bill on 
61Benjamin Shwadran, 3d rev. ed., The Middle East. Oil and the Great Powers (New York: John 
Wiley, 1973), 56. 
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63BP 55190, A brief review of events leading upto the present situation of the AIOC in Iran, 7. 6PRO FO 371 91456, Shepherd to Foreign Office, 28 April 1951; Musaddiq, Memoirs, 1988, 
264-5. 
241 
28 April 1951. Meanwhile strikes hit Abadan, which was the site of the largest oil refinery 
in the world, but which also constituted Britain's greatest single overseas investment. 66 On 
the 1 May 1951, the Oil Nationalisation Law comprising nine articles was passed. 67 
Musaddiq found a method to deal with the opposition in the Majlis by holding confidence 
motions to flush out the opposition and confirm the mandate for the nationalisation. Thus, 
on 20 June 1951 the Shah and Sayyid Zia managed to break the quorum. However, by the 
afternoon the Majlis had unanimously cast a vote of confidence for Mussadiq and, by 
proxy, for his oil policy. 68 The vocal parliamentary opposition to Mussadiq constituted 
only a fragment of the opposition whose main activity was advising the British Embassy to 
offer the Shah decisive advice and to press him to act. 69 Advisers included Dr Hasan 
Imami (Imam Jum'ih) and Hikmat, the Speaker of the Majlis, who suggested appointing a 
few hundred assassins in , order 
to overthrow Mussadiq. 70 A crucial link between the 
opposition and the Embassy was provided by Robin Zaehner, the Press Attache in Tehran 
from 1943 to 1947, and from 1952, Spalding Professor of Eastern Religions and Ethics at 
the University of Oxford. During the Azerbaijan crisis he had followed the technique of 
mobilising "public opinion from the bazaars upwards about the dangers of Russian 
penetration! '" 
The British believed that such tactics could succeed because they believed that the 
10 nationalism was artificial. Shepherd claimed that to conceive of Iranian nationalism as a 
65Mussadiq, Memoirs, 265. 
66BP 68908, Diary of Events, General Strike, Abadan, April 1951; Jim Bamberg, History of the 
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"coherent and positive movement of national regeneration" was a false premise for policy 
formulation. 72 This view was not shared by the Americans or the Shah who both treated 
the nationalist mood as real, rather than feigned. The Shah refused to oppose Musaddiq 
and support the British protege, Sayyid Zia He would not tell the people that he had 
appointed him Prime Minister "because London wanted it. "73 However, the Foreign 
Office wrote to Attlee: "It has been our objective for some time to get Sayyid Zia 
appointed Prime Minister. We now have a chance of securing this objective and it should 
not be lost. "74 Attlee approved the suggested action. 75 While Shepherd contacted the Shah 
to recommend Sayyid Zia, the United States regarded Sayyid Zia's chances as being 
uvir wally nll. "76 
The Shah refused to support Sayyid Zia which gave impetus to Qavam's efforts. 
Qavam's effort against the Soviet oil concession made the British suspicious so the 
Embassy asked to see his programme, and he provided a signed letter containing the 
details of his policies, which included a promise to solve the oil issue on the basis of a 
25: 75 arrangement. 77 
However, opposition to Musaddiq ceased in the Majlis and in the Senate, Said 
Tagizadih, the president of the Senate, opposed both Sayyid Zia and Qavam and thus in 
w 
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effect supported Musaddiq. 78 He had signed the 1933 agreement against his will, a claim 
he made in 1948 and repeated in 1952. He was well educated and at one time worked as a 
lecturer in the School of Oriental Studies in London. 79 In 1933 there had been a new 
agreement between the company and the state, since negotiations for a mutual revision of 
the terms of the original concession of 1901, which started in 1928, were abruptly ended 
by the unilateral cancellation of the concession in 1932 by the then Shah, Reza Khan. 8° An 
angry series of letters were exchanged between Taqizadih and Fraser. It was reported that 
Sir William Fraser had said that, "if he Tagi-adih [sic] did not sign the Concession by his 
free will why then he accepted a commission with the permission of the Shah. "8' 
[underlined in original. ] In contrast to many prominent members of the elite, Taqizadih 
favoured continued British negotiations with Musaddiq and had the moral courage and 
integrity to reject the legitimacy of the British Embassy's anti-Musaddiq interventions. In 
the face of efforts by Shepherd to enlist his cooperation in anti-Musaddiq efforts, he stated: 
"No Persian Ambassador at the Court of St. James would recommend the King to change 
his Government. "92 
The seventeenth Majlis convened on 27 April 1952. Musaddiq suspected foul play 
and sought to exclude new members with no "local standing". This oblique reference was 
particularly aimed at Imam Jum'ih, who had with royal support been `elected' from 
Mahabad, where he had `never set foot [in] his life'. 83 However, the majority of deputies 
were working for his election as Speaker of the Majlis, and the British Embassy and 
78PRO F0248 1514, Minute by Pyman, 20 September 1951; ibid., Minute by Pyman, 25 
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Sayyid Zia supported Imam Jum'ih's speakership. 84 Moreover, far from yielding to 
Musaddiq's pressure to ask Imam Jurn'ih to withdraw his candidature, the Shah actually 
encouraged him to remain a candidate. 85 
Imam Jum'ih was a supporter of Qavam but Zaehner, having eventually realized 
the extent of British unpopularity, stated that "I think it would be a tactical mistake to do 
any overt campaign on behalf of Qavam; we did this with Sayyid Zia and this did him no 
good. "6 At the same time Musaddiq was considering the removal of Imam Jum'ih from 
the chair of the Majlis. 87 Realizing that such deadlock would make his failure inevitable he 
introduced a bill for plenary powers. The bill was unacceptable to the Shah. 58 In turn, 
Musaddiq offered his resignation which was accepted. Immediately after Musaddiq's 
resignation had been publicized, in a hastily convened and inquorate Majlis, forty out of 
forty-two deputies cast their `vote of inclination' for Qavam, who was then formally 
appointed Prime Minister by the Shah, but since the Majlis contained a considerable 
number of deputies loyal to Musaddiq, Qavam could not hope to achieve anything with the 
Majlis in session. But the Shah refused to dissolve the Majlis. British charge d'affaires 
Middleton and the new American ambassador Loy Henderson persuaded Qavam to 
concentrate on specific measures to consolidate his position. " 
The replacement of Henry Grady with Henderson marked a shift in policy in Iran. 
He reduced all events to the zero sum conflict of the Cold War. "Henderson always 
viewed events in the Middle East in terms of their impact on the ideological and political 
84PRO F0248 1531, Minute by Zachner, 15 May 1952. Sayyid Zia wrote a speech for Mihdi 
Mir-Ashrafi, the staunchly anti-Musaddiq deputy, for the purpose of attacking the credentials of 
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balance of power between the United States and the Soviet Union". 90 He was director of 
the office of Near Eastern and African Affairs from 1945 and insisted that containment be 
applied in the Middle East, beginning with the Azerbaijan crisis of 1946. His biographer 
has argued that a despatch, `The Present Situtation in the Near East -A Danger to World 
Peace', "was to American policy for the Middle East what George Kennan's more 
celebrated `long telegram' of two months later would be to American relations with the 
Soviet Union". 91 Ignoring the possible exaggeration, it is clear that Henderson's 
appointment to Iran resulted in the crisis being seen through anti-communist lens which 
made covert actions more likely. Musaddiq assessed Henderson as "a highly effective 
instrument of British policy in Iran. " He explained how Henderson was involved in a plot 
on his life. 92 Such a perspective made it more difficult to trust an American-brokered 
proposal. But his reluctance to come to terms was to backfire as the Americans began 
assessing him as untrustworthy. 
Qavam secretly ordered the arrest of Ayatollah Kashani, an important ally of 
Musaddiq, who had been stirring popular feelings against Qavam and had refused a 
choice of six ministries in his Cabinet. However, news of the arrest was broadcast by the 
BBC on 19 July, well before the planned day of implementation. The report did 
considerable damage since it was taken "as an expression of what HMG" would have 
"liked Qavam to do", thus making it more difficult for Qavam to take any action against 
Kashani. 93 On 21 July 1952 masses of ordinary people came out and returned Musaddiq. 
Henderson was sure that these events were organized by the Tudeh and that there was a 
89PRO F0371 98600, Middleton to Foreign Office, 17 July 1952. 
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"formal understanding" between the National Front and the Tudeh Party. 94 On 22 July the 
International Court of Justice decided that they had no jurisdiction in the case. The same 
day Musaddiq got permission to enact legislation without Majlis approval for six 
months. 95 The British now decided that their best tactic would be to convince the 
Americans that if Musaddiq remained in office there would eventually be a communist 
take-over, and behaved as if they genuinely believed in their frequently reiterated 
prognosis. 96 
While Musaddiq's popular support waxed, the unity of the National Front 
diminished. Zaehner claimed credit for the disunity in the ranks of the National Front 
which "was due to other factors, and these factors were created and directed by Brothers 
Rashidian. "7 The three Rashidian brothers were pro-British political activists. The most 
serious breach was with Ayatollah Kashani. Kashani regarded his role in the July uprising 
as crucial, and expected increased powers. When these were not forthcoming he began to 
oppose Musaddiq. 
After the resignation of Imam Junfih, Musaddiq's opponents rallied behind 
Kashani to secure his election as Speaker and since Musaddiq's followers could not openly 
contest his candidature, Kashani was elected by 47 votes out of 62.98 Musaddiq had 
initially cooperated with Kashani in order to counterbalance his opponents' exploitation of 
religious forces, and in the early stages of the nationalist movement this had proved 
rewarding. Now, however, Kashani and his followers invoked religiously loaded issues in 
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order to extract concessions from and to put pressure on the Government itself. " The 
violent extremist Fida'iyan-i-Islam continued to threaten Musaddiq, who was virtually a 
prisoner in his own home, and Kashani, who could no longer restrain them. '°° Kashani 
had become so opposed to Musaddiq that the British and the Americans did not discount 
the possibility that he might become premier. '°' 
Kashani argued that the Majlis would give the Shah its overwhelming support if 
Musaddiq attacked him, and mentioned General Zahidi as a successor. 102 Faced with pro- 
Shah demonstrations Musaddiq was forced to leave the palace and his own home on 28 
February 1953. The Association of Retired Officers played a role haranguing the crowds 
that Musaddiq had forced the Shah to leave, wanting to remove him from the throne. 103 
The Americans and the British did not deny that the demonstrations were staged. 104 
Musaddiq's pressure on the Shah had provided Kashani with a "heaven-sent opportunity" 
to recover lost ground. 1°' Musaddiq regarded the meeting as a set-up between the Shah 
and Henderson aimed at his assassination. 106 
The royalist demonstrations of 28 February were a proto-coup. The younger 
Zahidi had informed the American Embassy that his father, General Zahidi, might soon 
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become Prime Minister and "had already allocated portfolios in his Cabinet". 107 Zahidi 
"had agreed to present his undated resignation to the Shah in advance so that, should the 
Shah be displeased with him, he could dismiss him at any time". His information was that 
Zahidi was backed by Kashani, "influential political leaders not connected with the 
movement" and also by "many mullahs". He recommended that support for him be 
demonstrated quickly. 108 
Faced with a Majlis which was being used to prevent governance, rather than 
shape it, Musaddiq was compelled to seek a referendum to dissolve it. Altogether, over 
2,400,000 votes were cast in favour of the dissolution of the Majlis, with only a negligible 
number against. 109 While it constituted an overwhelming vote of confidence for Musaddiq 
it also represented a tremendous opportunity for those who wanted a coup, for the 
referendum had been widely lambasted as unconstitutional. The Shah could pose as 
defender of the constitution against tyranny. Furthermore, having been guaranteed an exit 
from the country by the western powers should the coup fail, the Shah agreed to sign two 
decrees. The first was for the dismissal of Musaddiq, while the other was for the 
appointment of Zahidi. Musaddiq was aware that action was being taken but given the 
degree of penetration of the intrigues he was unable to suppress the coup. 110 Musaddiq, in 
particular, continued to see these intrigues as essentially British. The Americans, by 
definition, were an anti-colonial power. Thus, Henderson was explained away as an 
aberration. Musaddiq claimed that, "for reasons which are not clear, America who herself 
had suffered our fate two centuries earlier, traded the freedom of a nation such as this for a 
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40 per cent share in the consortium. "111 The consortium he is referring to is the one which 
replaced the one held exclusively by Anglo-Iranian during the first half of the century. 
Musaddiq's misperceptions complicated the international negotiations. 
8.4 INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS 
Since the Azerbaijan crisis the United States had taken an increasing interest in 
Iran. As the crisis loomed the British began to talk to the United States. The British held 
their first meeting with the State Department on 9 April 1951. They indicated that they had 
two objectives: to maintain the period of the concession and keep control of the asset, 
whatever the final form of the agreement with regard to profits or administration. Apart 
from the need to maintain sanctity of contracts, oil was vital to common defence, balance 
of payments and, therefore, British rearmament. George McGhee, Assistant Secretary for 
Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs, replied that the Americans were primarily 
concerned to prevent the loss of Iran to the Soviets and felt that there was more depth to 
Iranian nationalism than the British accepted. It might be necessary to "make a bow" or 
pay "lip service" to nationalisation. 112 
The Americans regarded Iranian nationalism as a real force whereas the British 
did not. The Americans proposed an Iranian company which would maintain a contract 
with the company. This would allow the company to control production, share half of the 
profits, and have costs and capital outlays reimbursed. They were concerned that the 
British did not go beyond the benchmark of the 50: 50 profit share. They wanted to present 
111Musaddiq, Memo, 350. 
112BP 100557, Anglo-U. S. talks On Persia in Washington, 10 April 1951,1- 1 
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a joint proposal which they could support but they would not do anything to hinder or 
embarrass the British if the latter went ahead with a scheme of their own. 113 
Musaddiq was aware of the international dimensions. He had calculated that if the 
1933 concession were cancelled, the concession agreement contained clauses which 
would lead to international arbitration which Iran might well lose. However, 
nationalisation was an act of soverign immunity recognised in public international law. He, 
therefore, proposed nationalisation with compensation. "4 The passage of the 
Nationalisation Law by the Majlis, Senate and Shah set up mechanisms for the 
implementation of nationalisation. The British Government responded by instituting 
proceedings before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) at the Hague. 
On 29 May Musaddiq met British Ambassador Shepherd and the American 
Ambassador Grady. He wished them to understand that the nationalisation could not be 
legally challenged as it was the act of a sovereign nation. This essentially political point 
was central. What his guests saw was his apparent economic delusion. He seemed to think 
that it would be possible to sell oil directly to countries, without any marketing 
organisation; that specialist British technicians could be easily replaced by Iranians; and 
that financial losses caused by the shutting down of production could be borne by Iran. 115 
But Ilan was making attempts to attract new technicians and markets. For instance, 2,500 
American technicians working for Lee Factors, Inc. were interested in going to Iran, but 
nothing came of the plan. 116 
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It was later agreed that the British Government would conduct the negotiations 
with Iran guided by a Working Party. "In London, Government officials and Company 
representatives joined in the Working Party. "117 Even in Washington the company had 
some influence. Burrows, the Counsellor in Washington had formerly been the Head of 
Middle East Section in the Eastern Department of the Foreign Office. Gass commented, 
"naturally we have seen a lot of him in that capacity. He has worked very hard to help us 
to solve some of our difficult problems in that part of the world. "' 18 
A mission led by Basil Jackson was sent to Iran. He indicated that the 
nationalisation would be acceptable provided that the company would continue to manage 
the operations. At this point his views coincided with those of the Foreign Office and State 
Department. 119 His American connections may have been useful as in mid-May 
representatives of the American majors informed the State Department of their depth of 
opposition to the Iranian nationalisation and `concession jumping'. "Following their 
representations, on 18 May the State Department issued an official statement opposing the 
unilateral cancellation of contractual relationships. "' 120 On the 5 July, the ICJ upheld the 
British request for interim measures. 121 
The Iranians rejected the Jackson mission as it did not accept nationalisation. The 
Americans still thought that negotiation was possible and offered the `Harriman formula'. 
Through this the British would accept the nationalisation as defined in the law of 20 March 
1951 - "all operations for exploration, extraction and exploitation shall be in the hands of 
117J1m Bamber& of British Petroleum, 417. 
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the Government. "122 United States special envoy, Averall Harriman, landed in Tehran on 
15 July and was met by anti-western crowds. He realised that Musaddiq blamed the 
British and had little interest in discussion. 123 Harriman's journey paved the way for the 
mission led by Richard Stokes, the British Lord Privy Seal, which arrived in Iran in early 
August 1951. The proposals appeared to accept the principle of nationalisation since it 
involved the transfer of assets from the Anglo-Iranian to the National Iranian Oil Company 
NIOC. However, the NIOC would be operating through a purchasing organisation and the 
terms between the two would be arranged so that there was a 50: 50 division of the 
profits. 124 
Before Stokes was sent there was a meeting in which an Anglo-Iranian director, 
Neville Gass, effectively repeated the terms of the Jackson Mission. 125 The Iranians were 
expecting to discuss three issues: payment of compensation, arrangements for continued 
employment of British technicians, and discussion of the terms under which oil was 
supplied to Britain. The Stokes proposals were presented on the 13 August. 126 This 
became the formula and was even endorsed by Harriman, though it clearly did not accept 
the nationalisation law. 127 "The Americans and British were in complete agreement that 
the proposals submitted by the British were in accordance with the Harriman formula and 
the Nationalisation Law... Harriman timed a definite right and left which has certainly 
caused a bad cut in the opponents eye... [by] what to all intents and purposes amounts to an 
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ultimatum. "128 Musaddiq rejected the offer and on 21 August Stokes withdrew his offer 
returning home. 129 
However, Musaddiq was not regarded as the only major personality impeding a 
solution; a variety of individuals including the permanent secretary at the Ministry of Fuel 
and Power and President Truman's special envoy to Iran, Averell Harriman, wanted the 
removal of Fraser. 130 Hostility to Fraser continued through the year. Referring to the view 
held by sections of both the United Kingdom and United States Governments that either 
Musaddiq or Fraser would have to be replaced for a settlement to be reached, Bamberg 
informs us that, "for a time it was by no means a foregone conclusion that Fraser would 
not be the first to go. "131 
Herbert Morrison, the Foreign Secretary, met with Hugh Gaitskell and they 
decided that there should not be any compromise on three issues - the purchasing 
company should be British, it should be owned by Anglo-Iranian and controlled from 
London, and Iran should not receive more than fifty per cent of the profits. 132 The 
proposals were designed so that control of Iranian production would remain in the hands 
of Anglo-Iranian. 133 Stokes was adamant that the purchasing company would be an one 
hundred per cent owned subsidiary, "unless the Persians force us to contemplate a 
consortium [emphasis by Stokes]". 134 While in Iran, Stokes advised the Shah that the 
"only solution" was "a strong Government under martial law and the bad boys in prison 
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for two years or so. "135 Yet Stokes observed that "all he [Musaddiq] asked" was that he 
be permitted to introduce the same nationalising reforms "which the Labour Government 
had introduced in the United Kingdom. "136 
Stokes conceded that the British might have no option but to gradually offer more 
and negotiate with Mussadiq. 137 Musaddiq reiterated that he was prepared to re-open 
negotiations on the three issues of compensation to the company, terms of sale of oil to 
Britain, and the working conditions of the British technicians. 138 The Foreign Office felt 
that Musaddiq's recent speech in the Senate had shown that negotiations were impossible 
with the "Present [capital in original] Persian Government' 'and thus negotiations were "no 
longer in suspense but broken off. "139 Meanwhile, the British Government informed the 
Shah that unless Musaddiq was replaced economic measures to hurt Iran would be 
implemented. "° The State Department did not object to Britain taking such measures. 141 
On 10 September the British introduced measures which blocked sterling balances held by 
Iranians and the export to Iran of scarce commodities. 142 The United States decided to 
refuse a loan from the Export Import Bank on the basis that the Iranians could not service 
the loan, and Musaddiq accused the Americans of applying Sanctions. 143 
6 
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On September 19, Hussein Ala provided what appeared to be a fresh proposal. 144 
The British Government rejected it, but the Americans were concerned that the Shah 
would not dismiss Musaddiq and felt that it might be possible to develop some agreement 
with x. 145 Musaddiq announced that the British staff must leave Iran by October 4.146 
The staff left the office. '47 The British decided that this order involved a breach of the 
interim ruling of the International Court of Justice and brought the matter before the 
Security Council. The Council agreed to take up the issue immediately but the Iranian 
Ambassador to the UN achieved a ten day delay during which time Musaddiq could come 
to the United States to defend the Iranian action himself. 148 While in the United States, 
George McGhee, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian and African 
affairs had eighty hours of talks with Musaddiq. 149 They agreed that Anglo-Iranian would 
acquire oil under a long-term contract on a cost-plus basis and the Iranians could not sell 
the oil where it might prejudice Anglo-Iranian sales. The terms were similar to many of 
the contractual joint ventures examined in the previous chapter. In the Working Party 
meeting on 6 November, Gass again slowed down the pace of American-inspired 
concessions to Musaddiq. His basic objection was put plainly: 
Other Mossadeqs would arise and what would be left of the fabric of the oil 
industry to which the Americans professed to attach so much importance if 
the Mossadeqs were to be allowed to get their way and kick their 
Concessionaire Companies out... t5o 
144BP 100652, Shepherd to Foreign Office, 20 September 1951. 
145Bp 100652, Franks to Foreign Office, 21 September 1951, BP 100652; Foreign Office to 
Shepherd, 22 September 1951. 
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The British refusal to accept the United States brokered deal demonstrates how 
the United States could not impose its will on the `weaker' British power. In October 1951 
the World Bank offered themselves as mediators, and Anglo-Iranian decided to wait for 
the outcome of this effort to the exclusion of others. '5' Between November 1951 and 
March 1952 there were two proposals from the World Bank. These were intended to 
resume production in Iran without prejudicing the outcome of the nationalisation. 152 The 
Bank was advised by Rieber, formerly President of Texaco. He was adamant that the 
company could not return to Iran and should agree to long-term sale of oil contracts. '53 
Another former oilman for Caltex companies who was also an important figure in the 
crisis was Max Thornburg. He had designed a Seven Year Development Plan for Iran 
which, in part, had caused the demand for greater revenues, which started the process 
culminating in the Supplemental Agreement. '54 The Anglo-Iranian had been aware of the 
importance of Thornburg's Seven Year Development Plan. '55 The Plan Organisation was 
terminated at the beginning of 1951, "the ostensible reason is conservation of dollars. " 56 
In fact, Thornburg had become very disruptive. He told the press that, "I believe because 
AIOC has not paid Iranian Government its indisputable rights on account of royalties the 
company is responsible for most of the economic misfortunes of Iran. " 57 Though these 
anti- Anglo-Iranian attitudes may have originated in the early 1940s in the context of the 
rivalry examined in chapter five, at a time when both Rieber and Thornburg were senior 
" 
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managers, the attitudes appeared to colour perceptions and, therefore, influence policy 
statements almost a decade later. 
In spite of Rieber's view towards the role of Anglo-Iranian in any final settlement, 
the Bank adopted a strictly neutral position. It would not engage in the oil industry 
permanently or as a business venture. '58 This was intended to be a temporary arrangement 
and not to prejudice the legal rights of the Iranian Government, British Government or 
Anglo-Iranian. '59 Under the arrangements a management company would be set up from 
non-nationals to the dispute. They would be responsible to the Bank and sell oil to the 
company and other parties putting some proceeds in an escrow pending the final decision 
by the International Court of Justice. The first plan failed in part because Musaddiq 
insisted that the management would act as the agent of the Iranian Government. 160 
Musaddiq argued that the Anglo-Iranian did not have any property which the World Bank 
could manage on their behalf After two years, Anglo-Iranian would repeat their claim to 
assets in Iran and it would be unlikely that circumstances would again allow 
nationalisation. 161 One sees Musaddiq's determination to seize the political moment, but 
this intensity blinded him to any shades of grey - the World Bank had offered to act as a 
neutral party. 
6 
The same issue remained a stumbling block in the second proposal, with 
Musaddiq in addition insisting that British technicians would not be employed. 162 
Musaddiq was adamant that the return of British technicians would renew Soviet influence 
in the country as they would counteract what he was sure they would perceive as the 
158Bp 101074, Garner to Musaddiq, December 28,159BP 
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160BP 101074, Musaddiq to Garner, 3 January 1952. 
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recovery of British influence. 163 The British embassy did not think that the Tudeh could 
take over, but they did not think that Musaddiq could survive long if the World Bank 
initiative failed. The economy would continue to deteriorate and he would be forced to 
seek aid from the United States. This would be refused and he might resign from office. 164 
The World Bank and State Department now concluded that it would be impossible to 
make an agreement with Musaddiq. They waited for economic and political pressures to 
bring about a change of Government. 165 
The International Court did not help the British or the company. In fact, the 
procedural objections of Iran were upheld by the separate decisions of July and August 
1952, which did not however examine the merits of the case. The judges tended to the 
opinion that there was not any privity of contract between the British and Iranian 
Governments. In other words, the 1933 concession did not have a double character - an 
agreement between two states resulting from a particular agreement between a state and a 
company. 166 Moreover, the Iranians had consistently denied the jurisdiction of the court, 
and the court ruled that it did not have jurisdiction. 167 The judges ruled that the court was 
not competent to decide whether the 1933 agreement was more than an agreement 
between a sovereign state and a company. 1611 
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After Qavam's failure in July 1952, the Americans felt that Musaddiq remained 
the only alternative to communism. In August, they suggested that Anglo-American joint 
proposals should be made and their terms were conciliatory. "It was an indication of the 
lengths to which the Americans were prepared to go to reach agreement with Musaddiq 
that these proposals were, to all intents and purposes, the same as Musaddiq had put to 
Middleton on 25 July. "169 Churchill pushed for altered terms and a text was agreed on 26 
August. In these joint Truman-Churchill proposals, the Iranians would have control over 
their industry and would enjoy a long term sale of oil contract with Anglo-Iranian. 
Compensation would be settled by international arbitration. Musaddiq responded to the 
proposals by insisting that compensation would only be paid for the value of the 
company's physical assets, and the arbitral tribunal would also examine counter-claims 
from British prevention of sales of Iranian oil. 170 
The Americans now proposed to advance one hundred million dollars rather than 
the ten millions in the Truman-Churchill proposals, and in December Musaddiq agreed 
that compensation could be settled on the basis of any English law of nationalisation. The 
British accepted that the sale of oil contract would be with a consortium, not just Anglo- 
Iranian. 17e Musaddiq preferred an American company with the possibility of some British 
participation. He "would not grant the tremendous power to AIOC over the economic life 
of Iran which would be'possessed by the company if it had long-term contractual rights to 
buy the bulk of Iran's oil production. " 72 
169 Jim Bamberg, Eton, of British Petroleum, 474. 
170BP 46596, Tehran to London, 17 September 1952. 
171BP 100570, Henderson to State Department, 6 January 1953; London to Washington, 14 
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The UK Coal Nationalisation Act was discussed in connection with the issue of 
compensation. For the Anglo-Iranian wanted compensation to include loss of future 
profits. Therefore, they insisted on a claim for "property, rights and interests. " Mr 
Acheson tried to alter the wording to "losses sustained" as this might make it easier to put 
across in Tehran, but the ambiguity might cause the Tribunal setting compensation some 
difficulty and, therefore, the wording was not changed. 173 The proposed arbitration by the 
International Court of Justice would be based upon any English law nationalising any 
industry in the United Kingdom specificed by the company. 174 Anglo-Iranian were 
unwilling not to have an international settlement, because an Iranian agreement could in 
future be repudiated as a dictatorial imposition. 175 However, Musaddiq refused to 
countenance unlimited compensation and the State Department were sympathetic. A 
formula was agreed with the British under which the International Court of Justice would 
r 
set the amount which Iran would pay, but the maximum cash payments were a quarter of 
the proceeds from oil sales for twenty years, after which any remaining balance would be 
paid in free oil. 176 These proposals were put to Musaddiq on 20 February but he remained 
sceptical of the International Court. His reasoning was that the I. C. J. had already denied 
the British claim for compulsory jurisdiction, so why should he accept the jurisdiction of 
the court voluntarily? Iran had been successful in the Hague since its case had been 
properly defended. Once it had voluntarily accepted jurisdiction, the British "could use its 
facilities to overthrow the government [§k]and replace it with another which would not 
genuinely defend Iran's case. "177 
173BP 101911, Minutes of Persia Official Committee meeting on 13 January 1953. 
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In the study of President Eisenhower's foreign policy there was an assumption that 
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles was the prime mover, but this view became 
untenable after the presidential papers were made available for public inspection. In 
particular, it became clear that Eisenhower asserted his leadership during foreign policy 
crises. However, even this revisionist view has given way to what may be termed 
`Eisenhower postrevisionism'. 178 Given his military background it is perhaps not 
surprising that such management often involved the threat or use of military power. For 
instance, during the first few months of 1953 he thought aloud about the use of atomic 
weapons against the North Koreans and the Chinese. "These twelfth hour schemes seem 
to be evidence of an almost subconscious desire by Eisenhower for one final try for an 
easy solution to the Korean deadlock. " 179 
In both the case of the Korean War and the tension with China, Eisenhower has 
been credited with making peace. The same assessment holds for the Suez crisis of 1956 
when Eisenhower rather than Dulles controlled the policy and opposed the British, French, 
and Israeli invasion of Egypt. But his objective was containment of the Soviet Union rather 
than satisfaction of Egyptian aspirations. Eisenhower consistently confused Third World 
nationalism with communism. Failing to distinguish between them he backed authoritarian 
regimes suppressing desire for change. 180 Eisenhower was the driving force for the coup 
which overturned democratically elected Jacobs Arbenz Guzman of Guatemala in 1954. 
Covert actions became used more routinely. 181 The CIA coup against Musaddiq was no 
178Stephen G. Rabe, "Eisenhower Revisionism: A Decade of Scholarship, " 17.1 Diplomatic 
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aberration of United States foreign policy in the Eisenhower administration. Musaddiq did 
not understand the nature of this anti-communism. He continued to argue that, "if the 
British government [sic] had not enjoyed the assistance of the internal opposition there 
would not have been a coup d'etat, and, for fear of a Soviet oil deal with Iran, western 
governments [sic] would eventually have had to buy Iranian oil. "182 
The British were originally unsure about Dulles as "he is still very new to subjects 
of this kind, but at the senior levels of the State Department" there was urgency "to 
determine decisively in the next round of negotiations whether or not an agreement is 
possible. " In the event of Musaddiq's rejection of terms, "I do not suppose they know 
what they would do... [but] I think they would at last be convinced in their own minds that 
Persia was in the wrong and this I believe would be a considerable gain from our point of 
view. "183 While Charles Bohlen, a prominent member of the State Department, was 
"greatly upset by the attitude of high-up people in London" who would "rather see Persia 
go communist than make an unsatisfactory oil agreement" and "very worried" to learn that 
the British "were still thinking about the possibility of a military coup", 184 Henderson, 
however, had a different attitude. He did not entirely share British optimism about Zahidi, 
but agreed with Middleton that the only way to topple Musaddiq was by a coup, to be 
launched in the Shah's name but without his knowledge. 'its 
Operation Boot was promoted by Colonel Monty Woodhouse to the CIA Together 
they organised the coup against Mussadiq. l86 Colonel Woodhouse argued that the coup 
182Mus8ddiq, Memoirs, 291. 
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263 
was necessary to prevent a communist takeover. He recalls that: "When we knew what the 
prejudices of our collaborators were, we played all the more on these prejudices. "' 87 
Commenting on the role of the CIA, Allen Dulles argued that Musaddiq originally 
concealed "creating a Communist state. " But after his true intention became clearer 
"support from outside was given to loyal anti-Communist elements... to the Shah's 
supporters. "' 199 Something should here be said about allegations of the direct role of 
Anglo-Iranian in the coup. In the original edition of Counter Coup, Kermit Roosevelt had 
stated that Anglo-Iranian were involved, yet after this edition was withdrawn following 
protests from British Petroleum, the second edition did not repeat the account. While 
Bamberg concedes that individual employees of the company might have been involved, 
"possibly marginally", this does not reflect on the company. '89 
8.5 CONCLUSION 
The interplay of economic and political forces is interesting. The boycott led to 
economic discontent which facilitated British Governmental intrigues on the one hand, and 
propaganda that the state was about to be overtaken by communists on the other. At the 
same time, the corporate great powers who managed the boycott also managed 
international trade in oil so that the Anglo-Iranian suffered very little financially. This 
enabled it to slow down the pace of concessions to the Iranians, even though its reluctance 
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strained Anglo-American relations on occasion. Rather than behaving like cutthroats, 
AIOC's competitors stood back to back, supporting the company like a Roman phalanx 
putting down the barbarians. 
In turn, the concession was supported by British penetration of the political 
system. Musaddiq's Memoirs demonstrate that by taking Musaddiq's statements about his 
beliefs seriously we can better understand his psychological closure as regarded 
negotiation with the British. This eventually alienated all third parties including the World 
Bank and the United States, For him there was little reason to distinguish between the 
British company and the British state. The dispute presaged the North-South dialogue of 
the 1960s and 1970s concerning the link between permanent sovereignty of natural 
resources and decolonisation, rather than looking back to the concessionary readjustments 
of the pre-war period. The struggle for control over national resources was linked to the 
struggle for constitutional Government. This struggle failed as the dynamics of 
competitive cooperation which had tied British and American Governmental and corporate 




The empirical material examined in part three clarified the different institutions of 
the society of majors. It also pointed to the importance of examining the nexus between 
state and firm to see how corporate influences were translated into British foreign oil 
relations. In this chapter, I theorise the material about this nexus contained in the empirical 
material. 
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CHAPTER NINE: FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS AND 
BRITISH OIL RELATIONS. 1939-1954 
9.1 INTRODUCTION 
This dissertation examines the way in which transnational corporations are of 
relevance to foreign policy analysis. Though states may remain the central referent for 
foreign policy behaviour these other actors become significant, not only to the extent that 
their behaviour affects or influences Governments, but also in their own right. The 
traditional method of analysing foreign policy in commodity issue areas using Government 
records permits us to understand one dimension of international relations. Adding 
company archives facilitates examination of state-firm and firm-firm relations as well. Use 
of three dimensions rather than one provides a richer and more subtle account. Each 
historical case will differ, but during this project it became clear that Anglo-Iranian and 
Shell were important actors in British foreign oil relations between 1939 and 1954 and that 
`British foreign oil policy' was not unambiguously determined by the state, but by the 
interplay of public and corporate interests. Companies contributed to the development of 
official policy and also represented `British' policy on behalf of the state. Even when the 
companies acted independently, other actors, especially Governments, regarded their 
actions as having at least the sanction of the British Government. Thus, rather than 
assuming a permanent state identity as a national political actor, `British' foreign oil 
relations need to be interrogated and opened up. 
To concede the importance of examining relations between states and firms 
alongside those between one state and another, is to depart from a strictly realist account 
of international history which would be based solely on Government records. When 
clarifying the relationship between the private international society of majors and the 
society of states it became apparent that the majors had great influence on British foreign 
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policy behaviour. Material from the corporate archives supplemented Government 
records. The two factors which were seen to affect the impact of the firms were the degree 
of transnational organisation and the pattern of state-firm relations. The social organisation 
of the oil industry accounts for the degree and nature of the influence of the firms. The 
analogy between international society and firm-firm relations was developed in chapters 
three through eight. The second factor was the relationship between firm and state. Britain 
and the United States had very different patterns of behaviour with regard to the corporate 
society. This chapter examines the mechanisms which translated the corporate influences 
into `British' oil relations. 
It might be interesting at this point to return to the image of the web, which was 
introduced in part two. The intercompany web was distorted by pressure from the state 
system throughout the period between 1939 and 1954, but it did not break. Even when a 
part of it was broken in the Iranian nationalisation, it did not totally unravel. Throughout 
this period the United States Government tried to penetrate, if not unravel, the web as with 
a needle, but this had no impact upon it. The effect of the British state, on the other hand, 
was more akin to that of a soft ball, able to distort the web without tearing it. In particular, 
the British Government distorted the web to increase their resources vis-ä-vis the United 
States. In this chapter, I wish to theorise how this `soft ball' distortion occurred. 
This chapter is divided into six sections, the first introducing the theme and 
structure of the chapter and section two clarifying the nature of realist assumptions 
regarding foreign policy which are central to the thrust of the entire realist school of 
international relations theory with its hard `billiard ball' imagery. I examine how 
distinguishing between inter-state and inter-national relations becomes essential to 
understanding the role of companies in foreign policy. Section three looks at administrative 
politics within the foreign policy process; more specifically, at two models - organisational 
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process and bureaucratic politics. It was found that the former was more applicable to the 
British foreign policy system, the latter to the United States. Psychological approaches to 
foreign policy analysis can usefully be applied in relation to the Iranian nationalisation 
crisis, especially recent work on the difficulties of moving away from negative stereotypes, 
which illuminate Mohammed Musaddiq's failure to respond to the various policy 
initiatives. The fifth section looks at foreign relations from the perspective of 
implementation. The insights of this approach are absolutely vital if we seek to move 
beyond a theory of foreign policy decision making to foreign relations. It clarifies the 
importance of the role of Anglo-Iranian and Shell as implementers of British foreign oil 
policy. Section six reviews the usefulness of corporate history in enriching the sub- 
discipline of foreign policy analysis and liberating the concept of the state from its 
traditional realist assumptions. 
9.2 FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS 
"Foreign policy is that area of politics which bridges the all-important boundary 
between the nation-state and its international environment. "' It is, therefore, possible to 
examine foreign policy either from a political science or an international relations point of 
view. While a political science perspective highlights domestic determinants like 
" Governmental politics, pressure group activity and public opinion, the different lens of an 
international relations perspective brings into focus different elements of the international 
environment - states, firms, or a mixture of the two - as the major determinant of foreign 
policy. This thesis adopts both elements. I have combined both methods to draw out the 
importance of international cooperation among firms as well as the `domestic' dimension 
of relations between state and firm to enrich a more traditional account of inter-state 
pressures. The conventional assumptions which underpin traditional foreign policy 
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analysis have been summarised by Joseph Nye. The state, rather than any other 
international actor, is regarded as the foreign policy-making unit. More importantly, the 
state, or rather the Government acting on behalf of the state, is treated for analytical 
purposes as a unitary, monolithic actor; in other words, as a collectivity whose behaviour 
is broadly analogous to that of a rational, purposeful individual. 2 
These two assumptions - the state as principal actor, and the state as rational actor 
- are usually attached to a realist analysis of international relations. The realist school 
comprehends many different types of analysis, but the core assumptions are that the state 
is the major actor in the international system, that states are unitary rational actors, each 
representing a national interest, and that the key factor for the state is the search for power 
either as an end in itself or as part of the search for security. 3 States are thought of as 
analogous to `billiard balls' - hard, impenetrable, striking one another. State behaviour is 
determined, either in part (classical realism) or in the main (neorealism) by external rather 
than internal factors. Allison has labelled such analyses as the `rational actor model' or 
model 1 of his typology of foreign policy analyses. 4 
6 
According to realist theory, all states are driven by the self-help imperative of the 
international political anarchy. Thus, predicting their behaviour is possible by reference to 
their position in the international power hierarchy and by assessing their national interest. 
In practice, a strictly realist account would have predicted that the United States would 
'William Wallace, Foreign and the Political Process (London: Macmillan, 1971), 7. 
2Nye, Joseph S. in New Dimensions in World Politics ed. Goodwin, G. L. and Andrew Linklater 
(London: Croom Helm, 1975), 36. 
3Robert 0. Keohane ed. Neorealism and Its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1986), 164-165. Barry Buzan, Charles Jones, and Richard Little, The Logic of Anarchy: 
Neorealism to Structural Realism New Directions in World Politics ed. Helen Milner and John G. 
Ruggie (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 9-10. 
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have achieved all of its objectives during this period. But it would be as accurate to say 
that the United States Government consistently failed to achieve its objectives as to say 
that it secured them. The main reason for this was the role of the companies. Predicting 
state policy is extremely difficult, increasingly so as one moves from tidy generalisations 
to specific foreign policy behaviour. This is why realist analyses must be supplanted or, at 
least, supplemented. 5 
In the thesis we find three types of international transaction: intergovernmental, 
transgovernmental and transnational. Realist theorists tend to dismiss the importance of 
the transgovernmental and transnational interactions maintaining that states and state 
power determine policies and outcomes in world politics. By contrast, non-realist theorists 
tend to argue that these latter two categories re-shape the nature of the state and of state 
power. Intergovernmental interactions consist of direct dealings between Governments. 
They are the subject of traditional diplomacy. However, as Edward Morse has cogently 
argued, the attempt to maintain economic growth through establishing a world market has 
greatly increased the range of issues that are the subject of direct Government-to- 
Government relations. 6 The increasing dependence of national economic growth on world 
economic growth means that states have to provide for diplomacy on economic as well as 
strategic matters. Since these are issues relating to a world market such diplomacy is not 
usually bilateral, but multilateral. The Anglo-American Oil Agreements, for instance, 
resulted from bilateral talks but the aim was to include other states as well. It may be 
recalled that one of the points of Anglo-American contention was the timing of such 
extension. 
5However, as we saw in the contrast between Keohane's empirical work and his realist theoretical 
propositions, any serious empirical work would not sustain a strictly realist approach. However, a large number of authors identified in chapter two could be termed implicit realists. 
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Another feature of the negotiations was the role of the transnational corporations. 
Since global corporations are the leading economic actors they play an important role in 
discussions about world economic growth. In fact, we saw how perhaps the most decisive 
meeting of the whole series of negotiations between 1944 and 1945 was the ninth meeting 
of the technical talks which preceded the ministerial talks and Agreement of 1944. It will 
be recalled that the agenda in this meeting consisted of a discussion of the conclusions of 
informal talks in small groups which had concluded that both private and public 
restrictions should be removed so that outstanding issues in the international industry 
could be resolved by the majors. Hence, while many issues are still the subject of bilateral 
dealings between Governments, the increasing importance of world economic growth has 
multilateralized economic issues and also involved transnational relations and actors, 
especially corporations. The third type of international activity is transgovernmental 
relations. International conferences offer opporunities for networking among officials 
working in similar departments in different states. The officials may use these contacts to 
minimise friction when they are required to coordinate policies. But they may also 
establish a coalition with their opposite numbers to promote their policies, even against 
other departments within their state.? We saw this phenomenon in the Allied oil 
programming, with the twist that the `officials' were oilmen and the international 
conferences were the As Is conferences of the inter-war years. 
11 
9.3 ADMINISTRATIVE POLITICS WITHIN THE FOREIGN POLICY SYSTEM 
The most influential study of bureaucratic and organisational politics in foreign 
policy-malting has been made by Graham Allison in the now classic text, Essence of 
6Edw'ard Morse, "The transformation of foreign policies: modernization, interdependence and 
extCrnaU7Adon, " World Politics 22.3 (1970): 371-392. 
7Robert 0. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, "Transgovernmental Relations and International Organizations, " World Politics 27.1 (1974): 39-62. 
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Decision in which he studied the Cuban missile crisis. & One of the clearest indications that 
the Soviet Union was installing medium-range ballistic missiles [MRBMs] in Cuba was 
that surface-to-air missiles [SAMs] to protect the MRBM sites were installed and 
arranged in exactly the same trapezoid patterns as within the Soviet Union. The 
deployment of SAMs in this way could hardly mean anything other than the installation of 
MRBMs. An explanation based on rational actor assumptions would find that the 
discovery of these sites was intended by the Soviet Union. Allison suggests, however, that 
we know the transportation of the SAMS was the responsibility of Soviet military 
intelligence and the KGB, but that the construction of the SAM sites once they were on 
the island was a highly technical job performed by the Air Defence Command (ADC). 
And the simple fact may be that while military intelligence and the KGB always operated 
secretly, the ADC did not. So the crucial aspect of secrecy in this part of the Soviet action 
was probably not the result of a formal decision at all. 
Another example of the importance of administrative routines is the concept of 
`non-decisions'. This is very different from a decision not to act, for that is still the result 
of a choice. It is the study of the way in which routines may interpret inputs so that it 
appears that there is no choice. Routines arise from neat flows of activity. These may 
channel difficult inputs in a way which does not appear threatening. A `problem' needs to 
be recognised. Unless something is identified as a problem it will not be treated as one. 9 
An example of this is the attitude of the British foreign policy establishment to the society 
of majors. They accepted that it existed, and worked with it. The non-decision becomes 
clearer set in contrast to the various decisions of United States policy. For the United 
States Government the society of majors was not a `given' in the same way but a social 
construct that the state might - even ought - to try to shape in the public interest. Hence, 
8Graham Allison, Essence of Decision, 110-113. 
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their various policy initiatives, including attempted ownership of concessions and pipelines 
by the Petroleum Reserves Corporation, the original plans for the International Petroleum 
Commission, and the ongoing antitrust proceedings of the Justice Department. 
These sorts of observations have been integrated in the incrementalist perspective 
of Braybrooke and Lindblom. 1° Organisations identify inputs and issues as different 
problems which are then passed onto specialists at different levels. In dealing with the 
problems these low-ranking officials make many small decisions. However, by the time 
that a political leader looks at the problem, these small decisions may have added up to a 
certain way of dealing with the problem which the political leader then adopts. In other 
words, incremental processes may lead to a formal political decision which is not the result 
of a political analysis of the national interest, but recognition of a choice made by lower 
level actors unaware of the final significance of their small choices. This model is 
incompatible with the assumption of rational decision-making at the political level which 
was Allison's model 1. Allison has developed two influential models based on these ideas, 
organisational process (model 2) and bureaucratic politics (model 3). 
The organisational perspective builds on the premises of incrementalism by 
assuming that organisations are dominated by their `standard operating procedures' which 
only occasionally will be waived or breached. It emphasises that organisations may act 
logically and clearly within their own standard operating procedures and responsibilities, 
but that there is no guarantee that their output will be consistent or compatible within the 
foreign policy process as a whole. The organisational process model assumes that for 
foreign policy purposes Government consists of a conglomerate of semi-feudal, loosely 
9P. Bachrach and M. Baratz. "Decisions and Non-Decisions: An Analytic Framework, " American 
Political Science Revicw 57.3 (September 1963): 632-642. 
10D. Braybrooke and Charles Edward Lindblom, A Str atesty of Decision (New York: Free Press, 
1970). 
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allied organisations, each with a substantial He of its own. Foreign policy from this 
perspective is understood to be the product of the outputs of large organisations 
functioning according to standard patterns of behaviour, rather than the deliberate choices 
of a unified Governmental actor. 
My treatment of the British contribution to the Azerbaijan crisis fits comforably 
into this. The Petroleum Department did what they always did; so did the local officials 
and the Foreign Office. These were not new developments, but the consistent application 
of `tried-and-tested' means of handling specific inputs which can be traced, at least, to the 
1920s with the Petroleum Department promoting firms in the Middle East, the local 
officials handling the southern tribes, and the Foreign Office recognising a Soviet sphere 
of influence in the north of Iran. 
Bureaucratic politics is a variant of the organisational process model which 
emphasises the struggle between different civil servants to increase their own influence 
and the importance of their organisation. Officials, in this view, are not at all unaware of 
the significance of their actions. Viewing national interests through the eyes of their role in 
their departments, they use all resources at their disposal to have that view prevail over 
others. A foreign policy decision, therefore, may be the result not of any single view of the 
national interest, and it may not have much to do with the intrinsic merits of the problem - 
even in times of crisis - but may merely represent the only acceptable compromise 
between competing bureaucratic interests. 
It certainly seems applicable to some issues in the United States. I exposed 
bureaucratic struggle between civilian and military authorities during the Second World 
War, between the Petroleum Reserves Corporation and the State Department over the 
control of foreign oil policy, and between the Justice Department and State Department 
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over the applicability of antitrust policy. However, as my treatment of the British role in 
the Azerbaijan crisis suggests, I think the organisation process model is more applicable to 
the United Kingdom. This supports the findings of Wallace who, after examining foreign 
policy-making in Britain, West Germany and France, concludes that "in no case can the 
observer safely ascribe the outcome to bureaucratic politics alone. "11 The basic problem 
with the bureaucratic politics model is the strict correlation between bureaucratic position 
and policy preference. If this is relaxed, we weaken the explanatory power of the model. If 
it is not relaxed, then it may be more appropriate to consider the looser, organisational 
process model as ubiquitous and more applicable to Britain, and bureaucratic politics as a 
particular variant, mainly applicable to the United States. 
9.4 PSYCHOLOGICAL APPROACHES 
According to Boulding. "We must recognise that the people whose decisions 
determine the policies and actions of the nations do not respond to the `objective' facts of 
the situation, whatever that may mean, but to their `image' of the situation. It is what we 
think the world is like, not what it is really like, that determines our behaviour. "12 The 
`facts' of a situation never speak for themselves - they have to be selected, ordered and 
given meaning. Thus, all we ever have are images, or representations, never reality. 
Commentators "have to acknowledge and take into account, in one way or another, the 
point of view of the actor, both because it bears witness to an irreplaceable intimacy with 
the empirical phenomena to which the analysis refers, and, above all, because in the last 
"William Wallace and W. Paterson ed., Foreign Policy-Making in Western Europe 
(Farnborough, Hants.: Saxon House, 1978), 48. 
12Kcnncth E. Bou1din8, `National Images and International Systems", in International Politics and 
Foreign Policy -A Reader in Research and Theory cd. James Nathan Rosenau (New York: The 
Free Press, 1969), 423. 
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resort it is an irreducible part of this same phenomenal reality. "13 The self-perception of 
the corporate leaders as a society or club was a major reason for preferring the analogy 
between the organisation of oil companies and international society, rather than oil 
companies and international regimes. Growing awareness of this dimension of behaviour 
has resulted in a body of literature which highlights the role of misperception in 
deterrence, the escalation of crises, and the onset of war. For instance, political 
psychologists such as White sought to explain East-West relations in terms of a 
pathological spiral of hostile and defensive misperception. '4 
A problem with the use of psychological approaches is that it appears to hearken 
to the sort of intentionalism associated with examining history as the story of great men. It 
cannot be applied to the masses or other vast social forces which historians today consider, 
whether classes, institutions, nations, genders, or ideologies. "The criticism raised here is 
not that these approaches are useless but that their use is restricted to particular structural 
situations in which individuals'... point of view might play a role... It would, for instance, 
be more likely that individuals played a bigger role in situations of crisis. "'S For this 
reason I have restricted the use of psychological analysis to Musaddiq during the 
nationalisation crisis. 
Much of the psychologically oriented writing about foreign policy has dealt with 
the investigation of crisis behaviour and, according to Oppenheim, it is this area that has 
13Michael Girard, -Meory and practice in foreign policy: epistemological problems and political 
realities" in Theory and Practice in Foreign Policy_ Making: National Perspectives on Academics 
and Professionals in Inte national Relations ed. Michael Girard, Wolf-Dieter Eberwein and Keith 
Webb (London: Pinter, 1994), S. 
14White, R, K., W ors: A Psychological Profile of US Soviet Relations (New York: 
Free Press, 1984). 
15Henrik Larsen, Fon rei_ ý policy and Discourse Analysis: France. Britain and Europe (London: Routledge, 1997), 5. 
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exhibited "the biggest and most clearly established gains". 16 A well-established, although 
not universally accepted, definition of crisis has been provided by Hermann. Decisional 
situations may be classified in terms of three dimensions representing the perceptions of 
participants - threat, time and surprise. A crisis is said to exist when there is a serious 
threat to high priority goals, when the amount of time allowed for decision is sharply 
limited, and where precipitating events have been unanticipated. A range of conditions 
have been observed in crises. They include a sudden rise in the volume of information that 
decision-makers are required to process (sometimes leading to overload); resort to 
informal channels of communication; and the location of responsibility for decision at the 
highest level of the Government hierarchy. When compounded by a sense of threat, an 
awareness of potentially devastating costs and risks, high levels of uncertainty and 
relentless time pressure - the result is to produce a psychological state of stress in the 
decision-maker. '7 
There are some typical reactions, including a tendency to aggression, diminished 
focus of attention and highly selective perceptions, a failure to distinguish between sense 
and nonsense, the loss of the ability to abstract, loss of complexity in terms of political 
cognition, and reduction in the tolerance of ambiguity-19 Images can become fixed with 
negative consequences for the policy-maker. 19 Musaddiq's fixed image of the British as 
sophisticated manipulators and imperialists made him desire their total removal and 
adamant that this was the best chance to achieve this. For this reason he was unwilling to 
160p Abraham Noftali., "Psychological Processes in World Society" in Conflict 
World Society ed. Michael Banks (Brighton: Wheatsheaf, 1984), 112-127. In this article the 
author reviews the existing literature on crisis. For his evaluation of the general literature, see 
"Psychological Aspects" in International Relations-, A Handbook of Current Theory ed. Margot 
Lght and A. J. R. Groom. (London, Pinter, 1995), 201-213. 
17Hermann, C. F. ed., International Crisis: Insights from Behavioural Research (New York: Free 
Press, 1972), 14. 
18Holsti, OR, ri 'E al ' "n War (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 1972), chap. 1. 
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cooperate to allow them back in any way. Moreover, his view of the Americans as anti- 
colonialists did not square with the growing importance of anti-communism in American 
foreign relations. 
9.5 IMPLEMENTATION APPROACHES 
The perspectives considered earlier have focused on how decisions are made. This 
section looks at how they are implemented. When foreign relations are considered as a 
whole, rather than simply as an analysis of policy statements, we begin to look at how the 
policy machine acts in the international environment. From this perspective the role of 
Anglo-Iranian and Shell is just as significant as their role in decision-making. One major 
problem is that there is `slippage' between the purposes of the decision-makers and the 
actual implementation of the policy. A good example is the gap between the intentions, 
actual processes, and short and long-term results of the Bretton Woods agreements. 20 
The method of applying the implementation approach is to describe outputs and 
outcomes, and then trace backwards to those factors which seem to have influenced the 
output. Political involvement and leadership emerged as a direct but occasional 
determinant in the cases of the Anglo-American oil talks and nationalisation crisis. 
However, in general it was a constant but rather indirect low-key factor. The Government 
played as important a role in monitoring and responding to foreign policy outputs, as in 
directing them. Political influence acts on and responds to the ongoing routines developed 
by implementing agencies. 2' 
19Shannon Lindsey Blanton, "Images in Conflict: The Case of Ronald Reagan and El Salvador, " International Studies Quarterly 40 (1996): 23-44. 
20L. eon Martel, Lend-Lease Loans and the Coming of the Cold War: A Study of the implementation of Foreign Policy (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1979). 
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The implementation approach looks at outcomes as well as output. If the policy 
during the Second World War was to optimise oil allocation, the output comprised 
relations between the British Government and companies, and relations between the 
British and American oil administration The outcome was a greater share of oil for Britain 
than would have been possible if a more formal mechanism had been adopted. The 
success of the British `soft ball' in distorting the web of the society of majors so as to 
resist the United States `needle' is interesting. It tells us that the presence of Anglo-Iranian 
and Shell in implementing output ensured greater congruence with the `web' and, 
therefore, greater success in distorting it to secure outcomes. 
The role of the companies remained significant as they were able to deal with the 
problem of `complexity of joint action'. As different actors are involved implementation 
becomes very complex as there needs to be coordination. Even without the problems of 
organisational politics, the complexity of coordinating different actors explains the many 
failures and partial successes of coordinated action in the international system. Most of 
these joint actions are shaped from the `bottom up' by the flow of complicated 
implementation procedures. 22 This is exactly where the role of Anglo-Iranian and Shell in 
implementation came into its own. All the problems of complexity were evident. It was 
necessary to coordinate with agencies which were foreign and operating under their 
different rules and norms, and where working an implementation coalition was central. 
Moreover, there was little point in attempting to exercise political control since there were 
few direct levers which policy-makers could use. Under such conditions our political 
agents have less impact than bureaucracies. In this context transnational groups may 
facilitate cooperation between states by allowing states to link into their private networks. 
21Dunsire, Implementation in a Bureaucracy (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1978). 22Michael Clarke and Brian White ed. Understanding Forei Policy: The Foreign Policy Systems 
Approach (Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1989), 178-179. 
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Anglo-Iranian and Shell were able to shape British policy to make it amenable to the `web' 
of the society of majors. The United States had a different foreign policy environment 
characterised mainly by bureaucratic politics between different Government agencies. Its 
policies were frequently perceived as anti-web and the majors and the British Government 
resisted them. 
This pattern of implementation is much more subtle than the patterns of slippage 
referred to above for it is not clear whether decision-makers do make a difference or not to 
the flow of events. 23 There were few specific policy statements during this period, notable 
examples being the policy to be followed in the Anglo-American oil talks and the 
statements during the Iranian nationalisation crisis. On these occasions British policy was 
made by the organisational politics between different departments, But even in such cases 
what Britain `wanted' was, in most cases, what officials thought they could achieve. For 
the most part, they believed that the only people who could tell them what they could 
achieve were the majors. 
Another problem arises in those cases in which implementation is not simply the 
output of policy, but it is the policy. Officials working in highly specialised areas who have 
to make important decisions on a day-to-day basis may establish procedures and networks 
which produce a regular `flow' of decision-making activity. "As the old saying in 
Whitehall goes; `once is a cock-up, twice is a coincidence, three times and it's a 
policy'. "24 The close networks between Anglo-Iranian, Shell, and the Petroleum 
23Hood, C., The Limits of Administration (London: Wiley, 1976). See also Dunsire, Control in 
Bureaucracy (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1978). 
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Department fall into this category. But in these circumstances the `policy' may only be a 
rationalisation of the flow of activity. In this way, policy is not chosen, it is formed in the 
flow of activity. This factor was particularly significant for oil relations during the Second 
World War. 
The significance of the companies in the Anglo-American oil talks and their 
retarding influence on concessions during the nationalisation crisis has been discussed. 
Moreover, these were instances of activism by public decision-makers. In the absence of 
very active and decisive political involvement from the top, the `policy' was even more the 
sum total of the routine. The implementers, through practice, were making policy, and 
these implementers were often private sector corporations with their own agendas. 
Implementation rather than deliberate choice may be the major determinant of a 
state's behaviour, and it is behaviour that is observed by other states as a guide to their 
own actions. This is, perhaps, why both the United States and Iran regarded Anglo-Iranian 
as the instrument of the British Government in this period. While analysing policy 
decisions is important, without the implementation perspective we have theories of foreign 
policy decision-making which are only partial accounts of foreign relations. 
9.6 CONCLUSION 
This chapter forms a vital link in the thesis. Without it we lack theoretical 
discussion of the way the companies actually shaped British foreign oil relations. In part 
three we analysed the way in which firms and the society of majors shaped each other. 
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Here, I examine how these pressures were translated into state behaviour. The range of 
approaches I use do not amount to an elegant theory but they illuminate the translation of 
corporate agendas and resources into British foreign relations. 
24 Michael Clarke and Brian White eds. Understanding- Foreign Policy: The Foreign Policy satm Ao r (Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1989), 178 
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PART FIVE 
I conclude by reviewing the major findings of the research. I recapitulate the 
central themes which were the importance of the society of majors and the domestic 
relationship between state and firm in British foreign oil relations. This demonstrates the 
significance of relations among firms and relations between state and firm in shaping 
relations among states. Foreign relations are constructed through the interplay of both 
Governmental and corporate agendas and resources. 
b 
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CHAPTER TEN: CONCLUSION 
This dissertation has examined the way in which numerous other actors 
operating above and below the level of the state are of relevance to foreign policy 
analysis. Though states may remain the central referent for foreign policy behaviour 
these other actors become significant, not only to the extent that their behaviour affects 
or influences Governments, but also in their own right. Appreciation of inter-state 
behaviour in economic issue areas may be enriched through analysing the impact of 
leading firms in that sector on foreign policy behaviour. The traditional method of 
analysing foreign economic policy using Government records permits us to understand 
state-state relations from one dimension. The additional use of company archives enables 
examination of state-firm and firm-firm relations, also. We have three dimensions rather 
than one. We can see what impact, if any, these extra two dimensions have on state-state 
relations. Each historical case will differ, but during this project it became clear that 
Anglo-Iranian and Shell were important actors in British foreign oil relations between 
1939 and 1954. 
Two heuristic tools have been used in this thesis, the first being the model of 
triangular diplomacy introduced by Susan Strange. This enables us to disentangle 
relations between firms, relations between states, and relations between firms and the 
state, before tying these relationships back together to see how each side of the triangle 
influences the other two. The second is the analogy with international society. This 
enabled us to distinguish different facets of relations between firms. It became clearer 
that the identity and interests of the firm were shaped by its participation within this 
society. 
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Since it was found that the companies played an important role in formulating 
and implementing `British' foreign policy, the reification of the British state-as-actor 
was seen to have prevented important issues being researched. These included the 
significant role of the companies in foreign policy thereby challenging the neglect of 
corporate archives for the study of diplomatic history, but also the role of the society of 
majors in shaping the interests of the firms which might be translated into foreign policy 
processes and decisions. The porosity of the boundary between the economic and 
political, and the domestic and the international enabled a diverse range of actors and 
interests to shape `British oil relations. ' Indeed, British oil relations may be recognised 
as a space rather than a fact. This area has been termed the `Frontier' by James Rosenau 
who refers to "replacing `a boundary which isn't there' with `a new and wide political 
space' - here called the Frontier, with a capital `F' to stress its centrality. "' 
10.1 HISTORICAL DEBATES 
Material from the corporate archives supplemented Government records. The 
historical narrative thus generated differed from the conventional one in several ways. It 
challenged the assumption that the inter-war years saw the general breakdown of 
international cooperation. In fact, there had never been closer international collaboration. 
While there was intergovernmental rivalry between the United Kingdom and the United 
States, states are only one set of actors in the global arena. The thirties was witness to 
unprecedented collaboration between the international oil companies. Moreover, such 
collaboration affected intergovernmental relations as the development of private 
international institutions by the companies facilitated accommodation between the states. 
The degree of United Kingdom - United States Governmental agreement over 
international oil was higher than it had been at any point earlier in the twentieth century. 
'James Nathan Rosenau, Along the Domestic-Foreign Frontier: Exploring Governance in a Turbulent World, Cambridge Studies in International Relations, no. 4 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
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The reformed narrative account also contributes to the growing literature 
dissatisfied with the notion of an Anglo-American `Special Relationship'. United States 
policy towards the United Kingdom during the Second World War was far from 
benevolent. However, damage to British interests in oil was partly offset by the close 
working relationship between Government and the companies combined with the 
transgovernmental coalition, which these companies developed with the United States 
companies. In the period of United States neutrality the companies had managed private 
negotiations in order to garner as much United States assistance as possible. This 
informal arrangement was developed even after the United States joined the war. Allied 
joint programming was largely managed by British and United States company 
personnel, then employed in public service. Since a system of formal public negotiation 
would highlight the discrepancy between the two states the United Kingdom opposed the 
various challenges to the informal mechanism mounted by the United States 
Government. 
The corporate diplomats who managed global oil production and supply for the 
Allies were the same individuals who had performed these functions for the companies 
in the inter-war years. I discovered considerable continuity among the key individuals. It 
is hardly surprising therefore that I was able also to delineate the continuation of pre-war 
agreements during the Second World War in contrast to the prevailing view that all 
cartel arrangements ended in 1939. The war nevertheless caused disruption to these 
programmes, particularly through the enforcement of short haul that led to greater 
emphasis on drawings from the Americas and a decline of Anglo-Iranian production till 
1942-3. Thereafter, the collapse of the Netherlands East Indies led to a renewal of 
Persian Gulf production, which was also encouraged as United States companies and 
Government departments took renewed interest in the Persian Gulf. The pre-war 
University Press, 1997). 
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agreements were now found wanting as they limited the expansion of Persian Gulf 
production and limited United States participation in the Persian Gulf. 
The two separate Anglo-American Oil Agreements were largely an attempt to 
generate consensus on the mechanisms for the increase of Persian Gulf production. The 
United States Government took an increased interest in the Persian Gulf and through the 
Petroleum Reserves Corporation appeared to be seeking a direct interest in a concession 
or pipeline. The British companies were able to persuade their Government to approach 
the State Department for talks at the same time as the United States companies urged the 
State Department for talks. In these talks the United States plans for public regulation of 
the international industry were resisted by the British Government, which contributes to 
the literature rejecting the thesis of post-war American domination and control of British 
economic policy. The British also won concessions for the special use of sterling. The 
main departure was that it was agreed that the majors would resolve the removal of pre- 
war restrictions such as the Red Line agreement. The talks effectively removed the risk 
of direct American Governmental interest in the international oil industry, whether 
through acquisition of equity in the industry or through formal regulation. Instead, the 
talks furthered the development of private regulation of the industry. Nevertheless, local 
companies in the United States continued to fear any public agreement and prevented 
ratification. The non-ratification of the Agreements does not negate their importance. 
Hitherto, their importance has been obscured. The Agreements made possible the new 
accord in Persian Gulf oil between 1944 and 1951 which was the purpose of the 
companies who had originated the idea for the talks. 
The Persian Gulf was transformed after 1944 as its share of world oil production 
dramatically increased. This increase spurred the post-war repairs to the web of the 
society of majors that had been torn in places during the trade war precipitated by the 
Second World War. The post-war agreements strengthened the interconnections of the 
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web. Shell entered into a twenty-year contract for oil produced by the Kuwait Oil 
Company, a joint venture between Anglo-Iranian and Gulf. Anglo-Iranian made long- 
term contracts with Socony-Vacuum and Jersey. Aramco in Saudi Arabia extended its 
membership to include Jersey and Socony-Vacuum in addition to Socal and Texaco. 
These developments were made possible by the abrogation of the Red Line agreement by 
the majors which was made possible during the Anglo-American oil talks of 1944-1945. 
Nevertheless, the success of the British in resisting United States plans during the oil 
talks could not have been predicted in advance. At the same time in 1944, the Foreign 
Office, therefore, supported the search for British oil concessions in the north of Iran. 
This worried the Soviet Union on its southern flank and it began to safeguard its interests 
through aggressive support of the left-leaning Tudeh party, and a demand for Soviet oil 
concessions. The Iranian Government turned to the United States as a counter-balancing 
power. The ensuing face-off in the northern territories in 1946 was one of the earliest 
Cold War confrontations. Thereafter, the United States also maintained greater interest in 
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Traditional accounts of the Cold War focus 
on Soviet aggression while revisionist accounts reveal capitalist pressures from the 
United States economy. In addition, this evidence highlights the role - of the United 
Kingdom outside the European theatre, and the role of British capital in shaping the role 
of the United Kingdom. 
6 
Through this crisis the Iranians learnt to equate the denial of oil concessions and 
their national integrity. Meanwhile, continuing fiscal difficulties in Britain led to the 
establishment of dividend limitations. As the Iranian budget was significantly dependent 
on revenues from Anglo-Iranian, and part of these accrued from dividend payments, the 
Iranians began a series of negotiations which culminated in legislation to remove the 
Anglo-Iranian Oil Company as a prerequisite for national rejuvenation. The 
nationalisation crisis lasted from 1951 to 1953. The United States continually 
encouraged the British Government to offer greater concessions to the Iranians. The slow 
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pace of concessions frustrated them. The British Government were influenced by the 
Anglo-Iranian who, in turn, was supported by the other majors in resisting these 
concessions. The majors also organised a boycott, which caused economic crisis for the 
Government of Musaddiq at the same time as the British Government maintained 
political intrigues against Musaddiq. The two factors fused in his mind, but as it became 
clear that the Iranians would not revoke their nationalisation, whatever the concessions, 
and in the context of fears of the spread of communism a joint CIA-MI6 coup toppled 
Musaddiq. 
10.2 THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS 
One study of the arrangements among the firms has concluded that a conspiracy 
existed. Thus, Engler observes that, "a cluster of integrated corporations controls this 
basic resource. They operate as political institutions, and together they take on the full 
nature of a government... The global interests and jurisdictions of these corporations, in 
turn, are part of a system of arrangements and understandings that may be called the first 
world government. "2 I found that throughout the period companies competed with one 
another as well as cooperated, which qualifies the over-simplistic notions of a cartel, 
which was economically successful, seamless, and engaged in manipulation of both 
parent and host Governments. 
In fact, the society of majors faced hardship during the Depression, suffered from 
British economic controls in the post-war period, and faced increasingly assertive 
Persian Gulf states. Relations between members were often frayed, but the concept of 
society requires a lesser degree of harmony and single-mindedness among its members 
than the notion of `government'. Moreover, in its relations with host Governments the 
2Robert Engler, The Politics of Oil: A Study of Private Power and Domestic Directions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961), 3-4. 
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outcome was often uncertain, and the companies relied on the support of parent 
Governments. In relations with parent Governments, its specific leverage in that 
moment, for instance, due to its expert opinion or ability to implement policy or build 
transgovernmental coalitions affected its importance. Other factors included the 
personality of the politicians, standing of the department and other features of 
organisational politics. The companies did not constitute a world government, but did 
contribute to global governance, by which I mean the overall effect of different sites and 
steering mechanisms in the global system. 3 
Corporate archives enriched the historical account in many ways in this thesis. 
However, while they supplement traditional accounts, they do not supplant them. 
Governments remain important actors and it is the specific interplay of non-state actors 
and various agents and agencies of Government, which determines the specific form of 
`national' interest and `power. ' It could be argued that oil represents a special case 
because it is a strategic commodity and because the oil companies are among the largest 
industrial enterprises. However, the most important considerations appear to have been 
the close relationship between state and firm in Britain combined with the integration of 
the British and other firms in an international society of majors. One hypothesis is that 
whenever these two criteria are met the firms will have a substantial impact on British 
foreign policy behaviour, whichever commodity is involved, and whatever the size of the 
firms. 
It is important to assess how far, and in what ways, these findings can be 
generalised. They challenge the realist methodology of studying foreign policy in 
economic issue areas in several ways. By highlighting the rich material to be gathered 
3James Rosenau, "Governance, order and change in world politics", in governance without Gova-mmants: Order a Change in World Politics ed. James N. Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel, Cambridge Studies in International Relations, no. 20 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1992). 
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from corporate archives, firm-firm and state-firm interactions are seen to deepen 
analyses of state-state relations. It is only by an examination of corporate archives that 
one could be satisfied that the firm had no leverage on foreign policy. If any leverage 
were detected then it becomes vital to make a more in-depth study to better understand 
the corporate dynamics. 
For instance, in cases where the industry is not globalised or where global 
cooperation among the leading firms is absent there may not be a layer of 
institutionalised private governance in the international system. This will affect firm 
relations with the local state for they will be more dependent on it for achieving goals. In 
these circumstances intergovernmental relations would be more important in world 
politics. In such circumstances, firms and firm dynamics would be marginal, and the 
resources marshalled over issues would be state-centred. Nevertheless, the use of 
corporate records may be significant even when no system of private international 
governance is prevalent. For firms may still play an important part in foreign policy. The 
tools of foreign policy analysis made it possible to look at the complete foreign policy 
system rather than simply to note policy decisions. The scope is wider comprising 
decision making processes (inputs), decisions, implementation, and outcomes 
(feedback). This sets decisions in their proper context. It also sheds light on the non- 
public actors and processes in constituting foreign relations. 
Theorising these state-firm relations points up the benefits of looking at foreign 
policy behaviour rather than foreign policy decisions. There were very few direct policy 
statements regarding British foreign policy in oil, and the first articulated policy, as 
opposed to disparate statements, emerged in 1944 just before the Anglo-American oil 
talks. By focusing on state-firm relations more comprehensively, including decision 
making processes (inputs), implementation, and outcomes as well as the decisions 
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themselves it is possible to establish the threads of continuity woven together in the 
narrative of part three. 
The inter-war years witnessed the development of a policy encouraging 
international joint ventures between British and United States companies as a means of 
diffusing tensions over oil concessions. The policy was thus to be implemented by the 
firms developing trans-Atlantic business connections. During the Second World War the 
British Government was able to take advantage of their close relations with the 
companies to build a transgovernmental implementing coalition managed by the 
companies. The senior position of oilmen from these companies resulted in the 
implementers in practise acting as decision makers. Hence, the continuation of the 
private international agreements during the war. 
The British companies also played an important role in the Anglo-American Oil 
Agreements. They promoted the talks and then assisted in the negotiating team for the 
technical discussions. The decisions of the most important session of these discussions in 
terms of describing what was to be included in the Agreement was session nine, which 
reported on the decision of informal groups to leave effective resolution of the issues to 
the global companies. The political input was effectively a struggle between the British 
and American Governments, the result of which was to create conditions in which the 
companies could be assured that their private global governance would not be challenged 
by American Governmental initiatives or regulation. The ministerial team, which 
followed later in 1944 basically ratified what had been decided. The Agreement of 1945 
was only changed in further watering down the powers of the proposed international 
petroleum commission. The chapter sheds interesting light on decision making during 
international negotiations in economic issues. The companies were regarded as the 
relevant experts and the arbiters of the Agreements. The British took this position 
voluntarily, the United States more hesitantly. 
6 
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The crisis in the northern territories of Iran demonstrates how foreign policy 
making bodies may become caught in routine procedures, which may be inapplicable to 
changing circumstances. Different British political actors in Iran continued their 
traditional means of maintaining influence in Iran - by dividing Majlis and monarchy, 
and provinces and centre, by supporting oil concessions as a means of extending their 
influence, and accepting a Soviet sphere of influence in the north, seemingly oblivious to 
new factors: Soviet expansionism and United States capitalist expansionism. This 
coalescing of forces resulted in an early Cold War crisis. The organisational politics 
between petroleum interests and political interests in Iran was resolved in favour of 
supporting Shell's concession seeking in the northern territories. Shell's drive for a 
concession originated in and triggered balance of power manoeuvres from the other 
majors. After the Soviets intervened to retain their sphere of influence, American 
pressure was welcomed by the Iranians to secure their territorial integrity and 
independence. However, the United States intervened to maintain the anti-communist 
position of the Persian Gulf states, not to secure the independence of the local actors in 
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Iran. 
The role of the corporate great powers in boycotting nationalised Iranian 
production, thereby causing economic 1collapse, which 
heightened fears of communism 
in Iran, was significant. For the nationalisation crisis of 1951-3 demonstrates many of the 
psychological features of crisis. If the international industry had not maintained such a 
tight embargo on Iranian production, Musaddiq may have had the leeway to implement 
measures which would have considerably lessened the chance of communist takeover, 
which was the dominant image haunting United States foreign policy makers when they 
supported the British plans for covert action. However, Musaddiq himself regarded the 
British company and state as inseparable and thereby regarded the exclusion of Anglo- 
Iranian as crucial to political freedom. Given the confusion of Third World nationalism 
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with communism in American circles, Musaddiq could have been considered a target for 
covert action, even if the economic conditions had been more stable than they were. 
As soon as we concede the importance of examining state-firm relations together 
with state-state relations we depart from a strictly realist account of international history. 
By a realist account I mean one based on states as the only foreign policy actors using 
national resources to pursue national interests. The examination of firms in foreign 
relations unpacks this formula in three ways. The first is implied, for if foreign policy is 
a record of specific political decisions, then by definition firms have no role to play. So, 
to examine the role of firms we must look at the system of foreign relations, which 
incorporates a study of decisions within a wider context including their origins and 
implementation. Second, it examines the role of non-public actors in the policy-making 
process bringing to light whose interest the `national' interests actually serves. Finally, in 
circumstances where the state and firm are working closely, the resources of the firm 
may become an important aspect of `national power'. 
It becomes interesting to investigate the link between the role of the companies 
in British oil relations and the ability of the British to slow the transfer of hegemony in 
oil relations to the United States. For it is true that there is no necessary link between a 
state and extended capital from that state, as Murray argues. However, he sees the power 
of the state as the crucial variable; weak states have less in common with their firms. 4 In 
fact, there was greater coincidence between the agendas of the British Government and 
both American and British firms. We saw that the crucial variable was the organisation 
of the market. 5 
4Robin Murray, "The Internationalization of Capital and the Nation State, " New Left Review 67 
(May-June 1971): 84-109. Reprinted in Robin Murray ed., International Firms and Modern 
Imperialism (Middlesex: Penguin, 1975), 133. 
51n different arenas different factors will construct the relevant domain. For other applications of 
constructivist approaches, see Scott Bowden, "Explaining change in the international trade in 
armaments: A constructivist approach, " International Politics 34.3 (September 1997): 233-263, 
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Hedley Bull's five institutions of international society neatly captured the 
normative basis of the multifaceted nature of international cooperation among the 
companies. What is interesting about the society of oil majors is how this web was 
supported by normative cohesiveness based on ideas about the limited role of public 
authorities and usefulness of private international cooperation shared by a core group of 
international managers. Such cooperation in turn reinforced a sense of society. The idea 
that norms and institutions can be combined is central to the `new institutionalism' with 
its emphasis on communicative action, duties, social obligations, and norms of 
appropriate behaviour. Moreover, to incorporate norms and values and, therefore, 
informal understandings and rules into a concept emphasising `structure' is only unusual 
if one has a rather mechanical understanding of structure. The society of majors 
structured the behaviour of the firms, without determining it. 6 
The literature on international society is state-centric. States are the main 
participants in international society. Other actors are regarded as part of transnational 
society. Therefore, the institutionalisation of the international oil market along the lines 
of an analogy with Hedley Bull's five institutions of international society does not imply 
that the firms should be regarded as members of international society, nor yet that the 
international industry, however institutionalised, is part of international society. What the 
analogy demonstrates is that a rich layer of private international cooperation exists in the 
world market economy, that it is normatively based, and that it is institutionally 
organised. 
and Lawrence R. Robertson, "The constructed nature of ethnopolitics, " International Politics 34.3 
(September 1997): 265-283. 
6Friedrich Kratochwil, Rules. Norms and Decisions (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
1989); Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen, and Frank Longstreth, eds. Structuring Politics. Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
1992). 
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The evolution of a society of majors facilitated the Anglo-American entente over 
oil in the inter-war years. Similarly, the Allied transgovernmental implementing 
coalition depended on diplomat-type relations among a core group of international 
managers. The role of the implementers making policy shaped the trade war hastened by 
the catalyst of wartime disruption. The decision making processes of international 
economic negotiations in the Anglo-American oil negotiations reflect the primacy of 
transnational business practice in the creation and development of international business 
law. 
On the other hand, concession-seeking by Shell in a balance of power manoeuvre 
aimed at the other majors created tensions on the Soviet Union's southern flank. When 
the British found themselves unable to resist the Soviets, American involvement became 
inevitable. The Cold War represented a schism in international society. Moreover, the 
Iranian nationalisation crisis reflected the tension between the principle of national 
sovereignty and private property in international society. Thus, the transnational society 
of oil majors was supportive of some elements within international society, but a divisive 
influence at other times. 
In sum, though national Governments were extremely significant in international 
relations, transnational companies did crucially affect state interests, policies, and inter- 
state relations. The impact of transnational corporations was seen to depend on two 
factors - differences in domestic structures and degrees of international 
institutionalisation.? The domestic structure was important since building winning 
7This conclusion supports the findings of Thomas Risse-Kappen, with the significant departure 
that we have looked at the private international institutionalism of the society of majors, while he 
examined inter-governmental and transgovernmental institutionalism. Thomas Risse-Kappen, 
Main Transnational Relations Back In: Non-State Actors Domestic Structures and International Institutions, Cambridge Studies in International Relations, no. 42 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). 
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coalitions within the national policy process depends on the ability to adjust to the 
structure of the target country. British companies found this easier than their American 
counterparts. The international institutionalisation of the society of majors shaped the 
companies' behaviour and thus indirectly the foreign policy process. It also directly 
constrained United States policy. The founding principle of the society of majors was 
private global governance. The United States wanted to bring this private governance 
under a system of public control. They were unable to achieve this because of the 
alliance between United Kingdom foreign policy and the oil companies. This alliance, in 
turn, was the product of the important role of Anglo-Iranian and Shell in British oil 
policy between 1939 and 1954. 
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